Anton had some good analysis and summary of slow signs that the sanctions are having effect and the war is causing increasing tension in Russia
Some more thoughts about the current situation in Russia and its future by expert Oleksii Kopytko:
1. A wave of accidents in the housing and utilities system in dozens of cities refreshed the topic of the real state of that sector (deterioration, and even the verge of collapse). The attempt of the authorities to shift the blame provoked petitions in their defense. Promises to make large-scale investments in the system renovation have been met with questions of whether the money is available. And is it worth investing in "new territories" at the expense of worn-out "old" ones?
2. The "incident" with a unique long-range reconnaissance airplane and flying command post. Despite the Kremlin's attempts to write it all off as a mistake by the Russian Air Defense Forces, Russia is worried that the Ukrainian army has once again gained capabilities it did not have before. This leads some Russian citizens to the conclusion that if the Ukrainians have seriously pinned down the fleet on the water, and now they have begun to harass aircraft in the skies above the Sea of Azov, then in the future the situation on land will become more complicated. First in Kherson region, then in Crimea....
3. An accident at Lukoil's Nizhny Novgorod refinery (5% of Russian oil refining). The company halved gasoline production. They promise to fix it by March. Immediately a wave of comments was launched that gasoline prices would not rise, there were capacities to maneuver within the country and some exports would be closed.
However, simultaneously, a cascade of other assessments followed: the oil refinery became the first major casualty of the sanctions. In December, the same refinery had a small fire at one of its systems, which was restarted at a lower capacity. Now there is a serious breakdown. All business publications have the same message — it will not be possible to replace the equipment with Chinese ones, it is not a solution to fix it by hand. And the prognosis is that this is the first sign, and it will get worse.
4. Mass protests in Bashkiria because of the trial of one of the local activists, Fail Alsynov. Allegedly, in one of his speeches in Bashkir language, he spoke negatively about the inhabitants of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Armenians. For this, he received a four-year colony sentence for "stirring up inter-ethnic discord" (Alsynov claims that his words were mistranslated). It turns out that storming an airport with a crowd to settle scores with Jews in Dagestan is considered a local unpunished peculiarity, while protecting the environment of one's native land and speaking the native language in Bashkiria are seen differently.
As a result, several thousand people (a figure of 5,000 is mentioned - [even up to 10,000 - AG]) protested in front of the court, ending in clashes with the police and the detention of several people.
According to the "Information Resistance" group, Bashkortostan's publicly recorded losses during the attack on Ukraine are 30% higher than Tatarstan's. And the population is the same. This is the result of the unstoppable enthusiasm of local fuhrer Radiy Khabirov, who actively sends his fellow countrymen to their deaths.
After the discontent with significant losses in Dagestan combined with the irritation of local residents due to regular blackouts, the government radically reduced sending of Dagestanis to the front. This is a bad example for other regions. And at the same time, it is a clue to people what they need to do. The authorities are afraid of protests because they don't have the forces to crush them. That is, their resources for mobilization are not as limitless as they convince everyone.
5. Gradual toughening of the rhetoric of the mobilized men's wives. They are publicly asking: convicts with multi-year sentences for serious crimes are dismissed after 6 months of service, while mobilized Russians are taken away indefinitely. Women's protests are the worst thing that can happen. So far they are very localized and do not pose a direct threat. What poses a threat is the trend. The Kremlin will need resources to extinguish it.
Summary.
It does not mean that the Russian Federation will collapse tomorrow or anything like that. It is an indicator that tension is growing inside Russia in various spheres. Disruptions and collapses will happen more often.
Combined, this creates a bad backdrop for Putin's run in March. They don't have good news. The result will not be affected, but the atmosphere will worsen.
That's why the Kremlin is so vehemently sending signals that Russia is incredibly strong, and Ukraine will fall apart tomorrow. They desperately need to maintain this myth, or else unrest will begin.