To__ Orlan_o - _efensive Coor_inator

[Born Burnt 6244]

9 minutes ago, 6th Street said:

Watching that defense get hopelessly shredded reminded me of the Cal game back in 2016. Orlando is the white Vance Bedford.

[LTtxfan 49921]

2 minutes ago, Xian said:

Ugh. This thread is depressing. So close to being great, but so far 

I'm glad Texas played lsu early enough to find out just how good the current 2019 Horns are.  Better to learn Texas' weaknesses before conference games start. Now coaches know more about what areas to work on to improve the Horns and earn a trip to this year's B12 CCG.  

Then Win the Damn B12 CCG!! 

Hook 'em 

[Goodman 3280]

I hope TO proves us wrong but if what Paul says is true, not much will change. 

 

 

[Hard Times 309]

6 hours ago, LTtxfan said:

Thx for this @Machinator

T.O. did take some responsibility for poor defensive results in lsu game...

 

Taking responsibility is one thing, correcting problems and making systematic changes that result in substantial improvement is another. It sounds just like Charlie Strong and Vance Be_for_ 3 years ago. I’m sick and tired of hearing real close, inches away. We got too much of that 3 years ago. As they say, close only counts in horseshoes and something else.

The fact he said it didn’t matter if it was 3rd and short, 3rd and 7 or 3rd and 17 and no regrets on the call, not even considering other options, shows you he’s clueless. What DC in the NFL would ever say it doesn’t matter if it’s 3rd and short vs 3rd and 17 it’s the same call, it doesn’t matter?

Texas will give up half as many yards to Rice and everything will seem OK until the mullet puts up 600+. Of course Rice will still double their average passing YPG playing the Texas defense.

[LTtxfan 49921]

2 hours ago, Hard Times said:

Taking responsibility is one thing, correcting problems and making systematic changes that result in substantial improvement is another. It sounds just like Charlie Strong and Vance Be_for_ 3 years ago. I’m sick and tired of hearing real close, inches away. We got too much of that 3 years ago. As they say, close only counts in horseshoes and something else.

The fact he said it didn’t matter if it was 3rd and short, 3rd and 7 or 3rd and 17 and no regrets on the call, not even considering other options, shows you he’s clueless. What DC in the NFL would ever say it doesn’t matter if it’s 3rd and short vs 3rd and 17 it’s the same call, it doesn’t matter?

Texas will give up half as many yards to Rice and everything will seem OK until the mullet puts up 600+. Of course Rice will still double their average passing YPG playing the Texas defense.

The Texas Defense has to keep improving week to week and Orlando has to be better too.  However, playing a Top 5 team this early in the season was really challenging for this young inexperienced Horns defense. 

But it is only Week 2.

During 2014,  Herman was OC for the ohio state team that won a national championship.  Ranked #8 in Week 2, they also lost their 2nd game of the season at home to Virginia Tech 35 - 21 .  That same ohio state team was young, also endured some critical injuries during the season, and did a lot of growing up in Sept/Oct/Nov.  By the time they reached the B10 Championship Game on Dec 6th, ohio state was a much better team than earlier in the year.  In that B10 CG, ohio state beat Wisconsin 59-0.

This current 2019 Texas Defense has a ton of potential.  But it's time for improvement and better coaching by the defensive staff and Orlando.  No doubt Gundy and Okie Lite will be another hell of a challenge for this young Texas Defense next week.  But it's time to step up and beat Rice, Okie Lite, and West Virginia. It's time to see week to week growth for this Horns defense.

Get to the blOU game with a 4-1 record, and then let's all enjoy another big time game vs blOU at The State Fair of Texas!!

Hook 'em🤘 

 

Edited September 12, 2019 by LTtxfan
typo

[Reynolds Woodcock 5065]

I think some of the histrionics with respect to Orlando are a bit overblown. In college football, more often than not really good quarterbacks running a hurry up spread are going to put up points. That is particularly true when defenses have inexperienced corners like we do.

Is Dave Aranda a bad coordinator because his defense couldn't stop our offense a single fucking time in the second half? Was Brent Venables a bad coordinator in 2008 when Colt hung 45 on them? It's not that Orlando is infallible or that individual plays can't be criticized, but I don't think he's suddenly become a net negative because his defenses have given up points to some great offenses and quarterbacks.  3rd and 17 in particular was obviously massively disappointing, but Burrow was a half second from being sacked and made a really incredible play.    

[Liquor and Poker 3659]

The title of this thread always makes me think “Ace Ventura - Pet Detective” for some reason. 

[sith_horn 2487]

Scipio Tex is spot on in his assessment. The most important thing TO's defense lacks is fundamentals. Being young doesn't excuse poor angles and tackling. If you can chew gum and walk at the same time, you can learn to tackle correctly. And it doesn't take all of spring and fall camp to learn it either. It's a matter of emphasis. TO emphasizes his schemes over fundamentals.

[Fozzz 152]

Removing the letter D from the name of a defensive coach you don't like is some of the most aggy shit ever.  

[LTtxfan 49921]

33 minutes ago, Liquor and Poker said:

The title of this thread always makes me think “Ace Ventura - Pet Detective” for some reason. 

Interesting... thread created by @Machinator 

 

Finkle is Einhorn is Machinator???

 

 

Edited September 12, 2019 by LTtxfan

[WBT 20898]

10 minutes ago, Fozzz said:

Removing the letter D from the name of a defensive coach you don't like is some of the most aggy shit ever.  

I don't see how that can be true.

 

No D to remove

[softlynow 1893]

Todd clearly failed to impart focusness. With that we can overcome all else. Do we even have a focusness QC coach?

[Gravy Train 983]

17 minutes ago, softlynow said:

Todd clearly failed to impart focusness. With that we can overcome all else. Do we even have a focusness QC coach?

Better rally the troops for a road trip to find some.

[satyanash 15429]

Godspeed, Orlando.

 

[Fondren & Main 6881]

To Orlano, the definition of insanity is to repeat the same shit process and expect different results.  Fucking To...fix this shit you bastard!

[6th Street 6656]

That guy has no shame. The defense is not "close" when they are leaving WR wide open and giving up scores on every drive.

[BurdineBandit 823]

Just to be clear, the whole "it's early in the season at least we know what are weaknesses are!" slant only works if you're confident your coach knows how to and is willing to fix those weaknesses.

Last year we got our wake up call week 1. 34 points to Maryland. Then he took Malc out of the ILB spot (what a f'n idea that was) just in time to give up 45 to OU, 38 to Ok St and 42 to WVU. Then 34 to Tech (win) and another 39 to OU in the CG. With seniors galore as DBs. He had been coaching them in the system for a full year + already. How much time are these DBs going to need?

I'm not down on this season yet. A strong QB can win you a lot of games, but we're basically OU with less explosive receivers right now. A QB that knows exactly how to run his system and can carry you to a victory, in spite of a defense that will hurt you when it matters. This isn't championship football, it's 4th seed in the playoff football with a 1st-round exit. As a die-hard Longhorn and Texas Ex, I don't cheer on my team for a hope that our ceiling will be OU for the past decade.

[bschoolprof 6340]

Sadly, the "we're so close" nonsense reminds of the 2009-2010 Gerg Davis era when the excuse from our coaches for our terrible running game was always "we were one block away on that play !!!"

Edited September 12, 2019 by bschoolprof

[6th Street 6656]

5 minutes ago, BurdineBandit said:

Just to be clear, the whole "it's early in the season at least we know what are weaknesses are!" slant only works if you're confident your coach knows how to and is willing to fix those weaknesses.

Last year we got our wake up call week 1. 34 points to Maryland. Then he took Malc out of the ILB spot (what a f'n idea that was) just in time to give up 45 to OU, 38 to Ok St and 42 to WVU. Then 34 to Tech (win) and another 39 to OU in the CG. With seniors galore as DBs. He had been coaching them in the system for a full year + already. How much time are these DBs going to need?

I'm not down on this season yet. A strong QB can win you a lot of games, but we're basically OU with less explosive receivers right now. A QB that knows exactly how to run his system and can carry you to a victory, in spite of a defense that will hurt you when it matters. This isn't championship football, it's 4th seed in the playoff football with a 1st-round exit. As a die-hard Longhorn and Texas Ex, I don't cheer on my team for a hope that our ceiling will be OU for the past decade.

The defense can not be counted on to get a stop during critical moments in the 4th quarter where they fold like a cheap tent - see OU twice last year, WV on their last min scoring drive, Ok State, and LSU this year. 

[Reynolds Woodcock 5065]

8 minutes ago, BurdineBandit said:

This isn't championship football, it's 4th seed in the playoff football with a 1st-round exit. As a die-hard Longhorn and Texas Ex, I don't cheer on my team for a hope that our ceiling will be OU for the past decade.

Then you must have been pretty disappointed in all but a handful of seasons for the entirety of our program. 

[GTX Horn 1725]

What has happened since 2017? The defense kept us in a lot of those games Herman's first year but now it's become a liability? I don't understand. It seems like as they bring in players that fit more in line with their scheme the defense would continue to perform well but it's regressed since then.

[stork642 4511]

3 hours ago, Reynolds Woodcock said:

I think some of the histrionics with respect to Orlando are a bit overblown. In college football, more often than not really good quarterbacks running a hurry up spread are going to put up points. That is particularly true when defenses have inexperienced corners like we do.

Is Dave Aranda a bad coordinator because his defense couldn't stop our offense a single fucking time in the second half? Was Brent Venables a bad coordinator in 2008 when Colt hung 45 on them? It's not that Orlando is infallible or that individual plays can't be criticized, but I don't think he's suddenly become a net negative because his defenses have given up points to some great offenses and quarterbacks.  3rd and 17 in particular was obviously massively disappointing, but Burrow was a half second from being sacked and made a really incredible play.    

Well, this is way too logical.  Some people just jump at any opportunity to say the sky is falling.  I still remember when the offense was young and some wrote off Sam.  Now the defense is very young and Orlando sucks.  I’m not saying he’s is great and will turn things around but it’s premature to say he sucks.  Weren’t a bunch of posters wanting to give him a big raise because we didn’t want to lose him not too long ago?  Schizophrenic surly is the best.  

[bschoolprof 6340]

1 hour ago, GTX Horn said:

What has happened since 2017? The defense kept us in a lot of those games Herman's first year but now it's become a liability? I don't understand. It seems like as they bring in players that fit more in line with their scheme the defense would continue to perform well but it's regressed since then.

possibilities for the defensive decline that I have seen offered:

1) In 2017 perhaps we lived off fundamentals from the prior regime, akin to Manny benefiting from Muschamp players in 2011, or Strong benefiting from  Greg Robinson players in 2014.

2) personnel - we are young (and bad) at D-line and corner

3) Offenses have caught up to Orlando and he has not responded.  

 

2) and 3) seem much more likely than 1 IMO.   

 

[onileven 6]

Nice hair


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[1leggedduck 443]

I'm concerned but not hysterical. I have questions. There are no bad questions, but there are inquisitive idiots, so be patient: Is the scheme such an attack oriented scheme that the D backs are screwed if the rush can't get to the QB? Or, are the D backs failing to execute their assignments and would otherwise be in better positions to make plays? Which raises the question of whether the D backs are being well coached. 

Whatever the reason, our secondary is often a step behind, even though we seem to be recruiting some very talented D backs. 

[BigVegasHorn26 630]

Corners can’t cover shit.  DL can’t get shit for pressure.   Shitty combination to have.  

[Machinator 32102]

(Ian Boyd) Inside the Gameplan: Orlando's miscalculation

There’s no turning back from third-and-17. That was a decisive moment in history for Tom Herman’s time at Texas when it became clear that Todd Orlando is not “getting it” in the way that it appeared he did in 2017. The Longhorns had a fantastic chance on that down to play respectable defense, receive a punt, and then allow Sam Ehlinger to go win the football game against a worn down LSU defense. Instead he called that fateful zero blitz that played man coverage on all four wideouts while asking safety Chris Brown to hang shallow to play hot routes or the QB scramble.

Chris Brown’s assignment on this play sums up the total failure to play smart situational football. To use a safety to safeguard against one of the least dangerous risks (a scramble or underneath pass) in that situation rather than ensuring that he can protect against the most dangerous risk (a completion at or near the first down marker) is baffling. Orlando called that play like his whole career hinged on a remarkably positive outcome, like he needed to justify his whole philosophy. Instead the underlying flaws in his philosophy were laid bare.

While enduring yet another whipping at the hands of the hurry-up, no-huddle (HUNH) spread offense, Orlando doubled down on his guiding principle, “solve your problems with aggression.” That's a common refrain heard amongst coordinators in Orlando’s sphere and that’s exactly what he turned to in order to try and finally land a victory against Joe Burrow. It’s an increasingly outdated philosophy that doesn’t work at the highest levels of the game that we’re watching evolve on Saturdays and Sundays.

What is Todd Orlando trying to do?

Before diving into the challenges that the HUNH spread is presenting to Orlando’s defensive schemes, it’s worth pausing to sum up what it is exactly that the Texas defense is trying to accomplish. Scipio’s “call-matching” is a pretty useful summary but there are some other dimensions at play too. After all, Gary Patterson often explains that out-calling the offensive coordinator is a major component to his anti-spread strategy:

“I’ve always said if you have a 60 play game, 50% of the time I want to have a better call than you do. So 30 plays. If I can limit a game down to 30 plays...”

There’s some good sense here. If the defense can thwart the offensive design half the time with a smart call that punishes an offensive tendency or denies their go-to options, that leaves the other half of the plays for the offense to make something happen. Provided that the defense plays sound football all the time, this approach can grievously limit an offense’s ability to pile points on the scoreboard.

There are key differences in how Orlando and Patterson approach this strategy though, as anyone that watches the two defenses can see. Patterson’s defense is highly compartmentalized in a fashion that allows for them to bring complexity from down to down just by varying the combinations. They are far less ambitious than the Longhorns in regards to which players are asked to play in which realm of responsibility. Another difference is that Patterson is aiming to out-call the offense and play to their specific tendency, not to kill them with pressure half the time.

Orlando’s defense is perhaps best described as an attacking, positionless quarters defense. While they played a huge variety of coverages and calls against LSU, a fair chunk of the time Orlando is simply reconfiguring the pieces on the field to arrive at the same point. The main call is this one, a quarters scheme played behind the “tite” front:

This is the base quarters look. The safeties have reads to determine where to help while the cornerbacks are potentially on islands outside against the outside receivers. It’s an innovative defense that’s been a popular system for years now for the way it allows a team to match spread sets without giving up numbers deep while still bringing enough hats to stop the run. Orlando’s brand, which matches quarters coverage with the tite front, is now a well established “spread to run” killer.

It becomes a “positionless quarters” team for the way that Orlando regularly moves players around to fill different roles in the front. The dime package is highly useful for getting multiple players on the field that are fast, physical, and can credibly force the edge, blitz, or match receivers in coverage. With extra safeties on the field there are more Xs for Orlando to potentially move around without yielding matchup advantages to the offense. It’s also useful for helping Orlando to achieve his other two base calls, the overload, 5-man edge blitz from single high and then the rover insert.

Here’s the single-high call:

It plays by match rules moreso than zone with the corners typically manning up the outside receivers, the rover and B-backer here matching the RB and TE, and the strong safety dropping down to cover the slot. The other safety plays the post from the deep middle. Orlando has tons and tons of blitzes but this is a favorite and it pairs really well with the rover insert blitz:

In this call Texas plays a more hybrid front backed by quarters coverage with the rover serving as a de-facto defensive tackle trying to beat a guard in protection. Orlando loves showing one of these blitzes to encourage the offense to check into a pass protection call that is then vulnerable to the other blitz.

The guiding philosophy behind this “positionless quarters” defense is to be able to have a dozen ways to play a few traditional, sound coverages while still bringing pressure on the quarterback and offense. The goal is to use duplicity to confuse the offense about what’s coming and then hit them hard and fast in their weak spots.

Every offensive and defensive call has its tradeoffs, the strong dimensions and the weak spots. Orlando’s goal is to use his constantly shifting movements to encourage the offense to call plays that will be vulnerable against his pressures while resting on the security that ultimately, even if the offense isn’t fooled, that Texas is still almost always playing a fairly normal, sound call (except third-and-17). Whereas Patterson wants to defend you as precisely as he can on each play, Orlando wants to attack you as precisely as he can.

What is Todd Orlando missing?
Texas initially began running the 3-2-6 dime package against Oklahoma State back in 2017. The Iowa State-inspired “inverted Tampa 2” was initially just one tool they intended to utilize in that game but it became an every down call when they realized that Oklahoma State couldn’t move the ball against it, especially when combined with Michael Dickson’s punting. The inverted Tampa 2 is different than the single high coverages or quarters schemes that comprise the bulk of Texas’ base defense:

As I explain in my new book, this defense is basically the classic “Tampa 2” defense with two addendums. The first is subbing a DT like Warren Sapp out of the game and distributed his run fit responsibilities to the remaining defenders up front. The second is subbing in another safety to play the deep middle drop that the Tampa 2 gave to middle linebackers like Brian Urlacher. The middle linebacker becomes a plugger again and that middle safety is responsible for making sure the defense gets an extra hat in coverage or against the run.

What makes it effective against spread offenses is presence of that middle safety (the joker for Texas) who can stop the deeper crossing routes that spread offenses love using. With an extra guy sitting on that route, the defense can get back to playing deep safeties on the hash marks who can credibly help the cornerbacks on football's most lethal route, the post.

You can see that dynamic on this play from the LSU game.

The Tigers are running the sort of play that has defined the Air Raid and HUNH spread’s dominion over the Big 12 for the last 20 years, a shallow cross with a dig/post combination outside.

Without enough depth underneath from the linebackers (distracted by the shallow), the safety has to pick up that dig, leaving the corner without any help inside on the post route. Touchdown.

You can watch this exact same process play it every other Saturday in the Big 12 for the last decade, but the inverted Tampa 2 defense matches that dig with the joker and allows the safety to stay over the top and stop the post.

It’s not impossible to defend these concepts with Texas’ quarters defense, but it’s very difficult and particularly so when defenders are constantly shuffling into different positions rather than fine-tuning their execution of specific roles. The Longhorns are in the “rover insert” call here, which is pretty standard and should be very familiar to their players, but they are not executing it at a high enough level to defend that play call from the better Big 12 (or now SEC) HUNH spread offenses.

The “positionless quarters” defense is at its finest when the game is about getting numbers to the box to stop the run and then confusing a QB or OL with who exactly is coming from where. It’s not as effective against a spread passing attack unless that unit can’t read coverages or protect.

Another challenge for Texas is the way that Orlando chooses to deploy his personnel in a given year. Texas played Foster on the edge as a B-backer for the majority of the LSU game and called “inverted Tampa 2” on just eight plays Saturday night. Those eight plays faced five run calls that yielded 17 yards at 3.4 ypc. The Tigers called a pass into that defense just three times, with a pair of deep cross completions for 35 total yards and then a six yard scramble from Burrow. The genius of the inverted Tampa 2 is that it often encourages the offense into a run play before allowing the front to spill the ball outside to a fast and physical secondary.

Texas did that well, but they didn’t play particularly great coverage even when in the IT2. Instead they opted for something akin to the 2010 Pittsburgh Steelers 3-4 defense only with B.J. Foster and Brandon Jones playing as the outside linebackers rather than LaMarr Woodley and James Harrison. Orlando seemed to think that the outdated dimension to the old Dick LeBeau zone blitz defense was the personnel package rather than the system itself. The Steelers have slowly been learning to give up on that defense as a consequence of getting shredded on an annual basis by the HUNH spread New England Patriots.

Even before the 2017 season had concluded Orlando was starting to experiment and diversify the 3-2-6 personnel package to move away from the inverted Tampa 2 and back toward attacking up front. Thus far 2018 and 2019 have been defined by Orlando using the dime package not as a way to bolster the back end but as a way to increase the number of options for disguising and attacking up front. That’s clearly his guiding philosophy, to orient his defense in ways that allow them to be as aggressive as possible.

In the 2018 season he oriented his defense to attack opponents at the most foundational levels of the defense. He played the league's fastest and potentially best coverage linebacker (Gary Johnson) as the blitzing rover while using one of the league's slowest linebackers (Anthony Wheeler) to handle slot receivers in space. In 2019 he got back to dime defense but has regularly parked his extra safety down on the line to disguise Texas’ movements and increase the multiplicity of the blitz package.

This approach simply doesn’t appreciate the firepower of modern HUNH spread offenses. Even with Texas in dime, a QB like Joe Burrow is still able to sort out the gameplan in live action and avoid Orlando’s different traps. The Tigers used TE motion and some other tricks to get Texas to give away some of coverages and looks before punishing them down the field.

The calculus against this style of offense is different. A successful call by Orlando may yield a six yard loss on a sack, a successful counter by Burrow may result in six points. Texas sacked Burrow four times and he threw four touchdown passes, who won that exchange?

What’s more, the “safe” quarters and single high coverages that Texas is playing behind their pressures aren’t really “safe” against modern offenses. As we see on a weekly basis, a defense is always dancing on a knife’s edge against a good spread passing attack. The reason for the spread of the inverted Tampa 2 defense is that increasing numbers of defensive coordinators are realizing that they can’t ask their team to hold up on the back end playing two-deep.

Civil war buffs may recall a similar dynamic at play in the battle of Gettysburg. Fresh off a ridiculous victory at Chancellorsville in which he’d split his already badly outnumbered army in half and flanked the Union army with a charge from Gen. Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee and the Confederate army were riding high as they marched through Pennsylvania. When Lee encountered the Union army parked on the heights at Gettsyburg, he determined to probe and find the perfect spot to attack and punch through, culminating in “Pickett’s charge” on the third and final day of the battle.

That frontal assault into the middle of the Union line across open field and uphill was strongly discouraged by Lee’s top general, James Longstreet, who repeatedly cautioned Lee that modern offensive firepower made these sorts of Napoleonic charges completely outdated and ruinous. Lee ignored those concerns and ordered him to send General Pickett and 15,000 men across the field and up the hill where over half of them were killed, wounded, or captured. Lee’s army never recovered and would go on to lose the war.

Orlando’s third-and-17 play call was his “Pickett’s charge.” When the offensive firepower of spread offenses proved too much, he doubled down and sent a full frontal assault that cost Texas the game against LSU. Fortunately for Texas, there’s still enough time that the season may not be lost, although you worry about the missed offseason reps in a more conservative style.

High school offensive systems, private skills coaching, rule changes, and modern spread passing tactics have changed the game. Trying to flip the script and building your defense first to punch holes through the front is an outdated strategy. The modern calculus doesn’t allow for it.

Defenses need to figure out how to start from the back end like Bill Belichik has done in the NFL, orienting their tactics to be able to first cover up an opponent’s most dangerous passing dimension before worrying about anything else. While Orlando is teaching his safeties to blitz and drop in a variety of places, Belichik is teaching his how to bracket and eliminate the sorts of receivers and routes that lead to scores like 45-38. Once Belichik is sure that he’s taken away your right hand in the passing game, it becomes simpler and safer to apply pressure.

Many elements of the Texas defense are cutting edge. Packaging personnel for generating matchups and creating disguise is the new wave, as are the “simulated pressures” that define the approach of blitzing coaches from the defensive school that produced Orlando. But that can’t be the guiding light of a defense that wants to play winning football against players like Kyler Murray, Joe Burrow, or Trevor Lawrence. Winning with an attacking defense shouldn’t be the gameplan for a program that can attack with Sam Ehlinger. The philosophy needs to change for Texas to win a championship.

[Bill Lumbergh 7337]

The defense can not be counted on to get a stop during critical moments in the 4th quarter where they fold like a cheap tent - see OU twice last year, WV on their last min scoring drive, Ok State, and LSU this year. 

Orlando needs to understand when to prevent big plays rather than trying to make them.

In all of the games you listed, we only had to prevent big/fast/low probability scores from happening. Too often in situations like this he's still coaching to prevent first downs rather than to prevent quick strike scores. There's no reason for anything other than conservative calls in these game situations.

We should have been ok to give up a couple of scores to ou late in the RRS, just make sure each one takes time. Instead we were still attacking and left ourselves vulnerable to a quick strike, just as we did against osu and wvu.

It was true with a mature team, and it's more true now with a young team. It's like a guy who sells himself out of a sale he'd already made bc he doesn't know when to back off. He has to stop or we'll see more fourth quarter madness this year.

[Levi 2657]

3 hours ago, sith_horn said:

Scipio Tex is spot on in his assessment. The most important thing TO's defense lacks is fundamentals. Being young doesn't excuse poor angles and tackling. If you can chew gum and walk at the same time, you can learn to tackle correctly. And it doesn't take all of spring and fall camp to learn it either. It's a matter of emphasis. TO emphasizes his schemes over fundamentals.

Well comparing the defensive fundamentals from Charlie to now I think we are in much better shape. Physicality alone has been one of the best things brought by TH and company. Texas’ young corners were indeed found to be young and they showed by looking lost or by not making the open field tackle. Most of our older guys tackled well e.g. jones and brown. Also, Devin Duvernay might have something to say about LSU’s tackling fundamentals and how he made them look like Pop Warner.  *cough* Delpit *cough*. But hey who gives a fuck about their shitty defense, they won. 

[pacman 7497]

1 hour ago, bschoolprof said:

possibilities for the defensive decline that I have seen offered:

1) In 2017 perhaps we lived off fundamentals from the prior regime, akin to Manny benefiting from Muschamp players in 2011, or Strong benefiting from  Greg Robinson players in 2014.

2) personnel - we are young (and bad) at D-line and corner

3) Offenses have caught up to Orlando and he has not responded.  

 

2) and 3) seem much more likely than 1 IMO.   

 

It's 3 and only 3, though we certainly are inexperienced at corner.

Graham struggles, but the DL has been a plus this season. They clog running lanes and get push on passing plays.

They are 3 versus 5 for 60 plays a game. Too many blitzes are so slow, we gave LSU time to double the DL and then hammer the blitzer for a clean pocket. It's a losing proposition to expect stats out of the DL.

The CBs have way too much on their plate left on an island, with no LB help underneath, across the middle and the QB has 20 Mississippi's to find the pass. Washington and predecessors also clearly never teaches anybody to look for the ball as that has been a problem since Akina left 

Edited September 12, 2019 by pacman

[LTtxfan 49921]

1 hour ago, Machinator said:

(Ian Boyd) Inside the Gameplan: Orlando's miscalculation

 

  Reveal hidden contents

 

There’s no turning back from third-and-17. That was a decisive moment in history for Tom Herman’s time at Texas when it became clear that Todd Orlando is not “getting it” in the way that it appeared he did in 2017. The Longhorns had a fantastic chance on that down to play respectable defense, receive a punt, and then allow Sam Ehlinger to go win the football game against a worn down LSU defense. Instead he called that fateful zero blitz that played man coverage on all four wideouts while asking safety Chris Brown to hang shallow to play hot routes or the QB scramble.

Chris Brown’s assignment on this play sums up the total failure to play smart situational football. To use a safety to safeguard against one of the least dangerous risks (a scramble or underneath pass) in that situation rather than ensuring that he can protect against the most dangerous risk (a completion at or near the first down marker) is baffling. Orlando called that play like his whole career hinged on a remarkably positive outcome, like he needed to justify his whole philosophy. Instead the underlying flaws in his philosophy were laid bare.

While enduring yet another whipping at the hands of the hurry-up, no-huddle (HUNH) spread offense, Orlando doubled down on his guiding principle, “solve your problems with aggression.” That's a common refrain heard amongst coordinators in Orlando’s sphere and that’s exactly what he turned to in order to try and finally land a victory against Joe Burrow. It’s an increasingly outdated philosophy that doesn’t work at the highest levels of the game that we’re watching evolve on Saturdays and Sundays.

What is Todd Orlando trying to do?

Before diving into the challenges that the HUNH spread is presenting to Orlando’s defensive schemes, it’s worth pausing to sum up what it is exactly that the Texas defense is trying to accomplish. Scipio’s “call-matching” is a pretty useful summary but there are some other dimensions at play too. After all, Gary Patterson often explains that out-calling the offensive coordinator is a major component to his anti-spread strategy:

“I’ve always said if you have a 60 play game, 50% of the time I want to have a better call than you do. So 30 plays. If I can limit a game down to 30 plays...”

There’s some good sense here. If the defense can thwart the offensive design half the time with a smart call that punishes an offensive tendency or denies their go-to options, that leaves the other half of the plays for the offense to make something happen. Provided that the defense plays sound football all the time, this approach can grievously limit an offense’s ability to pile points on the scoreboard.

There are key differences in how Orlando and Patterson approach this strategy though, as anyone that watches the two defenses can see. Patterson’s defense is highly compartmentalized in a fashion that allows for them to bring complexity from down to down just by varying the combinations. They are far less ambitious than the Longhorns in regards to which players are asked to play in which realm of responsibility. Another difference is that Patterson is aiming to out-call the offense and play to their specific tendency, not to kill them with pressure half the time.

Orlando’s defense is perhaps best described as an attacking, positionless quarters defense. While they played a huge variety of coverages and calls against LSU, a fair chunk of the time Orlando is simply reconfiguring the pieces on the field to arrive at the same point. The main call is this one, a quarters scheme played behind the “tite” front:

This is the base quarters look. The safeties have reads to determine where to help while the cornerbacks are potentially on islands outside against the outside receivers. It’s an innovative defense that’s been a popular system for years now for the way it allows a team to match spread sets without giving up numbers deep while still bringing enough hats to stop the run. Orlando’s brand, which matches quarters coverage with the tite front, is now a well established “spread to run” killer.

It becomes a “positionless quarters” team for the way that Orlando regularly moves players around to fill different roles in the front. The dime package is highly useful for getting multiple players on the field that are fast, physical, and can credibly force the edge, blitz, or match receivers in coverage. With extra safeties on the field there are more Xs for Orlando to potentially move around without yielding matchup advantages to the offense. It’s also useful for helping Orlando to achieve his other two base calls, the overload, 5-man edge blitz from single high and then the rover insert.

Here’s the single-high call:

It plays by match rules moreso than zone with the corners typically manning up the outside receivers, the rover and B-backer here matching the RB and TE, and the strong safety dropping down to cover the slot. The other safety plays the post from the deep middle. Orlando has tons and tons of blitzes but this is a favorite and it pairs really well with the rover insert blitz:

In this call Texas plays a more hybrid front backed by quarters coverage with the rover serving as a de-facto defensive tackle trying to beat a guard in protection. Orlando loves showing one of these blitzes to encourage the offense to check into a pass protection call that is then vulnerable to the other blitz.

The guiding philosophy behind this “positionless quarters” defense is to be able to have a dozen ways to play a few traditional, sound coverages while still bringing pressure on the quarterback and offense. The goal is to use duplicity to confuse the offense about what’s coming and then hit them hard and fast in their weak spots.

Every offensive and defensive call has its tradeoffs, the strong dimensions and the weak spots. Orlando’s goal is to use his constantly shifting movements to encourage the offense to call plays that will be vulnerable against his pressures while resting on the security that ultimately, even if the offense isn’t fooled, that Texas is still almost always playing a fairly normal, sound call (except third-and-17). Whereas Patterson wants to defend you as precisely as he can on each play, Orlando wants to attack you as precisely as he can.

What is Todd Orlando missing?
Texas initially began running the 3-2-6 dime package against Oklahoma State back in 2017. The Iowa State-inspired “inverted Tampa 2” was initially just one tool they intended to utilize in that game but it became an every down call when they realized that Oklahoma State couldn’t move the ball against it, especially when combined with Michael Dickson’s punting. The inverted Tampa 2 is different than the single high coverages or quarters schemes that comprise the bulk of Texas’ base defense:

As I explain in my new book, this defense is basically the classic “Tampa 2” defense with two addendums. The first is subbing a DT like Warren Sapp out of the game and distributed his run fit responsibilities to the remaining defenders up front. The second is subbing in another safety to play the deep middle drop that the Tampa 2 gave to middle linebackers like Brian Urlacher. The middle linebacker becomes a plugger again and that middle safety is responsible for making sure the defense gets an extra hat in coverage or against the run.

What makes it effective against spread offenses is presence of that middle safety (the joker for Texas) who can stop the deeper crossing routes that spread offenses love using. With an extra guy sitting on that route, the defense can get back to playing deep safeties on the hash marks who can credibly help the cornerbacks on football's most lethal route, the post.

You can see that dynamic on this play from the LSU game.

The Tigers are running the sort of play that has defined the Air Raid and HUNH spread’s dominion over the Big 12 for the last 20 years, a shallow cross with a dig/post combination outside.

Without enough depth underneath from the linebackers (distracted by the shallow), the safety has to pick up that dig, leaving the corner without any help inside on the post route. Touchdown.

You can watch this exact same process play it every other Saturday in the Big 12 for the last decade, but the inverted Tampa 2 defense matches that dig with the joker and allows the safety to stay over the top and stop the post.

It’s not impossible to defend these concepts with Texas’ quarters defense, but it’s very difficult and particularly so when defenders are constantly shuffling into different positions rather than fine-tuning their execution of specific roles. The Longhorns are in the “rover insert” call here, which is pretty standard and should be very familiar to their players, but they are not executing it at a high enough level to defend that play call from the better Big 12 (or now SEC) HUNH spread offenses.

The “positionless quarters” defense is at its finest when the game is about getting numbers to the box to stop the run and then confusing a QB or OL with who exactly is coming from where. It’s not as effective against a spread passing attack unless that unit can’t read coverages or protect.

Another challenge for Texas is the way that Orlando chooses to deploy his personnel in a given year. Texas played Foster on the edge as a B-backer for the majority of the LSU game and called “inverted Tampa 2” on just eight plays Saturday night. Those eight plays faced five run calls that yielded 17 yards at 3.4 ypc. The Tigers called a pass into that defense just three times, with a pair of deep cross completions for 35 total yards and then a six yard scramble from Burrow. The genius of the inverted Tampa 2 is that it often encourages the offense into a run play before allowing the front to spill the ball outside to a fast and physical secondary.

Texas did that well, but they didn’t play particularly great coverage even when in the IT2. Instead they opted for something akin to the 2010 Pittsburgh Steelers 3-4 defense only with B.J. Foster and Brandon Jones playing as the outside linebackers rather than LaMarr Woodley and James Harrison. Orlando seemed to think that the outdated dimension to the old Dick LeBeau zone blitz defense was the personnel package rather than the system itself. The Steelers have slowly been learning to give up on that defense as a consequence of getting shredded on an annual basis by the HUNH spread New England Patriots.

Even before the 2017 season had concluded Orlando was starting to experiment and diversify the 3-2-6 personnel package to move away from the inverted Tampa 2 and back toward attacking up front. Thus far 2018 and 2019 have been defined by Orlando using the dime package not as a way to bolster the back end but as a way to increase the number of options for disguising and attacking up front. That’s clearly his guiding philosophy, to orient his defense in ways that allow them to be as aggressive as possible.

In the 2018 season he oriented his defense to attack opponents at the most foundational levels of the defense. He played the league's fastest and potentially best coverage linebacker (Gary Johnson) as the blitzing rover while using one of the league's slowest linebackers (Anthony Wheeler) to handle slot receivers in space. In 2019 he got back to dime defense but has regularly parked his extra safety down on the line to disguise Texas’ movements and increase the multiplicity of the blitz package.

This approach simply doesn’t appreciate the firepower of modern HUNH spread offenses. Even with Texas in dime, a QB like Joe Burrow is still able to sort out the gameplan in live action and avoid Orlando’s different traps. The Tigers used TE motion and some other tricks to get Texas to give away some of coverages and looks before punishing them down the field.

The calculus against this style of offense is different. A successful call by Orlando may yield a six yard loss on a sack, a successful counter by Burrow may result in six points. Texas sacked Burrow four times and he threw four touchdown passes, who won that exchange?

What’s more, the “safe” quarters and single high coverages that Texas is playing behind their pressures aren’t really “safe” against modern offenses. As we see on a weekly basis, a defense is always dancing on a knife’s edge against a good spread passing attack. The reason for the spread of the inverted Tampa 2 defense is that increasing numbers of defensive coordinators are realizing that they can’t ask their team to hold up on the back end playing two-deep.

Civil war buffs may recall a similar dynamic at play in the battle of Gettysburg. Fresh off a ridiculous victory at Chancellorsville in which he’d split his already badly outnumbered army in half and flanked the Union army with a charge from Gen. Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee and the Confederate army were riding high as they marched through Pennsylvania. When Lee encountered the Union army parked on the heights at Gettsyburg, he determined to probe and find the perfect spot to attack and punch through, culminating in “Pickett’s charge” on the third and final day of the battle.

That frontal assault into the middle of the Union line across open field and uphill was strongly discouraged by Lee’s top general, James Longstreet, who repeatedly cautioned Lee that modern offensive firepower made these sorts of Napoleonic charges completely outdated and ruinous. Lee ignored those concerns and ordered him to send General Pickett and 15,000 men across the field and up the hill where over half of them were killed, wounded, or captured. Lee’s army never recovered and would go on to lose the war.

Orlando’s third-and-17 play call was his “Pickett’s charge.” When the offensive firepower of spread offenses proved too much, he doubled down and sent a full frontal assault that cost Texas the game against LSU. Fortunately for Texas, there’s still enough time that the season may not be lost, although you worry about the missed offseason reps in a more conservative style.

High school offensive systems, private skills coaching, rule changes, and modern spread passing tactics have changed the game. Trying to flip the script and building your defense first to punch holes through the front is an outdated strategy. The modern calculus doesn’t allow for it.

Defenses need to figure out how to start from the back end like Bill Belichik has done in the NFL, orienting their tactics to be able to first cover up an opponent’s most dangerous passing dimension before worrying about anything else. While Orlando is teaching his safeties to blitz and drop in a variety of places, Belichik is teaching his how to bracket and eliminate the sorts of receivers and routes that lead to scores like 45-38. Once Belichik is sure that he’s taken away your right hand in the passing game, it becomes simpler and safer to apply pressure.

Many elements of the Texas defense are cutting edge. Packaging personnel for generating matchups and creating disguise is the new wave, as are the “simulated pressures” that define the approach of blitzing coaches from the defensive school that produced Orlando. But that can’t be the guiding light of a defense that wants to play winning football against players like Kyler Murray, Joe Burrow, or Trevor Lawrence. Winning with an attacking defense shouldn’t be the gameplan for a program that can attack with Sam Ehlinger. The philosophy needs to change for Texas to win a championship.

 

Thanks... out of reps today.

1) So with Foster and Overshown out for awhile, what will Orlando do for secondary in Okie Lite game??

2) Is B.Jones really our best option at nickel?? 

Just seems like we might be playing too many DB's in new positions, resulting in a lot more mistakes...

[XYZ 2154]

I know this thread is for bitching about Orlando’s scheme, but I think another reason why the Texas D is getting pummeled by good passing offenses is the lack of game changers. Who is the heart of this defense, the guy that keeps the opposing OC from sleeping at night?

[Katfid54 9005]

3 minutes ago, XYZ said:

I know this thread is for bitching about Orlando’s scheme, but I think another reason why the Texas D is getting pummeled by good passing offenses is the lack of game changers. Who is the heart of this defense, the guy that keeps the opposing OC from sleeping at night?

This is dumb.  We have several of them.

BJ Foster, Caden Sterns, Joseph Ossai

[Fozzz 152]

Quote

Another difference is that Patterson is aiming to out-call the offense and play to their specific tendency, not to kill them with pressure half the time.

This is why it's laughable when idiots try to defend Orlando by claiming that he has a "bend but don't break" defense and that's why many teams find it so easy to move the ball on Texas.  No, he emphasizes creating negative plays and the reason why teams move the ball so well on Texas is because Texas' defense was bad last season and doesn't appear to be much (if at all) improved this season.  

[LTtxfan 49921]

1 hour ago, Machinator said:

(Ian Boyd) Inside the Gameplan: Orlando's miscalculation

 

  Reveal hidden contents

 

There’s no turning back from third-and-17. That was a decisive moment in history for Tom Herman’s time at Texas when it became clear that Todd Orlando is not “getting it” in the way that it appeared he did in 2017. The Longhorns had a fantastic chance on that down to play respectable defense, receive a punt, and then allow Sam Ehlinger to go win the football game against a worn down LSU defense. Instead he called that fateful zero blitz that played man coverage on all four wideouts while asking safety Chris Brown to hang shallow to play hot routes or the QB scramble.

Chris Brown’s assignment on this play sums up the total failure to play smart situational football. To use a safety to safeguard against one of the least dangerous risks (a scramble or underneath pass) in that situation rather than ensuring that he can protect against the most dangerous risk (a completion at or near the first down marker) is baffling. Orlando called that play like his whole career hinged on a remarkably positive outcome, like he needed to justify his whole philosophy. Instead the underlying flaws in his philosophy were laid bare.

While enduring yet another whipping at the hands of the hurry-up, no-huddle (HUNH) spread offense, Orlando doubled down on his guiding principle, “solve your problems with aggression.” That's a common refrain heard amongst coordinators in Orlando’s sphere and that’s exactly what he turned to in order to try and finally land a victory against Joe Burrow. It’s an increasingly outdated philosophy that doesn’t work at the highest levels of the game that we’re watching evolve on Saturdays and Sundays.

What is Todd Orlando trying to do?

Before diving into the challenges that the HUNH spread is presenting to Orlando’s defensive schemes, it’s worth pausing to sum up what it is exactly that the Texas defense is trying to accomplish. Scipio’s “call-matching” is a pretty useful summary but there are some other dimensions at play too. After all, Gary Patterson often explains that out-calling the offensive coordinator is a major component to his anti-spread strategy:

“I’ve always said if you have a 60 play game, 50% of the time I want to have a better call than you do. So 30 plays. If I can limit a game down to 30 plays...”

There’s some good sense here. If the defense can thwart the offensive design half the time with a smart call that punishes an offensive tendency or denies their go-to options, that leaves the other half of the plays for the offense to make something happen. Provided that the defense plays sound football all the time, this approach can grievously limit an offense’s ability to pile points on the scoreboard.

There are key differences in how Orlando and Patterson approach this strategy though, as anyone that watches the two defenses can see. Patterson’s defense is highly compartmentalized in a fashion that allows for them to bring complexity from down to down just by varying the combinations. They are far less ambitious than the Longhorns in regards to which players are asked to play in which realm of responsibility. Another difference is that Patterson is aiming to out-call the offense and play to their specific tendency, not to kill them with pressure half the time.

Orlando’s defense is perhaps best described as an attacking, positionless quarters defense. While they played a huge variety of coverages and calls against LSU, a fair chunk of the time Orlando is simply reconfiguring the pieces on the field to arrive at the same point. The main call is this one, a quarters scheme played behind the “tite” front:

This is the base quarters look. The safeties have reads to determine where to help while the cornerbacks are potentially on islands outside against the outside receivers. It’s an innovative defense that’s been a popular system for years now for the way it allows a team to match spread sets without giving up numbers deep while still bringing enough hats to stop the run. Orlando’s brand, which matches quarters coverage with the tite front, is now a well established “spread to run” killer.

It becomes a “positionless quarters” team for the way that Orlando regularly moves players around to fill different roles in the front. The dime package is highly useful for getting multiple players on the field that are fast, physical, and can credibly force the edge, blitz, or match receivers in coverage. With extra safeties on the field there are more Xs for Orlando to potentially move around without yielding matchup advantages to the offense. It’s also useful for helping Orlando to achieve his other two base calls, the overload, 5-man edge blitz from single high and then the rover insert.

Here’s the single-high call:

It plays by match rules moreso than zone with the corners typically manning up the outside receivers, the rover and B-backer here matching the RB and TE, and the strong safety dropping down to cover the slot. The other safety plays the post from the deep middle. Orlando has tons and tons of blitzes but this is a favorite and it pairs really well with the rover insert blitz:

In this call Texas plays a more hybrid front backed by quarters coverage with the rover serving as a de-facto defensive tackle trying to beat a guard in protection. Orlando loves showing one of these blitzes to encourage the offense to check into a pass protection call that is then vulnerable to the other blitz.

The guiding philosophy behind this “positionless quarters” defense is to be able to have a dozen ways to play a few traditional, sound coverages while still bringing pressure on the quarterback and offense. The goal is to use duplicity to confuse the offense about what’s coming and then hit them hard and fast in their weak spots.

Every offensive and defensive call has its tradeoffs, the strong dimensions and the weak spots. Orlando’s goal is to use his constantly shifting movements to encourage the offense to call plays that will be vulnerable against his pressures while resting on the security that ultimately, even if the offense isn’t fooled, that Texas is still almost always playing a fairly normal, sound call (except third-and-17). Whereas Patterson wants to defend you as precisely as he can on each play, Orlando wants to attack you as precisely as he can.

What is Todd Orlando missing?
Texas initially began running the 3-2-6 dime package against Oklahoma State back in 2017. The Iowa State-inspired “inverted Tampa 2” was initially just one tool they intended to utilize in that game but it became an every down call when they realized that Oklahoma State couldn’t move the ball against it, especially when combined with Michael Dickson’s punting. The inverted Tampa 2 is different than the single high coverages or quarters schemes that comprise the bulk of Texas’ base defense:

As I explain in my new book, this defense is basically the classic “Tampa 2” defense with two addendums. The first is subbing a DT like Warren Sapp out of the game and distributed his run fit responsibilities to the remaining defenders up front. The second is subbing in another safety to play the deep middle drop that the Tampa 2 gave to middle linebackers like Brian Urlacher. The middle linebacker becomes a plugger again and that middle safety is responsible for making sure the defense gets an extra hat in coverage or against the run.

What makes it effective against spread offenses is presence of that middle safety (the joker for Texas) who can stop the deeper crossing routes that spread offenses love using. With an extra guy sitting on that route, the defense can get back to playing deep safeties on the hash marks who can credibly help the cornerbacks on football's most lethal route, the post.

You can see that dynamic on this play from the LSU game.

The Tigers are running the sort of play that has defined the Air Raid and HUNH spread’s dominion over the Big 12 for the last 20 years, a shallow cross with a dig/post combination outside.

Without enough depth underneath from the linebackers (distracted by the shallow), the safety has to pick up that dig, leaving the corner without any help inside on the post route. Touchdown.

You can watch this exact same process play it every other Saturday in the Big 12 for the last decade, but the inverted Tampa 2 defense matches that dig with the joker and allows the safety to stay over the top and stop the post.

It’s not impossible to defend these concepts with Texas’ quarters defense, but it’s very difficult and particularly so when defenders are constantly shuffling into different positions rather than fine-tuning their execution of specific roles. The Longhorns are in the “rover insert” call here, which is pretty standard and should be very familiar to their players, but they are not executing it at a high enough level to defend that play call from the better Big 12 (or now SEC) HUNH spread offenses.

The “positionless quarters” defense is at its finest when the game is about getting numbers to the box to stop the run and then confusing a QB or OL with who exactly is coming from where. It’s not as effective against a spread passing attack unless that unit can’t read coverages or protect.

Another challenge for Texas is the way that Orlando chooses to deploy his personnel in a given year. Texas played Foster on the edge as a B-backer for the majority of the LSU game and called “inverted Tampa 2” on just eight plays Saturday night. Those eight plays faced five run calls that yielded 17 yards at 3.4 ypc. The Tigers called a pass into that defense just three times, with a pair of deep cross completions for 35 total yards and then a six yard scramble from Burrow. The genius of the inverted Tampa 2 is that it often encourages the offense into a run play before allowing the front to spill the ball outside to a fast and physical secondary.

Texas did that well, but they didn’t play particularly great coverage even when in the IT2. Instead they opted for something akin to the 2010 Pittsburgh Steelers 3-4 defense only with B.J. Foster and Brandon Jones playing as the outside linebackers rather than LaMarr Woodley and James Harrison. Orlando seemed to think that the outdated dimension to the old Dick LeBeau zone blitz defense was the personnel package rather than the system itself. The Steelers have slowly been learning to give up on that defense as a consequence of getting shredded on an annual basis by the HUNH spread New England Patriots.

Even before the 2017 season had concluded Orlando was starting to experiment and diversify the 3-2-6 personnel package to move away from the inverted Tampa 2 and back toward attacking up front. Thus far 2018 and 2019 have been defined by Orlando using the dime package not as a way to bolster the back end but as a way to increase the number of options for disguising and attacking up front. That’s clearly his guiding philosophy, to orient his defense in ways that allow them to be as aggressive as possible.

In the 2018 season he oriented his defense to attack opponents at the most foundational levels of the defense. He played the league's fastest and potentially best coverage linebacker (Gary Johnson) as the blitzing rover while using one of the league's slowest linebackers (Anthony Wheeler) to handle slot receivers in space. In 2019 he got back to dime defense but has regularly parked his extra safety down on the line to disguise Texas’ movements and increase the multiplicity of the blitz package.

This approach simply doesn’t appreciate the firepower of modern HUNH spread offenses. Even with Texas in dime, a QB like Joe Burrow is still able to sort out the gameplan in live action and avoid Orlando’s different traps. The Tigers used TE motion and some other tricks to get Texas to give away some of coverages and looks before punishing them down the field.

The calculus against this style of offense is different. A successful call by Orlando may yield a six yard loss on a sack, a successful counter by Burrow may result in six points. Texas sacked Burrow four times and he threw four touchdown passes, who won that exchange?

What’s more, the “safe” quarters and single high coverages that Texas is playing behind their pressures aren’t really “safe” against modern offenses. As we see on a weekly basis, a defense is always dancing on a knife’s edge against a good spread passing attack. The reason for the spread of the inverted Tampa 2 defense is that increasing numbers of defensive coordinators are realizing that they can’t ask their team to hold up on the back end playing two-deep.

Civil war buffs may recall a similar dynamic at play in the battle of Gettysburg. Fresh off a ridiculous victory at Chancellorsville in which he’d split his already badly outnumbered army in half and flanked the Union army with a charge from Gen. Stonewall Jackson, Robert E. Lee and the Confederate army were riding high as they marched through Pennsylvania. When Lee encountered the Union army parked on the heights at Gettsyburg, he determined to probe and find the perfect spot to attack and punch through, culminating in “Pickett’s charge” on the third and final day of the battle.

That frontal assault into the middle of the Union line across open field and uphill was strongly discouraged by Lee’s top general, James Longstreet, who repeatedly cautioned Lee that modern offensive firepower made these sorts of Napoleonic charges completely outdated and ruinous. Lee ignored those concerns and ordered him to send General Pickett and 15,000 men across the field and up the hill where over half of them were killed, wounded, or captured. Lee’s army never recovered and would go on to lose the war.

Orlando’s third-and-17 play call was his “Pickett’s charge.” When the offensive firepower of spread offenses proved too much, he doubled down and sent a full frontal assault that cost Texas the game against LSU. Fortunately for Texas, there’s still enough time that the season may not be lost, although you worry about the missed offseason reps in a more conservative style.

High school offensive systems, private skills coaching, rule changes, and modern spread passing tactics have changed the game. Trying to flip the script and building your defense first to punch holes through the front is an outdated strategy. The modern calculus doesn’t allow for it.

Defenses need to figure out how to start from the back end like Bill Belichik has done in the NFL, orienting their tactics to be able to first cover up an opponent’s most dangerous passing dimension before worrying about anything else. While Orlando is teaching his safeties to blitz and drop in a variety of places, Belichik is teaching his how to bracket and eliminate the sorts of receivers and routes that lead to scores like 45-38. Once Belichik is sure that he’s taken away your right hand in the passing game, it becomes simpler and safer to apply pressure.

Many elements of the Texas defense are cutting edge. Packaging personnel for generating matchups and creating disguise is the new wave, as are the “simulated pressures” that define the approach of blitzing coaches from the defensive school that produced Orlando. But that can’t be the guiding light of a defense that wants to play winning football against players like Kyler Murray, Joe Burrow, or Trevor Lawrence. Winning with an attacking defense shouldn’t be the gameplan for a program that can attack with Sam Ehlinger. The philosophy needs to change for Texas to win a championship.

 

Great Read... enjoyed the last part:

"Orlando’s third-and-17 play call was his “Pickett’s charge.” When the offensive firepower of spread offenses proved too much, he doubled down and sent a full frontal assault that cost Texas the game against LSU. Fortunately for Texas, there’s still enough time that the season may not be lost, although you worry about the missed offseason reps in a more conservative style.

High school offensive systems, private skills coaching, rule changes, and modern spread passing tactics have changed the game. Trying to flip the script and building your defense first to punch holes through the front is an outdated strategy. The modern calculus doesn’t allow for it.

Defenses need to figure out how to start from the back end like Bill Belichik has done in the NFL, orienting their tactics to be able to first cover up an opponent’s most dangerous passing dimension before worrying about anything else. While Orlando is teaching his safeties to blitz and drop in a variety of places, Belichik is teaching his how to bracket and eliminate the sorts of receivers and routes that lead to scores like 45-38. Once Belichik is sure that he’s taken away your right hand in the passing game, it becomes simpler and safer to apply pressure.

Many elements of the Texas defense are cutting edge. Packaging personnel for generating matchups and creating disguise is the new wave, as are the “simulated pressures” that define the approach of blitzing coaches from the defensive school that produced Orlando. But that can’t be the guiding light of a defense that wants to play winning football against players like Kyler Murray, Joe Burrow, or Trevor Lawrence. Winning with an attacking defense shouldn’t be the gameplan for a program that can attack with Sam Ehlinger. The philosophy needs to change for Texas to win a championship."

 

Edited September 12, 2019 by LTtxfan

[Bruh Man 3160]

4 hours ago, satyanash said:

Godspeed, Orlando.

 

Dude sounded lost in that presser. 

For two years I've been telling people on here not to worry about this him getting a HC job. 

[Burt Macklin 19222]

3 hours ago, bschoolprof said:

possibilities for the defensive decline that I have seen offered:

1) In 2017 perhaps we lived off fundamentals from the prior regime, akin to Manny benefiting from Muschamp players in 2011, or Strong benefiting from  Greg Robinson players in 2014.

2) personnel - we are young (and bad) at D-line and corner

3) Offenses have caught up to Orlando and he has not responded.  

 

2) and 3) seem much more likely than 1 IMO.   

 

I think it’s one of 2 or 3, but not both. Orlando’s defenses have been at their best when they have 1) a dynamic NT, 2) 2 fast, rangy LBs who can allow the defense to play light boxes and still win in the run game, and 3) a CB who can not get killed on an island. 

UH had all three of those. I forget his name, but they had a 1st round CB, really good NT play, even the year before Oliver, and some really good ILBs who can move, like Roberts and Taylor. 

In 2017, we had Poona, Malik and GJ (the D took a big jump for the rest of the year when GJ was inserted in place of Wheeler during the OSU game), and we had Holton Hill. 

Now, that’s not an excuse for Orlando’s poor performance because a DC shouldn’t be this bad, even without the desired personnel, but we could be a lot closer to that personnel next year, which could see a big jump in performance. 

I think retaining Orlando depends a lot on how much the D improves the rest of the year, and if Orlando can show that he can control his tendency to try to win every play via playcalling and instead play sound defense more consistently. The reality is we do have a lot of inexperience, even for older guys. This only Roach’s second year playing DL, it’s Shark’s first year playing Rover, Foster/Jones have never played Nickel before. We’ve had to take some guys out of their ideal spots due to holes on the roster, and we have 7 out of 11 spots with guys who are full time starters for the first Time in their careers. 

So the defense was always going to be at its worst early in the year, even if we didn’t expect it to be as bad as it was against LSU. If Orlando keeps doing the same shit as he did against LSU and last year: terrible playcalling and getting lit up for 500 yards and 45 points against every good O, then he needs to go, but if he can show some improvement, knowing his personnel will be much more talented, deeper and experienced next year,  I think there’s an argument for bringing him back.

Either way, we’re stuck with him for the rest of the year, so we might as well hope to see some improvement in scheme and personnel for the rest of this season. 

 

[BurdineBandit 823]

2 hours ago, Katfid54 said:

This is dumb.  We have several of them.

BJ Foster, Caden Sterns, Joseph Ossai

Sterns hasn't had an interception since Week 7 of last year. He's not keeping anybody up at night. He earned a rep by picking off TCU's shitty QB Shawn Robinson (who is now at Missouri) twice and got another against Tulsa.  He's pretty decent tracking down receivers and tackling in the open field, he closes fast, but he's not Earl Thomas. BJ can be schemed around because you put him into coverage and he's not exactly Quandre Diggs at nickel.

Ossai might be the only true difference maker we have right now, Roach could be one, but he's still a bit away from it. These guys are weapons that we can line up in different spots and who **can** make a difference when deployed in different ways, but we do not have a Malco(l)m Brown out there, or even a Hassan Ridgeway. A guy that can single-handedly disrupt an offense's drive with a big play, through sheer effort.

[HtownHorn 15243]

20 hours ago, LTtxfan said:

While the lsu offense is good, on Saturday in DKR the Horns Defense made Burrow look like he's freakin' Tom Brady.

Herman better provide constructive feedback to Orlando and the defensive coaches on that piss poor defensive coaching performance against lsu.   Scipio made several good points in above write-up. Orlando has to simplify the defense for awhile and put the Texas defenders in positions to make more plays.  Less thinking and more flying around and hitting people...

There's enough talent and athleticism on the roster for Texas to have a much better defense.   

Coach 'em up Todd!! 😁 

I have serious doubts he can do this. These type of offensive performances have become commonplace, and he still hasn't adjusted. His defensive schemes worked when the talent he faced on a weekly basis was average to below average. Facing NFL caliber players on a weekly basis has exposed Orlando, as has not having a kid like Oliver tearing up the middle of the opposing OL.

[Goodman 3280]

Talent is not the issue. 

[LTtxfan 49921]

50 minutes ago, Burt Macklin said:

I think retaining Orlando depends a lot on how much the D improves the rest of the year, and if Orlando can show that he can control his tendency to try to win every play via playcalling and instead play sound defense more consistently....   We’ve had to take some guys out of their ideal spots due to holes on the roster, and we have 7 out of 11 spots with guys who are full time starters for the first Time in their careers. So the defense was always going to be at its worst early in the year, even if we didn’t expect it to be as bad as it was against LSU....  Either way, we’re stuck with him for the rest of the year, so we might as well hope to see some improvement in scheme and personnel for the rest of this season. 

Pretty sure Orlando is under contract at Texas for both 2019 and 2020.

Really like your analysis of how so many players are starting in new positions on defense.  Sure would like to see Brandon Jones go back to his original Safety position... let that dude fly around and help everyone else get lined up right!!

Edited September 12, 2019 by LTtxfan

[HtownHorn 15243]

8 hours ago, Reynolds Woodcock said:

I think some of the histrionics with respect to Orlando are a bit overblown. In college football, more often than not really good quarterbacks running a hurry up spread are going to put up points. That is particularly true when defenses have inexperienced corners like we do.

Is Dave Aranda a bad coordinator because his defense couldn't stop our offense a single fucking time in the second half? Was Brent Venables a bad coordinator in 2008 when Colt hung 45 on them? It's not that Orlando is infallible or that individual plays can't be criticized, but I don't think he's suddenly become a net negative because his defenses have given up points to some great offenses and quarterbacks.  3rd and 17 in particular was obviously massively disappointing, but Burrow was a half second from being sacked and made a really incredible play.    

Is Aranda a bad coordinator, probably not. But he gotten taken to the woodshed by Herman, and would likely put up similar results on a weekly basis in the Big 12. Now, could he adjust to allow his defenders a pretty chance to make more plays, that's when it would get decided if he's a good DC or not in a league like ours.

The trend is pretty apparent for Orlando right now. A good DC, could fix it. Right now, Orlando isn't.

[HtownHorn 15243]

4 hours ago, 1leggedduck said:

I'm concerned but not hysterical. I have questions. There are no bad questions, but there are inquisitive idiots, so be patient: Is the scheme such an attack oriented scheme that the D backs are screwed if the rush can't get to the QB? Or, are the D backs failing to execute their assignments and would otherwise be in better positions to make plays? Which raises the question of whether the D backs are being well coached. 

Whatever the reason, our secondary is often a step behind, even though we seem to be recruiting some very talented D backs. 

Putting your safeties in 0 coverage against 3 NFL WR's is fucking retarded. Not too mention, blitzing from the middle of the field, and leaving Burrow MACK size truck throwing windows.

It also didn't help that Brown ran himself out of the play. Had he either stayed where he was or dropped even more, he would have been in the throwing window Burrow found, or had he just gone to tackle Burrow instead of pausing twice he likely hits Burrow before he can deliver the ball or as he's throwing it. It was already a wounded duck.

Edited September 12, 2019 by HtownHorn

[jinx 2636]

I hope Sam can get us over 50 against OSU and OU, because I have a feeling we are going to need it.

[Thermos H. Christ 478]

Based on Diaz, Robinson, Bedford, and Orlando I think we just need to hire a new DC every year because somehow our defense is always awesome with a first-year coordinator. After that things seem to get dicey.

[Burt Macklin 19222]

26 minutes ago, LTtxfan said:

Pretty sure Orlando is under contract at Texas for both 2019 and 2020.

Really like your analysis of how so many players are starting in new positions on defense.  Sure would like to see Brandon Jones go back to his original Safety position... let that dude fly around and help everyone else get lined up right!!

That doesn’t matter. If Orlando continues to give up this many points/yards against every spread team we face, he needs to go. There has to be some improvement this year.

[Katfid54 9005]

10 minutes ago, HtownHorn said:

Is Aranda a bad coordinator, probably not. But he gotten taken to the woodshed by Herman, and would likely put up similar results on a weekly basis in the Big 12. Now, could he adjust to allow his defenders a pretty chance to make more plays, that's when it would get decided if he's a good DC or not in a league like ours.

The trend is pretty apparent for Orlando right now. A good DC, could fix it. Right now, Orlando isn't.

What "good" DCs are out there that have a shown a propensity for stopping or limiting the nouveau spread offenses of the last 5 or so years?  Even Bama got buzzsawed for most of the semifinal last year against OU.

Obviously Patterson.  Other than him... maybe Heacock at Iowa State?  Venables at Clemson?  Pete Kwiatkowski (Washington has had Leach's number for the past several years)?

[Katfid54 9005]

7 minutes ago, Thermos H. Christ said:

Based on Diaz, Robinson, Bedford, and Orlando I think we just need to hire a new DC every year because somehow our defense is always awesome with a first-year coordinator. After that things seem to get dicey.

Honestly, this is my biggest concern about Grinch at OU this year.  Is there some universal mythic first-year DC bump that exists (or is it false or Texas-specific for some reason) and, if there is, will OU benefit from it this year?

[Burt Macklin 19222]

9 minutes ago, Katfid54 said:

What "good" DCs are out there that have a shown a propensity for stopping or limiting the nouveau spread offenses of the last 5 or so years?  Even Bama got buzzsawed for most of the semifinal last year against OU.

Obviously Patterson.  Other than him... maybe Heacock at Iowa State?  Venables at Clemson?  Pete Kwiatkowski (Washington has had Leach's number for the past several years)?

After doing a quick rewatch of the LSU game, and seeing how god awful our playcalling and individual performances (looking at you Boyce, Green, and Cook)  were on defense, I watched some ISU defensive tape against good B12 offenses. Heacock’s system is impressive and it would be tantalizing to see what our long, rangy athletes could do in that zone D. 

I don’t want a DC that hasn’t consistently faced air road offenses, even if they’ve fielded good defenses in the past. It’s still too much of a question mark. 

Idk how tied Heacock is to Campbell, but he’d probably be my first pick, other than Patterson, who’s obviously not attainable.

unfortunately, Patterson’s system seems confined only to him. I don’t know of any of his defensive assistants who’ve had success elsewhere. 

Other than this guy of course...

7 minutes ago, Katfid54 said:

Honestly, this is my biggest concern about Grinch at OU this year.  Is there some universal mythic first-year DC bump that exists (or is it false or Texas-specific for some reason) and, if there is, will OU benefit from it this year?

It does make you wonder if B12 offensive minds just need one offseason to crack almost any defense.

Edited September 12, 2019 by Burt Macklin

[Fondren & Main 6881]

Gundy and crew probably have their own version of Bohemian Grove where they meet up annually and brainstorm on how to ruin DC’s careers in the Big 12.