Growing rejection of religious traditions by religious adherents

[NotActuallyALonghorn 4,968]

And a better answer for whether or not a God or anything supernatural exists would also be "I don't know" using the same standard of proof. Yet you have repeatedly made the claim that you do know and that the answer is there isn't. If you want to revise your claim, then feel free to.

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

1 minute ago, NotActuallyALonghorn said:

And a better answer for whether or not a God or anything supernatural exists would also be "I don't know" using the same standard of proof. Yet you have repeatedly made the claim that you do know and that the answer is there isn't. If you want to revise your claim, then feel free to.

No, I never said there wasn't a God. I said provide the evidence. As there is no evidence to support the claim, I dont believe it. That is far different. I'm always open to the possibility that evidence may be presented. But until such a time that it does, I'm not going to turn my life upside down over any of that bullshit.

Never mind the fact that were evidence to come forward, which God is it supposed to prove exists? There are tens of thousands that man has put in books and probably 10 times as many that never did throughout history. So which one?

[RayDog 682]

13 minutes ago, NotActuallyALonghorn said:

And a better answer for whether or not a God or anything supernatural exists would also be "I don't know" using the same standard of proof. Yet you have repeatedly made the claim that you do know and that the answer is there isn't. If you want to revise your claim, then feel free to.

God's are both known fiction and logical impossibilities.

No additional proof is required.

[sidis 9,754]

14 hours ago, Aphelion said:

I understand that some and maybe most people prefer to discuss specific religious claims in these threads and they aren’t necessarily interested in the base philosophical positions, but I am intrinsically interested in the base philosophical positions and I believe this is the case for at least a few others.  My general goal in these threads is to achieve mutual respect for the fundamental ideas of the various worldviews.  I do think this is a worthwhile pursuit since longstanding worldviews are being given unfair mischaracterzation as being fundamentally absurd and inconsistent. 

wait, you believe that deism is a "base philosophy" of religions that espouse an interventionist, personal god (which the overwhelming majority of christians believe in)?

you think that a criticism of a religion/worldview such as christianity, judaism, islam, or hunduism can be countered or shown to be mischaracterizations by ontological arguments for deism?

if so, i strongly disagree.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, sidis said:

wait, you believe that deism is a "base philosophy" of religions that espouse an interventionist, personal god (which the overwhelming majority of christians believe in)?

you think that a criticism of a religion/worldview such as christianity, judaism, islam, or hunduism can be countered or shown to be mischaracterizations by ontological arguments for deism?

if so, i strongly disagree.

By base philosophy I was referring to the ontological positions of materialism/physicalism/naturalism (these terms can mean different things in different contexts but here I'm meaning the belief that only the physical or natural world exists and that everything supervenes on the physical and/or that everything is exclusively ontologically dependent on the physical) vs. the supernatural position, by which I mean the negation of physicalism, i.e. any ontology which posits that some things exists which do not supervene on the physical and/or that things exist which are not exclusively ontologically dependent on the physical.  It is commonly presented as absurd (both throughout society in modern times and also on this thread) to believe in anything that is not fully physical or in anything whose explanation is not fully physical; my responses were specifically against this view; to state another way, I'm arguing for the rationality of the negation of physicalism.  In this thread I've not argued for deism nor given any cosmological or ontological argument for the existence of God.  

 

 

Edited July 17, 2018 by Guest

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

23 minutes ago, Aphelion said:

By base philosophy I was referring to the ontological positions of materialism/physicalism/naturalism (these terms can mean different things in different contexts but here I'm meaning the belief that only the physical or natural world exists and that everything supervenes on the physical and/or is exclusively ontologically dependent on the physical ) vs. the supernatural position, by which I mean the negation of physicalism, i.e. any ontology which posits that some things exists which do not supervene on the physical and/or things exist which are not exclusively ontologically dependent on the physical.  It is commonly presented as absurd (both throughout society in modern times and also on this thread) to believe in anything that is not fully physical or in anything whose explanation is not fully physical; my responses where specifically against this view; to state another way, I'm arguing for the rationality of the negation of physicalism.   In this thread I've not argued for deism or given any cosmological or ontological argument for the existence of God.  

 

 

The ontological argument is fucking ridiculous conjecture. There is no valid reason to give it any thought or to even consider it. You're trying to use it as a foundation to assert something for which you have demonstrated that you can not provide evidence, as are everyone else using it for the same.

[Guest]

13 minutes ago, HOOK'EMHOOAH said:

The ontological argument is fucking ridiculous conjecture. There is no valid reason to give it any thought or to even consider it. You're trying to use it as a foundation to assert something for which you have demonstrated that you can not provide evidence, as are everyone else using it for the same.

In the post you quoted I stated that I have not given any ontological argument in this thread; I've also not based any of my points on one.  I've not read every post in this thread, but as far as I'm aware no one else has given an ontological argument nor have they based any of their points on one.  So I'm not sure how you could deduce that an ontological argument is being used as the foundation for any assertion made by the supernaturalists in this thread.

Also, ontological arguments are a type of argument; there are many of them.  If you say "the ontological argument" then you should specify which one you are referring to.  

Edited July 17, 2018 by Guest

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

37 minutes ago, Aphelion said:

In the post you quoted I stated that I have not given any ontological argument in this thread; I've also not based any of my points on one.  I've not read every post in this thread, but as far as I'm aware no one else has given an ontological argument nor have they based any of their points on one.  So I'm not sure how you could deduce that an ontological argument is being used as the foundation for any assertion made by the supernaturalists in this thread.

Also, ontological arguments are a type of argument; there are many of them.  If you say "the ontological argument" then you should specify which one you are referring to.  

There is only one ontological argument. I believe you mean ontology. Either way, it's still bullshit.

[sidis 9,754]

2 minutes ago, HOOK'EMHOOAH said:

There is only one ontological argument.

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

2 minutes ago, sidis said:

even if there is more than one, the entire enterprise proves nothing and is baseless. EVIDENCE.

[sidis 9,754]

7 minutes ago, HOOK'EMHOOAH said:

even if there is more than one, the entire enterprise proves nothing and is baseless. EVIDENCE. 

i am very dubious of all forms of the ontological arguments from anselm to godel and platinga as aoc and i went round and round about back on shaggy about...but it undermines the persuasiveness of your opinion regarding its efficacy if you make authoritative declarations about something so fundamental that are demonstrably wrong.

Edited July 17, 2018 by sidis

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

1 minute ago, sidis said:

i am very dubious of all forms of the ontological arguments from anselm to godel and platinga as aoc and i went round and round about back on shaggy about...but it undermines the persuasiveness of your opinion regarding its efficacy if you make authoritative declarations about something so fundamental that is demonstrably wrong.

i dont care about whatever argument someone wants to use for their position. their claim is meaningless unless the person making it has evidence to support it. if there is no evidence, then the claim is dismissed for lack of any support.

[JBJ 3,649]

 

2 minutes ago, HOOK'EMHOOAH said:

i dont care about whatever argument someone wants to use for their position. their claim is meaningless unless the person making it has evidence to support it. if there is no evidence, then the claim is dismissed for lack of any support.

Much has been presented in this thread for the existence of supernaturals.  Far more than against it.

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

Just now, JBJ said:

 

Much has been presented in this thread for the existence of supernaturals.  Far more than against it.

so where is the evidence?

[JBJ 3,649]

9 minutes ago, HOOK'EMHOOAH said:

so where is the evidence?

What do you want to know? We touched on the existence of qualia, math, numbers.  Just click the back button.

[Huckleberry 32,703]

Yes, by changing the definition of supernatural you offered evidence of the supernatural. Quite the accomplishment.

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

2 minutes ago, JBJ said:

What do you want to know? We touched on the existence of qualia, math, numbers.  Just click the back button.

none of that proves the existence of the supernatural. subjective experience, mathematics, and numbers in no way prove anything about the supernatural. next.

[WhatTheBuck 28,713]

Have you ever stopped to consider that maybe Creator and Creation are the same thing?

[hpslugga 4,044]

34 minutes ago, Huckleberry said:

Yes, by changing the definition of supernatural you offered evidence of the supernatural. Quite the accomplishment.

“You know, ice cream is made from burning hot milk, right?”

”No, dude. Ice cream is made from milk that’s frozen...that’s the fucking word “ice” is in the name”

”Well my definition of “burning hot” is any temperature above Absolute Zero.”

[sidis 9,754]

25 minutes ago, JBJ said:

 

the existence of supernaturals. Far more than against it. 

speaking of undermining one's persuasiveness.

[JBJ 3,649]

 

42 minutes ago, Huckleberry said:

Yes, by changing the definition of supernatural you offered evidence of the supernatural. Quite the accomplishment.

It's the same definition of supernatural that naturalism uses.  In the realm of philosophy, it has been consistent throughout application and time.  You aren't a naturalist if you don't hold to that definition.

You, Huck, are not a naturalist.  You believe math is real.  If you believe in certain scientific theories, like quarks or blackholes, you are not a strict naturalist.

A true naturalist is a very rare thing.  RayDog might be the closest thing to it.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, sidis said:

i am very dubious of all forms of the ontological arguments from anselm to godel and platinga as aoc and i went round and round about back on shaggy about...but it undermines the persuasiveness of your opinion regarding its efficacy if you make authoritative declarations about something so fundamental that are demonstrably wrong.

I told you that few would follow your links.

 

49 minutes ago, Huckleberry said:

Yes, by changing the definition of supernatural you offered evidence of the supernatural. Quite the accomplishment.

As I mentioned to you before, the definition of natural and supernatural given are both valid and perfectly in line with how they are used within the context of the subject discussion.  No one has changed the definition of anything.   See the very first definition given here:  "Of or relating to existence outside the natural world."  And also from the same link: "not existing in nature or subject to explanation according to natural laws; not physical or material;"  So the way in which we have been using the term is exactly in accordance with known and accepted definitions.

Not applying every possible definition or connotation of a term is not the same thing as changing the definition of a term.  If I said "I took the express train" and someone countered "express means to press or squeeze out; what did you squeeze out of the train?  You are changing the definition of 'express'" - would this be a valid criticism?

If I'm judging by our recent exchanges on this forum you will also fail to address this objection.  

 

15 minutes ago, WhatTheBuck said:

Have you ever stopped to consider that maybe Creator and Creation are the same thing?

Yes, I have.  This is a type of pantheism.  I've considered it but personally do not think it is very compelling. 

Edited July 17, 2018 by Guest

[formermav43 4,599]

12 minutes ago, hpslugga said:

“You know, ice cream is made from burning hot milk, right?”

”No, dude. Ice cream is made from milk that’s frozen...that’s the fucking word “ice” is in the name”

”Well my definition of “burning hot” is any temperature above Absolute Zero.”

It’s more like stating that this is either ice cream or frozen yogurt, and you’re interjecting “that’s not true, it could be Blue Bell.”

[Huckleberry 32,703]

On 7/15/2018 at 4:45 PM, Aphelion said:

(1)  An object is supernatural if and only if it is not solely composed of the physical particles or space of the universe.  Υ(x) ⇔ ¬Φ(x)

 

10 minutes ago, Aphelion said:

"Of or relating to existence outside the natural world."  And also from the same link: "not existing in nature or subject to explanation according to natural laws; not physical or material;"  So the way in which we have been using the term is exactly in accordance with known and accepted definitions.

No, I disagree that those are the same or in accordance. And to me it's quite clear that they are different definitions of the term. Also, I have a feeling when I hit Submit Reply that the formatting here is going to get all jacked up because of having multiple quotes then a response. So good luck to everyone reading this.

Sweet, it formatted correctly somehow.

Edited July 17, 2018 by Huckleberry

[Guest]

9 minutes ago, Huckleberry said:

 

No, I disagree that those are the same or in accordance. And to me it's quite clear that they are different definitions of the term. Also, I have a feeling when I hit Submit Reply that the formatting here is going to get all jacked up because of having multiple quotes then a response. So good luck to everyone reading this.

Sweet, it formatted correctly somehow.

So one of the definitions is that supernatural means not material or physical, and my definition says that an object is supernatural iff it is not composed solely of physical particles or space of the universe.  Can you further explicate why these are clearly distinct?  Maybe give a counter example of an object that meets one definition but not the other?  

Edited July 17, 2018 by Guest

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1,606]

12 minutes ago, Aphelion said:

So one of the definitions is that supernatural means not material or physical, and my definition says that an object is supernatural iff it is not composed solely of physical particles or space of the universe.  Can you further explicate why these are clearly distinct?  Maybe give a counter example of an object that meets one definition but not the other?  

You are mistaking supernatural with intangible. Try again.

[Huckleberry 32,703]

19 minutes ago, Aphelion said:

So one of the definitions is that supernatural means not material or physical, and my definition says that an object is supernatural iff it is not composed solely of physical particles or space of the universe.  Can you further explicate why these are clearly distinct?  Maybe give a counter example of an object that meets one definition but not the other?  

You picked one half of one definition to make your point and intentionally excluded the other half of the same definition which says "not existing in nature or subject to explanation according to natural law" because it suited your purpose.

Furthermore, human concepts are composed of physical particles of the universe anyway because they exist only in the minds of humans and are nothing more than electrical and chemical reactions in the brain. While those reactions are too complex for us to currently explain or even fully understand, in the end you are merely arguing for what can be crudely described as a God of the Gaps for the 21st Century.

[hpslugga 4,044]

42 minutes ago, formermav43 said:

It’s more like stating that this is either ice cream or frozen yogurt, and you’re interjecting “that’s not true, it could be Blue Bell.”

Sure

Edited July 17, 2018 by hpslugga

[JBJ 3,649]

26 minutes ago, Huckleberry said:

You picked one half of one definition to make your point and intentionally excluded the other half of the same definition which says "not existing in nature or subject to explanation according to natural law" because it suited your purpose.

Furthermore, human concepts are composed of physical particles of the universe anyway because they exist only in the minds of humans and are nothing more than electrical and chemical reactions in the brain. While those reactions are too complex for us to currently explain or even fully understand, in the end you are merely arguing for what can be crudely described as a God of the Gaps for the 21st Century.

Which definition of supernatural excludes math?

Since I've seen this argument thrown around so much, all perception could equally be described as electrical and chemical reactions in the brain.  That doesn't preclude the mug on my desk from existing outside my brain. 

(Furk, that's a throwback to a post I ended up not making.  Pretend like the mug example wasn't just out of thin air.)

Edited July 17, 2018 by JBJ

[JBJ 3,649]

1 hour ago, sidis said:

speaking of undermining one's persuasiveness.

Noted.  It's hard to discuss with someone who refuses to discuss.

[Guest]

39 minutes ago, Huckleberry said:

You picked one half of one definition to make your point and intentionally excluded the other half of the same definition which says "not existing in nature or subject to explanation according to natural law" because it suited your purpose.

Furthermore, human concepts are composed of physical particles of the universe anyway because they exist only in the minds of humans and are nothing more than electrical and chemical reactions in the brain. While those reactions are too complex for us to currently explain or even fully understand, in the end you are merely arguing for what can be crudely described as a God of the Gaps for the 21st Century.

I used a single clause in a definition to simplify.  I could use many different clauses from many different definitions to make my point.  The idea that my defintion is not in line with how the terms are commonly used in this subject or that I disingenuously constructed my definition to get the outcome I want is nonsense.  I could have directly copy and pasted the definition of physical or natural used by physicalists/naturalists and it wouldn't change the structure or intent of my argument at all.  The only reason I did not copy and paste definitions is because they use esoteric language & terms and so I gave a good faith plain language translation to best capture the basic intent; the reason I did this was for the sake of saving work (do you know what supervenience means or would you have to look it up?) and for more transparent and straightforward message board discussion.  You can question my motives if you like but that is the truth.  

In regards to your 2nd paragraph: yes, that is the basic physicalist position.  A physicalist would claim "the supervenience of the mental on the physical" or that "mental properties supervene upon physical properties."  They would also claim that mental properties are ontologically dependent upon physical properties and that abstractions such as numbers are mental properties.  I disagree with this position.  I claim that the physical or natural world supervenes on and is ontologically dependent upon the laws of logic, mathematics, geometry, and various other nonphysical conceptions.  For example, I think the number 7 is prime regardless of the actualization of any physical world or consequent mental state of a being in a physical world, but there is no such thing as a physical world in which the number 7 is not prime.  

Edited July 17, 2018 by Guest

[JBJ 3,649]

In keeping things simple, it easier to frame this as which is a necessity for which.

Does natural law need math?  The evidence would be a conceivable alternative natural order - not like an alternative universe with the same nature, but one with a completely different nature - that would still be bound to obey the laws of math.

Alternatively does mathematics need nature?  The evidence would be a conceivable alternative mathematical system - equal in function to but intrisically different from our math.  Not just a different mathematical model or different characters, but a completely different system (where 7 isn't prime to use the example given).  That also supports our same laws of nature.

Or are they co-dependent? That any other math would also produce a different nature and vice-versa.

Edited July 17, 2018 by JBJ

[Guest]

20 hours ago, JBJ said:

In keeping things simple, it easier to frame this as which is a necessity for which.

Does natural law need math?  The evidence would be a conceivable alternative natural order - not like an alternative universe with the same nature, but one with a completely different nature - that would still be bound to obey the laws of math.

Alternatively does mathematics need nature?  The evidence would be a conceivable alternative mathematical system - equal in function to but intrisically different from our math.  Not just a different mathematical model or different characters, but a completely different system (where 7 isn't prime to use the example given).  That also supports our same laws of nature.

Or are they co-dependent? That any other math would also produce a different nature and vice-versa.

My answer is that natural laws (i.e. the laws of physics) are dependent upon math, but math does not depend upon or need (in an ontological sense) the laws of physics.  Evidence of this is that we can't do physics without knowledge of math, but we can do math without knowledge of physics.  

 

On 7/17/2018 at 11:09 AM, sidis said:

i am very dubious of all forms of the ontological arguments from anselm to godel and platinga as aoc and i went round and round about back on shaggy about...but it undermines the persuasiveness of your opinion regarding its efficacy if you make authoritative declarations about something so fundamental that are demonstrably wrong.

I know you don't think much of the ontological arguments in general.  But I'm curious to know:  of all the arguments given for the existence of an intelligent conscious Creator who created the universe with its various properties (e.g. fine tuning, any of the cosmological arguments, moral arguments, the argument from consciousness, or any of the others that come to mind) which do you find the most compelling or interesting?  If you think that none are interesting or compelling, then which do you think are the most difficult to address or refute, i.e. if you had to have a debate with consequences, which argument(s) would be at the bottom of the list of the ones you would prefer to face?

Edited July 18, 2018 by Guest

[JBJ 3,649]

2 minutes ago, Aphelion said:

My answers is that natural laws (i.e. the laws of physics) are dependent upon math, but math does not depend upon or need (in an ontological sense) the laws of physics.  Evidence of this is that we can't do physics without knowledge of math, but we can do math without knowledge of physics.  

For similar reasons, I'm convinced that nature is dependent on math.

I hold no preference as to whether they are equally co-dependent or if math is independent.

Math ≧ nature

[sidis 9,754]

i'll write more on this later as real world crap intervenes but the summary answer to those questions are ironic and opposite.  the one i find personally the most compelling in a deep, deep down in the "quest for truth and knowledge" sense are the most basic forms of the cosmological argument (the basic kalam argument formed by the islamists that craig stole) because going back beyond the planck era is the ultimate point of ignorance re: causality.  it could easily be a non-contingent, first cause just as easily as it could be any type of actual infinite.

ironically, if i had to debate any of the major arguments however with the goal of prevailing (even though i am not remotely equipped to do so in any serious sense), i would want to debate against the cosmological argument because i think it has the weakest logical and philosophical reasoning...i'll come back to it but the critiques such as reliance on experience/inductive, exemption of causality for the first cause, kantian critique of necessary being, weak sufficient reason, etc... are all fairly strong critiques in my mind.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, sidis said:

i'll write more on this later as real world crap intervenes but the summary answer to those questions are ironic and opposite.  the one i find personally the most compelling in a deep, deep down in the "quest for truth and knowledge" sense are the most basic forms of the cosmological argument (the basic kalam argument formed by the islamists that craig stole) because going back beyond the planck era is the ultimate point of ignorance re: causality.  it could easily be a non-contingent, first cause just as easily as it could be any type of actual infinite.

ironically, if i had to debate any of the major arguments however with the goal of prevailing (even though i am not remotely equipped to do so in any serious sense), i would want to debate against the cosmological argument because i think it has the weakest logical and philosophical reasoning...i'll come back to it but the critiques such as reliance on experience/inductive, exemption of causality for the first cause, kantian critique of necessary being, weak sufficient reason, etc... are all fairly strong critiques in my mind.

Looking forward to your follow up post on this.  

Craig got the kalam argument from the Arab scholars, but they got it from John Philoponus who developed & applied it in the 6th century in a polemic against Aristotle's assertion that the universe is eternal. 

[triplelonghorn 27]

He says nothing on the subject in the New Testament that I'm aware of. Likely because the very idea was considered nonsensical (or rather not considered at all) in that time and place. And yet through at least the first 1900 years of the Christian tradition marriage was between a man and a woman only and both the Latin and the Eastern Church are completely explicit that this has not changed. How can one be a catholic and also 'support' same-sex marriage, for a catholic the very term is a contradiction

Why nonsensical? The very Rome that executed Jesus had gay marriage. So did Egypt in the time of the Old Testament.

Sent from my Pixel XL using Tapatalk

[WhatTheBuck 28,713]

On July 17, 2018 at 1:22 PM, Aphelion said:

 Yes, I have.  This is a type of pantheism.  I've considered it but personally do not think it is very compelling. 

It's not theism at all. 

Edited July 19, 2018 by WhatTheBuck

[Guest]

6 hours ago, WhatTheBuck said:

It's not theism at all. 

Why do people on this forum have an aversion to looking up terms they aren't familiar with before commenting on their meaning? 

The claim that "Creator and Creation are the same thing" is a claim entailed by versions of naturalistic pantheism.

From pantheism.com:

"But some pantheists view cause and effect as a unified event, leaving no definite distinction between creator and created."

From the linked entry on pantheism:

"..traditional theists have often insisted on creation ex nihilo precisely to drive a wedge between creator and created and thereby rule out pantheism."

"Many pantheists argue that physical conceptions are adequate to explain the entire cosmos. This is an ancient form of pantheism, found for example in the Stoics, for whom only bodies can be said to exist. ...This is also a form of pantheism popular today—often termed, scientific or naturalistic pantheism. Such worldviews make no ontological commitments beyond those sanctioned by empirical science.

[Guest]

On 7/18/2018 at 11:33 AM, sidis said:

i'll write more on this later as real world crap intervenes but the summary answer to those questions are ironic and opposite.  the one i find personally the most compelling in a deep, deep down in the "quest for truth and knowledge" sense are the most basic forms of the cosmological argument (the basic kalam argument formed by the islamists that craig stole) because going back beyond the planck era is the ultimate point of ignorance re: causality.  it could easily be a non-contingent, first cause just as easily as it could be any type of actual infinite.

ironically, if i had to debate any of the major arguments however with the goal of prevailing (even though i am not remotely equipped to do so in any serious sense), i would want to debate against the cosmological argument because i think it has the weakest logical and philosophical reasoning...i'll come back to it but the critiques such as reliance on experience/inductive, exemption of causality for the first cause, kantian critique of necessary being, weak sufficient reason, etc... are all fairly strong critiques in my mind.

I hate to expedite, but it is not beneath me.  

[Gatorubet 30,115]

On 7/17/2018 at 1:35 PM, JBJ said:

Noted.  It's hard to discuss with someone who refuses to discuss.

Hey Laphroaig !

[TDunk 590]

 

 

[kopp0e 1,135]

On 7/17/2018 at 6:44 AM, HOOK'EMHOOAH said:

A better answer for what might or might not be beyond the horizon of the edges big bang is "I DON'T KNOW." In science, that is a perfectly acceptable answer especially instead of making unknowable, unprovable, and unsubstantiated claims.

Agreed, as some of the world's most intelligent people in the world, that admit they don't know all things, normally wind up learning more because of knowing that...

[WhatTheBuck 28,713]

On July 19, 2018 at 3:43 PM, Aphelion said:

Why do people on this forum have an aversion to looking up terms they aren't familiar with before commenting on their meaning? 

The claim that "Creator and Creation are the same thing" is a claim entailed by versions of naturalistic pantheism.

From pantheism.com:

"But some pantheists view cause and effect as a unified event, leaving no definite distinction between creator and created."

From the linked entry on pantheism:

"..traditional theists have often insisted on creation ex nihilo precisely to drive a wedge between creator and created and thereby rule out pantheism."

"Many pantheists argue that physical conceptions are adequate to explain the entire cosmos. This is an ancient form of pantheism, found for example in the Stoics, for whom only bodies can be said to exist. ...This is also a form of pantheism popular today—often termed, scientific or naturalistic pantheism. Such worldviews make no ontological commitments beyond those sanctioned by empirical science.

You missed the point of philosophy class. You were supposed to learn to think for yourself, not to quote the thoughts of others as if their opinion describes the nature of reality. And maybe you should refresh yourself on the definition of theism.

[Guest]

15 hours ago, WhatTheBuck said:

You missed the point of philosophy class. You were supposed to learn to think for yourself, not to quote the thoughts of others as if their opinion describes the nature of reality. And maybe you should refresh yourself on the definition of theism.

Most of the discussion & debate on this subtopic starting on page 6 has been nothing more than quibbling over the meaning of terms e.g.: epistemology, natural & supernatural, pantheism.  It's apparent that the folks objecting to their use haven't even bothered to look up what the terms mean within the subject of discussion.  Instead of discussing ideas or engaging the intent of the points being made they decide to solely challenge definitions (which could all be cleared up if they took 5 minutes and did a bit of study).  Why is that?  Is it because they want to genuinely explore ideas and to seek to understand the nature of reality or are they instead simply making very sloppy attempts at winning message board gotcha? 

The point of philosophy is not to explain what basic terms mean that anyone can look up if they care at all.  You seem to have some sort of objection to the term pantheism because it contains the term "theism."  Atheism also contains the word "theism."  If I were to say that a given claim was a type of atheism, would it makes sense to say that "it's not theism at all" or that I should look up the definition of theism? Did you know that naturalistic pantheism is much closer to atheism than theism and can arguably be categorized as a type of atheism? 

"Pantheists don't believe in a supernatural God at all, but use the word God as a non-supernatural synonym for Nature, or for the Universe, or for the lawfulness that governs its workings. Deists differ from theists in that their God does not answer prayers, is not interested in sins or confessions, does not read our thoughts and does not intervene with capricious miracles. Deists differ from pantheists in that the deist God is some kind of cosmic intelligence, rather than the pantheist's metaphoric or poetic synonym for the laws of the universe. Pantheism is sexed-up atheism."  -Richard Dawkins

 

Edited July 22, 2018 by Guest

[sidis 9,754]

On 7/18/2018 at 11:33 AM, sidis said:

i'll write more on this later as real world crap intervenes but the summary answer to those questions are ironic and opposite.  the one i find personally the most compelling in a deep, deep down in the "quest for truth and knowledge" sense are the most basic forms of the cosmological argument (the basic kalam argument formed by the islamists that craig stole) because going back beyond the planck era is the ultimate point of ignorance re: causality.  it could easily be a non-contingent, first cause just as easily as it could be any type of actual infinite.

ironically, if i had to debate any of the major arguments however with the goal of prevailing (even though i am not remotely equipped to do so in any serious sense), i would want to debate against the cosmological argument because i think it has the weakest logical and philosophical reasoning...i'll come back to it but the critiques such as reliance on experience/inductive, exemption of causality for the first cause, kantian critique of necessary being, weak sufficient reason, etc... are all fairly strong critiques in my mind.

following up on this...

first question is what philosophical argument do i find the most "compelling" in a day-to-day sense...which one makes fundamental sense to me as a conscious being with no preconceived notions of what is truth as it relates to the ever present origins question (thanks, gebser).  as i stated, the most basic cosmological argument is probably the most reasonable option amongst the litany of arguments due to its simplicity.  ultimately, i believe in the preponderance of observed, scientific conclusions, as well as theories regarding the last ~13.7B years in the universe.  the disbursement of energy, the accretion of galaxies and solar-planetary systems, the formation of earth, and so on through today.  the observations of the cosmic microwave background, gravity, all the way though the current structure of the observable universe.  however, prior to the planck era, there is absolutely no knowledge or theory that is in anyway more compelling than any other...multiverses, primordial singularity, chaotic inflation theory, flying spaghetti monster, intelligent creator, non-contingent first cause, whatever.  none of them are particularly persuasive on their own.  thus, at its core...the argument that the universe exists and everything that exists has a cause is just as persuasive as anything.  i have no idea where point 0...or if point 0 exists.  it is far more compelling to me than making an axiomatic declaration that and entity possesses maximal excellence and then just accepting the conclusion as rational.  whether your analogize it with motion as aquinas did or simple causality/contingency, it is far more compelling to me as a competing theory for a currently unanswerable question...where did energy originate and what event set its expansion in motion.  if we observe that everything can be followed back to some causality, which ultimately lead to the same ultimate cause (the expansion of energy and the interaction of matter regardless of its the "thing's" banality), where do we go from there(?).  perhaps a non-contingent, first cause whether that be a "creator," an "intelligent creator," a confluence of cosmic events prior to the singularity that we simply cannot contemplate...ultimately no one is in a position to answer such questions or even begin to conceive of or describe the cause but in my mind, it is a far more compelling (in the most fundamental way) argument for the existence of such an entity than others. 

now, none of that has anything to do formal logical structures or the rigors of philosophical argument. it is just a simplification of the argument as one that appeals to the simplicity of my ignorance.  if one were to put me into a debate to argue against the existence of a "creator," as i said above, of the major arguments that have prevailed through the centuries, the cosmological argument is likely the one i would choose if my goal were to succeed in persuading.  i would again caveat this by saying i am obviously not currently equipped to do such a thing against any serious philosophical debater. 

however, how i critiqued the cosmological argument would obviously be contingent (ha) on what form of the cosmological argument was employed...whether it was an inductive argument, the most basic kalam argument, or the more complex deductive arguments for a non-contingent cause.  however, one core critique that would generally apply to all the variations of the argument would stem from the special pleading required to exempt the first cause, non-contingent being from the rest of the argument (hume, russell obviously developed this at length).  there is no justification for this whatsoever that i have seen that is persuasive.  the responses to this critique i have reviewed and considered including craig and sinclair, clarke, etc... are not moving as they generally rely on semantic shifting between entities and events which i do not think is helpful or instructive.  craig's arguments against the actual infinite as opposed to a potential infinite are not remotely helpful at all to me when contemplating the why the exemption of the first cause must exist. 

all that said, if i had to choose one to argue against, it would be the deductive cosmological argument from contingency.  See section 4:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/

1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed or could cease to exist) exists.
2. This contingent being has a cause of or explanation for its existence.
3. The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.
4. What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide a completely adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being.
6. Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists.
8. The universe is contingent.
9. Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the universe.

my core argument regarding the special pleading still applies here, but like axiom 4 in the traditional ontological arguments, the acceptance of 5 in this argument is completely specious and relies entirely on principle of sufficient reason...as well as relying on empirical experience and non-a priori reasoning.  (as a personal side note, once we move back past the planck era, we have no idea if 5 holds or not)  on the psr, from the same link to the stanford page:

Peter van Inwagen (1983: 202–04) argues that the PSR must be rejected. If the PSR is true, every contingent proposition has an explanation. Suppose

P is the conjunction of all contingent true propositions. Suppose also that there is a state of affairs S that provides a sufficient reason for P. S cannot itself be contingent, for then it would be a conjunct of P and entailed by P, and as both entailing and entailed by P would be P, so that it would be its own sufficient reason. But no contingent proposition can explain itself. Neither can S be necessary, for from necessary propositions only necessary propositions follow. Necessary propositions cannot explain contingent propositions, for if x sufficiently explains y, then x entails y, and if x is necessary so is y. So S cannot be either contingent or necessary, and hence the PSR is false. Thus, if the cosmological argument appeals to the PSR to establish the existence of a necessary being whose existence is expressed by a necessary proposition as an explanation for contingent beings, it fails in that it cannot account for the contingent beings it purportedly explains.

and you know i am going to raise kant's fundamental objections from critique of pure reason, likening the logical weakness of the cosmological argument to the same problems i have with the ontological arguments...from the same link:

Kant held that the cosmological argument, in concluding to the existence of an absolutely necessary being, attempts to prove the existence of a being whose nonexistence “is impossible”, is “absolutely inconceivable” (

Critique B621). Kant indicates that what he has in mind by an “absolutely necessary being” is a being whose existence is logically necessary, where to deny its existence is contradictory. The only being that meets this condition is the most real or maximally excellent being—a being with all perfections, including existence. This concept lies at the heart of the ontological argument. Although in the ontological argument the perfect being is determined to exist through its own concept, in fact nothing can be determined to exist in this manner; one has to begin with existence. In short, the cosmological argument presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument. But since the ontological argument is defective for the above (and other) reason, the cosmological argument that depends on or invokes it likewise must be defective (Critique B634).

i particularly like john mackie's response to critics of kant's argument in which they claim that he is metaphysically necessary stating that if that is the case, god is logically contingent and we are brought back to the same special pleading to exempt god from the underlying causation or contingency argument.  i have yet to consider a strong response to that.

finally, at its simplest in arguing against this particular cosmological argument as a basis for the existence of god, the argument as constructed doesn't actually conclude that a non-contingent, first cause "god" exists.  i do not see 8 and 9 from above concluding that god or a creator exists...

[sidis 9,754]

i have no idea what the hell is up with the formatting above.  the quote function in this software is totally fucked.  apologies.

[WhatTheBuck 28,713]

On July 22, 2018 at 2:41 PM, Aphelion said:

Most of the discussion & debate on this subtopic starting on page 6 has been nothing more than quibbling over the meaning of terms e.g.: epistemology, natural & supernatural, pantheism.  It's apparent that the folks objecting to their use haven't even bothered to look up what the terms mean within the subject of discussion.  Instead of discussing ideas or engaging the intent of the points being made they decide to solely challenge definitions (which could all be cleared up if they took 5 minutes and did a bit of study).  Why is that?  Is it because they want to genuinely explore ideas and to seek to understand the nature of reality or are they instead simply making very sloppy attempts at winning message board gotcha? 

The point of philosophy is not to explain what basic terms mean that anyone can look up if they care at all.  You seem to have some sort of objection to the term pantheism because it contains the term "theism."  Atheism also contains the word "theism."  If I were to say that a given claim was a type of atheism, would it makes sense to say that "it's not theism at all" or that I should look up the definition of theism? Did you know that naturalistic pantheism is much closer to atheism than theism and can arguably be categorized as a type of atheism? 

"Pantheists don't believe in a supernatural God at all, but use the word God as a non-supernatural synonym for Nature, or for the Universe, or for the lawfulness that governs its workings. Deists differ from theists in that their God does not answer prayers, is not interested in sins or confessions, does not read our thoughts and does not intervene with capricious miracles. Deists differ from pantheists in that the deist God is some kind of cosmic intelligence, rather than the pantheist's metaphoric or poetic synonym for the laws of the universe. Pantheism is sexed-up atheism."  -Richard Dawkins

 

You're very fond of the appeal to authority, aren't you?Have you ever had an original thought?

Richard Dawkins is an authority on evolutionary biology, not religion. I'm a fan of his writing but he and I have different arguments for arriving at the same conclusion wrt religion. (Although if he was here right now he'd agree with me. Your quote is contextually irrelevant and he would see that.)

"Atheism" and "pantheism" aren't similar terms because they contain the word "theism." Prefixes have meanings. What a weak argument. I don't find your attempts to tell me what I meant by what I said compelling at all. I'm only mildly curious about who you'll quote next. 

[WhatTheBuck 28,713]

35 minutes ago, sidis said:

i have no idea what the hell is up with the formatting above.  the quote function in this software is totally fucked.  apologies.

But did you get off?

[Guest]

24 minutes ago, sidis said:

following up on this...

first question is what philosophical argument do i find the most "compelling" in a day-to-day sense...which one makes fundamental sense to me as a conscious being with no preconceived notions of what is truth as it relates to the ever present origins question (thanks, gebser).  as i stated, the most basic cosmological argument is probably the most reasonable option amongst the litany of arguments due to its simplicity.  ultimately, i believe in the preponderance of observed, scientific conclusions, as well as theories regarding the last ~13.7B years in the universe.  the disbursement of energy, the accretion of galaxies and solar-planetary systems, the formation of earth, and so on through today.  the observations of the cosmic microwave background, gravity, all the way though the current structure of the observable universe.  however, prior to the planck era, there is absolutely no knowledge or theory that is in anyway more compelling than any other...multiverses, primordial singularity, chaotic inflation theory, flying spaghetti monster, intelligent creator, non-contingent first cause, whatever.  none of them are particularly persuasive on their own.  thus, at its core...the argument that the universe exists and everything that exists has a cause is just as persuasive as anything.  i have no idea where point 0...or if point 0 exists.  it is far more compelling to me than making an axiomatic declaration that and entity possesses maximal excellence and then just accepting the conclusion as rational.  whether your analogize it with motion as aquinas did or simple causality/contingency, it is far more compelling to me as a competing theory for a currently unanswerable question...where did energy originate and what event set its expansion in motion.  if we observe that everything can be followed back to some causality, which ultimately lead to the same ultimate cause (the expansion of energy and the interaction of matter regardless of its the "thing's" banality), where do we go from there(?).  perhaps a non-contingent, first cause whether that be a "creator," an "intelligent creator," a confluence of cosmic events prior to the singularity that we simply cannot contemplate...ultimately no one is in a position to answer such questions or even begin to conceive of or describe the cause but in my mind, it is a far more compelling (in the most fundamental way) argument for the existence of such an entity than others. 

now, none of that has anything to do formal logical structures or the rigors of philosophical argument. it is just a simplification of the argument as one that appeals to the simplicity of my ignorance.  if one were to put me into a debate to argue against the existence of a "creator," as i said above, of the major arguments that have prevailed through the centuries, the cosmological argument is likely the one i would choose if my goal were to succeed in persuading.  i would again caveat this by saying i am obviously not currently equipped to do such a thing against any serious philosophical debater. 

however, how i critiqued the cosmological argument would obviously be contingent (ha) on what form of the cosmological argument was employed...whether it was an inductive argument, the most basic kalam argument, or the more complex deductive arguments for a non-contingent cause.  however, one core critique that would generally apply to all the variations of the argument would stem from the special pleading required to exempt the first cause, non-contingent being from the rest of the argument (hume, russell obviously developed this at length).  there is no justification for this whatsoever that i have seen that is persuasive.  the responses to this critique i have reviewed and considered including craig and sinclair, clarke, etc... are not moving as they generally rely on semantic shifting between entities and events which i do not think is helpful or instructive.  craig's arguments against the actual infinite as opposed to a potential infinite are not remotely helpful at all to me when contemplating the why the exemption of the first cause must exist. 

all that said, if i had to choose one to argue against, it would be the deductive cosmological argument from contingency.  See section 4:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/

 

 

Thanks for the response.  It's funny because I have the exact opposite take on compelling vs. defendable in regards to the arguments.  I find the ontological arguments in the family of the Descartes-Leibniz-Godel arguments the most compelling, but since their axioms are so abstract they are difficult to defend.  One can just simply reject one or more of the axioms and there won't be much in the way of implied consequences.  And really in arguments such as these that rely on premises that are not based on a pre-agreed  axiomatic system, the game is finding axioms that if one were to reject them, then other undesirable consequences follow.  As a side note, this is the exact opposite situation for mathematical arguments since pre-agreed axiomatic math systems do exist; thus the point of that game is to find what follows from the agreed axioms and if you do this then you will be said to have given a proof; but there is no such luxury in ontology.  The ontological arguments generally are based on axioms that if rejected do not lead to any difficult consequences (at least not any that are immediately obvious) that need to be addressed by the opposition.  

The argument that i would give if I were to be summoned to metaphysical court would be the same argument that you would prefer to address if in the same situation:  the cosmological argument from contingency.  Here are a few thoughts on cosmological arguments in general and on the argument from contingency in particular:

1. I do not find the kalam argument very compelling for the following reason:  I do not have any objection to the existence of an actual infinite; in fact, I think they are perfectly consistent and possible.  So did Leibniz: "it is quite untrue that an actual infinity is impossible."  -Paragraph 8 in the preliminary dissertation of the Theodicy
2. The argument from contingency as given by Leibniz (and the various modern revisions of this argument) based on the PSR have an advantage over the ontological arguments in that the rejection or even the binding or restricting of the PSR in any way leads to unpleasant consequences and difficult questions to address for the one who takes issue with the PSR.  The PSR is an axiom that was assumed both explicitly or implicitly by scientists for centuries (and it is still assumed implicitly even today).  The famous physicist & religious skeptic Laplace employed the PSR (see A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, page 3).  The only time any issue it taken with the PSR is when it is used to demonstrate the existence of the necessary being.  You may argue that this is rightly so, as the PSR is fine to apply within our physical world but we cannot assume it in metaphysics or apply it to anything outside of our world.  However, if we assume that the PSR does not apply to all or to things beyond our world (i.e. we bind the PSR to apply solely within our world), then other unpleasant questions still arise.  For example, if the universe does not require a sufficient reason to exist, then it does not require a sufficient reason to not exist.  This means it could simply pop out of existent for no reason whatsoever.  When we remove the requirement for reason in any way at all, then we get unreasonableness.  Furthermore, many physicalists and naturalists look for reasons why the big bang occurred, why our universe exists, where it came from, and so on.  They do this precisely because they believe the PSR applies in a metaphysical sense to our world as well; otherwise, they would not look for reasons beyond the bounds of our world for why it happened.  
3. There is not any special pleading or requested exemption for the first cause/necessary being who created the universe in the contingency argument from Leibniz.  Leibniz said that the necessary being requires and has a sufficient reason like all other entities.  The question is not what things require a reason and what things do not.  All things require a reason, even God (according this argument).  The question is this:  is the universe the type of thing that contains the reason for its existence within its very nature?  Leibniz argued that is it not, as the universe has all the properties of a contingent entity and none of the properties of a necessary entity.  However, there are some entities that do contain the reason for their existence withing their nature (i.e. the necessary entities).   How or why a necessary entity exists is not a question addressed by the contingency argument; instead, it shows that such an entity must exist.  This leads into the next point.
4. I disagree that the contingency argument relies upon the ontological argument.  The contingency argument is a reductio argument and relies upon excluded middle (unlike ontological arguments which are constructive).  It makes no claim on how the necessary being came to be and that is not necessary for it to be valid.  Instead, it shows that such an entity must exist as it is not possible for our contingnet world to exist if a necessary being did not exist.  Similarly, one can give a valid and independent reductio argument that demonstrates the the square root of 2 is irrational, even if there were no known methods for calculating the square root of two and its value was unknown.