Ukraine War

[DigglerontheHoof 21564]

So WWII was all (checks notes)...America's fault?

[kevwun 16449]

Of course, everyone knows the US goaded Hitler in to invading Poland.  He basically had no choice because a neutral Poland was necessary for Germany's national defense.

Edited April 5, 2022 by kevwun

[Brisketexan 107028]

34 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

There is only one President in the history of the United States that has asked a hostile foreign power to help him find and circulate kompromat on his American political enemies. 

 

34 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

There is only one President in the history of the United States that has asked a hostile foreign power to help him find and circulate kompromat on his American political enemies. 

I quoted it twice because this is a fucking rock-solid monument that cannot be erased.  Precisely ONE POTUS has done this.  TFG.  Who is still supported with cult-like fanaticism by an entire American political party.  The party of treason.  This can never be forgotten, or forgiven.  EVER.

26 minutes ago, Anastasis said:

The fact that an American president has been enlisted as Putin’s agent only deepens the disaster.

That Anastasis quoted a piece with this matter-of-fact statement is perfection.  Irony is fucking dead.

[Horn Under a Bad Sign 20950]

The "Roosevelt provoked Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor"  canard has been disproved by every serious historian who has ever studied the situation. Somebody here (Hornius maybe) studied this very question as part of their master's thesis or doctoral dissertation. I remember watching a very vigorous discussion of this on Shaggy. 

However, Putin's invasion of Ukraine has Hunter Biden's laptop fingerprints all over it. 

[fattyflattie 4640]

2 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

Irony is fucking dead.

💯

[956 Worldwide 35602]

26 minutes ago, Anastasis said:

I think that it's absurd to not appreciate the role that the failures of our post-cold war policies play in where we are today. 

You and others might find this article interesting: https://prospect.org/world/was-putin-inevitable-feb-2022/

The Western officials who inflicted raw, uncushioned shock therapy on Russia’s economy and needlessly treated Russia as a defeated enemy rather than a new security partner virtually invited a nationalist reaction likely to produce a Vladimir Putin or someone like him. This observation doesn’t make Putin a good guy. Quite the contrary: He is a thug, an autocrat, and an ally of kleptocrats. But the history shows that the twin conceits of America as sole superpower and abrupt marketization as the cure for communism interacted to create a needless catastrophe that ranks with the Treaty of Versailles. The fact that an American president has been enlisted as Putin’s agent only deepens the disaster. The rise of Hitler, at least, paralleled the ascent of Roosevelt.

As the Russia scholar Michael Mandelbaum observes, looking back at two centuries of great wars, there were two postwar settlements that basically got it right and two that got it disastrously wrong. After the Napoleonic Wars crushed the French, the 1815 Congress of Vienna nonetheless recognized France as a great power with legitimate interests. There was no such treatment of Germany after World War I. After a second world war, the victorious Allies made sure to help promote German economic recovery and bring Germany into both the Western alliance and the Western economic system. But after the Cold War, the triumphalist Americans repeated the folly of Versailles, with similar results.

This winter happens to be the 100th anniversary of the publication of the book that launched Keynes as the world’s leading critic of dumb geopolitics and misguided economics. It’s also the 30th anniversary of the collapse of communism and the bungled effort to help Russia rebuild as a democratic market economy, as well as the 20th anniversary of Putin’s rule. At 67, he is now the longest-tenured leader of any major nation, having served longer than any Russian ruler since Stalin. This is a good moment for a sorting-out. In an effort to assess whether U.S. policy and Russian history might have been different, I reviewed dozens of memoirs, books, documents, and articles from the period, and interviewed more than a score of former senior officials. The record shows there was a better road not taken.

This post and article is a cope cage.

Quote

Between 1993 and 1997, real financial aid from the U.S. to Russia averaged under $2 billion a year. Once again, the contrast with the postwar Marshall Plan era and the similarity to the treatment of Weimar Germany could hardly be clearer or more depressing.

 

Please tell me you understand how outrageously idiotic it is to compare 2 billion a year in aid to the astronomically high reparations demanded of Germany. Please also tell me you understand that the Marshall Plan wasn’t just for Germany but for 17 fucking counties in Europe- winners and losers.

Blaming America for Russian corruption and failure in privatization and shock therapy is cope. Amazingly, other former Warsaw Pact nations were able to navigate that process and it worked. 
 

I tip my hat to you, as this shit perfectly echoes Kremlin propaganda. “Russia is great, powerful, strong, rich in resources, vigorous and deserving of respect yet is helpless against the wiles of the perfidious West, which are bringing it to its knees.” 

[Blotto 24044]

8 minutes ago, Dahobbs said:

Stop playing games. I have plenty of non-Ukraine related criticisms. But I very clearly talking about Ukraine. 

What criticism would you have of Biden's performance during this crisis? What about my description of his performance in regards to Ukraine do you disagree with?

 

Not sure what you're expecting from someone that believes this bullshit

23 minutes ago, fattyflattie said:

Eh, ok. Near flawless.  I've been told the CR is tough on Biden, glad to see it in person.

I'm saying Reagan>41>Clinton>Jr>Obama >Trump in this situation.  Of course all of these guys can also say it would never happen during their tenure but I really don't gaf to debate everyone on that.  We are helping Ukraine, and that's all that matters. 

Jr shouldnt be shown ahead of anyone. His "leadership" during the Iraq/Afghanistan response to 9/11 was an extremely costly and tragic foreign policy fuck up, probably the largest of my lifetime. 

[Brisketexan 107028]

1 minute ago, 956 Worldwide said:

I tip my hat to you, as this shit perfectly echoes Kremlin propaganda. “Russia is great, powerful, strong, rich in resources, vigorous and deserving of respect yet is helpless against the wiles of the perfidious West, which are bringing it to its knees.” 

Again, perfection.

[Mdhorn 6166]

43 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

There is only one President in the history of the United States that has asked a hostile foreign power to help him find and circulate kompromat on his American political enemies. 

And there's only one party that would permit it and continues.  DT actually accelerated the crazy in it to no longer require facts, science, or evidence for the passage of legislation, that sets the country back and directly harms Democracy.  

[956 Worldwide 35602]

One more jewel from that dumbass article:

Quote

Even the two U.S.-led wars of the 1990s against fellow Slavs, in Serbia and Kosovo, which might have been flashpoints in U.S.-Russian relations, were ended with the full participation of Russia as joint guarantor of the peace. Yet both U.S. military interventions, via NATO rather than the U.N., left the Russians wary of U.S. intentions.

Let’s imagine a world where some other country, say, Germany, openly proclaimed solidarity with and protection of “fellow Aryans” a bedrock principle of its foreign policy.  Oh, actually I don’t have to imagine it. We don’t accept shit like this from other countries, why is Russia some special snowflake.
 

If anything, the world has not been hard enough on Russia and its bullshit. Russia’s endless fucked-upedness and its mutant Imperial Bolshevik view of the world around it are not anyone else’s fault.

 

 

[DDD Dad 14663]

2 hours ago, fattyflattie said:

Yes, I know.  Bestest president eva!!!!1! vs worsest person eva!!!1!!  Got it. 

 

2 hours ago, Red Five said:

Decent president and human vs worsest person eva. You were close. 

Basically competent President and decent human versus worst President and pretty shitty person.

[Hagbard Celine 11293]

16 hours ago, Anastasis said:

I commented on the long and well established history of dishonesty at the intersection of our government/media/military apparatus when it comes to the war drums.  Here we are again.

 

"What about Russia!" "What about Ukraine!" 

 

Jesus Christ guys. 

1/sisatana

[Hagbard Celine 11293]

15 hours ago, WhatTheBuck said:

Fighting the Germans, Japanese, and Italians in WWII was a good idea.

Trying to reason with Anastasis who is an intellectually dishonest Trump supporter and Russia apologist is a yuuuuge waste of time. 

i'm now convinced that the more we agitate him, the faster he will literally immolate and self-combust, thus removing himself from the surl for all time.

 

[956 Worldwide 35602]

8 minutes ago, DDD Dad said:

 

Basically competent President and decent human versus worst President and pretty shitty person.

You know, I actually agree that Biden gets a lot of credit for meeting a depressingly low standard. The people most upset about that are the ones who set that bar.

[cactusflinthead 27628]

 

[RomaVicta 30636]

Mariupol:

 

Bucha

Kharkiv

 

Donetsk

 

What to expect as the Russian army withdraws:

I sorta don't care about presidents and foreign policy gaffes from last century. Not today at least.

 

[Longhorn_Fan68 34108]

goddamn dust

 

[Macanudo 13339]

2 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

There is only one President in the history of the United States that has asked a hostile foreign power to help him find and circulate kompromat on his American political enemies. 

That you know of.   I mean, uh, prove it!

[Macanudo 13339]

7 minutes ago, Longhorn_Fan68 said:

goddamn dust

 

I have a neighbor who's Husky is named Frank.   Because he "tries" to sing like that one is doing.

[Guest Lobo]

And that President?  
 

You guessed it!

Frank Stallone.

Sorry, I have to joke after those horrifying photos.  I can't imagine seeing those and your first instinct is, "hey, he dropped off his laptop at CompUSA store #137, can you find out what they found on it?"  

[Macanudo 13339]

1 minute ago, Lobo said:

And that President?  
 

You guessed it!

Frank Stallone.

Sorry, I have to joke after those horrifying photos.  I can't imagine seeing those and your first instinct is, "hey, he dropped off his laptop at CompUSA store #137, can you find out what they found on it?"  

Ironic that those civilians are laying in the shadow of what looks like a monument to Russian soldiers from WWII.

[Guest Lobo]

I'm gonna go out on a limb and say that when this is all over (please very soon, God)...Ukraine is gonna remove any Soviet Union military leader statue in their country...unless it was a born & bred Ukrainian.  And I have a real hard time imagining any Ukrainian being opposed to, "It ain't about hate, it's about heritage!"  

Edited April 5, 2022 by Lobo

[Foosters 18287]

4 hours ago, fattyflattie said:

Yes. And absolutely nothing like ‘16-20. 

Agreed.

[Huckleberry 34749]

"The USA is responsible for Russia's current attempt to ethically cleanse Ukraine because they only gave Russia about $2,000,000,000 in charity per year in the 1990s" is an immediate contender for the dumbest argument ever published. 

And I used to read TexAgs.

[Hornius Emeritus 12812]

 

 

[Guest Lobo]

who the fuck wrote that?  the part about the U.S. only gave Russia?......so we're to blame for Ukraine? 

Edited April 5, 2022 by Lobo

[hayden_horn 11403]

17 minutes ago, Huckleberry said:

"The USA is responsible for Russia's current attempt to ethically cleanse Ukraine because they only gave Russia about $2,000,000,000 in charity per year in the 1990s" is an immediate contender for the dumbest argument ever published. 

And I used to read TexAgs.

it's very strange.

and i can vouch for the guy.

[956 Worldwide 35602]

13 minutes ago, Lobo said:

who the fuck wrote that?  the part about the U.S. only gave Russia?......so we're to blame for Ukraine? 

It’s in Anastasia’ article that he posted. From The American prospect and written by an economics journalist who teaches on labor policy and managed capitalism at Tufts. As best as I can tell- not a Russian speaker, not a Russia scholar, not a diplomatic historian, not diplomat or foreign policy practitioner. 

There should be a disclaimer for everyone who publishes hot takes about Russia, Putin, Ukraine, etc. that spells out their exact knowledge of the subject. 

[Guest Lobo]

Tufts?  Tufts?  My incarcerated business partner's retarded gay niece went to Tufts.  What year did he graduate?  

[Chad Fuck 18166]

17 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

It’s in Anastasia’ article that he posted. From The American prospect and written by an economics journalist who teaches on labor policy and managed capitalism at Tufts. As best as I can tell- not a Russian speaker, not a Russia scholar, not a diplomatic historian, not diplomat or foreign policy practitioner. 

There should be a disclaimer for everyone who publishes hot takes about Russia, Putin, Ukraine, etc. that spells out their exact knowledge of the subject. 

And if anyone sponsored the article.

[WhatTheBuck 28941]

1 hour ago, Macanudo said:

I have a neighbor who's Husky is named Frank.   Because he "tries" to sing like that one is doing.

 

[PenelopeWitherspoon 19331]

4 hours ago, Anastasis said:

I think that it's absurd to not appreciate the role that the failures of our post-cold war policies play in where we are today. 

You and others might find this article interesting: https://prospect.org/world/was-putin-inevitable-feb-2022/

The Western officials who inflicted raw, uncushioned shock therapy on Russia’s economy and needlessly treated Russia as a defeated enemy rather than a new security partner virtually invited a nationalist reaction likely to produce a Vladimir Putin or someone like him. This observation doesn’t make Putin a good guy. Quite the contrary: He is a thug, an autocrat, and an ally of kleptocrats. But the history shows that the twin conceits of America as sole superpower and abrupt marketization as the cure for communism interacted to create a needless catastrophe that ranks with the Treaty of Versailles. The fact that an American president has been enlisted as Putin’s agent only deepens the disaster. The rise of Hitler, at least, paralleled the ascent of Roosevelt.

As the Russia scholar Michael Mandelbaum observes, looking back at two centuries of great wars, there were two postwar settlements that basically got it right and two that got it disastrously wrong. After the Napoleonic Wars crushed the French, the 1815 Congress of Vienna nonetheless recognized France as a great power with legitimate interests. There was no such treatment of Germany after World War I. After a second world war, the victorious Allies made sure to help promote German economic recovery and bring Germany into both the Western alliance and the Western economic system. But after the Cold War, the triumphalist Americans repeated the folly of Versailles, with similar results.

This winter happens to be the 100th anniversary of the publication of the book that launched Keynes as the world’s leading critic of dumb geopolitics and misguided economics. It’s also the 30th anniversary of the collapse of communism and the bungled effort to help Russia rebuild as a democratic market economy, as well as the 20th anniversary of Putin’s rule. At 67, he is now the longest-tenured leader of any major nation, having served longer than any Russian ruler since Stalin. This is a good moment for a sorting-out. In an effort to assess whether U.S. policy and Russian history might have been different, I reviewed dozens of memoirs, books, documents, and articles from the period, and interviewed more than a score of former senior officials. The record shows there was a better road not taken.

Post your shit somewhere else.  Stop fucking up this thread.

[PenelopeWitherspoon 19331]

4 hours ago, fattyflattie said:

Eh, ok. Near flawless.  I've been told the CR is tough on Biden, glad to see it in person.

I'm saying Reagan>41>Clinton>Jr>Obama >Trump in this situation.  Of course all of these guys can also say it would never happen during their tenure but I really don't gaf to debate everyone on that.  We are helping Ukraine, and that's all that matters. 

You are a fucking moron.  Stop trolling and post elsewhere.

[Anastasis 23717]

2 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

It’s in Anastasia’ article that he posted. From The American prospect and written by an economics journalist who teaches on labor policy and managed capitalism at Tufts. As best as I can tell- not a Russian speaker, not a Russia scholar, not a diplomatic historian, not diplomat or foreign policy practitioner. 

There should be a disclaimer for everyone who publishes hot takes about Russia, Putin, Ukraine, etc. that spells out their exact knowledge of the subject. 

Not really sure that it would matter in the context of this exchange. Prior posts referencing people like George Kennan and his perspective on the missteps in American post-cold war policy and their inevitable consequences were met with "we can forgive him being old and wrong". You don't really care about the credentials involved. A few snipes to one or two excerpts really doesn't address the scope of the article. The reality is that if something runs contrary to your chosen orthodoxy, you simply dismiss it as Kremlin talking points. And plenty of people will lap that shit up. 

 

So serious question.  If you were to recommend a set of articles or white papers specific to a critical examination of American policy wrt Russia in the period following the fall of the Soviet Union, the things that we did right, the things that we did wrong, what we can learn and take forward, written by people that meet your requirements, what would they be?

 

Edited April 5, 2022 by Anastasis

[Thatguy 9450]

6 hours ago, kevwun said:

Of course, everyone knows the US goaded Hitler in to invading Poland.  He basically had no choice because a neutral Poland was necessary for Germany's national defense.

  Dude, you don't know what the fuck you are talking about. WW2 was clearly Black People's fault. Had Jesse Owens not drug his dick and balls all over the Nazis' foreheads at the Olympics then Hitler wouldn't have been forced to respond.

Edited April 6, 2022 by Thatguy

[Guest Lobo]

I am finally understanding the love-fest for Trump.  It took me 6 years, but I'm starting to get my arms around it.  What I really can't understand though is how so many of his idolators can shit on everything Reagan worked for in terms of foreign policy.  I mean, most of Trump's supporters were massive Reagan acolytes back then.  I know we change stances in this country like we change underwear.  But Russia was kind of a big thing for Reagan and the GOP back then.  Whuh happun'?  

[WhatTheBuck 28941]

14 minutes ago, Lobo said:

I am finally understanding the love-fest for Trump.  It took me 6 years, but I'm starting to get my arms around it.  What I really can't understand though is how so many of his idolators can shit on everything Reagan worked for in terms of foreign policy.  I mean, most of Trump's supporters were massive Reagan acolytes back then.  I know we change stances in this country like we change underwear.  But Russia was kind of a big thing for Reagan and the GOP back then.  Whuh happun'?  

I was fooled by Reagan too. I don’t think, upon reflection, that he would be as opposed to Trump as one might think. There’s been a serious effort by those on the right to whitewash his legacy. (I’m looking at you in particular, Grover Norquist.)

This is a good read:

And before you heap too much praise on ol’ Dutch for bringing down the Soviet Union, you might also want to read this:

[Guest Lobo]

Even as a kid, I never gave Reagan full credit for bringing down the Soviet Union...my late father and a few decent schoolteachers educated me enough on that topic.  But Reagan distrusted them, he knew the menace they were, he knew their internal vulnerabilities and inward pointed daggers.  He knew their treatment of humanity was a farce, he knew their imperialism would not stop---particularly among vulnerable nations.  And he knew above all else, they had very little to lose and thus had to be kept on a short leash.  Reagan understood their strength came from the illusion of their strength.  And here I am, watching 25 million Americans jerk off to Putin, blaming us for this crime against humanity in Ukraine.  All because their dear leader thinks Vlad is just a misunderstood genius protecting his borders. 

[cactusflinthead 27628]

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/stephen-kotkin-putin-russia-ukraine-stalin

I have only the greatest respect for George Kennan. John Mearsheimer is a giant of a scholar. But I respectfully disagree. The problem with their argument is that it assumes that, had nato not expanded, Russia wouldn’t be the same or very likely close to what it is today. What we have today in Russia is not some kind of surprise. It’s not some kind of deviation from a historical pattern. Way before nato existed—in the nineteenth century—Russia looked like this: it had an autocrat. It had repression. It had militarism. It had suspicion of foreigners and the West. This is a Russia that we know, and it’s not a Russia that arrived yesterday or in the nineteen-nineties. It’s not a response to the actions of the West. There are internal processes in Russia that account for where we are today.

[cactusflinthead 27628]

 

[MaybeACoordinator 8350]

The most concise argument I've seen yet for a neutral Ukraine and it doesn't even mention Mearsheimer but rather shares the opinion of scholars more focused on the region.

 

Spoilered for length:

Spoiler

Even without downplaying the shock and disappointment most felt when Russia invaded Ukraine, it is perhaps more disheartening how many astute and highly-respected analysts/academics around the world deftly argued for a strategy that should have worked but was roundly shoved aside by Western powers: pushing for and explicitly formalizing Ukrainian neutrality might have entirely avoided this 8-year morass that has engulfed Ukraine since the Crimean conflict.

Stephen Walt, even before the current incursion, lamented what he saw as Western hubris, wishful thinking, and liberal idealism as powering an arrogance that dismissed Russian security concerns even when they were fairly conservative and rational.

Anatol Lieven talked of a “golden bridge” left by Russia for the West to positively capitalize on…if only it would.

Hall Gardner pulled no punches in going all the way back to strategic mistakes made with the initial dissolution of the Soviet Union, but also emphasized how NATO’s strategy of “double enlargement” was basically a diplomatic thumb to the nose of Russia that should have been seen as causing inevitable blowback.d

Pascal Lottaz, while still calling Russia a “rational crook,” astutely pointed out how it was impossible for Russia to not recognize NATO membership offerings to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 as a direct provocation (or worse, confirmation of Western indifference to Russia), but also highlighted something many in the West have ignored: that failing to get Ukraine to implement the Minsk II agreement was tantamount to the West telling Russia that its strategic needs and opinions just didn’t matter.

Perhaps more importantly, Lottaz also highlighted something I have argued for more than 15 years: that Russia has always studied American international behavior carefully and will follow the realism-power principles it displays (note, this is different from the international governance normative principles America often publicly espouses). Consequently, for the current crisis in Ukraine, it matters to Russia that it can highlight an American display of invasive power backed by dubious provocation claims (Iraq), an American acknowledgement of territorial status change without larger international consent (Kosovo), or unilateral American recognition of border changes that resulted only through a non-internationally approved war (Golan Heights). While Lottaz went on, as the list can truly be made expansively if not exhaustively, the strategic relevance is unquestionable: as America behaves, so Russia feels justified in pursuing like-minded behavior aligned to its own security interests. That the West has routinely rejected this fact or simply ignored it seems based on the dubious idea that no one should have a problem with American actions because America deems itself the “good guy.” Russia, in this world view, is obviously the “bad guy” and therefore cannot be allowed to utilize the same strategic security largesse. Not surprisingly, Russia has always rejected this rather weak “good guy/bad guy” theory of international relations.

Which is why the concept of pushing for a formally recognized neutral Ukraine is so important. In the most basic of terms, it means Ukraine is off-limits to everyone. Russia would have no authority to forcefully assert its interest over Ukraine just because it is more powerful and the bigger regional player. The West would also be obligated to end all the flirtation (real and imagined) when it comes to Ukraine being part of NATO. Thus, just as Switzerland has been with so many major powers surrounding it historically in Europe and Mongolia in greater Asia, Ukraine would be an effective buffer state that is able to openly and prosperously engage both sides to its own advantage, but never for the purpose of setting both sides on edge and against each other. While the above-mentioned fine scholars have argued for quite some time as to the mutually beneficial nature of such a strategy, a nod of acknowledgment again has to go to Lottaz, who graciously recognized that in many ways, before the incursion, Russian policy on Ukraine pushed the basic structure of neutrality for years, but to no avail.

This fact leads to an uncomfortable diplomatic elephant in the room: if so many astute Western scholars can agree on a policy direction and some even explain how it likely aligns with professed Russian security perspectives, then why did the idea go ignored until after Russia actually felt compelled to invade? The answer to that awkward question is what needs greater examination and far greater airplay across international mainstream media. Arguably, this idea of Ukrainian neutrality went ignored because the West was simply unwilling to admit that it needed to let Ukraine be neutral. In other words, why let Ukraine go neutral (which would be to most a semi-acceptance of Russian priorities) when it could be brought at least symbolically into the Western fold (which delivers a much more satisfying slap to the Russian security/diplomatic face)? So, when one accepts that Russian policy on Ukraine since the 2014 Minsk II agreement has pushed for de facto neutrality and the precedent for accepting neutrality exists (Russia basically gives the same consideration for Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia within what it considers its natural sphere of influence), but that neutrality has never been seriously acknowledged by either Ukraine or the West, then it suddenly starts to be a little less murky as to why Russia might feel a more radical (and unfortunately more violent) maneuver was needed to get their attention.

The fact that the neutrality argument is finally being spoken by Ukraine and Russia to each other (even if it is still just the very beginning of bargaining at a formally-recognized negotiating table) and the West seems diplomatically amenable means three things for the global community: first, whatever the overall loss of life in Ukraine because of the incursion, it could have been easily avoided; second, this new status for Ukraine is likely the superior option not because it is the best for any one side but exactly because it leaves all sides a little dissatisfied but able to claim political contentment; third, it is finally time that all sides abandon their Cold War instincts when it comes to dealing with each other and start recognizing the need to establish a new 21st century relationship that isn’t stubbornly frozen onto the logic and suspicions of the 20th. That stubbornness sacrifices innocent lives and prevents innovative peace in favor of familiar discontent and mistrust. It is time the world became disenchanted with this familiarity.

A long snippet:

Pascal Lottaz, while still calling Russia a “rational crook,” astutely pointed out how it was impossible for Russia to not recognize NATO membership offerings to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 as a direct provocation (or worse, confirmation of Western indifference to Russia), but also highlighted something many in the West have ignored: that failing to get Ukraine to implement the Minsk II agreement was tantamount to the West telling Russia that its strategic needs and opinions just didn’t matter.

Perhaps more importantly, Lottaz also highlighted something I have argued for more than 15 years: that Russia has always studied American international behavior carefully and will follow the realism-power principles it displays (note, this is different from the international governance normative principles America often publicly espouses). Consequently, for the current crisis in Ukraine, it matters to Russia that it can highlight an American display of invasive power backed by dubious provocation claims (Iraq), an American acknowledgement of territorial status change without larger international consent (Kosovo), or unilateral American recognition of border changes that resulted only through a non-internationally approved war (Golan Heights). While Lottaz went on, as the list can truly be made expansively if not exhaustively, the strategic relevance is unquestionable: as America behaves, so Russia feels justified in pursuing like-minded behavior aligned to its own security interests. That the West has routinely rejected this fact or simply ignored it seems based on the dubious idea that no one should have a problem with American actions because America deems itself the “good guy.” Russia, in this world view, is obviously the “bad guy” and therefore cannot be allowed to utilize the same strategic security largesse. Not surprisingly, Russia has always rejected this rather weak “good guy/bad guy” theory of international relations.

Which is why the concept of pushing for a formally recognized neutral Ukraine is so important. In the most basic of terms, it means Ukraine is off-limits to everyone. Russia would have no authority to forcefully assert its interest over Ukraine just because it is more powerful and the bigger regional player. The West would also be obligated to end all the flirtation (real and imagined) when it comes to Ukraine being part of NATO. Thus, just as Switzerland has been with so many major powers surrounding it historically in Europe and Mongolia in greater Asia, Ukraine would be an effective buffer state that is able to openly and prosperously engage both sides to its own advantage, but never for the purpose of setting both sides on edge and against each other. While the above-mentioned fine scholars have argued for quite some time as to the mutually beneficial nature of such a strategy, a nod of acknowledgment again has to go to Lottaz, who graciously recognized that in many ways, before the incursion, Russian policy on Ukraine pushed the basic structure of neutrality for years, but to no avail.

This fact leads to an uncomfortable diplomatic elephant in the room: if so many astute Western scholars can agree on a policy direction and some even explain how it likely aligns with professed Russian security perspectives, then why did the idea go ignored until after Russia actually felt compelled to invade? The answer to that awkward question is what needs greater examination and far greater airplay across international mainstream media. Arguably, this idea of Ukrainian neutrality went ignored because the West was simply unwilling to admit that it needed to let Ukraine be neutral. In other words, why let Ukraine go neutral (which would be to most a semi-acceptance of Russian priorities) when it could be brought at least symbolically into the Western fold (which delivers a much more satisfying slap to the Russian security/diplomatic face)? So, when one accepts that Russian policy on Ukraine since the 2014 Minsk II agreement has pushed for de facto neutrality and the precedent for accepting neutrality exists (Russia basically gives the same consideration for Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia within what it considers its natural sphere of influence), but that neutrality has never been seriously acknowledged by either Ukraine or the West, then it suddenly starts to be a little less murky as to why Russia might feel a more radical (and unfortunately more violent) maneuver was needed to get their attention.

The fact that the neutrality argument is finally being spoken by Ukraine and Russia to each other (even if it is still just the very beginning of bargaining at a formally-recognized negotiating table) and the West seems diplomatically amenable means three things for the global community: first, whatever the overall loss of life in Ukraine because of the incursion, it could have been easily avoided; second, this new status for Ukraine is likely the superior option not because it is the best for any one side but exactly because it leaves all sides a little dissatisfied but able to claim political contentment; third, it is finally time that all sides abandon their Cold War instincts when it comes to dealing with each other and start recognizing the need to establish a new 21st century relationship that isn’t stubbornly frozen onto the logic and suspicions of the 20th. That stubbornness sacrifices innocent lives and prevents innovative peace in favor of familiar discontent and mistrust. It is time the world became disenchanted with this familiarity.

[freyguy 4368]

counterpoint:  Putin, go fuck yourself...

[Woland 755]

I think the time for neutrality has passed for at least 50 or so years.

[MaybeACoordinator 8350]

WRT to foreign policy, after 120 years of failures to export Americanism, it is becoming more and more apparent to me that we are Charlie Brown and the mean ol' world is Lucy. I think some, maybe even most, of our foreign policy apparatus believes that exporting the American way, forcibly if necessary, is for the greater good of the planet. Time and time and time again, Lucy has snapped away that football and we've wound up on our ass. Even as we at home criticize our institutions as obsolete and corrupted, we attempt to export them all over the globe. Perhaps it would be better if we turned inward. Resolved the constitutional crisis we are undergoing. Did something to fix healthcare and infrastructure and income inequality as we spiral deeper and deeper into a dark Gilded Age. I'd rather fix a bridge than send five moe Javelins to Ukraine when the alternatives are a neutral Ukraine or a bridge collapsing here. 

[MaybeACoordinator 8350]

11 minutes ago, freyguy said:

counterpoint:  Putin, go fuck yourself...

 

3 minutes ago, Woland said:

I think the time for neutrality has passed for at least 50 or so years.

Quality responses! Bravo! 

What do you two propose we do now?

[cactusflinthead 27628]

7 minutes ago, MaybeACoordinator said:

 

Quality responses! Bravo! 

What do you two propose we do now?

Did you bother to read The Nation article?

 

[Brisketexan 107028]

The most concise argument I've seen yet for a neutral Ukraine and it doesn't even mention Mearsheimer but rather shares the opinion of scholars more focused on the region.
 
Spoilered for length:
Spoiler

Even without downplaying the shock and disappointment most felt when Russia invaded Ukraine, it is perhaps more disheartening how many astute and highly-respected analysts/academics around the world deftly argued for a strategy that should have worked but was roundly shoved aside by Western powers: pushing for and explicitly formalizing Ukrainian neutrality might have entirely avoided this 8-year morass that has engulfed Ukraine since the Crimean conflict.
Stephen Walt, even before the current incursion, lamented what he saw as Western hubris, wishful thinking, and liberal idealism as powering an arrogance that dismissed Russian security concerns even when they were fairly conservative and rational.
Anatol Lieven talked of a “golden bridge” left by Russia for the West to positively capitalize on…if only it would.
Hall Gardner pulled no punches in going all the way back to strategic mistakes made with the initial dissolution of the Soviet Union, but also emphasized how NATO’s strategy of “double enlargement” was basically a diplomatic thumb to the nose of Russia that should have been seen as causing inevitable blowback.d
Pascal Lottaz, while still calling Russia a “rational crook,” astutely pointed out how it was impossible for Russia to not recognize NATO membership offerings to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 as a direct provocation (or worse, confirmation of Western indifference to Russia), but also highlighted something many in the West have ignored: that failing to get Ukraine to implement the Minsk II agreement was tantamount to the West telling Russia that its strategic needs and opinions just didn’t matter.
Perhaps more importantly, Lottaz also highlighted something I have argued for more than 15 years: that Russia has always studied American international behavior carefully and will follow the realism-power principles it displays (note, this is different from the international governance normative principles America often publicly espouses). Consequently, for the current crisis in Ukraine, it matters to Russia that it can highlight an American display of invasive power backed by dubious provocation claims (Iraq), an American acknowledgement of territorial status change without larger international consent (Kosovo), or unilateral American recognition of border changes that resulted only through a non-internationally approved war (Golan Heights). While Lottaz went on, as the list can truly be made expansively if not exhaustively, the strategic relevance is unquestionable: as America behaves, so Russia feels justified in pursuing like-minded behavior aligned to its own security interests. That the West has routinely rejected this fact or simply ignored it seems based on the dubious idea that no one should have a problem with American actions because America deems itself the “good guy.” Russia, in this world view, is obviously the “bad guy” and therefore cannot be allowed to utilize the same strategic security largesse. Not surprisingly, Russia has always rejected this rather weak “good guy/bad guy” theory of international relations.
Which is why the concept of pushing for a formally recognized neutral Ukraine is so important. In the most basic of terms, it means Ukraine is off-limits to everyone. Russia would have no authority to forcefully assert its interest over Ukraine just because it is more powerful and the bigger regional player. The West would also be obligated to end all the flirtation (real and imagined) when it comes to Ukraine being part of NATO. Thus, just as Switzerland has been with so many major powers surrounding it historically in Europe and Mongolia in greater Asia, Ukraine would be an effective buffer state that is able to openly and prosperously engage both sides to its own advantage, but never for the purpose of setting both sides on edge and against each other. While the above-mentioned fine scholars have argued for quite some time as to the mutually beneficial nature of such a strategy, a nod of acknowledgment again has to go to Lottaz, who graciously recognized that in many ways, before the incursion, Russian policy on Ukraine pushed the basic structure of neutrality for years, but to no avail.
This fact leads to an uncomfortable diplomatic elephant in the room: if so many astute Western scholars can agree on a policy direction and some even explain how it likely aligns with professed Russian security perspectives, then why did the idea go ignored until after Russia actually felt compelled to invade? The answer to that awkward question is what needs greater examination and far greater airplay across international mainstream media. Arguably, this idea of Ukrainian neutrality went ignored because the West was simply unwilling to admit that it needed to let Ukraine be neutral. In other words, why let Ukraine go neutral (which would be to most a semi-acceptance of Russian priorities) when it could be brought at least symbolically into the Western fold (which delivers a much more satisfying slap to the Russian security/diplomatic face)? So, when one accepts that Russian policy on Ukraine since the 2014 Minsk II agreement has pushed for de facto neutrality and the precedent for accepting neutrality exists (Russia basically gives the same consideration for Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia within what it considers its natural sphere of influence), but that neutrality has never been seriously acknowledged by either Ukraine or the West, then it suddenly starts to be a little less murky as to why Russia might feel a more radical (and unfortunately more violent) maneuver was needed to get their attention.
The fact that the neutrality argument is finally being spoken by Ukraine and Russia to each other (even if it is still just the very beginning of bargaining at a formally-recognized negotiating table) and the West seems diplomatically amenable means three things for the global community: first, whatever the overall loss of life in Ukraine because of the incursion, it could have been easily avoided; second, this new status for Ukraine is likely the superior option not because it is the best for any one side but exactly because it leaves all sides a little dissatisfied but able to claim political contentment; third, it is finally time that all sides abandon their Cold War instincts when it comes to dealing with each other and start recognizing the need to establish a new 21st century relationship that isn’t stubbornly frozen onto the logic and suspicions of the 20th. That stubbornness sacrifices innocent lives and prevents innovative peace in favor of familiar discontent and mistrust. It is time the world became disenchanted with this familiarity.

A long snippet:
Pascal Lottaz, while still calling Russia a “rational crook,” astutely pointed out how it was impossible for Russia to not recognize NATO membership offerings to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 as a direct provocation (or worse, confirmation of Western indifference to Russia), but also highlighted something many in the West have ignored: that failing to get Ukraine to implement the Minsk II agreement was tantamount to the West telling Russia that its strategic needs and opinions just didn’t matter.
Perhaps more importantly, Lottaz also highlighted something I have argued for more than 15 years: that Russia has always studied American international behavior carefully and will follow the realism-power principles it displays (note, this is different from the international governance normative principles America often publicly espouses). Consequently, for the current crisis in Ukraine, it matters to Russia that it can highlight an American display of invasive power backed by dubious provocation claims (Iraq), an American acknowledgement of territorial status change without larger international consent (Kosovo), or unilateral American recognition of border changes that resulted only through a non-internationally approved war (Golan Heights). While Lottaz went on, as the list can truly be made expansively if not exhaustively, the strategic relevance is unquestionable: as America behaves, so Russia feels justified in pursuing like-minded behavior aligned to its own security interests. That the West has routinely rejected this fact or simply ignored it seems based on the dubious idea that no one should have a problem with American actions because America deems itself the “good guy.” Russia, in this world view, is obviously the “bad guy” and therefore cannot be allowed to utilize the same strategic security largesse. Not surprisingly, Russia has always rejected this rather weak “good guy/bad guy” theory of international relations.
Which is why the concept of pushing for a formally recognized neutral Ukraine is so important. In the most basic of terms, it means Ukraine is off-limits to everyone. Russia would have no authority to forcefully assert its interest over Ukraine just because it is more powerful and the bigger regional player. The West would also be obligated to end all the flirtation (real and imagined) when it comes to Ukraine being part of NATO. Thus, just as Switzerland has been with so many major powers surrounding it historically in Europe and Mongolia in greater Asia, Ukraine would be an effective buffer state that is able to openly and prosperously engage both sides to its own advantage, but never for the purpose of setting both sides on edge and against each other. While the above-mentioned fine scholars have argued for quite some time as to the mutually beneficial nature of such a strategy, a nod of acknowledgment again has to go to Lottaz, who graciously recognized that in many ways, before the incursion, Russian policy on Ukraine pushed the basic structure of neutrality for years, but to no avail.
This fact leads to an uncomfortable diplomatic elephant in the room: if so many astute Western scholars can agree on a policy direction and some even explain how it likely aligns with professed Russian security perspectives, then why did the idea go ignored until after Russia actually felt compelled to invade? The answer to that awkward question is what needs greater examination and far greater airplay across international mainstream media. Arguably, this idea of Ukrainian neutrality went ignored because the West was simply unwilling to admit that it needed to let Ukraine be neutral. In other words, why let Ukraine go neutral (which would be to most a semi-acceptance of Russian priorities) when it could be brought at least symbolically into the Western fold (which delivers a much more satisfying slap to the Russian security/diplomatic face)? So, when one accepts that Russian policy on Ukraine since the 2014 Minsk II agreement has pushed for de facto neutrality and the precedent for accepting neutrality exists (Russia basically gives the same consideration for Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia within what it considers its natural sphere of influence), but that neutrality has never been seriously acknowledged by either Ukraine or the West, then it suddenly starts to be a little less murky as to why Russia might feel a more radical (and unfortunately more violent) maneuver was needed to get their attention.
The fact that the neutrality argument is finally being spoken by Ukraine and Russia to each other (even if it is still just the very beginning of bargaining at a formally-recognized negotiating table) and the West seems diplomatically amenable means three things for the global community: first, whatever the overall loss of life in Ukraine because of the incursion, it could have been easily avoided; second, this new status for Ukraine is likely the superior option not because it is the best for any one side but exactly because it leaves all sides a little dissatisfied but able to claim political contentment; third, it is finally time that all sides abandon their Cold War instincts when it comes to dealing with each other and start recognizing the need to establish a new 21st century relationship that isn’t stubbornly frozen onto the logic and suspicions of the 20th. That stubbornness sacrifices innocent lives and prevents innovative peace in favor of familiar discontent and mistrust. It is time the world became disenchanted with this familiarity.

What. An utter load. Of mainlined bullshit.

The entire thing can be dispelled with a single question: is it more likely that Russia pushed for a “neutral” Ukraine because a) Russia just had regular old security concerns and wanted a truly neutral buffer, or b) Russia wanted a neutral - and thus neutered - Ukraine that it could then just t invade and conquer at will, fully assimilating it into Russia and exterminating any spark of Ukrainian independence it found?

Jesus, the Pollyanna bullshit is DEEP with this one.

Russia he made it plain and clear, for a long-ass time, that it views Ukraine as something with which they can do as they please, because Ukraine is just Russia, and any Russians who think otherwise aren’t really people. When did these fucking genius academics decide to utterly ignore what Russia a) actually does and b) actually says, when it’s being honest and internal?

FFS, this “poor Russia, if we only treated them more nicely, they wouldn’t be abusive” is sick poison. It’s the exact same insane self-destructive bullshit spit at battered spouses - “you just need to understand HIS perspective. And you really shouldn’t have provoked him - you know how he hates it when you talk while the Cowboys are on.” You should be embarrassed to post such garbage.

[freyguy 4368]

11 minutes ago, MaybeACoordinator said:

 

Quality responses! Bravo! 

What do you two propose we do now?

Nothing that concerns you.  I'll tell your mom that you need another Yoo-Hoo.

[MaybeACoordinator 8350]

Consider this: Mongolia, long the buffer state between Russia and China,  has a GDP per capita of $4000. Despite having vastly more resources, that of Ukraiine is $3,700.

I mean, Mongolia has got nothin'. The national diet is meat, roots, and the milk of beasts we don't drink from. Maybe some cheese from same. Ukraine on the other hand is the breadbasket to the world and yet their people are among the poorest in Europe. A lot of that has to do with corruption....And then of what trickles down after that, they have to pay more for a national defense budget that would go away in large part were they neutral. 

[cactusflinthead 27628]

“US-centric explanations are outdated,” wrote Volodymyr Artiukh, in an essay for Open Democracy. “I see how the Western left is doing what it [does] best: analysing the American neo-imperialism, the expansion of NATO. It is not enough anymore as it does not explain the world that is emerging from the ruins of Donbas and Kharkiv’s main square. The world is not exhaustively described as shaped by or reacting upon the actions of the US.”

---

 

The Central and East European left’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine comes from people with diverse experiences and backgrounds. However, all of the writers offered examples of the Western left’s denial of East European agency (for example, suggesting that Ukraine must be a “buffer zone”). Many noted the Western left’s fixation on Ukraine’s far right; the far right is indeed a problem, but has less political power in Ukraine than in many other countries in Europe, they point out. No one accepted the assertion that Russia viewed “NATO encroachment” as a security threat (though Artiukh noted Russia does perceive NATO as a political and cultural threat).

Many in the East European left have felt obliged to point out that “NATO expansion” only comes about when each country decides to apply for membership. And they emphasize that decision belongs to the citizens of those countries—not to former colonial powers.

Goddamn right I am going to run it out there again. 

Edited April 6, 2022 by cactusflinthead