Laxtonto

How the hell can any of the 9.95ers survive if they can't discuss people missing practice, injury news, or even position switches? Getting up-to-date information about the team is the entire point of subscribing to this type of website. That is the business model. You pay people for their access. In turn, the AD lets those people have access to push narratives and help increase fan engagement. If you can't report anything, why pay for it? If you can't talk about anything at practice, why attend? What is the point of attending something you can't write about? Is practice attendance required to have representation as press to the games? Does anyone think the UT 9.95 crew would ever abide to something like this? I get keeping the lid on some things from time to time, but holy fuck this is insane...

I think most of the rest of the CFB world doesn't know yet about the new aggy AD stance on information and how much pravada control is going on regarding A&M injuries.. What I am more curious about is do the boards get in trouble for talking about reporting from Texas boards and how much injury news will now get traded to the UT guys so they can report on the report to try and skate the AD reprisals..

The OL is already suspect and he has had serious injuries in the past and concussion issues... He may not make it to week 6 if they go all Tebow

Owens was their "best back" and Moss was medicore. If Owens is done, how does the Klein offense work without several functional backs? Does this mean that we get more Weigman running the ball?

Did anyone notice that it looks like Russia has sent S-300/S-400/S-500 to Tehran? I am not going to get into the political discussion regarding Israel and Iran here, but my first question has to be, "Where did they come from"? We are already seeing an AD shortage across the entire front in Ukraine. So where did they rob Peter to pay Paul? The other thing is that Russia has been increasingly wary of letting Iran have its newer radar and AD technology. So how can they stand up new ADs around Tehran without them being manned by Russian troops? New tech is new tech. Unless the Iranians have been training on these for months, which they haven't, who is manning these systems? From a geopolitical point, are these ADs in place to help Iran share the burden on their own ADs, so they make sure that the Iranian drone manufacturing plants have adequate coverage? If I was Israel, those manufacturing centers would be very high on my list if Iran starts retaliatory strikes. It would take a major supplier of drones off the map that are a constant annoyance for Isreal and as a benefit hurts the Russian war effort as well... If we are really at the point where Russia is at the maximum deployment of their upper-tier AD, then something is weaker right now than previously. It is time to find it and exploit it. Just something to think about...

Talking to a friend of mine who is a retired Cold War intelligence wonk today about this... We ended up with a laundry list of questions about how and why and what this means. Lots of facets to this that all lead to a variety of interesting questions. 1. How did they know he was going to be in this specific residence 2 months ago? Did they plant this bomb 2 months ago for a jsut in case opportunity or did they know whenever he visits Tehran he always stays there and knew the bomb won't be found? Or did they plant bombs in all of the guesthouses just to be through? I bet there is a lot of ripped-up drywall right now in Tehran.. 2. How did they know he was using that specific guest house? If they planted bombs in all of them, how did they know he was in that specific one that day? If they only had the bomb in that one, how did he get assigned to that particular guest house? Was it chance or did the person involved in assigning rooms put him there on purpose? 3. How did a bomb not get detected in the wall of a guesthouse for over 2 months? So is this an extreme security failure due to poor screening? Or is this a type of bomb-making component that they can't detect? No explosive should be able to avoid detection for over 2 months in a high-end visiting diplomatic residence. Where is the failure? How many failures are there? Where else then might also be at risk? 4. Who in Tehran was involved and how did the Israelis get into the location to plant the bomb? How many points of failure in personal screening and security assessments are there? How far has Israel infiltrated the Republican Guards? 5. When do the purges start in the Security Forces? There are going to be massive questions regarding who they can trust at this point. With a new President and an aging Ayatollah the internal politics is going to be brutal. This now provides a huge cover to settle grudges and, in truth, how can they trust anyone involved in security there now? The fact that they did this in Tehran, in their high-end guest house sends an undeniable message that no one is safe from Israeli reprisals. If they can get Haniyeh there, they can get others elsewhere in Tehran and throughout the world. This sends a much larger message than people want to admit to...

So they are now looking to use sub-based cruise missiles to attack Ukraine? This is a sign that they are pretty much scraping the bottom of the barrel regarding cruise missile production and instead are looking to use the much more expensive sub based systems... That is absolutely wild that they are insinuating that this is a good idea or a show of force. These are deterrent-based offensive weapons whose primary value is from surprise. This is a sign of desperation and it they use them as just localized missile platforms, the Ukrainians will find a way to sink one of these. The Black Sea is tiny and I am fairly sure we know exactly where these subs are at all times...

Is this sad that I sorta want one of these?

This is purely theater/political in nature. If they are pulling their AD to the beachhead of the Kerch bridge, all they are doing is putting them into a position to pull them over the bridge to the other side of the border if Crimea starts to fall and attempt to keep them out of harms way. There is no real functional AD design that would provide greater protection for the bridge by pulling the AD back to the bridge vs being used as an umbrella over the rest of Crimea. All this does is move them away from protecting the airfields and naval installations at Sevastapol while hoping these very expensive units can't get reached by HIMARS etc. This also signals that Russia knows full well that they can't defend the Crimea from the air and all this is an attempt to keep the Kerch bridge open as a viable line of retreat for equipment at the cost of putting a serious strain on the ground defense in both the Kherson and Crimea Oblasts. I would be real curious what the latest imagery shows regarding troop density and fortifications over the Kherson river and around Armiansk in particular. If you are seeing a general withdrawal in the secondary units in the reserves on the Russian side of the Kherson River towards Armiansk and Melitopol, it is an obvious signal that the Russians believe that they cannot hold the Kherson Oblast when the F16s show up. The problem with using natural barriers, like the Kherson River, to limit the Ukrainian advance is that it also means that you end up with a heavy density of troops massed along those barriers. If you look at the geography of the region, its a funnel in the Kherson Oblast that leads to a land bridge in Armiansk to be able to bring troops into Crimea proper from the north. There is really no other way, beyond a legitimate amphibious landing, to get to Crimea proper. On paper, this approach will tie up the Ukrainian forces and make it not worth the attrition needed to mount a breakthrough and in essence allow Russia to hold the Crimea. So Russia can pull back their troops and place and dig in a blocking force at Armiansk. That is fine when you have enough AD to control the skies. Now you have lots of equipment that is vulnerable and no AD umbrella. So either you entrench them and hope for the best or pull them back to the next layer of the AD umbrella,. The problem with that is now the umbrella has moved down to Kerch as an epicenter and so you lose the benefit of geography if you want to pull your blocking force back under the AD umbrella. So in short, if they feel that they can't hold the banks of the Kherson, then they are going to have a slow delaying action back to Armiansk and leave their main blocking force to the mercy of the F16s and HIMARS. To me, that is an untenable situation that will become a bloodbath.

F16s being used in the north is probably never going to make sense due to the expansive Russia border and layered AD on the Russian side of the border. That is what makes the Crimea such an appealing target environment. All the attack vectors come over water and there really isn’t a AD strategy that works to protect the major points of interest due to geography. In the north, the F16s would be flying into a U that has overlapping AD systems. In the Crimea, the geography is such that it is the complete opposite. You instead are dealing with an attack vector that you come in at a point and so there is a very limited amount of ADs.

wrong thread

wrong thread