My interest in polymarket is increasing. If I am understanding correctly, the entire market is built on block chain tech and is decentralized.
An interesting article that unpacks some of the potential motivations at play here among the regulators: https://www.piratewires.com/p/cftc-attempt-to-destroy-election-markets-kalshi-polymarket?f=author
The CFTC’s rationale for prohibiting political event contracts — the need to defend democracy from money and manipulation — parallels that offered by progressive groups and elected officials. But the ‘defending democracy’ argument is nonetheless confused about, well, democracy. As Kalshi’s CEO Tarek Mansour explains, prediction markets are “unbiased aggregators of individual convictions” — their inputs are highly democratic. So are their outputs, which provide key feedback to researchers, operatives, leaders, and voters. In a primary campaign, for example, ultimate electability is a key issue pertinent to voters. Given these markets’ utility as a public information source for the electorate, and as John Phillips (a co-founder of PredictIt) observes, it’s therefore ironic that unelected bureaucrats claim to be “defending democracy by stifling and trying to destroy” election markets during an election cycle.
One can make sense of these contradictions by understanding the Commission’s manipulation concerns as a species of anti-“misinformation” campaign. Indeed, explicit fears about election markets incentivizing misinformation — e.g., tricking the public to swing the race to win a buck, or tricking the market to sway the public to win a race — are littered throughout the CFTC’s order blocking Kalshi’s election market, arguments to the D.C. Circuit and District Court, and proposed ban on political event contracts.
The fear that prediction markets will encourage misinformation is nevertheless perplexing, given their relative accuracy and resistance to manipulation. But one of the concerns animating the backlash to DARPA’s prediction market was that amateurs would replace professionals. One reason Robin Hanson originally was attracted to prediction markets was the hope that through them, “established insiders could no longer suppress contrarian outsiders merely by silence or ridicule.”
As is often the case, campaigns against misinformation, while ostensibly concerned with whether the truth will win out, are also animated by concern over whose truth will win out. Far from threatening democracy, election markets may be offering too much of it in the view of certain regulators. To their consternation, though, federal courts may just end up saving a democratic information source from the regulators themselves.