Israel-Hamas war thread

[InkaUtexas 25496]

53 minutes ago, Laxtonto said:

 

I still don't think it happens.

[Laxtonto 11927]

13 minutes ago, InkaUtexas said:

I still don't think it happens.

I dont either because it is a death sentence to go there. The real question is that how few viable options are there on the table if Port Sudan is considered a potential compromise?

The Hamas leadership isn't worth the headache to protect at this point. Between the destruction of the Hezbollah leadership and changing political climate in the US, there is just no point to keep providing them cover.

[InkaUtexas 25496]

45 minutes ago, Laxtonto said:

I dont either because it is a death sentence to go there. The real question is that how few viable options are there on the table if Port Sudan is considered a potential compromise?

The Hamas leadership isn't worth the headache to protect at this point. Between the destruction of the Hezbollah leadership and changing political climate in the US, there is just no point to keep providing them cover.

Agree that there are few options. 1- no one really will want them. 2- anywhere they are vulnerable. That is why I brought up Turkey. Will the IDF go after them there? 3- Iran? Russia? Residents of the NORKS? 4- Europe?

Of those Turkey is the safest and provides a bit of something for both groups.

[bolverk 29397]

2 hours ago, InkaUtexas said:

Agree that there are few options. 1- no one really will want them. 2- anywhere they are vulnerable. That is why I brought up Turkey. Will the IDF go after them there? 3- Iran? Russia? Residents of the NORKS? 4- Europe?

Of those Turkey is the safest and provides a bit of something for both groups.

Could the chaos in Yemen somehow provide them with some cover? It's kind of in a fucked up Afghanistan-in-active-civil-war type of way with some rugged and mountainous terrain. I don't know shit about fuck when it comes to terrorist hidey-holes, but that might be a good one.

[InkaUtexas 25496]

22 minutes ago, bolverk said:

Could the chaos in Yemen somehow provide them with some cover? It's kind of in a fucked up Afghanistan-in-active-civil-war type of way with some rugged and mountainous terrain. I don't know shit about fuck when it comes to terrorist hidey-holes, but that might be a good one.

either way they are gonna get hit by the IDF. Only place would be in a KSA base

[Bevo 13524]

The upcoming administration would be very upset with Turkey if it protected Hamas leaders inside Turkey. The US would lose a lot and Turkey would lose a lot if the relationship fragmented. With such backlash, I don’t think Erdogan would risk it. 
 

 

 

Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, right, and Israel's President Isaac Herzog speak to the media after their talks, in Ankara, Turkey, Wednesday, March 9, 2022. 

Turkey and Israel have a long and complex history of relations, but never have they been more strained. Erdoğan made the Palestinian issue central to his foreign policy, even praising Hamas. A serious break could have major implications for the region.

As two of the three non-Arab states in the region, Turkey and Israel maintain a complex and often fluctuating relationship marked by both cooperation and tension. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to officially recognize Israel in 1949. From the 1950s until the 1980s, Turkey had a balanced policy that was sensitive to regional dynamics while keeping a low profile.  

Maintaining diplomatic and economic ties with both Israel and its Arab neighbors was a priority for Turkey, which also recognized the Palestinian state in 1988. Though initially shaped by Israel's stance on Palestinians, mutual visits and cooperation in the early 1990s show the relationship soon evolved beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

Increased trade and cooperation 

This era saw deep diplomatic relations with Israel and the signing of several key agreements in 1996. The Defense Cooperation and Free Trade Agreements (FTA) were pivotal in formalizing cooperation across military, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence sectors. The FTA, in particular, played a crucial role in boosting economic relations, with bilateral trade exceeding $1 billion by 2000—a significant increase from $304 million in 1994. This agreement laid the foundation for strong bilateral economic ties that have remained resilient until after October 7 despite many political crises. 

In the early 2000s, tensions between Turkey and Israel began to rise. The collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, along with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, strained relations. This period also saw a shift in Turkey's internal politics with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose administration initially proposed positive relations but shifted to a more assertive stance, focusing on the Palestinian cause and increasing criticism of Israel. 

Turkish-Israeli relations have been tumultuous under Erdoğan since then, often mirroring the fluctuations in Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Ankara’s condemnation of the 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict marked the beginning of a bleaker era, followed by the "one-minute" crisis in Davos in 2009 and the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish citizens. The crisis resulted in Turkey downgrading diplomatic ties to the second secretary level and suspending military agreements. 

Attempts to restore relations with an agreement in 2016 failed in December 2017 following US President Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, leading to further diplomatic fallout. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Erdoğan of being Hamas's biggest supporter, while Erdoğan labeled Israel an 'apartheid regime' and defended Hamas, rejecting labeling it a terrorist organization. 

Despite Erdoğan’sannouncements of suspending “military and commercial ties” with Israel after nearly every crisis, Turkey-Israel economic relations have significantly expanded over the past 20 years. 

The personal estrangement between the two leaders seemed to drive the two nations further apart, yet their economic relationship has paradoxically strengthened. Despite Erdoğan’sannouncements of suspending “military and commercial ties” with Israel after nearly every crisis, Turkey-Israel economic relations have significantly expanded over the past 20 years. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), the bilateral trade volume of $1.41 billion in 2002 rose to $8.91 billion by 2022, with the trade balance consistently favoring Turkey. Arguably, for both leaders, the rhetoric is merely a façade aimed at securing domestic gains, while the expansion of economic interests takes precedence. This dynamic indicated that the Israel-Turkey relationship prioritized economic interests over political factors.  

In 2022, Israel and Turkey restored full diplomatic ties and reappointed ambassadors, driven partly by Turkey's economic crisis and broader rapprochement with countries in the Middle East and North Africa region and both governments’ strategic interests in countering Iran. Despite anti-Israel rhetoric, Erdoğan’s administration recognized the strategic importance of maintaining relations with Israel, separate from its Palestinian policies. 

After October 7 

The October 7 attacks sparked an international crisis, further straining already fractured Turkey-Israel relations. Initially, Erdoğan projected a more restrained stance. During a speech in Ankara, he called for both Israelis and Palestinians to act with restraint. However, this relatively tempered approach lasted only for a minute. Within days, President Erdoğan escalated his rhetoric, aligning more vocally with the Palestinians while lambasting Israel's actions in Gaza as genocide and war crimes. 

This shift in tone was Erdoğan’s way of balancing pragmatism with ideological alignment, particularly with groups like Hamas. Throughout his presidency, Erdoğan has worked on cultivating an image of his government as a defender of Palestinians. His short-lived temperance following October 7 quickly led to more familiar aggressive rhetoric, albeit not matched by similarly aggressive actions. Erdoğan's speeches have grown more inflammatory, labeling Israel as a terrorist state and likening its leaders to historical tyrants, while his government's actions have remained relatively controlled, exposing a disconnect between fiery rhetoric and actual policy. In other words, it was bold talk for the home crowd but a striking lack of follow-through regarding international action. 

The most glaring example of this gap between words and deeds is Turkey’s trade with Israel. Despite claims that Turkey had suspended trade with Israel in protest of its actions in Gaza, investigative journalist Metin Cihan and others revealed that trade between the two countries has not fully stopped. Allegationssurfaced that Erdoğan’s son engaged in trade with Israel after October 7. In reality, Turkish goods have continued to reach Israel, often under the pretext of being destined for Palestine. This revelation, while not a surprise for those who are familiar with Ankara, showed geopolitical considerations were being managed in a way that limited direct economic fallout. 

Erdoğan’s government has also been cautious in its handling of domestic protests against Israel. While protests have erupted across Turkey, echoing the public’s anger towards Israel, the government has sought to maintain control over these demonstrations. Protests have been allowed under strict government oversight, reflecting a clear intent to prevent uncontrolled civil unrest that could spark broader demonstrations against the government itself—whether in response to trade relations with Israel, the economic crisis, the erosion of democracy, or other issues.  

When protests have fallen outside of this controlled framework, such as when demonstrators acted independently of government-organized rallies, authorities have intervened, even arresting anti-Israel protesters. For Ankara, the protests were more about shaping an image for the international community than actually opposing Israel, highlighting Erdoğan’s approach: sustaining a pro-Palestinian position to satisfy his political base while preventing any escalation into wider unrest against his government. Similarly, Netanyahu, who is facing charges of fraud, breach of trust, and accepting bribes, staying in power was crucial, and Ankara’s Hamas-friendly actions gave the Prime Minister the space needed to hit back at Erdoğan when needed.  

Inflammatory diplomacy 

Ankara’s support for Hamas has been a major point of contention, with Erdoğan defending the group as a legitimate resistance movement and, after October 7, praising them as liberators while condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza as comparable to historical atrocities in the Crusades and World War II. This reflects Erdoğan’s broader ambition to position himself as a leader of the ummah, or International Muslim community, using religious and historical narratives to rally domestic and regional support. 

Domestically, he has securitized Turkish politics by constructing an imagined threat of an eventual Israeli attack on Turkey, while internationally, he projected Turkey as a regional power capable of intervening in Middle Eastern conflicts, citing past actions in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Though relations with Israel have not been formally downgraded, tensions rose as ambassadors were withdrawn, and Turkey’s supportfor South Africa’s genocide case against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adds further strain, with uncertain long-term consequences. 

Erdoğan’s ambitions are tempered by Turkey’s economic and political constraints. A full-scale regional war, especially one involving Iran and its proxies, could severely impact Turkey’s fragile economy. Despite deteriorating diplomatic relations, Erdoğan has been cautious not to completely sever economic ties with Israel, given their long-standing trade in sectors like energy, textiles, and technology. Even rising tensions the transit of Azerbaijani oil through Turkey to Israel have continued unaffected.  

Israel, too, faces economic strain. More than a year into its war in Gaza, Israel is grappling with rising inflation, slowed growth, and public discontent over the high cost of living. Key sectors such as tourism and exports have been hit, while increased defense spending has added pressure to social services, fueling political divisions. These factors likely explain why both governments have hesitated to take more direct action despite their heated rhetoric. 

In the aftermath of October 7, a complex interplay of ideology, pragmatism, and geopolitical strategy has taken place.

In the aftermath of October 7, a complex interplay of ideology, pragmatism, and geopolitical strategy has taken place. While Erdoğan’s rhetoric has been fiery and uncompromising, particularly in his defense of Hamas and his condemnation of Israel’s actions, the reality on the ground has been more controlled compared to what it could have been. Economic ties between the two countries, though disrupted, have not been entirely severed despite the diplomatic tension.  

As the conflict evolves, the cynical balance between Erdoğan's domestic posturing and diplomacy will likely remain central to Turkey and Israel's relationship. Netanyahu’s need to maintain security cooperation while navigating complex regional dynamics mirrors Erdoğan’s tightrope walk between appeasing his domestic base and engaging in realpolitik. The future also hinges on the US elections, as a shift in Washington's foreign policy could redefine both countries' regional strategies and alliances. 

The views represented in this piece are those of the authors and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.    

[InkaUtexas 25496]

I understand it would be piss off a lot of people. What would we do? Kick them out of NATO? Remove our base?

Just saying that is what I have seen. Fuck it, let them go to the backwater of Port Sudan. Send them to Darfur. Move our old compound in Kabul?

 

[Rex Kramer 1301]

Why hasn’t Israel hit them in Qatar?

[InkaUtexas 25496]

11 minutes ago, Rex Kramer said:

Why hasn’t Israel hit them in Qatar?

Lots of reasons.

1- We want Qatar stable. We really like our base there. And the LNG is nice.

2- Qatar plays an interesting role in the Gulf. They play both sides in the Sunni-Shia game.

3- Hard to allow that while Trump's cabinet is meeting the Taliban there. Doha is kind of the Geneva of the region.

4- Israel wants trade with the region. Their assassination in Dubai caused some impact there.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Mahmoud_Al-Mabhouh

5- Hamas probably lives in a nice, well guarded villa.

Could they? Probably. But why? What is the benefit? They are mouthpieces. The fighters, the IDF's real worry, are in Gaza and pretty much surrounded. The IDF's Hamas problem is now getting hit outside of the region.

[Rex Kramer 1301]

1 minute ago, InkaUtexas said:

Lots of reasons.

1- We want Qatar stable. We really like our base there. And the LNG is nice.

2- Qatar plays an interesting role in the Gulf. They play both sides in the Sunni-Shia game.

3- Hard to allow that while Trump's cabinet is meeting the Taliban there. Doha is kind of the Geneva of the region.

4- Israel wants trade with the region. Their assassination in Dubai caused some impact there.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Mahmoud_Al-Mabhouh

5- Hamas probably lives in a nice, well guarded villa.

Could they? Probably. But why? What is the benefit? They are mouthpieces. The fighters, the IDF's real worry, are in Gaza and pretty much surrounded. The IDF's Hamas problem is now getting hit outside of the region.

All logical reasons. I just don’t know why they haven't because they can, and to show Hamas and Hezbollah they can wipe out all lesdership and find you anywhere in the world. Anywhere they go they’re in serious danger. 

[InkaUtexas 25496]

2 minutes ago, Rex Kramer said:

All logical reasons. I just don’t know why they haven't because they can, and to show Hamas and Hezbollah they can wipe out all lesdership and find you anywhere in the world. Anywhere they go they’re in serious danger. 

Read that link about the assassination. Mossad has an image of pulling off some amazing operations, but they also have fucked up a lot.

#5 is real. That villa could be in a senior Sheik's compound, etc. Doubt they go out and mingle at the club.

And what do those talking heads really accomplish? You make them martyrs it is a lot more. Arabs remember for a long time. We tend to forget. Except for football. We remember that shit.

[Bevo 13524]

47 minutes ago, InkaUtexas said:

I understand it would be piss off a lot of people. What would we do? Kick them out of NATO? Remove our base?

Just saying that is what I have seen. Fuck it, let them go to the backwater of Port Sudan. Send them to Darfur. Move our old compound in Kabul?

 

 

 

For a bunch of backwater Hamas leaders? How much money could they offer Erdogan? I don't think enough to fracture relationships.

 

[InkaUtexas 25496]

1 minute ago, Bevo said:

 

 

For a bunch of backwater Hamas leaders? How much money could they offer Erdogan? I don't think enough to fracture relationships.

 

For him there is a win on a few fronts.

1- Shows he is a leader not afraid of Israel. Strengthens his position on the street among the three Sunni powers. You know, cred. He is pushing hard, albeit quietly, for a bigger role in the region as a defender of the little dude.

2- A big ass middle finger to the EU. He says they harbor Kurdish terrorist groups that the EU says are separatists, not terrorists.

3- He knows we won't leave that nice big ass base. And if we did? well I am sure someone else would love to move in.

[InkaUtexas 25496]

This is interesting. Not expected, shows some serious fractures. Fatwa's are a big deal. Like a Papal Bull if issued from the right authority. This would form the basis of Friday Sermons. Not might, it will.

The most prominent Islamic scholar in Gaza has issued a rare, powerful fatwa condemning Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, which triggered the devastating war in the Palestinian territory.

Professor Dr Salman al-Dayah, a former dean of the Faculty of Sharia and Law at the Hamas-affiliated Islamic University of Gaza, is one of the region’s most respected religious authorities, so his legal opinion carries significant weight among Gaza’s two million population, which is predominantly Sunni Muslim.

A fatwa is a non-binding Islamic legal ruling from a respected religious scholar usually based on the Quran or the Sunnah - the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad.

Some good stuff in the spoiler. My highlights.

Spoiler

Dr Dayah argues that the significant civilian casualties in Gaza, together with the widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure and humanitarian disaster that have followed the 7 October attack, means that it was in direct contradiction to the teachings of Islam.

Hamas, he says, has failed in its obligations of “keeping fighters away from the homes of defenceless [Palestinian] civilians and their shelters, and providing security and safety as much as possible in the various aspects of life... security, economic, health, and education, and saving enough supplies for them.”

Dr Dayah points to Quranic verses and the Sunnah that set strict conditions for the conduct of jihad, including the necessity of avoiding actions that provoke an excessive and disproportionate response by an opponent.

His fatwa highlights that, according to Islamic law, a military raid should not trigger a response that exceeds the intended benefits of the action.

He also stresses that Muslim leaders are obligated to ensure the safety and well-being of non-combatants, including by providing food, medicine, and refuge to those not involved in the fighting.

“Human life is more precious to God than Mecca,” Dr Dayah states.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4vw1l8xvdo

[Braff Zacklin 13409]

They should consider re-homing the Palestinians to Kingman, Ariz. I'm sure they'd be well received there.

 

[Laxtonto 11927]

[ABSR 5289]

20 hours ago, Brian Fantana said:

It's ethnic cleansing o'clock!

Not that I agree with the statement/motion, but that's not ethnic cleansing being discussed. 

Israel controls most of the West Bank, and the parts they don't "officially" control they really do.   The lives of Palestinians who live there is vastly better than those in Gaza (even before current hostilities) as the infrastructure for roads, power, sewage, internet etc. works and is well run....by Israel.  

His statement (again, not saying good or bad), is more about that Israel is and has maintained de facto ownership/management of the West Bank for 50+ years and he is pushing to annex the territory to make it officially part of Israel.   They wouldn't displace the Palestinians who live and work there and to the every day lives of Jews and Palestinians it would be a fairly negligible change.  Politically etc, a big change.

[Brian Fantana 6667]

Lol lmao

[MagicSoccerSpray 1725]

Childish as always.

[Captainant 27442]

Seems significant.

https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-cuts-off-relations-israel-1985013

News outlet Medya Ege reported Erdogan to have said, "We, as the State and Government of the Republic of Turkey, have cut off relations with Israel. We do not have any relationship with Israel at this point. Period."

Erdogan made these comments to journalists aboard his plane following his recent visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdogan highlighted his condemnation of what he termed genocide in Gaza and Lebanon.

He emphasized the urgent need for humanitarian aid and an immediate ceasefire, "As you know, intense efforts are being made to keep the pressure on Israel alive and to take coercive measures against this country on the basis of international law We show it," he is reported to have said.

At the time of writing the Turkish embassy in Tel Aviv is still operating and Jerusalem has not made any official statement about Erdogan's comments.

Newsweek has reached out to the Turkish Embassy in Israel for comment by email.

[InkaUtexas 25496]

Well I guess that might be a good place for Hamas to go.

[Rex Kramer 1301]

45 minutes ago, InkaUtexas said:

Well I guess that might be a good place for Hamas to go.

Israel would hit them there. Erdogan would be a moron to admit them. Why do you seemingly care about their soft landing?  Maybe I am misreading concern for morbid interest. 

[InkaUtexas 25496]

9 minutes ago, Rex Kramer said:

Israel would hit them there. Erdogan would be a moron to admit them. Why do you seemingly care about their soft landing?  Maybe I am misreading concern for morbid interest. 

I don't give a fuck where they go. I think it is important as it shows changing policies in the region. It is a shift in a big way. One thing it is gives a middle finger to Iran, something Qatar has been very hesitant to do.

And still not sure Israel would hit them there.

 

[bolverk 29397]

40 minutes ago, InkaUtexas said:

I don't give a fuck where they go. I think it is important as it shows changing policies in the region. It is a shift in a big way. One thing it is gives a middle finger to Iran, something Qatar has been very hesitant to do.

And still not sure Israel would hit them there.

 

It'd be quite the conundrum to potentially have to Article 5 Israel over an attack on Turkish soil.

[Brisketexan 104557]

25 minutes ago, bolverk said:

It'd be quite the conundrum to potentially have to Article 5 Israel over an attack on Turkish soil.

No.  It wouldn't.  And you know exactly why it wouldn't.

[Rex Kramer 1301]

31 minutes ago, bolverk said:

It'd be quite the conundrum to potentially have to Article 5 Israel over an attack on Turkish soil.

A lot of your posts appear to be reasonable, informative fact-based posts that are heavily slanted toward being critical of Israel.

Here, you’re tipping your hand big time. In no way would this be “quite the conundrum”. First of all, Mossad keeps their mouths shut, unlike the idiotic braggadocio you hear out of Islamic terrorist groups. Second, if Israel somehow takes credit for it, and they’re Article 5’ed, who gives a flying fuck?  Who even considers these consequences as if they matter?

[bolverk 29397]

1 minute ago, Rex Kramer said:

A lot of your posts appear to be reasonable, informative fact-based posts that are heavily slanted toward being critical of Israel.

Here, you’re tipping your hand big time. In no way would this be “quite the conundrum”. First of all, Mossad keeps their mouths shut, unlike the idiotic braggadocio you hear out of Islamic terrorist groups. Second, if Israel somehow takes credit for it, and they’re Article 5’ed, who gives a flying fuck?  Who even considers these consequences as if they matter?

It's a hypothetical to consider. That's all.

I was thinking more along the lines of an Israeli Air Force strike on Turkish soil. Let's say that Erdogan does allow Hamas to set up shop there, and let's say that he also cuts off all diplomatic relations with them (as was reported earlier today). In response, Israel bombs the shit out of whatever base they have in Turkey.

Okay, so now we have a NATO country whose leader was already pissed off at Israel, and now he invokes Article 5, asking for NATO assistance. Who answers the call of Rohan Turkey? No one? I mean, yeah, it's possible, but it might piss off one of the members enough. On the other hand, let's say no one does. What now? Does Erdogan then foolishly decide to leave the alliance? Do we still keep our base in Irbil?

You honestly don't think that's a scenario to consider while idly perusing various threads on Surly? Because, to me, that's exactly the type of mental masturbation that happens all over this site.

[Rex Kramer 1301]

4 minutes ago, bolverk said:

It's a hypothetical to consider. That's all.

[bolverk 29397]

4 minutes ago, Rex Kramer said:

[Rex Kramer 1301]

9 minutes ago, bolverk said:

You’re preemptively condemning Israel on a technicality. It won’t be IDF with a fucking drone strike. It’ll be Mossad and Israel will never admit it. And zero fucks should be given, even by you. 

[InkaUtexas 25496]

9 minutes ago, Rex Kramer said:

You’re preemptively condemning Israel on a technicality. It won’t be IDF with a fucking drone strike. It’ll be Mossad and Israel will never admit it. And zero fucks should be given, even by you. 

KSA did not use a drone to take out Kashogi.

[Captainant 27442]

49 minutes ago, bolverk said:

Okay, so now we have a NATO country whose leader was already pissed off at Israel, and now he invokes Article 5, asking for NATO assistance. Who answers the call of Rohan Turkey? No one? I mean, yeah, it's possible, but it might piss off one of the members enough. On the other hand, let's say no one does. What now? Does Erdogan then foolishly decide to leave the alliance? Do we still keep our base in Irbil?

Frankly, if a member is attacked and Article 5 is invoked to no response, NATO is dead. 

Edited 22 hours ago by Captainant
Autocorrected to the wrong word, fixed.

[bolverk 29397]

5 minutes ago, Rex Kramer said:

You’re preemptively condemning Israel on a technicality. It won’t be IDF with a fucking drone strike. It’ll be Mossad and Israel will never admit it. And zero fucks should be given, even by you. 

You are reading way too much in it. In no way, shape, or form did I condemn Israel in that post. I was just pointing out that Turkey is a NATO member. Hell, I'm not even sure I buy into Inka's speculation that Hamas would decamp to there, but I'm just going with the flow of the conversation.

If Israel attacked Turkish soil (no matter the type of attack), Erdogan would be within his right to invoke Article 5. I didn't say that Israel has no right to go after Hamas. In fact, I've always stated they have every right to do so.

And, again, you continue to misconstrue my positions, which have remained consistent throughout the entire war based on the US's official long-term foreign policy and international law:

1. Support for Israeli defense and right to exist as a nation-state and condemnation of terrorism.
2. Support for aid to Palestinian civilians, concern over their needless deaths, and recognition of their collective right to self-determination as a fully independent nation.

Right now, I'm much less concerned about the whole affair, as there are much bigger concerns closer to home that actually affect our national security. I've honestly just about reached the point of just proclaiming a pox on both their houses.

[bolverk 29397]

5 minutes ago, Captainant said:

Frankly, if a member is attacked and Article 5 is involved to no response, NATO is dead. 

I think you meant to type "invoked," but yeah, that's pretty much where my thoughts were leading me in that hypothetical.

[InkaUtexas 25496]

I am not claiming anything about the Turks and Hamas, but I don't think they go to Port Sudan. It is what I am hearing through my grapevine.

There is this bit of interesting information. I am sure they are exchanging pleasantries only.

Qatar's Emir to visit Turkey on Thursday, Turkish minister says

ISTANBUL, Nov 13 (Reuters) - Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani will visit Turkey on Thursday for high-level meetings, Turkey's trade minister said on Wednesday, after Doha said at the weekend it stalled its Gaza mediation efforts for now.

Some analysts believe Turkey, despite strained ties with Israel, could play some role in mediation since it does not deem the Palestinian militant group Hamas a terrorist group, and some of its political officials regularly visit Turkey.

 

At the weekend, Qatar said it had told Hamas and Israel it will stall efforts to mediate a Gaza ceasefire and hostage release deal until they show willingness and seriousness.

"The Qatar Emir will be in Ankara tomorrow (Thursday) anyway. Important talks, a meeting of the high-level strategic council will be held," Trade Minister Omer Bolat told broadcaster tv100 in comments focused on bilateral trade.

 

Bolat did not mention Qatar's decision nor Hamas in his comments. "We are waiting for a comprehensive trade agreement with Qatar to come into effect...anytime," he added.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatars-emir-visit-turkey-thursday-turkish-minister-says-2024-11-13/

[Nivek 16852]

Is Jared back on the case? 

[Tonesky 917]

3 hours ago, bolverk said:

It'd be quite the conundrum to potentially have to Article 5 Israel over an attack on Turkish soil.

Just like the many Russian assassinations in European NATA member nations....

[Rex Kramer 1301]

56 minutes ago, Tonesky said:

Just like the many Russian assassinations in European NATA member nations....

Not to mention the dozens of Israeli assasinstions post 1949 in Euro NATO members. The fact that this is a discussion or causes heartburn is telling. Fuck Hamas and fuck Erdogan. 

[InkaUtexas 25496]

3 minutes ago, Rex Kramer said:

Not to mention the dozens of Israeli assasinstions post 1949 in Euro NATO members. The fact that this is a discussion or causes heartburn is telling. Fuck Hamas and fuck Erdogan. 

Yep, or hell, Turks killing people in NATO countries.

Fuck Hamas and fuck Erdogan. 

Something we agree on.

 

[Laxtonto 11927]

I would be very surprised if Hamas goes to Turkey. I would also be surprised if they go to Port Sudan.

The problem is that no one wants them and Qatar is now desperately wants to be rid of them.

As some added spice, OPEC+ overestimated Chinese demand and so it it unlikely they will be able to ramp up production to their targets anytime soon. They are also concerned that US tariffs and potential US overproduction could further weaken demand. Combine that with the potential end of the Ukraine war and lessening of Russian oil export restrictions and OPEC+ is concerned about future revenue estimates…

All of this makes the hot potato game with who gets stuck with the Hamas leadership that much more high stakes. Maybe Turkey takes them, but there is little benefit to having them in your country at this point. Is it really worth the headache now since they are already walking the tightrope between NATO, the US, and Russia with Ukraine?

Russia supports a Palestinian state but is staunchly opposed to any form of Islamic terrorism, and are in between on how to treat Hamas as a whole. I am not sure how Hamas being in Turkey works with that whole equation. As much of Erdogan likes to try to ride the line leveraging the tensions between the US and Turkey, and even the Arab nations to a point, this would probably put way too much of a target on Turkey if Iran, via Hamas, does something stupid. Worse, by giving Hamas a home, they are in essence siding with Iran, which has an extremely complicated relationship with Turkey and regardless how it would be framed cause a portion of Turkey be distrustful/upset of the situation.

 

Could it happen? Sure. I would bet against it at this point though. What is strange is there is no real options for Hamas at all. It is really easy to come up with reasons not to house them anywhere outside of Iran, and I am real short on reasons to take them anywhere else on the Arabian peninsula.

[Brian Fantana 6667]

2 hours ago, InkaUtexas said:

Fuck Hamas and fuck Erdogan. 

Really a brave take from Rex, you have to hand it to him.

[InkaUtexas 25496]

5 hours ago, Laxtonto said:

I would be very surprised if Hamas goes to Turkey. I would also be surprised if they go to Port Sudan.

The problem is that no one wants them and Qatar is now desperately wants to be rid of them.

As some added spice, OPEC+ overestimated Chinese demand and so it it unlikely they will be able to ramp up production to their targets anytime soon. They are also concerned that US tariffs and potential US overproduction could further weaken demand. Combine that with the potential end of the Ukraine war and lessening of Russian oil export restrictions and OPEC+ is concerned about future revenue estimates…

All of this makes the hot potato game with who gets stuck with the Hamas leadership that much more high stakes. Maybe Turkey takes them, but there is little benefit to having them in your country at this point. Is it really worth the headache now since they are already walking the tightrope between NATO, the US, and Russia with Ukraine?

Russia supports a Palestinian state but is staunchly opposed to any form of Islamic terrorism, and are in between on how to treat Hamas as a whole. I am not sure how Hamas being in Turkey works with that whole equation. As much of Erdogan likes to try to ride the line leveraging the tensions between the US and Turkey, and even the Arab nations to a point, this would probably put way too much of a target on Turkey if Iran, via Hamas, does something stupid. Worse, by giving Hamas a home, they are in essence siding with Iran, which has an extremely complicated relationship with Turkey and regardless how it would be framed cause a portion of Turkey be distrustful/upset of the situation.

 

Could it happen? Sure. I would bet against it at this point though. What is strange is there is no real options for Hamas at all. It is really easy to come up with reasons not to house them anywhere outside of Iran, and I am real short on reasons to take them anywhere else on the Arabian peninsula.

Agree, who knows where they go. I doubt they do. But the Middle East is a finicky place and predictions rarely work. But, I will throw in a few things to consider. The Qataris sending a senior group to go talk is worth watching. I doubt the trip is to talk about a new shisha flavor or broker some racing camels. But who knows.

Turkey and Iran both want the same thing, a lessening of power of the Saudis. Turkey does not mind the tightrope. They are the only girl at a bar full of guys. No matter how ugly someone is trying to court her. Turkey and Iran do trade. It has gone down in the past years, but that can change easily. At one point the Turks were going to invest in expanding Iran's export capacity.

One note I don't agree with is Russia not liking Islamic Terrorism. Um, they don't like it when aimed at them. Interesting how they did little vs. ISIS in Syria. Interesting ISIS never really attacked Assad's forces. And how did all those damn Dagestanis and Chechen's get to Syria?

The Middle East teaches you to ask questions, think of answers and know 95% of the time you are going to be an idiot.

 

[MagicSoccerSpray 1725]

15 hours ago, Captainant said:

Frankly, if a member is attacked and Article 5 is invoked to no response, NATO is dead. 

 

Frankly, no. It's not.

[Armybrat 40725]

An interesting article about the growing dissatisfaction with Hezbollah in Lebanon 

https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2024/1113/hezbollah-israel-lebanon-politics-christians-shiites

[InkaUtexas 25496]

Not new really. Shia tend to have more weapons.

[MagicSoccerSpray 1725]

37 minutes ago, Armybrat said:

An interesting article about the growing dissatisfaction with Hezbollah in Lebanon 

https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2024/1113/hezbollah-israel-lebanon-politics-christians-shiites

https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2024/1104/hezbollah-israel-lebanon-war-shiite-supporters