Bevo

Yeah, that's why I wonder if it is an exception to the rule or is flexible. A people is a population of humans or a people are a population of individuals may both be correct.

https://www.reddit.com/r/EnglishLearning/comments/l4fs0s/is_a_people_correct/ The example given is "Asgard is not a place, it is a people". It depends unfortunately on context. Is it talking about individuals in a group or a group where everyone is alike?

It's cool. You can buy me a bourbon.

This is incorrect.

That is all correct except "However, whenever we use the term "people" we're always referring to more than one person. In fact, we are referring to a lot of individuals. Well that isn't correct in this example. The author is referring to a people as a group not as individuals - like as a troop of monkeys. Maybe it is a specific grammar rule for people, though, or maybe some other word such as collective would be better.

Nothings not a thing.

This is incorrect - We are a group (of people) - people in this case is singular.

We are a people is a sentence.

For a bunch of backwater Hamas leaders? How much money could they offer Erdogan? I don't think enough to fracture relationships.

The upcoming administration would be very upset with Turkey if it protected Hamas leaders inside Turkey. The US would lose a lot and Turkey would lose a lot if the relationship fragmented. With such backlash, I don’t think Erdogan would risk it. Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, right, and Israel's President Isaac Herzog speak to the media after their talks, in Ankara, Turkey, Wednesday, March 9, 2022. Turkey and Israel have a long and complex history of relations, but never have they been more strained. Erdoğan made the Palestinian issue central to his foreign policy, even praising Hamas. A serious break could have major implications for the region. As two of the three non-Arab states in the region, Turkey and Israel maintain a complex and often fluctuating relationship marked by both cooperation and tension. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to officially recognize Israel in 1949. From the 1950s until the 1980s, Turkey had a balanced policy that was sensitive to regional dynamics while keeping a low profile. Maintaining diplomatic and economic ties with both Israel and its Arab neighbors was a priority for Turkey, which also recognized the Palestinian state in 1988. Though initially shaped by Israel's stance on Palestinians, mutual visits and cooperation in the early 1990s show the relationship soon evolved beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict. Increased trade and cooperation This era saw deep diplomatic relations with Israel and the signing of several key agreements in 1996. The Defense Cooperation and Free Trade Agreements (FTA) were pivotal in formalizing cooperation across military, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence sectors. The FTA, in particular, played a crucial role in boosting economic relations, with bilateral trade exceeding $1 billion by 2000—a significant increase from $304 million in 1994. This agreement laid the foundation for strong bilateral economic ties that have remained resilient until after October 7 despite many political crises. In the early 2000s, tensions between Turkey and Israel began to rise. The collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, along with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, strained relations. This period also saw a shift in Turkey's internal politics with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose administration initially proposed positive relations but shifted to a more assertive stance, focusing on the Palestinian cause and increasing criticism of Israel. Turkish-Israeli relations have been tumultuous under Erdoğan since then, often mirroring the fluctuations in Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Ankara’s condemnation of the 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict marked the beginning of a bleaker era, followed by the "one-minute" crisis in Davos in 2009 and the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish citizens. The crisis resulted in Turkey downgrading diplomatic ties to the second secretary level and suspending military agreements. Attempts to restore relations with an agreement in 2016 failed in December 2017 following US President Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, leading to further diplomatic fallout. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Erdoğan of being Hamas's biggest supporter, while Erdoğan labeled Israel an 'apartheid regime' and defended Hamas, rejecting labeling it a terrorist organization. The personal estrangement between the two leaders seemed to drive the two nations further apart, yet their economic relationship has paradoxically strengthened. Despite Erdoğan’sannouncements of suspending “military and commercial ties” with Israel after nearly every crisis, Turkey-Israel economic relations have significantly expanded over the past 20 years. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), the bilateral trade volume of $1.41 billion in 2002 rose to $8.91 billion by 2022, with the trade balance consistently favoring Turkey. Arguably, for both leaders, the rhetoric is merely a façade aimed at securing domestic gains, while the expansion of economic interests takes precedence. This dynamic indicated that the Israel-Turkey relationship prioritized economic interests over political factors. In 2022, Israel and Turkey restored full diplomatic ties and reappointed ambassadors, driven partly by Turkey's economic crisis and broader rapprochement with countries in the Middle East and North Africa region and both governments’ strategic interests in countering Iran. Despite anti-Israel rhetoric, Erdoğan’s administration recognized the strategic importance of maintaining relations with Israel, separate from its Palestinian policies. After October 7 The October 7 attacks sparked an international crisis, further straining already fractured Turkey-Israel relations. Initially, Erdoğan projected a more restrained stance. During a speech in Ankara, he called for both Israelis and Palestinians to act with restraint. However, this relatively tempered approach lasted only for a minute. Within days, President Erdoğan escalated his rhetoric, aligning more vocally with the Palestinians while lambasting Israel's actions in Gaza as genocide and war crimes. This shift in tone was Erdoğan’s way of balancing pragmatism with ideological alignment, particularly with groups like Hamas. Throughout his presidency, Erdoğan has worked on cultivating an image of his government as a defender of Palestinians. His short-lived temperance following October 7 quickly led to more familiar aggressive rhetoric, albeit not matched by similarly aggressive actions. Erdoğan's speeches have grown more inflammatory, labeling Israel as a terrorist state and likening its leaders to historical tyrants, while his government's actions have remained relatively controlled, exposing a disconnect between fiery rhetoric and actual policy. In other words, it was bold talk for the home crowd but a striking lack of follow-through regarding international action. The most glaring example of this gap between words and deeds is Turkey’s trade with Israel. Despite claims that Turkey had suspended trade with Israel in protest of its actions in Gaza, investigative journalist Metin Cihan and others revealed that trade between the two countries has not fully stopped. Allegationssurfaced that Erdoğan’s son engaged in trade with Israel after October 7. In reality, Turkish goods have continued to reach Israel, often under the pretext of being destined for Palestine. This revelation, while not a surprise for those who are familiar with Ankara, showed geopolitical considerations were being managed in a way that limited direct economic fallout. Erdoğan’s government has also been cautious in its handling of domestic protests against Israel. While protests have erupted across Turkey, echoing the public’s anger towards Israel, the government has sought to maintain control over these demonstrations. Protests have been allowed under strict government oversight, reflecting a clear intent to prevent uncontrolled civil unrest that could spark broader demonstrations against the government itself—whether in response to trade relations with Israel, the economic crisis, the erosion of democracy, or other issues. When protests have fallen outside of this controlled framework, such as when demonstrators acted independently of government-organized rallies, authorities have intervened, even arresting anti-Israel protesters. For Ankara, the protests were more about shaping an image for the international community than actually opposing Israel, highlighting Erdoğan’s approach: sustaining a pro-Palestinian position to satisfy his political base while preventing any escalation into wider unrest against his government. Similarly, Netanyahu, who is facing charges of fraud, breach of trust, and accepting bribes, staying in power was crucial, and Ankara’s Hamas-friendly actions gave the Prime Minister the space needed to hit back at Erdoğan when needed. Inflammatory diplomacy Ankara’s support for Hamas has been a major point of contention, with Erdoğan defending the group as a legitimate resistance movement and, after October 7, praising them as liberators while condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza as comparable to historical atrocities in the Crusades and World War II. This reflects Erdoğan’s broader ambition to position himself as a leader of the ummah, or International Muslim community, using religious and historical narratives to rally domestic and regional support. Domestically, he has securitized Turkish politics by constructing an imagined threat of an eventual Israeli attack on Turkey, while internationally, he projected Turkey as a regional power capable of intervening in Middle Eastern conflicts, citing past actions in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Though relations with Israel have not been formally downgraded, tensions rose as ambassadors were withdrawn, and Turkey’s supportfor South Africa’s genocide case against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adds further strain, with uncertain long-term consequences. Erdoğan’s ambitions are tempered by Turkey’s economic and political constraints. A full-scale regional war, especially one involving Iran and its proxies, could severely impact Turkey’s fragile economy. Despite deteriorating diplomatic relations, Erdoğan has been cautious not to completely sever economic ties with Israel, given their long-standing trade in sectors like energy, textiles, and technology. Even rising tensions the transit of Azerbaijani oil through Turkey to Israel have continued unaffected. Israel, too, faces economic strain. More than a year into its war in Gaza, Israel is grappling with rising inflation, slowed growth, and public discontent over the high cost of living. Key sectors such as tourism and exports have been hit, while increased defense spending has added pressure to social services, fueling political divisions. These factors likely explain why both governments have hesitated to take more direct action despite their heated rhetoric. In the aftermath of October 7, a complex interplay of ideology, pragmatism, and geopolitical strategy has taken place. While Erdoğan’s rhetoric has been fiery and uncompromising, particularly in his defense of Hamas and his condemnation of Israel’s actions, the reality on the ground has been more controlled compared to what it could have been. Economic ties between the two countries, though disrupted, have not been entirely severed despite the diplomatic tension. As the conflict evolves, the cynical balance between Erdoğan's domestic posturing and diplomacy will likely remain central to Turkey and Israel's relationship. Netanyahu’s need to maintain security cooperation while navigating complex regional dynamics mirrors Erdoğan’s tightrope walk between appeasing his domestic base and engaging in realpolitik. The future also hinges on the US elections, as a shift in Washington's foreign policy could redefine both countries' regional strategies and alliances. The views represented in this piece are those of the authors and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.   

Pentagon Plans $6 Billion in Ukraine Aid Ahead of Presidential Change Greg Hadley President Joe Biden’s administration plans to commit some $6 billion in aid for Ukraine in the next two months before President-elect Donald Trump takes office, a Pentagon spokesperson confirmed Nov. 7. Roughly two-thirds of that aid, or $4 billion, will come in the form of Presidential Drawdown Authority packages—weapons and equipment drawn from U.S. stockpiles—while the other one-third, or $2 billion will be procured new as part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh told reporters. The rush to get that aid committed comes amid uncertainty as to whether the incoming presidential administration will keep up aid deliveries to Ukraine. On the campaign trail, Trump expressed some criticism over the amount of aid being sent to Ukraine and how it was structured. However, Trump did not publicly oppose a $61 billion aid package passed by Congress in April. It remains to be seen whether the Pentagon can get most of its remaining authorized aid out the door before the presidential transition. Presidential authority drawdown packages can be delivered faster because they draw from existing stocks, but Singh acknowledged that the process can still take time to get across the Atlantic and into Ukraine. “Some things can arrive within days and weeks. Some items in those packages take longer,” Singh said. “It does matter what’s available on our stock, on our shelves. You’re going to see us continue to draw that down pretty frequently. Could there be things that go out beyond Jan. 20? I can’t say for certain right now.” Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative packages cane take even longer to deliver as they represent new buys. Yet Singh said the Pentagon would look to at least get contracts for aid signed and done. “Those could go for longer, but again, those are commitments and contracts that this administration has signed. So we would expect those to be upheld,” she said. Watchdogs at the Government Accountability Office and DOD’s own Inspector General have voiced concerns about a lack of oversight for some Ukraine aid, but Singh brushed aside a question as to whether the rush to get the remaining aid committed could hurt oversight. “We are very confident in the processes and procedures and measures that we’ve put into place when it comes to getting aid to Ukraine,” she said. Singh did not disclose what kinds of weapons the Pentagon will look to send to Ukraine in the coming months, but air defense and aerial munitions are likely to be a continued focus. In September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged allies to provide more on that front, saying “the world has enough air defense systems to ensure that Russian terror does not have results, and I urge you to be more active in this war with us for the air defense.” Not long after, the U.S. announced it was sending Ukraine AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW), a medium-range, air-to-ground, precision-guided glide bomb with a range of up to 70-plus miles. Previously, the Pentagon provided JDAM Extended Range guided bombs, Small Diameter Bombs, and HARM anti-radiation missiles. Whatever aid the Pentagon does deliver before the next administration, future packages for Ukraine remain uncertain. Vice President-elect JD Vance has vocally opposed sending more aid, and a faction of Republicans in the House and Senate oppose it as well, though Singh tried to argue the issue is a bipartisan one. “Republicans and Democrats have made commitments in votes and in money to Ukraine. So look, there’s an incoming team that that is going to have to work with Congress, and there is support in Congress to continue supporting Ukraine,” she said.

The Arab world would be more likely to support Israel which is to say that they would allow sorties but would say mean words about Israel.

You think they will go to a NATO country?

I think things will escalate between Iran and Israel. Israel with US assistance will go after Kharg Island and Iran's nuclear facilities. US will step up production as will much of the ME to make up the shortfall, but China will want Russian oil and gas. The US will allow it and will allow purchases from NATO countries as part of the negotiation to end the war between Ukraine and Russia.

why?

Just stopped for lunch in Bigfork, MT. Game update? Score?

Austin? What gallery?

Ascending cornerback prospect with the ideal mix of size and speed. Put himself on the national radar spring before senior season, clocking a laser-timed 4.51 effort in the 40-yard dash at an Under Armour Next Camp outside of Orlando. Comfortable at this stage in press-man coverage as he fights for leverage and does his best to maintain phase while out on the perimeter. Not a ton of ball production to date (only had one interception as a junior), but is competitive when the football is in the air and will do his best to shade throwing lanes. Tries to get off blocks and will use his turbo to get across the field and make tackles in pursuit. Should be viewed as a potential multi-year starter at the Power Four level and a possible all-conference selection if he can keep progressing. Likely to find the most success in a defensive scheme that wants to man-up on the outside and get aggressive, but could also always get a look over the top with his range. Also runs track. Posted a 10.91 effort in the 100-meter dash and a 50.30 effort in the 400-meter dash as a junior. ---- 2023: Starting CB for a Tampa Wharton squad that made Florida’s 3M playoffs. Credited with 30 tackles and an INT. Also had a KORTD.

They had to make room for Livingstone in the lineup.

Pavo

Although, I did kind of conflate the two, what I was trying to differentiate was that I didn't want a draftsman or an architect. I think more of what I would want is an exterior designer. So if I go through with the purchase, I would have a 3 story house with a gambrel roof and would need to add a garage with a master bedroom above it. So (not the best example) but converting something like below to something like the one below that while improving the decks: Into:

USC has a LB commit that we should be working hard on. And of course, we need to find CBs somewhere.