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Russia and American elections, now featuring radical republicans as co-stars

Pancho

By Pancho
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brakeman
brakeman

If I were Putin, I'd be a little worried that Trump thinks my invasion plan is "genius."

Neonmoon
Neonmoon

I think most people you call “left” on this board would agree with you. In fact, I would say the majority of the “liberals” on this board gripe often about Democrats being pussies that never get shit

Creasy Bear
Creasy Bear

My question is simple.  Why is Biden against domestic oil & gas production but is for increased oil & gas production overseas?

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Satchel

Satchel 6949

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On July 28, 2018 at 6:14 PM, Orca of Peace said:

nothing in human history can match American firepower, industrial base, resources and tech supremacy.

Civic apathy and ignorance are poised to make it a contest:

Only about 30% of Americans born in the 1980s think it's "essential" to live in a democracy. That's compared to 75% of Americans born in the 1930s.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2017/10/31/are-millennials-giving-up-on-democracy/#61df40212be1

Edited by Satchel
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FondrenRoad

FondrenRoad 4378

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12 minutes ago, Satchel said:

Civic apathy and ignorance are poised to make it a contest:

Only about 30% of Americans born in the 1980s think it's "essential" to live in a democracy. That's compared to 75% of Americans born in the 1930s.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2017/10/31/are-millennials-giving-up-on-democracy/#61df40212be1

That's all great in theory, but it's the ones who were born from the 1930s to 50s that are most on board with our current wannabe dictator.

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Hugo Stiglitz

Hugo Stiglitz 23367

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#Russia ponders possible retaliatory measures in response to the U.S. #sanctions: 

“start arresting Americans, shut down American businesses in Russia, form an anti-American front with the enemies of the United States, steal Western technologies."

Russian talking heads propose that Russia form an alliance w/ China to destroy America’s financial system. Russia recently liquidated most of its holdings in U.S. Treasury securities. Russian experts are hoping that China could be convinced to follow suit.

 

lolz

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Hugo Stiglitz

Hugo Stiglitz 23367

Posted
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32 minutes ago, retread said:

Would not be surprising to find out that they are already working together on a future cyber attack.

IMO Russia would work with North Korea or Iranian hackers way before the Chinese.  

China wouldn’t want risk being politically alienated by getting in bed with the Russians in cyberspace.

 Plus, whatever Russia can do online, China can already do on their own. The cost/benefit analysis for China would be to not align with Russia.

The North Korean hackers are really good and more into compromising financial systems.  Putin aligning with that operation would make more sense because it gives Russia another layer of plausible deniability. Same with Iran.

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Brisketexan

Brisketexan 105465

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That was just reason #500 why Mr. Obama was not prepared to be POTUS.  Brisket used to shout this as well. Wonder if he'll still support that line of thought.

I did and I still do. Obama was in over his head and was woefully unprepared for the complexity of geopolitics.

Understand that he was over his head....whereas Trump is tromping around the bottom of the Marianas
Trench, shouting about he’s on top of Everest. Oh, and actively collaborating with our enemies while he does it. So, that’s awesome.

Trump has unquestionably made me long for the relative competence of Obama....who I think is not competent. Proof positive that everything is relative.
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Hugo Stiglitz

Hugo Stiglitz 23367

Posted
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5 minutes ago, SmokeyTheBear said:

 

At this point I'm impressed Trump's heart hasn't popped yet.

 

Trump will end up being a good cautionary tale for any would-be traitor.  Even if you succeed, your life will be a never ending nightmare.

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Hugo Stiglitz

Hugo Stiglitz 23367

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Good read from 2007 on Putin's Russia

Is Putin's Russia Fascist?

Analyzing the nature of Vladimir Putin’s regime yields some valuable insights into the past, present and future of Russia.

https://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/inside-track-is-putins-russia-fascist-1888

by Alexander J. Motyl


Just what sort of political system has Vladimir Putin constructed in Russia? The Kremlin likes to speak of something called "managed democracy"; many observers prefer to call it "authoritarian." A few brave souls have even suggested that fascism might be an appropriate designation.

The correct term matters. First of all, it's important to call things by their real names and not engage in unnecessary obfuscation. Second, calling systems by their real names enables us to draw policy-relevant conclusions. If Russia really is democratic, then the current deterioration of Russia's relations with the West is likely to pass, as common values and common perspectives assert themselves over time. If, alternatively, Russia really is authoritarian-or even fascist-then the world may want to prepare for a further worsening of relations with an increasingly truculent Russia. Third, knowing just what Russia is now is especially important in light of Putin's imminent departure from the Russian presidency. If he's actually constructed a coherent political system, then that system will likely survive his withdrawal into the shadowy parts of the corridors of power. If, on the other hand, that system is only transitional, then Putin's leave-taking may provoke a crisis and, conceivably, a return to greater democracy.

One last introductory point. It's a mistake to think that calling Russia fascist necessarily means pursuing a policy of confrontation. There is no reason whatsoever why one cannot engage a fascist Russia; indeed, one could argue that engagement might be imperative precisely because Russia is fascist. It's no less a mistake to believe that calling Russia democratic necessarily means pursuing a policy of engagement. It's obvious that democratic states can be aggressive and act contrary to one's interests. And, although it may be true that, in the final analysis, "democracies do not fight", it is no less true that, in the lengthy run-up to that famed final analysis, they do not necessarily cooperate.

 

What Is Fascism?

Fascism is often used as an epithet, especially by the left, but it actually is a perfectly respectable social science term that refers to a particular type of political system. Everyone can agree that fascist states are authoritarian-that is, they lack the fundamental attributes of both democracy and totalitarianism. Unlike democracies, fascist systems lack meaningful parliaments, judiciaries, parties, political contestation, and elections. The key word here is meaningful: in fascist systems, as in all authoritarian systems, parliaments are rubber-stamp institutions, judiciaries do what the leader tells them, opposition parties are marginal, and electoral outcomes are preordained. Unlike totalitarian states, fascist states do not penetrate into every aspect of a country's political, economic, social, and cultural life; fascist states do not propound all-embracing ideologies that purport to answer all of life's questions. Instead, like all authoritarian states, fascist states attempt only to influence and control these dimensions of life and they prefer to espouse limited worldviews.

Like authoritarian states, fascist states are highly centralized and hierarchical, they give pride of place within the authority structure to soldiers and policemen, usually secret policemen, and they always have a supreme leader. Indeed, there can be no fascist state without a supreme leader. Like authoritarian states, fascist states limit freedom of the press, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Like authoritarian states, fascist states also reject socialism and embrace capitalism-which means that they tacitly acknowledge private property and the autonomy of capitalists. And like authoritarian states, fascist states generally espouse some form of hypernationalism glorifying their nation and its fabulous past, present and future. But fascist states also go further than authoritarian states in fetishizing the state and its glory and power.

But fascist states are not just run-of-the-mill authoritarian states. The latter typically connote images of dour old men ruling a sullen population.  Fascist states, in contrast, exude youth and vigor and they always implicate the population in its own repression. Fascist leaders strut; they want to appear youthful, manly and active. They also appeal to those qualities in the population, usually coopting the young into their movements or parties. No less important, fascist states are popular: They incorporate the population into the system of rule, promising it a grand and glorious future in exchange for its enthusiasm and support. Fascist leaders are especially popular, presenting themselves as the embodiments of a nation's best qualities and as the only hopes for its future.

Not surprisingly, fascist states tend to be aggressive-sounding and oftentimes aggressive states. The soldiers and policemen that run fascist states have a natural proclivity to toughness and weaponry. The hypernationalism, state fetishes, and cult of vigor of fascist states incline them to see enemies everywhere. The cult-like status of leaders encourages them to pound their chests with abandon. And the population's implication in its own repression leads it to balance its self-humiliation with attempts to humiliate others.

In sum, fascist states are authoritarian states with a few special characteristics thrown in: strong and vigorous leaders, cults of strong and vigorous leaders, and supine populations that willingly accept strong and vigorous leadership and thereby actively engage in their own self-repression. Fascist states are thus authoritarian states that glorify strength and vigor in the ruling elites and whose subject populations also glorify strength and vigor in the ruling elites.

 

Is Russia Fascist?

Seen in this light, Franco's Spain, Pinochet's Chile, and the Greece of the colonels were really just your average authoritarian states. So, too, is today's China. In contrast, Mussolini's Italy was clearly fascist, as was Hitler's Germany (even though it also had totalitarian aspirations). So, too, might Chavez's Venezuela, but only if he stops short of instituting genuine socialism. What of Putin's Russia?

Its democratic institutions are at best moribund, having been transformed into pliant tools of the Kremlin;
civil society and the press have been severely circumscribed, in a manner that approximates Hitler's Gleichschaltung (or coordination) of society in 1933-1934;
representatives of the military and secret police-the siloviki-dominate all ruling elites and suffuse them with their antidemocratic ethos;
the state promotes capitalism while making sure to control its strategic heights by means of controlling key industries, especially in energy, defense, mining, and manufacturing;
the Russian state is unabashedly glorified to the point of representing a genuine fetish;
Vladimir Putin is the undisputed leader, and his image exudes vigor, youth, and manliness;
a variety of rabidly pro-Putin youth groups act as the vanguard of the state;
the population overwhelmingly supports Putin, and has done so since he assumed the presidency;
hypernationalism, a growing mistrust of both internal and external foreigners, and a corresponding glorification of Russia's past (including its criminal Stalinist period) and present are the official worldview;
Russia has taken to asserting its "rightful" place in the sun by engaging in energy blackmail vis-à-vis Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, cyber-wars against Estonia, provocations against Georgia, Polar land grabs, and other forms of aggressive behavior.
Of all these factors, Putin's projected vigor and the population's willing self-abnegation are central. Like Mussolini, Putin favors stylish black clothing that connotes toughness and seriousness. Like Mussolini, Putin likes being photographed in the presence of weapons and other instruments of war. And like Mussolini, Putin likes to show off his presumed physical prowess. Russians, meanwhile, have consistently supported Putin to the tune of 70-plus percent. The standard explanation for such enthusiasm is that, although Putin may have actually done little to improve their lives materially, they are grateful to him for having restored their sense of pride, in themselves and in their formerly humiliated country. Just this same sense of pride was at the core of Germans' support of Hitler.

Indeed, it is striking just how similar post-Soviet Russia's developmental path resembles that of post-World War I Germany. Both countries underwent strategic defeats, lost empires, and experienced intense national humiliation. Both countries then experienced extreme economic hardship under the stewardship of weak and corrupt democratic regimes. Both countries blamed democracy and its internal and external supporters for their ills. Both countries turned to hypernationalism, state fetishization and strong-man rule. In both countries strong men seized power-by legitimate means, by the way-and exploited popular willingness to submit to domination to establish their authoritarian regimes.

Although Putin's Russia possesses the defining characteristics of fascism, they have not yet assumed the form of a consolidated, coherent and hence fully-stable political system. These characteristics have emerged haphazardly only in the last few years, and although they may now all be in place, it is not yet clear that they are here to stay. In that sense, Russia today resembles Germany in 1933 or Italy in the mid-1920s. Russia could follow in their footsteps, or it could falter and find its way back to some form of democracy. In particular, Putin's announced departure in 2008 will be a test of just how stable this system is. Russia may therefore be best termed an unconsolidated fascist state. If the system remains as is, or even hardens after Putin leaves the presidency, then one will be able to say that the transition has ended in full-fledged fascism. If the system breaks down, or undergoes significant change in the direction of democracy, then the transition will have proven unsuccessful.

 

Challenges for Fascist Russia

An unconsolidated fascist Russia faces three challenges.

(1) All fascist states scare their neighbors and provoke them to defend themselves against perceived threats emanating from the behavior and bluster of the fascist states. In that sense, fascist hypernationalism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy-effectively creating the very enemies it invoked as the reasons for its justification. As a result, Russia will create ever more suspicious and terrified neighbors the longer it remains fascist or unconsolidated-fascist. Those neighbors will, over time, band together, seek allies, and/or attempt to enhance their security militarily and economically and to view their own Russian-speaking populations as potential fifth columns. Their defensive reactions will only succeed in persuading Russia's ruling elites that continued power enhancement is imperative, both in defense of the fatherland and in defense of their "abandoned brethren" in the non-Russian states. At some point in this vicious circle, tensions can easily translate into armed conflict, especially if pockets of Russians living in the non-Russian states appeal to Russia for "fraternal" assistance.

Strong fascist states, when faced with non-fascist "encirclement", may seek to assert their dominance over their neighbors. Of course, since all states are potential enemies, strong fascist states tend to engage in war and overreach, resulting in ultimate defeat. No state is strong enough to defeat an ever larger coalition of opponents. Weak fascist states-like Russia-can respond to non-fascist encirclement with attempts to increase their own power or with still greater chest-beating. Either way, their neighbors get more terrified, and the cycle continues.

(2) Fascist states are inherently unstable states for three distinct reasons:

Cults of vigorous leaders cannot be sustained as leaders inevitably grow old or decrepit. A continual rejuvenation of the supreme leader might solve the problem were it not for the fact that fascist leaders do not want to give up power. Sooner or later, therefore, fascist leaders lose their core legitimacy, and when they do, both their followers and the submissive population begin to look for alternative idols. If Putin really leaves the scene and retires to his country estate, he will at least temporarily halt Russia's transition to fascism. If, as most analysts suspect, he continues to pull the strings in some other capacity, he will only accelerate Russia's transition. In any case, Putin, though young today, will not remain young forever. And an old and decrepit leader will not be able to make the case for youth, vigor, and manliness in typical fascist style.


Popular humiliation and the willingness to submit to unconditional authority are weak foundations on which to build states. Sooner or later, Russians will not feel humiliated and, when that happens-as it surely will, once their prosperity and exposure to the world and its blandishment increases-they will be far less inclined to accept leader cults and authoritarian rule by shadowy siloviki. To be sure, Russian political culture may be authoritarian, and it will sustain fascism. But strategic sectors of Russia society-the middle class, the educated elites, and the young-will increasingly reject that culture and prove to be a source of new thinking about Russia's politics.


Fascist regimes are invariably fragmented. Extreme centralization of power in a supreme leader is supposed to ensure elite coordination and submission; instead, as in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, it inclines elites to compete for the leader's favor, to amass resources, to build empires, and not to cooperate with their colleagues-turned-competitors. Fascist regimes are thus brittle, and when supreme leaders falter-as they inevitably do-or leave the scene, successor elites engage in cutthroat competition to assume the mantle of authority. In so doing, however, they not only weaken the regime, but they also expose the system as less then the imposing monolith that they project to the submissive population.


(3) Transitional states-like Russia-are especially unstable, because transition, whether to or from democracy or to or from fascism, is an inherently unstable process. The next two years will be especially difficult for Russia, as it copes with a genuinely post-Putin political system or with a seemingly post-Putin system still run by Putin. Either way, Russian politics will be exceedingly unsettled. If Putin really leaves, Russians will have to determine who, if anyone, can replace him as a charismatic, strong, and vigorous leader. If no such person can be found, many of the attributes of Russia's transitionally fascist system will begin to wither away. If, alternatively, Putin remains the puppet-master, then some tensions will inevitably arise between him, as the de facto leader, and his successor, the de jure leader. That will inevitably affect the effectiveness of the system and its capacity to retain popular support.

In sum, a fascist Russia faces the very serious risk of breakdown in the not too distant future. Overreach could stretch the resources of the state and result either in humiliating military defeat or in a progressive decay of its institutions. Leadership cults usually only work as long as the founding leaders-the unquestionably charismatic founders and "law givers"-are still vigorous. Humiliated populations will eventually abandon humiliation for more satisfactory forms of self-identification. Intra-elite infighting saps the system of its strength and undermines its image. And transitions are intrinsically destabilizing periods. Russia's sad fate may be that it will confront some combination of all these risks in the next few years.

 

Challenges for the World

Whatever happens in Russia, the rest of the world is in for a rough ride. At worst, Russia will become a consolidated fascist state-and the possibility of expansionism and overreach will become all too real. At best, Russia will become an unstable transitionally fascist state-and the potential for a complete breakdown of the system will become a near-term reality. How, then, should the rest of the world respond?

First of all, by recognizing that Putin's Russia is not a democracy, but an authoritarian fascist state. Just calling Russia by the right name immediately suggests that complacency is inappropriate.

Second, by recognizing that Russia is, and will long remain, too weak a military power to be a serious threat to the world. Russia's armed forces are still decrepit, and its nuclear weapons, though fearful, are useless as an instrument of foreign policy. But Russia can exert leverage over its neighbors and much of the world by virtue of its possession of enormous energy resources. Pursuing lesser energy dependence on Russia would not only reduce that leverage; it would also deprive Russia of the resources for possible military build-ups.

Third, by recognizing that the Russian people's current self-abnegation is necessarily temporary and that, sooner or later, significant elements will seek self-empowerment and self-rule. That segment of Russian society should be supported, encouraged and nurtured-and the easiest and most effective way of doing that is by integrating Russia into the world and exposing it to all forms of global processes.

Fourth, by recognizing that a fully fascist or unstable Russia is an immediate threat to its neighbors-the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Their nerves should be soothed, and their security should be supported. Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states all have good reason to be wary of Russia. Repeated Russian invasions, brutal attempts at colonization, and Russia's unwillingness to reject its Stalinist past would be reason enough to be suspicious. Add to that Russia's slide toward fascism and the continued unwillingness of the Western European states to recognize that there is cause for alarm-and it is no surprise that Russia's non-Russian neighbors feel as if they were being treated primarily as inconvenient obstacles to steady deliveries of Russian oil and gas.

Last, by recognizing that a fascist Russia will not long remain fascist. Sooner rather than later, fascist Russia will break down. The choice before the world may be whether that breakdown occurs as a result of the internal systemic weaknesses of all fascist systems or as a result of aggression and overreach. The former would obviously be the preferable scenario-but it will happen only if Russia's non-Russian neighbors remain secure and stable, and never become modern-day versions of pre-World War II Czechoslovakia or Austria.

 

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

Edited by Hugo Stiglitz
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atomheartbevo

atomheartbevo 89862

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So this popped up on Amazon Prime (probably because John McCain is in it) - To the Moon - it's got Ben Browder, and John McCain and others.

Quote

The political murder of a Moscow lawyer and the cancellation of 259 pending American adoptions of Russian orphans are seemingly disparate events found to have a deep and insidious connection. Connecting the dots from Russia’s warehousing of abandoned and special needs children to the cross-borders dealings of a billionaire investment banker to one American family’s tragedy, the film explores how Russian political corruption is linked to a single adopted child, whose accidental death becomes the declared reason behind Putin’s Russian Adoption Ban.

Looks pretty new.  Anybody watched it?

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Hugo Stiglitz

Hugo Stiglitz 23367

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I’ve been reading more up on Russia and how they prioritize their information warfare/influence operations.  The current analysis I’m reading suggests much of the strategic foreign operations is tied to inflating the price of oil.  This is based on the view that Russia is one big mob owned gas station and the success of the Russian State (kleptocrats) is directly tied to the global price of oil and gas.  

The Kremlin seems to believe the more chaos and instability they can manufacture in the Middle East and the West through malign influence operations, the higher the price of oil.  This could help explain why Putin didn’t object to the US pulling out of the Iran deal.

This conclusion also helps explain why, at times, their information warfare resources are more focused on Syria and less allocated to protecting Trump from his political problems.

Edited by Hugo Stiglitz
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