Reading an interesting interview (paywalled so I will paste here):
One thing that I think people forget about is Disney’s contractually obligated to buy Hulu as soon as next year, I think at a $27 billion valuation — that valuation was set at a more optimistic time for streaming is I think is a fair way to put it. On one hand, aspects of Hulu feel very successful. I think the ad-supported tier everyone is pointing to and saying, “Look, Netflix, this is why you need to be doing ads”. Hulu is actually making more on its ad-supported tiers than on the others because it’s such an attractive proposition for advertisers. On the other hand, what does Hulu stand for again? I’m preaching to the choir here, but the space is begging for some consolidation. I’m still not sure why Peacock exists, I’m still not sure why Paramount Plus exists. The Hulu original concept seems like is what ought to exist. You mentioned it’s just a tab internationally, should it be just a tab in the US? Should Disney actually try to reverse a transaction and sell it to Comcast? What do you see as the output here?
Yeah, I think we’re at an interesting point where I agree with everything that you’ve said and that leads you to say it’s pretty hard to make the argument that Disney should spend $9 billion to buy out the remaining third that they don’t currently own. If the best way to drive value through the catalog is through the platform they already own rather than the platform they’d be buying to own wholly.
Let’s also go back to early 2020. In early 2020, Iger said the plan was for Hulu to launch around the world and then later the company came to a conclusion that actually if we do that, then Comcast owns a third of that. Why don’t we just do the exact same thing but through Star, a brand they don’t participate in. And by the way, Star internationally is usually folded into Disney Plus, but in some markets it is a standalone service including live sports and so we see actual examples of launching a Hulu-like service abroad without calling it Hulu and thereby cutting Comcast out of there — this is one of the reasons why Comcast is understandably salty. But the result of that is it’s thus hard to imagine why buying the remaining third out is worth $9 billion. But then if you’re Comcast given the streaming turndown, you’re looking at the market value or the equity value of Warner Bros Discovery being $35 billion, how do you justify spending $18, $19 billion for the two-thirds of Hulu that they don’t own? And so I think you’re at a weird spot where both entities understandably see value there, but they don’t want to pay what they would ask the other party to.
What about ESPN? Because I think there are multiple moving pieces here, which is very fascinating. ESPN had so much value to Disney when it was the anchor of the bundle-within-the-bundle, and given that the price of ESPN was not just the carriage fees that ESPN charged, but the carriage fees that every other single Disney channel could charge, and they would raise prices on all of them.
Another interesting point is that it feels like we’re at peak affiliate revenue, because last quarter linear TV had six points of growth from contractual rate increases, and that growth has been outpacing cord cutting for a long time, but cord cutting was now up to five points of decline. So there is one point of increase in the linear TV bundle, and it feels like that’s about to tip over.
So, how does ESPN fit in? Iger said two things that were interesting. One, he’s like, “We need to be more disciplined in our spending.” He said this in the context of the NBA, and I think ESPN has shown to be more disciplined, particularly by passing on the Big 10 Football rights. At the same time, he’s like, “Yeah, it’s going to be over-the-top at some point, not yet, we need to have better pricing power”, which seems to auger towards we need to have everything. They did put ESPN in its own division, which makes it a lot easier to spin out even if he’s wants to say we’re not doing it yet, but are they just in a, “We’re not sure what to do with this property” mode right now?
It certainly looks that way. I would say that when Iger came back in November, he first and foremost needed to reset the strategy internally to change the things that he thinks Chapek was doing wrong or to reflect the changes in the environment that are different than when he passed the baton, but he was also building himself some breathing room.
I think that when you take a look at the announcements from last week, it’s actually a remarkable example of building breathing room, especially under activist assault. He does all of these things, he says, “We’re not going to spin off ESPN, but we’re going to separate its financials.” “We aren’t sure about general entertainment, but we’re not making a commitment to Hulu.” “We’re going to place control back in the hands of creatives and yet we’re going to reinstate the dividend and pull out billions of dollars in additional cash flow.” “We’re not sure when streaming is going to become the quality business investors focus on, but we’re going to renew our focus on linear.” It’s clear that he’s trying to tell the Street — and then he of course used the aforementioned phrase — “Everything’s on the table”, and so I do think that he is broadcasting to the Street, “Give me a little bit of time, I’m going to figure out the best arrangement for the pieces”. There’s no way to read that other than to say, “If it makes sense to spin or sell ESPN, I will do it”