I do think he’s right in that banks over a certain size are de facto government banks, but I don’t think that’s a new development; that goes back to 2008.
I also am failing to understand how the move to make uninsured SVB deposits immediately whole equates to injecting 2T of stimulus into the economy. My interpretation of what was done is that essentially the FDIC did what SVB could not, and that is to accelerate the liquidation of SVBs assets to meet the demands of the bank run. The assets were there and have value, they just weren’t liquid enough to meet the timing required to survive the bank run. There may have been some gap in paper value as of last week and what they end being sold for, but I don’t think it will be less than the total withdrawn deposits and I certainly don’t think it’s $2T.
To me the lesson from this boils down to the fact that FDIC should offer/require insurance above the $250k threshold and/or banks should require large depositors to utilize sweeps to get their daily balances under the threshold so that they are insured. Yes, that should have been done prior to this debacle, but the consequences of forcing the uninsured depositors to wait for SVBs assets to be liquidated in order to get access to their money would not have been worth whatever additional future prevention/risk aversion it would have created.