Evangelical Christians

[WhatTheBuck 28929]

Ev'rybody's talking 'bout
Bagism, Shagism, Dragism, Madism, Ragism, Tagism
This-ism, that-ism, ism, ism, ism

[Guest]

we fi'in'a drop some acid in here and get real damn philosophical and shit.

[deadshank 24654]

19 minutes ago, slorch said:

we fi'in'a drop some acid in here and get real damn philosophical and shit.

[F250 29200]

2 hours ago, Lagunamadre said:

No clue. I'm not well read on the various isms, so can't speak to any one groups thinking. I'm more referring to it in the abstract, that the events that happen in between a human's birth and death were out of their control, that a higher power controlled their actions, and at their birth the higher power knew how their story would end. 

 

What ism would that fall under? 

As Twicehorn said, that kinda falls on the Calvinist side of the tracks. The idea is that every event has already been determined by God at the moment of creation for his own purpose. The idea becomes controversial when it addresses salvation because it's not a choice any individual can make.

[JBJ 3825]

3 hours ago, Lagunamadre said:

No clue. I'm not well read on the various isms, so can't speak to any one groups thinking. I'm more referring to it in the abstract, that the events that happen in between a human's birth and death were out of their control, that a higher power controlled their actions, and at their birth the higher power knew how their story would end. 

 

What ism would that fall under? 

You are describing predeterminism, but I think you mean to describe determinism.

Predestination doesn't preclude free will, but it forsees the results. (I throw a rock at you, knowing you will tackle me, but you are making the decision to tackle me.)

Determinism is what BrickHorn describes in his post above.  Everything cascades down from one original cause, and no new original causes (via free will) are introduced.  (You don't really have a choice but to tackle me - whether I knew it or not.)

Predetermination is a combination. (Me throwing the rock at you is controlling your actions in tackling me.)

Edited May 22, 2018 by JBJ

[phdhorn 6225]

14 hours ago, F250 said:

As Twicehorn said, that kinda falls on the Calvinist side of the tracks. The idea is that every event has already been determined by God at the moment of creation for his own purpose. The idea becomes controversial when it addresses salvation because it's not a choice any individual can make.

With all the stuff coming in about the holographic universe, predestination doesn't sound so far off now.  Also, predetermination, although used of course in religious contexts, is not a religious term at all, but a widely used one, including classical Greek and pre-Christian philosophy, even science (gene predetermination).  

My favorite part of Calvinism is the idea that God not only determines the elect, but the damned.  It's my favorite because essentially it translates to "double predestination".  Where do you think Dean Wormer got his punishment from?

The free will/predestination discussion is always a lively one over about 5 beers.  In between and around "that chick has a great rack."

[Guest]

I’m a conditional elect/Calvinist

[BrickHorn 18447]

15 hours ago, JBJ said:

You are describing predeterminism, but I think you mean to describe determinism.

Predestination doesn't preclude free will, but it forsees the results. (I throw a rock at you, knowing you will tackle me, but you are making the decision to tackle me.)

It depends.  If by “foresees the results,” you mean omniscience of the future - i.e. some being knows for sure what will happen and cannot be wrong - then it precludes free will.  Free will is only possible if there’s room for error in that foresight.  

And one thing I should clarify: even in the absence of free will, people still decide.  Our brains are complicated decision-making machines.  Even if the end result of our decision-making process is determined, we still have to run the calculations and generate the result.  

Because that process is complicated, the result is unpredictable (by we mere mortals, anyway) and the result thus often surprising.  We often mistake that unpredictability for true freedom from prior causes.  

Edited May 23, 2018 by BrickHorn

[phdhorn 6225]

In Geneva one winter, posing in front of Reformation Wall, with statues of Ferel, Calvin, Basel, and Knox (the centerpiece "Big 4" of the Geneva Reformation).  I was intrigued.

But God knew I was gonna do that.  COLD AS SHIT that day as well.

[Guest]

This seems like this belongs on the thread as it was originally OP’ed:

‘This Is Not of God’: When Anti-Trump Evangelicals Confront Their Brethren - The New York Times https://apple.news/Ak6jAGV4BR5iirc1i6kDE5Q

[JBJ 3825]

2 hours ago, BrickHorn said:

It depends.  If by “foresees the results,” you mean omniscience of the future - i.e. some being knows for sure what will happen and cannot be wrong - then it precludes free will.  Free will is only possible if there’s room for error in that foresight.  

And one thing I should clarify: even in the absence of free will, people still decide.  Our brains are complicated decision-making machines.  Even if the end result of our decision-making process is determined, we still have to run the calculations and generate the result.  

Because that process is complicated, the result is unpredictable (by we mere mortals, anyway) and the result thus often surprising.  We often mistake that unpredictability for true freedom from prior causes.  

In effect it is the same.  But the process is different.

Going back to my example, knowing he is going to choose to tackle me is not quite the same as willing him to tackle me.

Can the tackler tell the difference?  Probably not.

[BrickHorn 18447]

4 minutes ago, JBJ said:

In effect it is the same.  But the process is different.

Going back to my example, knowing he is going to choose to tackle me is not quite the same as willing him to tackle me.

Can the tackler tell the difference?  Probably not.

Whether an omniscient being wills outcomes or not is irrelevant.  The only question is whether it is omniscient of the future or not.  If yes, there can be no free will.

[David Dennison 19536]

2 hours ago, BrickHorn said:

It depends.  If by “foresees the results,” you mean omniscience of the future - i.e. some being knows for sure what will happen and cannot be wrong - then it precludes free will.  Free will is only possible if there’s room for error in that foresight.  

And one thing I should clarify: even in the absence of free will, people still decide.  Our brains are complicated decision-making machines.  Even if the end result of our decision-making process is determined, we still have to run the calculations and generate the result.  

Because that process is complicated, the result is unpredictable (by we mere mortals, anyway) and the result thus often surprising.  We often mistake that unpredictability for true freedom from prior causes.  

Evolution is crazy awesome.

[Brisketexan 106889]

3 hours ago, phdhorn said:

The free will/predestination discussion is always a lively one over about 5 beers.  In between and around "that chick has a great rack."

And I am predestined to check it out.  Because of evolution and my reptilian brain.  Or divine design.  Whatever.  Just look at that -- she's magnificent.

[F250 29200]

2 hours ago, OatmealRaisinCookie said:

I’m a conditional elect/Calvinist

Is that even a thing? Sounds like someone saying they are a Free Market Marxist.

 

[JBJ 3825]

38 minutes ago, BrickHorn said:

Whether an omniscient being wills outcomes or not is irrelevant.  The only question is whether it is omniscient of the future or not.  If yes, there can be no free will.

We define free will differently.

If free will is the ability to be an original cause (be a cause without being originally effected), then I agree with you.

If free will is the ability to choose from a set, then I disagree.

This is all assuming there's a single universe with a single timeline of course.

Edited May 23, 2018 by JBJ

[BrickHorn 18447]

27 minutes ago, JBJ said:

We define free will differently.

If free will is the ability to be an original cause (be a cause without being originally effected), then I agree with you.

If free will is the ability to choose from a set, then I disagree.

This is all assuming there's a single universe with a single timeline of course.

We do not disagree on the definition of free will.  You’re just losing sight of the impact of omniscience on the ability to choose from a set.  

If omniscience exists (or is even possible), then the set of possible outcomes must be unitary.  Like Connor MacLeod, there can be only one.

I believe the mistake you are making is to assume that one has the power to choose unless someone or something else has already made the choice.  Thus, the logic goes, it doesn’t matter if God knows the future; so long as He did not choose the future, you still can.  

That is flawed logic.  Omniscience alone reduces the set of possible outcomes to a single member.  No one need decide what that member is.  So long as an omniscient being can know, without room for error, what the outcome will be, no other outcome is possible.  And thus, free will cannot exist.

Edited May 23, 2018 by BrickHorn

[Guest]

38 minutes ago, F250 said:

Is that even a thing? Sounds like someone saying they are a Free Market Marxist.

 

Oops, I typed out a long, boring testimony and then edited it down to that pithy blurb and misspoke. Unconditional elect*

[David Dennison 19536]

3 minutes ago, BrickHorn said:

We do not disagree on the definition of free will.  You’re just losing sight of the impact of omniscience on the ability to choose from a set.  

If omniscience exists (or is even possible), then the set of possible outcomes must be unitary.  Like Connor McLeod, there can be only one.

I believe the mistake your are making is to assume that one has the power to choose unless someone or something else has already made the choice.  This, the logic goes, it doesn’t matter if God knows the future; so long as He did not choose the future, you still can.  

That is flawed logic.  Omniscience alone reduces the set of possible outcomes to a single member.  No one need decide what that member is.  So long as an omniscient being can know, without room for error, what the outcome will be, no other outcome is possible.  And thus, free will cannot exist.

Can free will exist within the parameters of natural law?

[BrickHorn 18447]

11 minutes ago, David Dennison said:

Can free will exist within the parameters of natural law?

Not sure I understand the question.  

[David Dennison 19536]

1 minute ago, BrickHorn said:

Not sure I understand the question.  

Is free will compatible with the laws of nature?

[Brian Fantana 6864]

1 hour ago, David Dennison said:

Evolution is crazy awesome.

And fun to explain to creationists. Also fun is explaining how the two aren't mutually exclusive.

[BrickHorn 18447]

1 hour ago, David Dennison said:

Is free will compatible with the laws of nature?

If those laws are deterministic, no.  If those laws are stochastic, also no.  If there’s some other option between those two, maybe.  Although I’ve come around to the idea that free will is fundamentally an oxymoron.

To be free, a decision must be uncaused.  But to be an act of will, the outcome must be desired.  A willful choice is thus caused by the chooser’s desires, meaning it is not a free choice. 

The possibility of free will therefore moves to the choice of the desire that caused the original choice.  But the choice of one’s desire is itself a choice, which can only be an exercise of free will if it is not caused by a predecessor desire that was not chosen freely.  It’s an infinite recursion, and the only point at which free will could possibly exist is at an hypothetical first choice made before you possess any desires that cause your choice.  But that first choice cannot be an act of will, by definition, because it is not the fulfillment of a desire. 

That is why I think free will, even as a purely logical concept, is impossible.  

[David Dennison 19536]

1 minute ago, BrickHorn said:

If those laws are deterministic, no.  If those laws are stochastic, also no.  If there’s some other option between those two, maybe.  Although I’ve come around to the idea that free will is fundamentally an oxymoron.

To be free, a decision must be uncaused.  But to be an act of will, the outcome must be desired.  A willful choice is thus caused by the chooser’s desires, meaning it is not a free choice. 

The possibility of free will therefore moves to the choice of the desire that caused the original choice.  But the choice of one’s desire is itself a choice, which can only be an exercise of free will if it is not caused by a predecessor desire that was not chosen freely.  It’s an infinite recursion, and the only point at which free will could possibly exist is at an hypothetical first choice made before you possess any desires that cause your choice.  But that first choice cannot be an act of will, by definition, because it is not the fulfillment of a desire. 

That is why I think free will, even as a purely logical concept, is impossible.  

I tend to agree. 

[JBJ 3825]

2 hours ago, BrickHorn said:

We do not disagree on the definition of free will.  You’re just losing sight of the impact of omniscience on the ability to choose from a set.  

If omniscience exists (or is even possible), then the set of possible outcomes must be unitary.  Like Connor MacLeod, there can be only one.

I believe the mistake you are making is to assume that one has the power to choose unless someone or something else has already made the choice.  Thus, the logic goes, it doesn’t matter if God knows the future; so long as He did not choose the future, you still can.  

That is flawed logic.  Omniscience alone reduces the set of possible outcomes to a single member.  No one need decide what that member is.  So long as an omniscient being can know, without room for error, what the outcome will be, no other outcome is possible.  And thus, free will cannot exist.

Omniscience doesn't reduce the sets, it knows the choices. 

The outcome is known from a set of potential outcomes.

Let's say a DVD just springs into existence on it's own accord.  You watch it.  You watch it again, knowing how it ends.  Are you controlling the plot?

Edited May 23, 2018 by JBJ

[BrickHorn 18447]

14 minutes ago, JBJ said:

Omniscience doesn't reduce the sets, it knows the choices. 

The outcome is known from a set of potential outcomes.

Let's say a DVD just springs into existence on it's own accord.  You watch it.  You watch it again, knowing how it ends.  Are you controlling the plot?

It doesn’t matter.  The plot wont change, and that’s the only way I can know what it will be.  Which means the characters in the film cannot choose to do otherwise - even though I am not making any choices for them.

So, it’s a nice analogy.  But it proves my point.

[Pescado_Rojo 19586]

3 hours ago, Brisketexan said:

And I am predestined to check it out.  Because of evolution and my reptilian brain.  Or divine design.  Whatever.  Just look at that -- she's magnificent.

[JBJ 3825]

5 minutes ago, BrickHorn said:

It doesn’t matter.  The plot wont change, and that’s the only way I can know what it will be.  Which means the characters in the film cannot choose to do otherwise - even though I am not making any choices for them.

So, it’s a nice analogy.  But it proves my point.

But the DVD is self-determinant and not scient. You are scient and not determinant.  It shows that the two concepts can be exclusive.

Edited May 23, 2018 by JBJ

[BrickHorn 18447]

5 minutes ago, JBJ said:

But the DVD is self-determinant and not scient. You are scient and not determinant.  It shows that the two concepts can be exclusive.

In your analogy, who are you proposing is omniscient and who are you proposing has free will?

[David Dennison 19536]

12 minutes ago, JBJ said:

But the DVD is self-determinant and not scient. You are scient and not determinant.  It shows that the two concepts can be exclusive.

Our sentience must follow the laws of nature. If those laws are deterministic, sentience must also be deterministic.

[JBJ 3825]

31 minutes ago, David Dennison said:

Our sentience must follow the laws of nature. If those laws are deterministic, sentience must also be deterministic.

Neither premise (bolded nor underlined) are certain.

[David Dennison 19536]

1 minute ago, JBJ said:

Neither premise (bolded nor underlined) are certain.

The first one is about as ironclad as you can get. Or do you believe human sentience is supernatural?

Edited May 23, 2018 by David Dennison

[JBJ 3825]

49 minutes ago, BrickHorn said:

In your analogy, who are you proposing is omniscient and who are you proposing has free will?

You are scient about the DVD.  You could say omniscient if only you and the DVD exist in this universe.

The DVD has free will.  It determined it's own plot.

[JBJ 3825]

7 minutes ago, David Dennison said:

The first one is about as ironclad as you can get. Or do you believe human sentience is supernatural?

What makes you think it follows physical laws?  For that matter what makes you thinks physical laws are determinative?  It's certainly not the prevailing academic thought right now.

[David Dennison 19536]

Just now, JBJ said:

What makes you think it follows physical laws?  For that matter what makes you thinks physical laws are determinative?  It's certainly not the prevailing academic thought right now.

I think it follows physical laws because the brain is physical and that's where sentience originates. I believe physical laws are determinative because cause and effect seem to be the way the universe operates.

[XYZ 2154]

17 minutes ago, David Dennison said:

I believe physical laws are determinative because cause and effect seem to be the way the universe operates.

Physicists nowadays think that there is randomness.

[Orca of Peace 109]

1 minute ago, XYZ said:

Physicists nowadays think that there is randomness.

not in the Texas offense  <sorry>

[David Dennison 19536]

6 minutes ago, XYZ said:

Physicists nowadays think that there is randomness.

Sure. But that randomness would still exist within the parameters established by the laws of nature. We just don't know what all of those laws are.

Edited May 23, 2018 by David Dennison

[JBJ 3825]

I believe in determinative natural laws as well, it's just not real common.  Causality breaks down at the quantum level.  I still think it exists, just not the way physicists thought it did 30 years ago.

I don't think human sentience follows natural laws.  My evidence is the female mind.

[BrickHorn 18447]

5 hours ago, JBJ said:

You are scient about the DVD.  You could say omniscient if only you and the DVD exist in this universe.

The DVD has free will.  It determined it's own plot.

No, the DVD did not determine its own plot.  It is a recording of events, captured in a pattern of 0s and 1s that was printed on it before you ever acquired it.  That pattern was determined.  It could not change, which is why you are capable of knowing what will happen before viewing it.

The DVD analogy is an old one, and folks tend to get tripped up by it.  The problem is mixing up two different times.  The claim that free will and omniscience can not coexist applies only at a given time.  The two concepts are not logically incompatible at different times.  

In your example, it is possible that the actors depicted on the DVD had free will at the time of filming.  Maybe they ad libbed.  But if that were the case, then no one could know during filming what the next line would be.  Only after the movie is filmed and the adlibbing has run its course can someone come to know the movie perfectly.  

So in your example, omniscience can only begin once free will ends.  The two never coexist.

Edited May 24, 2018 by BrickHorn

[Gatorubet 30713]

On 5/22/2018 at 10:32 AM, Lagunamadre said:

Does anybody on here believe in predestination? I would love to have  civil debate on that, if so. 

I will cut you, Tulip!

[Guest]

There is no contradiction in an omniscient being who exists outside the rules of our universe knowing what an agent in our universe will decide to do at some future event and the ability of the agent to make a free choice.

I’ll give a bit of notation to make clear what I mean; otherwise this discussion gets awfully wordy and it becomes hard to follow one another’s points. For a given event or action I’ll use a bold capital letter followed by brackets. Inside the bracket can contain some description of the event and/or the time the event occurs as a t followed by a number (with a greater number meaning that it happens later in the timeline (i.e. t2 occurs after t1)). So for example action A, which is a glass falling off a table at time t1, is written as A[glass falls from table, t1].  After that I may refer to the same event as simply A.  Now if event A causes event B, I'll write this as A ► B.  So I could write A[glass falls from table, t1] ► B[glass breaks on floor, t2].  For the omniscient being who is outside the rules of our universe I’ll use Ω. Ω knows every detail about our universe, past, present, and future.  Ω is also outside the bounds & rules of our natural world.  

The argument that we cannot have free will if there exists Ω who truly knows everything, including what we will decide in the future, is known as theological fatalism.  This argument is based on the following postulate:

(TFP)  A[tx] ► B [ty] → y>x.  In other words, if A is the cause of B, then B must occur at a later time that A. 

From this the advocates of theological fatalism argue that the following situation A[person makes choice C, t5] ► B[Ω has knowledge of choice C, t2] is therefore an impossibility, since it violates the TFP.  The only way for the TFP to be honored would be if B[Ω has knowledge of choice C, t2] ► A[person makes choice C, t5], but it that were the case than the person's choice C was caused by the knowledge of Ω, which would mean that the choice was not freely made since it was caused by the knowledge of Ω.

The problem with this argument is that the TFP is at best a rule that applies to our universe.  It is not some metaphysical transcendent rule that mandates that our universal timeline is intrinsically linked with all causation.  Our timeline and any link it has with causation in our world is limited to our world; time is a physical property of our universe, not a law of logic.  Ω is not at any point tx in our universe.  Only physical entities within the rules of our universe are at given times in our universe and have events occur at specific times in our universe.  However, Ω is not a physical entity in our universe and therefore cannot be at any time tx.  So it is an error to describe a situation as A[person makes choice C, t5] ► B[Ω has knowledge of choice C, t2] because Ω's acquisition of knowledge is not an event that occurs at any time tx of our universe.  In previous discussions I gave the analogy of a computer game programmer being outside of the game's timeline and yet is still able to act on and know about the game to illustrate how Ω could be outside the rules of our physical world and not be at any given time in our universe and yet still be able to act on and know facts about the universe.  

Regarding the argument that our choices cannot be freely made (in the libertarian free will sense) if all the actions in the universe, including the actions in our brain, are the result of deterministic physical laws and/or stochastic occurrences at the quantum level and as a consequence it follows that the mind is purely the product of the brain, I would say that this is trivially true if one accepts the antecedent that is based on ontological materialism/physicalism/naturalism and the veracity of Mechanism/the mind/brain identity theory.  The discussion of what trivially follows from materialism is not what's of interest and framing the discussion that way begs the question.  The questions that are fundamentally important to the discussion are whether materialism is the correct ontology and whether the human mind can be completely explained by the actions of the brain.  I think both materialism and mechanism are false.  

 

 

[BrickHorn 18447]

If you place the omniscient being “outside of time,” then the premise “an omniscient being and free will coexist” is meaningless.  

The outside of time premise is logically equivalent to allowing omniscience to come about after free will is done.  No one doubts that free will in one timeframe is compatible with omniscience in another timeframe.  What cannot be true is that exercise free will while, at the time I am exercising free will, a being is omniscient of my future.  

Claiming to solve that problem by explicitly divorcing the timeframe in which you claim free will exists and omniscience exists is a cheat.  You haven’t resolved the conundrum.  You’ve just ignored a fundamental premise or, in the case of your latest attempt, explicitly written an assumption out of the premise.  

[Guest]

6 minutes ago, BrickHorn said:

If you place the omniscient being “outside of time,” then the premise “an omniscient being and free will coexist” is meaningless.  

The outside of time premise is logically equivalent to allowing omniscience to come about after free will is done.  No one doubts that free will in one timeframe is compatible with omniscience in another timeframe.  What cannot be true is that exercise free will while, at the time I am exercising free will, a being is omniscient of my future.  

Claiming to solve that problem by explicitly divorcing the timeframe in which you claim free will exists and omniscience exists is a cheat.  You haven’t resolved the conundrum.  You’ve just ignored a fundamental premise or, in the case of your latest attempt, explicitly written an assumption out of the premise.  

Do you view causation as necessarily dependent on temporal ordering of causes and effects?  I think this is a primary point we disagree on which leads to our opposing views on the matter.  Also, you have to view the problem from specific temporal perspectives.  It makes no sense to say before and after in a general applicable manner.  You have to specify before or after from an specific perspective - either the perspective of a given agent in our universe or from the perspective of Ω.  Actually, you have to specify temporal perspectives even when solely discussing physical entities in our universe, as their is no absolute time.  

Also, which premise did I ignore/write out?  Not sure which you are referring to.

[David Dennison 19536]

1 hour ago, Aphelion said:

There is no contradiction in an omniscient being who exists outside the rules of our universe knowing what an agent in our universe will decide to do at some future event and the ability of the agent to make a free choice.

I’ll give a bit of notation to make clear what I mean; otherwise this discussion gets awfully wordy and it becomes hard to follow one another’s points. For a given event or action I’ll use a bold capital letter followed by brackets. Inside the bracket can contain some description of the event and/or the time the event occurs as a t followed by a number (with a greater number meaning that it happens later in the timeline (i.e. t2 occurs after t1)). So for example action A, which is a glass falling off a table at time t1, is written as A[glass falls from table, t1].  After that I may refer to the same event as simply A.  Now if event A causes event B, I'll write this as A ► B.  So I could write A[glass falls from table, t1] ► B[glass breaks on floor, t2].  For the omniscient being who is outside the rules of our universe I’ll use Ω. Ω knows every detail about our universe, past, present, and future.  Ω is also outside the bounds & rules of our natural world.  

The argument that we cannot have free will if there exists Ω who truly knows everything, including what we will decide in the future, is known as theological fatalism.  This argument is based on the following postulate:

(TFP)  A[tx] ► B [ty] → y>x.  In other words, if A is the cause of B, then B must occur at a later time that A. 

From this the advocates of theological fatalism argue that the following situation A[person makes choice C, t5] ► B[Ω has knowledge of choice C, t2] is therefore an impossibility, since it violates the TFP.  The only way for the TFP to be honored would be if B[Ω has knowledge of choice C, t2] ► A[person makes choice C, t5], but it that were the case than the person's choice C was caused by the knowledge of Ω, which would mean that the choice was not freely made since it was caused by the knowledge of Ω.

The problem with this argument is that the TFP is at best a rule that applies to our universe.  It is not some metaphysical transcendent rule that mandates that our universal timeline is intrinsically linked with all causation.  Our timeline and any link it has with causation in our world is limited to our world; time is a physical property of our universe, not a law of logic.  Ω is not at any point tx in our universe.  Only physical entities within the rules of our universe are at given times in our universe and have events occur at specific times in our universe.  However, Ω is not a physical entity in our universe and therefore cannot be at any time tx.  So it is an error to describe a situation as A[person makes choice C, t5] ► B[Ω has knowledge of choice C, t2] because Ω's acquisition of knowledge is not an event that occurs at any time tx of our universe.  In previous discussions I gave the analogy of a computer game programmer being outside of the game's timeline and yet is still able to act on and know about the game to illustrate how Ω could be outside the rules of our physical world and not be at any given time in our universe and yet still be able to act on and know facts about the universe.  

Regarding the argument that our choices cannot be freely made (in the libertarian free will sense) if all the actions in the universe, including the actions in our brain, are the result of deterministic physical laws and/or stochastic occurrences at the quantum level and as a consequence it follows that the mind is purely the product of the brain, I would say that this is trivially true if one accepts the antecedent that is based on ontological materialism/physicalism/naturalism and the veracity of Mechanism/the mind/brain identity theory.  The discussion of what trivially follows from materialism is not what's of interest and framing the discussion that way begs the question.  The questions that are fundamentally important to the discussion are whether materialism is the correct ontology and whether the human mind can be completely explained by the actions of the brain.  I think both materialism and mechanism are false.  

 

What do you believe to be true?

[Guest]

17 hours ago, David Dennison said:

What do you believe to be true?

Honest question for you:  do you want to have an actual discussion?  It so, then put in just a little effort and make your point.  If you do that, then in return I'll take the time to answer.  It's not worth it to answer if all you have is a single bait question with nothing more than some silly gotcha answer in mind, which is all you had last time.

[David Dennison 19536]

On 5/24/2018 at 3:33 PM, Aphelion said:

Honest question for you:  do you want to have an actual discussion?  It so, then put in just a little effort and make your point.  If you do that, then in return I'll take the time to answer.  It's not worth it to answer if all you have is a single bait question with nothing more than some silly gotcha answer in mind, which is all you had last time.

My question is straightforward. 

What do you believe to be true?

I believe there is no God.

See how easy that is?

Edited May 26, 2018 by David Dennison

[David Dennison 19536]

Ireland supports baby murder.

[Pancho 46301]

 

[NWBuck 8629]

On 5/22/2018 at 8:32 AM, Lagunamadre said:

Does anybody on here believe in predestination? I would love to have  civil debate on that, if so. 

I don't, but only because it was foreordained that I wouldn't.