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Posted

The only thing I can see on their website that would require ethylene gas is thermal spray coating, but I would think the kind of volume that would be required for an explosion of that magnitude would be like high pressure PE plant levels. I'm thinking there was something else at play here, like a combo ethylene/dust explosion or something.

Posted
It is conceivable that, due to the number of claimants, Watson filed Chapter 11 not so much to screw claimants as just an orderly way of dealing with the claims.
That probably means some folks get screwed.

It’s conceivable that I will be elected President and Milana Vayntrub will be my First Lady
  • Like 1
Posted
On 2/9/2020 at 7:54 AM, NotActuallyALonghorn said:

The only thing I can see on their website that would require ethylene gas is thermal spray coating, but I would think the kind of volume that would be required for an explosion of that magnitude would be like high pressure PE plant levels. I'm thinking there was something else at play here, like a combo ethylene/dust explosion or something.

Well it sure is a good thing that we've completely neutered the CSB and other regulatory/reporting requirements for industrial worksites. Otherwise someone might just get in the way of generating private profits at a public expense.

  • 5 years later...
Posted (edited)

USCSB published their findings from the explosion. Wild it was 5 years ago - I remember it waking us up in when we lived in Midtown, and my neighbors said it broke windows

TLDW: an old propylene line gave way, started leaking, and leaked continuously into an automated working area. Watson Grinding had previously disconnected their gas detectors from their computer control system. So there was nothing to stop the building from filling up to stoichiometric levels and to cut power to the building. Facilities DID actually send out a warning notification to workers, but the first person in for the shift didn't hear any alarms or look at his messages, and turned on a light switch that ultimately was the detonation ignition. 

The kicker? Watson seemingly did not break any statutory rules or safety standards as they weren't required to create a process safety standard, but USCSB argues adoption of those mechanisms would have prevented the explosion.

 

Ultimately, Watson did not maintain their safety equipment and operated a facility that did not fail into a safe state. The facility was designed with fail-safe measures, but they had been disabled years prior to the incident. Contractors had raised concerns in writing to Watson in 2013, 2016, 2019, and just weeks before the explosion.

Watson was replacing copper lines with rubber hoses, and had disconnected their safety equipment. Thank god for our business-friendly state!

Edited by Captainant
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