Pat Shurmer understands math; Keyshawn doesn't

[Beau Vine 55894]

@Huckleberry to the bat phone...

[HOOK'EMHOOAH 1610]

Wow. Just... wow.

[taybo20 3042]

Fuck the giants. They lost anyway.

 

[Pam Cummings 9887]

It's simple really. Going for 2 makes it a 2 FG game.

 

Is it that hard for some to understand? Didn't some college team do this recently and it worked out?

 

And as always, fuck the Giants. 

[Dennis Taylor 19389]

There really wasn't time for 2 field goals in that scenario.  It still was a good call though. Booger McFarland was railing on and on about it being a bad call but he's not too bright.  

I saw it for the first time in a high school playoff game a few years ago and it is a huge momentum swing. You could feel the panic on the part of the team that suddenly would lose with an xp

[Huckleberry 34751]

Darrell Royal understood this nearly 50 years ago.

Most NFL players are infected with the "play not to lose" mentality that permeates the league. Which makes sense when being mediocre will keep the checks coming in (hi Jeff Fisher!).

[JBJ 3830]

The math says go for two when behind by 2, 4, 5, 8, 10 late in the game.

Conventional wisdom says 2, 5, 9, 11.

It's almost always slightly better to go for it when coming from behind (7, 3, 0 are exceptions to that rule).

Edited October 23, 2018 by JBJ

[clapclapclap 9000]

1 hour ago, Dennis Taylor said:

Booger McFarland was railing on and on about it being a bad call but he's not too bright.  

SEC degree.  The only math they teach is under the table.

[Hiphopopotamos 21192]

Here is an article on this very subject:

http://www.footballperspective.com/down-14-scoring-a-touchdown-and-then-going-for-2/

The math has been clear for so long, and been presented by so many writers, that this topic is essentially beating a dead horse. Late in games, it has always made sense for a team, after scoring a touchdown to cut a lead from 14 to 8 points, should go for two. The trailing team gets two bites at the apple: if it converts, a touchdown now wins the game. If the team fails, they get a second chance to erase that mistake. Only if the odds of missing *both* attempts were higher than the odds of making the first attempt would this strategy fail to make sense.

Yet it never happens. In fact, Brian Billick with the 2001 Ravens was the last coach to go for 2 late in a game after scoring a touchdown to cut the lead to 8 points.

More astonishingly, just once since the 2-point conversion rule was introduced in 1994, has a team ever been trailing by 14 points, scored a touchdown, and then converted a 2-point attempt. Once! And it came by none other than Bill Belichick as coach of the 1994 Cleveland Browns.

Trailing 20-6 in the 4th quarter against the Denver Broncos, the Browns were in a tough spot. Starting quarterback Vinny Testaverde was out with a concussion, leaving Mark Rypien as the team’s hope for a comeback. After a Cleveland touchdown early in the fourth, Rypien hit Derrick Alexander to cut the lead to 20-14.

And that was it. That’s the last time a team ever cut a lead from 14 to 6 points. Which is mind-blowing. But I bring this up today not to rehash old talking points, but to consider the new extra point rule. This makes the math even clearer about going for it, and I think it will also lead to it finally happening. Let’s say a team has a 96% chance of converting an extra point. That means a team has a 92% chance of converting two straight extra points. Down 14, it’s no longer a given that two touchdowns tie the game: you still have to make sure your kicker doesn’t mess up.

Now, let’s say a team has a 38% chance of making a 2-point conversion. This, of course, is quite a bit lower than the roughly 50/50 proposition that going for 2 truly is, but let’s just use this as a base. If a team goes for 2 after scoring the first touchdown, they have a 38% chance of converting and making this the successful play. There is also a 38% chance that the team misses both times (i.e., the odds of two events with a 62% chance of happening occurring both times), and a 24% chance of ending tied after the second touchdown (this is the result of missing the first time, and converting the second).

So a 24% chance of being tied, a 38% chance of winning, and a 38% chance of losing. That’s the breakdown of results if a team has a 38% chance of converting a two-point conversion. Meanwhile, if the team just kicks the extra point, it has a 92% chance of being tied via hitting two extra points, although if the team misses the first kick, they will obviously go for two on the second one. So we’re more looking at a ~94% chance of being tied, and a ~6% chance of losing, with no upside. Is that enough to tip the scales to convince coaches to be more aggressive when scoring a touchdown to cut the lead to 8?

I think it might be. While the variance is obviously much larger in the first option, variance is neither inherently good nor inherently bad given the zero sum game nature of sports. If it helps your win probability, it hurts your opponent’s win probability, and vice-versa. Given that there is now a roughly six percent chance a team can trail by two touchdowns, score two touchdowns, and still be trailing, that may convince some coaches to finally make the right choice in this situation.

[huge 3831]

That article is older than the crust in your underwear!

And it namechecks Mark Rypien?

[runthebone 8380]

That is assuming that the chance of successfully executing a 2 point conversion to tie the game is the same as any other 2 point attempt.  I'm not sure that is true, but I assume there are data on that.  I suppose teams have a "best" play for conversion attempts, right?  Or is that announcer bs?

Edited October 23, 2018 by runthebone

[Hiphopopotamos 21192]

From Football Scoop - who recognize that Darrell Royal knew this 50 years ago - 

Quote

With 4:47 remaining in the fourth quarter, Saquon Barkley scored a touchdown to pull his New York Giants to within eight, at 20-12.

And then Giants head coach Pat Shurmur did something that many MNF viewers felt was radical, but is in fact the right choice — he went for two.

Conventional wisdom says to kick the extra point, score another touchdown, kick that extra point and tie the game at 20-20. Theoretically, the team that scored those last two touchdowns would have the momentum as they likely would be heading into overtime. But this obscures one crucial point: the goal is to win the game, not tie it. Tying the game simply means you’re asking your defense to make another stop and your offense to put together a third scoring drive, rather than two. If overtime is involved, this brings a coin flip into the equation, where your offense must score a third touchdown (if you win the toss) or make a stop and then kick a field goal (if you lose the toss). In college or high school, playing for the tie and overtime means your defense must make at least one stop and possibly more.

Again, the goal is to win the game, not to tie it. 

 

 

If the 2-point try was successful, the Giants would now trail 20-14, and another touchdown plus an extra point wins you the game.

What’s more statistically likely: putting together three consecutive scoring drives (7 + 7 + 3) or converting one 2-point conversion (8 + 7)?

The Giants’ 2-point try didn’t work, keeping their deficit at 20-12, but that didn’t doom their hopes. It’s still a one-possession game at that point. A touchdown and a 2-point conversion ties the game, leaving the Giants exactly where they’d been had they just kicked the PAT.

But even if you miss both 2-point conversions, you’re still okay.

Remember, kicking two PATs still requires three scoring drives to win — TD, TD, FG. But missing both 2-point tries still leaves you with a chance to win the game in three drives in this scenario — 6 + 6 + 3 gives you 15 points, enough to erase a 14-point deficit.

Now, this scenario did not work out for the Giants on Monday night, but it wasn’t because of Shurmur’s strategy. After the missed 2-point try, the Atlanta Falcons kicked a field goal to push their lead to 23-12 with 1:55 remaining. New York scored another touchdown and converted the 2-point try this time… but that final score came with five seconds left. Atlanta won the game, 23-20.

“You increase your chances by 50 percent if you go for it and make it there, so that’s what you do,” Shurmur said. “Because then if you score a touchdown, we just kick the extra point and win. I felt good about the two-point play. You guys saw that, I think we got the ball in there, right? And we just didn’t connect on it.”

But it did work for another NFL team just a few weeks ago.

Trailing by the exact same 20-6 score early in the fourth quarter, Philadelphia Eagles head coach Doug Pedersen went for two after scoring with 12:05 to play. The 2-point try was successful, bringing the score to 20-14. The Minnesota Vikings kicked a field goal with 2:47, but an Eagles touchdown with 1:09 remaining pulled them within 23-21, rather than 23-20.

The Eagles did not recover the ensuing onside kick, but if they did a field goal would have won the game in regulation rather than push it to overtime.

The math is on your side, and so are the percentages

ESPN analytics writer Seth Walder broke down the numbers:

1. Convert on the two-point attempt, successfully kick a PAT after the second touchdown and win: 46 percent 

2. Convert on the two-point attempt, but miss the PAT and tie: 3 percent

3. Fail on the first two-point attempt, but succeed on the second and tie: 25 percent

4. Fail on both two-point attempts and lose: 26 percent

Again, it’s important to remember 14 points is not the destination, 15 or 17 or 21 or any number greater than 14 is. You haven’t won the game when you’ve kicked two PATs to rally for a tie. You’ve simply extended it, requiring your defense to get another stop and your offense to put together another drive.

The goal isn’t to come back but to do so in as few plays as possible, thereby limiting your exposure to a coverage bust by your cornerback, a crippling holding penalty by your right tackle or any of the infinite variables that can derail a comeback. You’re asking your team to execute 10, 15, 25 or more plays at that point rather than just one — the 2-point conversion.

This isn’t as radical as it may seem

Nearly 50 years ago, Darrell Royal understood these odds.

Trailing 14-0 in the Big Shootout against No. 2 Arkansas, Royal elected to go for two after No. 1 Texas scored its first touchdown. The try was successful, and the Longhorns scored a second touchdown with 3:58 remaining to take a 15-14 lead. After forcing a final stop, Texas needed just to sit on the ball to win the game. President Richard Nixon crowned the Longhorns national champions in the locker room afterward.  After scoring a touchdown when trailing by 14, it may seem like you’re rolling the dice by going for two. But really, you’re rolling the dice by kicking a PAT

Edited October 23, 2018 by Hiphopopotamos

[CurlyDumps 4664]

2 hours ago, Dennis Taylor said:

 Booger McFarland was railing on and on about it being a bad call but he's not too bright.  

He was also boasting about how he would soil himself on the sideline during games, so...

[clapclapclap 9000]

42 minutes ago, huge said:

That article is older than the crust in your underwear!

And it namechecks Mark Rypien?

Good point.  Living, Breathing Math may be different nowadays....

[Guest]

1 hour ago, JBJ said:

The math says go for two when behind by 2, 4, 5, 8, 10 late in the game.

Conventional wisdom says 2, 5, 9, 11.

It's almost always slightly better to go for it when coming from behind (7, 3, 0 are exceptions to that rule).

As a rule I always come from behind, and your mom certainly was no exception. 

[Knoxtnhorn 6312]

It was the right thing to do for a struggling offense.  Playing for the tie meant they'd have to have TWO more scoring drives instead of one.

[SpiralOut 1965]

I think you also have to consider that the PAT is not a foregone conclusion, either.  Especially since they moved it back.  Just ask our boy Tucker and the Ravens.  It rarely happens, but you can miss. 

[Murfdogg21 4578]

Why not go for 2 if down 14-0 in the first quarter?

 

When will society embrace crazy Arky HS coach’s statistics that you should always go for 2, always do an onside kick, and rarely punt on 4th downs?

[henrygandorf 29230]

the dkr example is a little different because of ties/ot.  but sure.

[JBJ 3830]

3 hours ago, Murfdogg21 said:

When will society embrace crazy Arky HS coach’s statistics that you should always go for 2, always do an onside kick, and rarely punt on 4th downs?

The analytics are against "non-surprise" onsides except as a last minute desperation move.

It's muddier on 4th downs and surprise onsides kicks.

Both are below their Nash Equilibrium, but completely flipping the script makes you even worse off.  Basically, teams should try them more often until their opponents adjust to defend them better.  But always trying them is dumber than never trying them.

Teams should go for two more often and I do think this is something that will creep into football in the next decade - at least in the 3rd and 4th quarters where the benefits are more pronounced.