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McCroskey
McCroskey

Took the plunge today and put a deposit down on a Monaco package for next year. I feel like a little kid. Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Levi
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let’s go!!!!!

Huckleberry
Huckleberry

Hope this helps clarify a bit.

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wood

wood 11102

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On 11/26/2021 at 12:01 PM, Prepuce of Doom said:

Sorry if already posted - I'm a few races behind and have been generally successful at avoiding spoilers, so while I haven't opened this thread in weeks, I thought this was too much fun not to share... 

Sound on. 

That. Is. Awesome.

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11 hours ago, Chewbacca said:
18 hours ago, FirstTimeCaller said:
I thought the Lando and Daniel bits were the funniest there. All of the voices seemed dead-on.

Kimi was great, too.

Yeah, second thought that might be the best. With it being second, I wasn't sure that it wasn't Kimi versus the same guy doing the Will Buxton bit.

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So any word on Jeddah about what we can expect for racing? I'm not jazzed about the whole Saudi Arabia hosting, but will admit that the track all lit up looks very cool. Also heard it's full throttle 80% of the lap. Will cars be going with Monza setups?

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18 hours ago, FirstTimeCaller said:

So any word on Jeddah about what we can expect for racing? I'm not jazzed about the whole Saudi Arabia hosting, but will admit that the track all lit up looks very cool. Also heard it's full throttle 80% of the lap. Will cars be going with Monza setups?

Good question. I think they will probably opt for a lower downforce set up because turn 13 and 27 are going to be pretty slow but everything else is fast

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wood

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21 hours ago, FirstTimeCaller said:

So any word on Jeddah about what we can expect for racing? I'm not jazzed about the whole Saudi Arabia hosting, but will admit that the track all lit up looks very cool. Also heard it's full throttle 80% of the lap. Will cars be going with Monza setups?

I think it's gonna be interesting & you may see teams going with different solutions in terms of how much downforce they apply. It's a very fast track, but there are long sections of one medium/fast turn after the next, so a relatively higher downforce setup in some cars could help them fend off the cars that are faster on the straights.

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From Reddit: What is the threat of a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi Arabia Grand Prix: An analysis

this specific comment is from one of the authors

http://www.reddit.com/r/formula1/comments/r78axn/what_is_the_threat_of_a_houthi_missile_attack_on/hmxlgej/

long, so spoilering it

Quote

I have to rephrase my TLDR, because I kind of contradicted myself. The likelihood of the militants being able and ready to launch an attack against Jeddah during the GP is high, but having the capability does not automatically translate into deciding to execute the strike.

text:

 

Spoiler

First of all, full disclaimer: I am one of the authors of this article. And this is a serious analysis of a very real threat.

Below is the entire text, translated with Google and given a very perfunctory clean up. Everything you need to know is here, so that you don’t have to feel obliged to give me clicks. But there are maps, videos, photos, supplementary tweets—as well as sources—included in the actual article, so if you want to see more, hop on over, we’ll be happy to have you.

In brief (because it's a fucking tall wall of text): the threat exists, the likelihood of an attempt being made is high, the likelihood of anyone at the track being hurt is microscopically low.

Edit: I have to rephrase my TLDR, because I kind of contradicted myself. The likelihood of the militants being able and ready to launch an attack against Jeddah during the GP is high, but having the capability does not automatically translate into deciding to execute the strike.

This having been said, here’s the translation:

———

The war in Yemen has already claimed the lives of 377,000 people, most of whom died not as a result of combat operations, but indirect causes: starvation or lack of medical care. Against the background of this enormous human suffering, the Saudi-Emirate coalition, despite the commitment of enormous forces, has still not come close to victory. Houthi forces backed by Iran not only inflict painful losses on the enemy (they are capable of destroying even tanks and combat aircraft), but also transfer the war to its territory. Meanwhile, the city of Jeddah will host Saudi Arabia's first ever Formula 1 Grand Prix this weekend.

The race generated a lot of controversy due to the catastrophic human rights situation in the Saudi monarchy and the condition of the track itself, which until a few days ago seemed unprepared to accept cars. Yet another concern lingered in the background: about the threat from the rebels of Ansar Allah. A successful attack on the biggest sporting event in the history of this country would be a huge blow to its rulers. On the one hand, it would undermine efforts to attract tourists and foreign investors, and on the other, it would question the chances of attracting more events of this kind to promote the image of the Saudis as modern and open to the world.

Of course, there is no fear that cannot be suppressed with petrodollars, but Riyadh would rather spare himself such a headache. This analysis will not attempt to read minds and answer the question of whether Ansar Allah's leadership is going to attack the track during the race. The question is, if the militants are willing, will they be able to launch the attack or will the Saudi Armed Forces be able to ensure security during the Grand Prix.

What the Houthis can attack with

Thanks to Iranian shipments, Ansar Allah fighters have an impressive arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Yemen was put under a UN arms embargo in 2015, but blockade-runners - mostly small motor-powered dhows - make regular deliveries.

In last year's report, UN experts recalled, for example, that in the Al-Jawf muhafase in northern Yemen, coalition forces stopped a shipment of Ghasef and Samad drones that arrived via Oman. In November 2019, the American Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) stopped the transport, which included, among others, 21 Dehlawa anti-tank guided missiles, three pieces of anti-aircraft loitering munition known as the 358 missile (we wrote more about this very interesting weapon recently in this article), as well as components that can be used to assemble the Ghods-1 cruise missile (Kuds-1), the C802 anti-ship missile and another, unidentified cruise missile.

Small UAVs such as the Ghasefs (a development version of the Iranian Ababil) and the Badr-1 dual missile launcher are used mainly to attack targets near the Yemen border and in Yemen itself. For example, Badrs were used on August 25, 2019 to attack the airport in the city of Jizan, sixty kilometers from the border. The Houthis admitted firing ten missiles, while the Saudis said they had intercepted and destroyed six. According to the rebels, several dozen people lost their lives in the attack. On the same day, the anti-aircraft defense also shot down a drone approaching the city of Khamis Mushayt. The summer of 2019 also saw a series of attacks on the civilian airport in the city of Abha, one hundred kilometers from the border.

However, we are mainly interested in the threat to the targets lying inland - there are over 600 kilometers from Jeddah to Yemen. This threat started to increase in the first half of 2019. The UN experts mentioned earlier point out that this coincided with increasing geopolitical tensions around the JCPOA nuclear deal; in May, Iran announced that in response to the sanctions imposed by Washington, it was ceasing to implement some of the provisions of the agreement. The Houthis then began to use UAVs and missiles with a greater range.

The first type of weapon that can reach Jeddah is the Burkan-2H ballistic missile, a distant relative of the Soviet R-11 family. Its range is estimated at over 1000 kilometers. It was used for the first time in July 2017 in an attack on the refinery of the state-owned Saudi Aramco concern (by the way, one of the main sponsors of Formula 1) in the city of Janbu, located north of Jeddah on the Red Sea coast. The Saudis have repeatedly boasted that their missile defense intercepted and destroyed Burkans-2H before they hit the target, but independent experts found no evidence of this.

Soon thereafter, reports began surfacing of a new version of the Burkans that were to be baptized into combat during the attack on the city of Dammam on the Gulf coast in August 2019. The Burkan-3 is most likely a variant of the Iranian Ghiam-1 (in Farsi: Uprising). The latter has a range of 800 kilometers (750 kilometers according to the Defense Intelligence Agency) and is an improved variant of the Shahab-2 - heavier (total weight is 6,155 kilograms) but with a smaller warhead (750 kilograms). The Iranians assure that missiles of this type are characterized by greater accuracy (the CEP is to be no more than 500 meters). The Burkan-3 is expected to have some modifications, in particular longer fuel tanks, holding approximately 5.3 tons of propellant, and a slightly higher total weight. The range is determined at 1,200 kilometers (a record in the rebel arsenal), and the weight of the warhead is 250 kilograms.

The Ghods-1 cruise missile also poses a great threat. It is a construction with a cylindrical body of 5.6 meters long and two wings, the propulsion is an unlicensed copy of the Czech TJ-100 turbojet engine mounted outside the body. The missile is fired from ground launchers and is probably available in several related (and very similar) versions. In 2019, Ghods-1 missiles were used in at least four attacks on civilian targets - in June and August in the attack on Abha airport, also in June on the desalination station in the city of Ash-Seek, and finally on September 14 in one of the loudest attacks on targets in the country of Saudi Arabia - Saudi Aramco installations.

It is worth noting that at the exhibition shown in the above tweet, the missile was most likely presented upside down. Evidence gathered by investigators indicates that the missile is flown with the engine below the body.

UAVs pose relatively little threat to Jeddah. The most popular Ghasefs and Samads are simple drones that probably won't make it that far, unless Houthi fighters first infiltrate Saudi Arabia and release them from there. There is information about Samads-4, expected to have a range of about 2,000 kilometers, but it is difficult to verify.

Perhaps the most advanced UAV in the militant arsenal is the unnamed delta wing loitering munition - and hence simply referred to as the Delta. This drone can be used as both loitering munition and a minibomb carrier, it has a span of 215 centimeters and a length of 190-210 centimeters, the plating is made of carbon fiber. At least two Delta attacks are known to occur in 2019. First, on May 14, oil pumping stations in the cities of Ad-Dawadimi and Afif in central Saudi Arabia were attacked. Exactly four months later, the Delta was used in conjunction with Ghods-1 in an attack on the installations of the state-owned oil company.

Attack on Saudi Aramco in 2019

The events of September 14, 2019 are among the best-known episodes of the Yemeni War. They were subjected to a comprehensive analysis mainly due to the targets attacked by the militants and how the effects of the attack translated into the Saudi (and world) economy. Additionally, Saudi Arabia showed a rare openness and allowed UN experts to investigate the sites of the attack caused by damage and missile debris.

The first target was Bukajk (spelled Abqaiq in English), a town built by Saudi Aramco with the world's largest crude oil desulphurization plant. As Piotr Syryczyński explains, "the oil from [Saudi] deposits is very sulphated and cannot be sold without the removal of sulfur, which would cause corrosion further in the process of oil transport or its initial processing". The goal was therefore chosen without error, calculating the attack to cause complete paralysis of the company's activities. The problem is that Bukajk is located north-east of Riyadh, near the known from elsewhere Az-Zahran, and as much as 800 kilometers from the Yemeni border. Moreover, we are talking about the eastern part of Yemen, while the Ansar Allah fighters control the western part of the country, so we are talking about a distance of up to 1,000 kilometers.

And yet at 3:31 a.m., the first Ghods-1 cruise missile flew over Bukajk. The attack lasted seventeen minutes - during this time four missiles fell on the installation. Later, Saudi authorities reported that the remains of three more missiles had been found within a radius of several dozen kilometers from Bukajku, apparently missing their target. The second target was installations in the Khurais oil field, about 130 kilometers east of the Riyadh suburbs and nearly 900 kilometers from Yemen (remember: Jeddah to Yemen is over 600 kilometers). A total of eighteen drones reached their target from 3.41 to 3.50. UN experts found that the hit points indicated both high precision of control and good orientation of operators who knew where to aim to do the greatest possible damage. In the end, the attack did not cause major losses due to the relatively light weight of the warheads, but daily oil production in the country fell by 5.7 million barrels during repairs.

However, there is a lot of speculation about the attacks on Bukajk and Churais. First of all, the fact that the targets were at the limit of the estimated range of the weapons used raises the question of whether militants made it into Saudi Arabia to attack from there. The situation is even more confused by the indications that missiles and drones did not arrive from the south, but from the north (and the north-east and north-west). The then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo quickly accused Iran of carrying out the attack, the authorities in Riyadh and later the UN panel of experts agreed with him.

Indeed, if the missiles and drones were to arrive from Iran, this would solve the range issue. The entire Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf from the Strait of Hormuz to the west is close enough to both installations. The Saudis also claim that the attack used other maneuvering missiles - not the Ghods-1 missiles fired by land-based launchers, but Ja-Ali, which are carried by combat aircraft (the photos below show preliminary ground tests). If Iran launched the attack with its own hands, it addresses the threat to the Saudi Arabia Grand Prix in two ways. First, the Iranians are less likely to waste energy on propaganda strikes, and it is in their interest to directly and rapidly weaken the Saudi oil industry. Second: from Iran it is too far to Jeddah.

UN experts, based on residual data on the engine (an unlicensed copy of the British AR731), weight, fuel supply and cruising speed, estimated that the range of Delta drones that attacked Bukajk could be up to 900 kilometers. In the case of the Ghods-1 missile, the same data made it possible to calculate the range of 700 kilometers. If we take into account that both of them would still have to encircle the targets in order to attack them from the north, indeed, there can be no question of an attack directly from Yemen. Ansar Allah representatives claim that the attack on Khurais and Bukajk was carried out from three locations (they did not say in which country they were) and that modernized versions of Ghasefs and Samads were used, operating no longer as loitering ammunition, but as mini-bombers carrying four dropped explosives.

Joseph Trevithick recalls, however, that the Saudis had misidentified Houthis weapons before. There is also the possibility that the attack was carried out by Shiite militias allied to the ayatollah regime operating in Iraq - which would also explain how the missiles ended up north of the targets.

However, the purpose of these considerations is not to pinpoint those responsible for attacks on oil installations. It is only a question of verifying that the Houthis are technically capable of launching an attack on Jeddah. The answer is unequivocal and there is no doubt about it. Ansar Allah fighters have weapons at their disposal that would allow them to attack Jeddah from controlled territory within Yemen's borders.

What can the Saudis defend themselves with?

Following the shock of the monarchy from the 2019 attacks, efforts were made to strengthen (with the help of allies) air and missile defense. The sad truth, however, is that despite their insane wealth, the Saudis have still not managed to create an effective system. And the point is not that some impenetrable net is to be spread over the country. The point is that the resources used are disproportionate in terms of cost to the results - and to the enemy's expenditure.

Less than a month ago, we wrote that Saudi Arabia's air force was getting ready to purchase a batch of 280 AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. Stockpiles are dwindling at an alarming rate as Saudi pilots use them to shoot down unmanned aerial vehicles. Of course, AMRAAM is not intended for this role, but paradoxically, it is the most suitable weapon of all the Eagle and Typhoons in the arsenal. A cannon shot would be the cheapest, but for the smallest UAVs, the target is too small for the pilot to be sure of a hit. In turn, regarding the use of AIM-9, The War Zone cites an anonymous US Air Force pilot, according to which drones "do not have a sufficient thermal signature, so the pilot may not get a [target] signal before he comes closer than the minimum distance, which makes that AIM-9 is rendered useless. It looks like the drones have the radar signature enough to be able to lock onto the target before getting close to the minimum distance."

From the safety perspective of the Saudi Arabia Grand Prix, the use of AMRAAM armed fighters is a sufficient safety measure. Both the F-15C/D and the Eurofighter Typhoons are stationed at the Al-Malik Fahd base, east of Mecca and Jeddah. If ordered by Riyadh, these machines will be on duty in the air south of the city all Friday, Saturday and Sunday. Of course, there is no guarantee of 100% effectiveness, there is always a risk that a Delta will pass unnoticed, but the threat posed by UAVs will be minimal. After all, we are not talking about securing the entire country (1,200 kilometers from coast to coast), but only about a narrow part of its airspace. AMRAAM should also be able to intercept simple cruise missiles, such as the Ghods-1, which are not capable of flying close to the ground and using relief to hide from radar. You have to worry about ballistic missiles.

For this, in turn, you need missile defense, which Saudi Arabia practically does not have. The situation in September 2019 was so critical that the Americans announced that they would forward their own forces to the monarchy - including two Patriot batteries and one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system - to defend oil installations. Combined with air units, this gave about 3,000 people. And everything would be fine if it were not for one detail: the Americans began to reduce their forces in Saudi Arabia.

After the new head of the White House took office and the publication of intelligence reports pointing to Saudi prince Muhammad ibn Salman as guilty of approving the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, the Americans announced that they would stop supporting the Saudi intervention in Yemen. A few months later, with the world, including the Persian Gulf states, preoccupied with the shift of power in Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban rule and the chaotic withdrawal of US forces from Kabul, Washington also withdrew some Patriot and THAAD systems from Saudi Arabia's Al-Amir Sultan airbase. The base is close to Riyadh, but the lack of US launchers in this key area means the Saudis have to secure it on their own, which means they may run out of resources elsewhere. Washington's decision thus created a large gap in the kingdom's air defense capabilities.

Although the Saudis ordered their own THAAD systems in 2017 for a fabulous 15 billion dollars, the deliveries of effectors will be carried out in 2023–2027. However, the situation is not as dramatic as it might seem. Saudi Arabia has received a helping hand from two rather unobvious directions.

The first aid was offered by Athens, then only to supplement the American systems, not to replace them. The Patriot battery was delivered to site in September. Even more interesting (due to philosophical and ideological differences) is the second direction - Israel, which has managed to build a relatively cost-effective multi-layer air defense system over the years. Here, however, we are talking about long-term cooperation (Riyadh is reportedly considering the purchase of Kipat Bar'zel short-range systems and Barak-8ER medium / long-range systems), which will not directly translate into the situation analyzed in this article. The investments made by Riyadh, however, are the best proof of the reality of the threat.

The situation in recent weeks

It is an open secret that in the last two years at least one Houthi drone has been intercepted practically every day - either by fighters or by Patriot anti-aircraft systems. Ballistic and cruise missiles are used less frequently. Formula 1 fans will certainly remember the incident that took place in February during the Formula E race in Ad-Diriya near Riyadh. There is no evidence that the goal was the race itself, but at the same time it is difficult to speak of pure coincidence.

In March this year, the Saudi Aramco infrastructure was targeted again, with the most surprising attacks being the oil export facility in the city of Ras Tanura in the Eastern Province north of Az-Zahran and Ad-Dammam. This time, however, there were no reports that the attack came from the north. Fourteen drones - including ten Sammad-3s - and eight ballistic missiles were used in the attack, according to an Ansar Allah spokesman. The same operation also attacked targets in the Jizan and Asir provinces. As they border areas conquered by the Houthis, they are attacked with admirable regularity, but reaching as far as Ras Tanura, although the attack did not cause serious losses, can be disturbing.

On March 26, the attack on Saudi Aramco infrastructure was repeated to "celebrate" the sixth anniversary of the Saud's participation in the Yemen war. Objects were targeted at Ras Tanura, Rabighu in Mecca Province, Janbu in Medina Province, and Jizan. In addition, the Houthis attacked military facilities - the Al-Malik Abd al-Aziz airbase in Dammama, and the bases in Najran to the southwest and Assir to the south. The "Zulfiqar" missile (in Polish transcription: Zolfaghar), referred to below by the representative of Ansar Allah, is probably an alternative name for the Burkan-3 missile mentioned above.

At the end of last month, the Houthis again boasted about attacks on Saudi Aramco's infrastructure. From the perspective of this article, it is important that a significant part of the forces were directed at Jeddah. Sammad drones attacked a former refinery (now a transshipment terminal) and the airport in the city. The Houthis did not make any reference to the upcoming race in reporting these strikes, but the focus of the attack on Jeddah - where feverish preparations were in progress - suggests that one of the goals was to make the Saudis understand that they should not enjoy their sports holiday in advance.

Ralph Savelsberg notes that the Burkan-3 does not deserve the name of a precision weapon, and the reduced warhead further reduces its effectiveness against point targets. It is, in fact, a missile designed to intimidate the people of Saudi Arabia - every major city in the country and every major oil installation are within its reach. With such targets, it doesn't matter where the bullet hits, all that matters is if it hits anywhere in the designated area. The Saudi armed forces, however, are not limited to passively waiting for the enemy's movement and attempts to intercept threats. Last month, a large-scale air campaign was launched over Yemen to destroy ballistic missiles, and their means of transport and launch, before they are even used.

Will the Saudi Arabia Grand Prix be the target?

The Houthis, taking responsibility for the attacks on Bukajk and Khurais, called them an economic deterrence operation. Last month's attacks were described as the eighth installment of this strategy. There should be no doubt: the rebels, aware that they will not be able to win in open warfare, attack where the enemy hurts the most. In the case of the Saudis, it is a hit on the wallet. So the targets were oil installations, tankers and airports. The attack on the Formula 1 race does not fit in with these goals, as the benefits of this venture are expected to come in many years. As we pointed out at the beginning, the Saudi Arabia Grand Prix is meant to be the seed from which a new branch of Saudi wealth will grow - except that on the other hand the Houthi leaders see very specific petrodollars they can prevent from reaching the dynasty's coffers.

However, as we pointed out at the beginning, the Saudi Arabia Grand Prix is to be the seed from which a new branch of Saudi wealth will grow. However, if an attack is attempted, the probability that it will produce tangible results is very low. Perhaps on Sunday night, recordings showing how Patriot missiles destroy incoming Burkans will reappear on Twitter. But it would have to come to a completely astronomical coincidence for anyone in Jeddah - be they a resident or a Formula One team member - to suffer any kind of harm. Of course, there is still the question of whether one of the greatest sports in the world should organize a competition in a country like Saudi Arabia, but that is a topic for a completely different article.

———

Whew, okay, I think I haven't missed any paragraph.

 

 

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6 minutes ago, Dutch said:

We had Alonso on the podium; is it too much to ask the F1 gods for a Kimi podium in the next two races?

I think this is the only hope for Kimi happening...
 

 

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12 minutes ago, faps said:

Yeah, I feel it's gonna be not if we get a safety car but how many.

Someone will get out on the marbles and with the walls being so close, game over. That said, it doesn't look as terrible as I was expecting.

Yeah, in addition the odds of someone binning it in Q3 seem pretty high.  

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7 minutes ago, Dutch said:

spacer.pngG

FWIW (and I know it's not much), but Lewis led Max by 0.367s at Brazil in FP1.

We had Alonso on the podium; is it too much to ask the F1 gods for a Kimi podium in the next two races?

it's hilarious the difference between #1 and #17 (~1.73 seconds) is the same as the difference between #19 and Mazepin (~1.64 seconds)

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Just now, NoName said:

it's hilarious the difference between #1 and #17 (~1.73 seconds) is the same as the difference between #19 and Mazepin (~1.64 seconds)

I legit want to know what time a complete amateur would do on some of these tracks. The person gets to sim just like they do, but then hop in for a practice session. I'd guess 1:50 for this if they didn't put it in the wall? I just think the average person would flip out about the Gs they pull on these turns.

 

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8 minutes ago, FirstTimeCaller said:

I legit want to know what time a complete amateur would do on some of these tracks. The person gets to sim just like they do, but then hop in for a practice session. I'd guess 1:50 for this if they didn't put it in the wall? I just think the average person would flip out about the Gs they pull on these turns.

 

For what it's worth: 

If you threw a true "layman" or someone that hasn't spent a lot of time on track in different vehicles, into an F1 car and asked them to put in a competitive time, or even a time that was respectable like your guess of 1:50, I don't think they could do it without crashing or overheating the engine. Of course it would depend on the track layout, track conditions, tires, etc. Tom Cruise is probably more like your Paul Newman, Steve McQueen, Patrick Dempsey type of "amateur" in that he's got the capacity and instinct to become a professional driver if he wanted to do that. 

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ConferenceRoom

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Exactly. Once you lose the tires, it's like driving on ice and you can't drive fast. Once you can't drive fast, the engine and the brakes get hot. If you try to drive fast while the tires are gone and the brakes are hot, you're in the wall. More likely, the engineer in your ear yells at you to stop the car and turn off the engine before you kill yourself. 

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