Русский корабль - иди нахуй

MNLonghornFUKM · February 15, 2022

cmon man, at least try harder in your trolling.

MoJames · February 15, 2022

3 minutes ago, 52-80 said:

its fluid and/or piss

Shady Ray · February 15, 2022

Ok, so assuming that what we have seen today indicates de-escalation (which, of course, isn’t certain by any means yet) what would be the fall-out from a Public Relations / Political/ “Intra-EU/NATO/Continental” standpoint? And does the insight into the European impact of a possible withdrawal help determine what Putin’s next move is going to be?

Within the US, there would be a lot of “Putin flinched” or “Putin’s bluff was called and he backed down” type of spin, but would that really be the case? And just as importantly, what would the perception/reaction be here in Europe, which is ultimately the geographic area that this entire ordeal was designed to impact?

If you are Putin, what would you reasonably get out of this if you end it right now, at 9:00 PM Moscow time on February 15th, 2022? And what could you still possibly gain?

I will spoiler my take for length:

Spoiler

1. It has effectively made Ukraine a leper in France and Germany - even more so than before. In Germany specifically, the damage between Ukraine and Berlin that this ordeal has caused is likely irreparable any time soon. The respective governments hate each other, the Germans are so sick of the Ukrainian PR strategy of demands and guilt-trips, and the existing ambassador is actively despised by a majority of those Germans who follow the news, which is a huge percentage here. I don’t know if I have ever seen a situation where the ambassador to a country has even been A) as widely known by the general populace of the country in which he serves, and B) been hated to such a degree by so many people he is tasked with working constructively with…both at the governmental level and by the general populace. And what had long been a quietly whispered sentiment in Germany is now clear to the world: The Germans -at least 86% of the elected Bundestag parliamentary groups - don’t care whatsoever about Ukraine, and even if they are about to be bludgeoned into the ground by the Russian army, there is no chance of Germany helping them beyond tossing them a few million euros now and then and some helmets. It has also allowed for that taboo opinion to be openly shared as “reasonable” amongst Germans, which previously it had not. That is a big deal in a society like Germany where the impression of a certain progressive/inclusive image to others is huge.

  Recall all the way back to three months ago when all this kicked off - at that time, the answer to the question of whether the West would intervene if Ukraine was attacked by Russia was still unknown officially. Well, it isn’t anymore. It has been openly and specifically stated; everyone knows the answer now, and most importantly, Ukraine knows that when push comes to shove, the Germans won’t give you arms, the US and Brits will give you weapons and attaboys, but no other support and they will (understandably) pull their advisors when the Russians get close. Brussels as an institution will basically ignore you, and your true, legitimate allies in Poland, Baltics, Eastern Europe don’t have nearly the juice - even with their own rock solid US backing - to buy you any real support. You are alone and you will have to deal with Russia in that light. And that realization certainly has value to Putin, and it certainly resonates internally within Ukraine. 

2. Secondly, a non-military outcome it would effectively mean that any internal momentum to add Ukraine to NATO (and most likely the EU) is done. If this settles down now with Russian de-escalation, it should be assumed that some type of informal assurances were likely made to Putin; and Paris and Berlin will never allow momentum to get moving again re Ukrainian accession. I mean, hell, Scholz said today it wouldn't happen in his term, and now that this ordeal has occurred, "Will you support Ukraine in NATO?" will become a regular question to potential chancellors. And an affirmative answer will be political suicide. Both Germany and France have long felt that the 2008 Bucharest announcement was done over their heads as a result of intense pressure by GWB administration, at a time when a ton of deference was being given to the US on NATO matters. This is going to be seen as the logical end to that momentum. They’ll never allow a situation where global perception is allowed to pressure the German and French governments again vis a vis Ukraine like it has these past 3 months. Oh, Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO will never be formally removed from the agenda, but if this resolves without war, it is effectively done. They are both essentially seen as poison pills that many European capitals have no desire trying to digest. 

3. It will open the door to Western Europeans portraying the Angloshperic media and intel community as being exactly as many Western European politicians have portrayed it lately…escalatory, full of unreliable intelligence leaks, and a US/UK media that is often seen to be a reckless echo chamber for war. The derision that Macron got in US media for just attempting to generate dialogue with Putin was definitely a bad move here. It was a head scratcher as to why David Frum and the CNN chatterati were so vocally derisive towards that. It undercut a lot of sensibilities here. Conversely, it will allow (laughably) the EU, Scholz, Macron, etc to play up their own wisdom in negotiating, acting slowly and rationally with respect to pulling embassies, consulates, etc. The US won’t be seen as incompetent, but dear God the Brits will…between Boris missing Putin’s phone call because he had to defend himself on the floor of parliament from charges of partying during lockdown, to the complete and total shitshow that was Liz Truss’ Moscow Journey, the UK came across as absolute bumbling idiots here.   Also, this will be spun here as a triumph of European initiative on the diplomatic front. Which is also laughable, but just as the US establishment will spin this as a victory driven by strength and unity, the French and Germans will claim that they stood between an aggressive Russia and a hyperventilating US/UK and guided the way to a drawdown. There will be puff pieces in certain media outlets here echoing the inevitable US line that Putin blinked, but very few people here will believe this occurred as a result of the US/EU/Ukrainian unity, and it also won’t be chalked up to Russia flinching due to fear. No one here really thinks that Russia was scared of these proposed sanctions or Ukrainian guerrillas…this would be seen completely as a decision made out of Putin’s chessmanship and nothing more. 

4. It will give Scholz and Macron well-needed boosts at home, which at least re Scholz, is a benefit for Putin…and on the French side, it gives Putin solid equity with Macron, which is a nice second-place trophy since he’s unlikely to get his dreamgirl Marine Le Pen in. Scholz is foundering in the polls and needs a foreign policy win here, big time. Foreign policy wins here carry much more political weight than they do in the US (as opposed to the domestic focus that the US tends to have) and it will give Olaf some breathing room to get his coalition under control.

As we have seen, the German-Russian co-dependency is strong, but the SPD-Russian bond is even stronger. Putin has an incentive to do what he can to help the SPD stay in power and with the much more headstrong Friedrich Merz quickly gaining in the polls, Putin could coast with respect to a stable German ally like Scholz for another couple of years, making some serious headway in further integrating into the German landscape. I will admit, I alway knew the "lore" surrounding the SPD’s affinity for Russia, but Merkel has been the only Chancellor that I have lived under here so my actual understanding was not nearly as strong as I thought. The SPD realllllly does fucking love them some Russia…it really does seem to be baked into the DNA of that party. Thanks, Willy Brandt. But anyway, with the German economy already soft and Olaf so amenable towards Russia, Putin could make some serious inroads here, particularly in areas not quite so publicly visible/divisive as gas. 

5. NS2. I think if this drops off the pages of the news peacefully, NS2 will be turned on within 3 months, but I think the Germans will push to have an extension of the existing Russia-Ukraine transit contract extended until 2029. It is set to expire in 2024, and the Germans have been completely indifferent as to whether that contract it is extended at all. But I think they can extract some type of extension, which will give the Germans cover to flip the "on" switch, and effectively buy off the existing Ukrainian kleptocrats to go along. It will also insulate the Germans from the arrows of “gas as a weapon”, which will take a tool away from the US elements that want NS2 dead. And I know that getting deeper in bed with Putin may seem counterintuitive given what all has just happened. But the impact of this situation will probably serve to focus the Germans on diversifying energy supply, but that will only be possible in the long-term. So I would expect to see a serious debate kick off re nuclear, potentially with the EU now deeming it “green”, but in the short-term, German Industry is going to say, “Fuuuuckk, we dodged this bullet. Let’s get this shit flowing now so that if this comes up again, it is that much harder for Ted Cruz and his band of merry senate allies to intervene in a way that will push us to use US LNG.” You really can’t discount how powerful the lobby for this pipeline is here. And I think that is why the German press has really come out these last couple of days mainstreaming some positions wrt Ukraine that would previously been reserved only for “fringe-ish” publications. There was an article that was top of the fold in Focus today from a former General of the Bundeswehr/Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Harald Kujat, in which he explicitly claimed that Ukraine wasn’t a democratic country and that the US wanted it as an aircraft carrier. This is stuff that is certainly repeated around here, but never in such a prominent position and never by someone with that level of pedigree.

So, if you are Putin, and your main concerns in Europe are 1) neutering Ukrainian NATO accession dreams, 2) continuing integration into the German economy, 3) further damaging a US reputation in Western Europe that has already been taking a hit due to the Middle East clusterfuckery and the Afghanistan withdrawal, 4) keeping your own domestic economy afloat, 5) portraying yourself as a wise and wily leader for the home audience, then why would you erase all of that by invading now? Do you really need fucking Kharkov in your 11-timezone-long behemoth of a country? Does integrating 15-20 million Ukrainians with a $3,000 per capita GDP really help you out much? You already have Crimea, which is the only thing that matters to you due to strategic reasons…do you really need the mines of the Donbass given how much energy Russia already has? I say he doesn’t.

Or do you simply dust off your hands, wind this down, and walk away ignoring the western media spin that you somehow “blinked”? If you are Russia, do you think the Middle East Dictators buy that spin, anyway? The Gulf arabs that are now buying your S-400s? Or the ones that depend on your influence like Syria? Or the ones like Iran that just inked huge trade deals with as a lifeline for their fully-sanctioned economies? Or the ones in the Stans who just saw you bail KZ out of their jam? I don’t think so. I think they will see this as a win against the west.

So, from my position, I think there is every reason for him to just wind this down. He has gained as much as he can gain, and anything more is just a risk of blowing it all just as he reaches the end-line.

Edited February 15, 2022 by Shady Ray

Bevo · February 15, 2022

48 minutes ago, Shady Ray said:

Ok, so assuming that what we have seen today indicates de-escalation (which, of course, isn’t certain by any means yet) what would be the fall-out from a Public Relations / Political/ “Intra-EU/NATO/Continental” standpoint? And does the insight into the European impact of a possible withdrawal help determine what Putin’s next move is going to be?

Within the US, there would be a lot of “Putin flinched” or “Putin’s bluff was called and he backed down” type of spin, but would that really be the case? And just as importantly, what would the perception/reaction be here in Europe, which is ultimately the geographic area that this entire ordeal was designed to impact?

If you are Putin, what would you reasonably get out of this if you end it right now, at 9:00 PM Moscow time on February 15th, 2022? And what could you still possibly gain?

I will spoiler my take for length:

Reveal hidden contents

1. It has effectively made Ukraine a leper in France and Germany - even more so than before. In Germany specifically, the damage between Ukraine and Berlin that this ordeal has caused is likely irreparable any time soon. The respective governments hate each other, the Germans are so sick of the Ukrainian PR strategy of demands and guilt-trips, and the existing ambassador is actively despised by a majority of those Germans who follow the news, which is a huge percentage here. I don’t know if I have ever seen a situation where the ambassador to a country has even been A) as widely known by the general populace of the country in which he serves, and B) been hated to such a degree by so many people he is tasked with working constructively with…both at the governmental level and by the general populace. And what had long been a quietly whispered sentiment in Germany is now clear to the world: The Germans -at least 86% of the elected Bundestag parliamentary groups - don’t care whatsoever about Ukraine, and even if they are about to be bludgeoned into the ground by the Russian army, there is no chance of Germany helping them beyond tossing them a few million euros now and then and some helmets. It has also allowed for that taboo opinion to be openly shared as “reasonable” amongst Germans, which previously it had not. That is a big deal in a society like Germany where the impression of a certain progressive/inclusive image to others is huge.

  Recall all the way back to three months ago when all this kicked off - at that time, the answer to the question of whether the West would intervene if Ukraine was attacked by Russia was still unknown officially. Well, it isn’t anymore. It has been openly and specifically stated; everyone knows the answer now, and most importantly, Ukraine knows that when push comes to shove, the Germans won’t give you arms, the US and Brits will give you weapons and attaboys, but no other support and they will (understandably) pull their advisors when the Russians get close. Brussels as an institution will basically ignore you, and your true, legitimate allies in Poland, Baltics, Eastern Europe don’t have nearly the juice - even with their own rock solid US backing - to buy you any real support. You are alone and you will have to deal with Russia in that light. And that realization certainly has value to Putin, and it certainly resonates internally within Ukraine. 

2. Secondly, a non-military outcome it would effectively mean that any internal momentum to add Ukraine to NATO (and most likely the EU) is done. If this settles down now with Russian de-escalation, it should be assumed that some type of informal assurances were likely made to Putin; and Paris and Berlin will never allow momentum to get moving again re Ukrainian accession. I mean, hell, Scholz said today it wouldn't happen in his term, and now that this ordeal has occurred, "Will you support Ukraine in NATO?" will become a regular question to potential chancellors. And an affirmative answer will be political suicide. Both Germany and France have long felt that the 2008 Bucharest announcement was done over their heads as a result of intense pressure by GWB administration, at a time when a ton of deference was being given to the US on NATO matters. This is going to be seen as the logical end to that momentum. They’ll never allow a situation where global perception is allowed to pressure the German and French governments again vis a vis Ukraine like it has these past 3 months. Oh, Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO will never be formally removed from the agenda, but if this resolves without war, it is effectively done. They are both essentially seen as poison pills that many European capitals have no desire trying to digest. 

3. It will open the door to Western Europeans portraying the Angloshperic media and intel community as being exactly as many Western European politicians have portrayed it lately…escalatory, full of unreliable intelligence leaks, and a US/UK media that is often seen to be a reckless echo chamber for war. The derision that Macron got in US media for just attempting to generate dialogue with Putin was definitely a bad move here. It was a head scratcher as to why David Frum and the CNN chatterati were so vocally derisive towards that. It undercut a lot of sensibilities here. Conversely, it will allow (laughably) the EU, Scholz, Macron, etc to play up their own wisdom in negotiating, acting slowly and rationally with respect to pulling embassies, consulates, etc. The US won’t be seen as incompetent, but dear God the Brits will…between Boris missing Putin’s phone call because he had to defend himself on the floor of parliament from charges of partying during lockdown, to the complete and total shitshow that was Liz Truss’ Moscow Journey, the UK came across as absolute bumbling idiots here.   Also, this will be spun here as a triumph of European initiative on the diplomatic front. Which is also laughable, but just as the US establishment will spin this as a victory driven by strength and unity, the French and Germans will claim that they stood between an aggressive Russia and a hyperventilating US/UK and guided the way to a drawdown. There will be puff pieces in certain media outlets here echoing the inevitable US line that Putin blinked, but very few people here will believe this occurred as a result of the US/EU/Ukrainian unity, and it also won’t be chalked up to Russia flinching due to fear. No one here really thinks that Russia was scared of these proposed sanctions or Ukrainian guerrillas…this would be seen completely as a decision made out of Putin’s chessmanship and nothing more. 

4. It will give Scholz and Macron well-needed boosts at home, which at least re Scholz, is a benefit for Putin…and on the French side, it gives Putin solid equity with Macron, which is a nice second-place trophy since he’s unlikely to get his dreamgirl Marine Le Pen in. Scholz is foundering in the polls and needs a foreign policy win here, big time. Foreign policy wins here carry much more political weight than they do in the US (as opposed to the domestic focus that the US tends to have) and it will give Olaf some breathing room to get his coalition under control.

As we have seen, the German-Russian co-dependency is strong, but the SPD-Russian bond is even stronger. Putin has an incentive to do what he can to help the SPD stay in power and with the much more headstrong Friedrich Merz quickly gaining in the polls, Putin could coast with respect to a stable German ally like Scholz for another couple of years, making some serious headway in further integrating into the German landscape. I will admit, I alway knew the "lore" surrounding the SPD’s affinity for Russia, but Merkel has been the only Chancellor that I have lived under here so my actual understanding was not nearly as strong as I thought. The SPD realllllly does fucking love them some Russia…it really does seem to be baked into the DNA of that party. Thanks, Willy Brandt. But anyway, with the German economy already soft and Olaf so amenable towards Russia, Putin could make some serious inroads here, particularly in areas not quite so publicly visible/divisive as gas. 

5. NS2. I think if this drops off the pages of the news peacefully, NS2 will be turned on within 3 months, but I think the Germans will push to have an extension of the existing Russia-Ukraine transit contract extended until 2029. It is set to expire in 2024, and the Germans have been completely indifferent as to whether that contract it is extended at all. But I think they can extract some type of extension, which will give the Germans cover to flip the "on" switch, and effectively buy off the existing Ukrainian kleptocrats to go along. It will also insulate the Germans from the arrows of “gas as a weapon”, which will take a tool away from the US elements that want NS2 dead. And I know that getting deeper in bed with Putin may seem counterintuitive given what all has just happened. But the impact of this situation will probably serve to focus the Germans on diversifying energy supply, but that will only be possible in the long-term. So I would expect to see a serious debate kick off re nuclear, potentially with the EU now deeming it “green”, but in the short-term, German Industry is going to say, “Fuuuuckk, we dodged this bullet. Let’s get this shit flowing now so that if this comes up again, it is that much harder for Ted Cruz and his band of merry senate allies to intervene in a way that will push us to use US LNG.” You really can’t discount how powerful the lobby for this pipeline is here. And I think that is why the German press has really come out these last couple of days mainstreaming some positions wrt Ukraine that would previously been reserved only for “fringe-ish” publications. There was an article that was top of the fold in Focus today from a former General of the Bundeswehr/Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Harald Kujat, in which he explicitly claimed that Ukraine wasn’t a democratic country and that the US wanted it as an aircraft carrier. This is stuff that is certainly repeated around here, but never in such a prominent position and never by someone with that level of pedigree.

So, if you are Putin, and your main concerns in Europe are 1) neutering Ukrainian NATO accession dreams, 2) continuing integration into the German economy, 3) further damaging a US reputation in Western Europe that has already been taking a hit due to the Middle East clusterfuckery and the Afghanistan withdrawal, 4) keeping your own domestic economy afloat, 5) portraying yourself as a wise and wily leader for the home audience, then why would you erase all of that by invading now? Do you really need fucking Kharkov in your 11-timezone-long behemoth of a country? Does integrating 15-20 million Ukrainians with a $3,000 per capita GDP really help you out much? You already have Crimea, which is the only thing that matters to you due to strategic reasons…do you really need the mines of the Donbass given how much energy Russia already has? I say he doesn’t.

Or do you simply dust off your hands, wind this down, and walk away ignoring the western media spin that you somehow “blinked”? If you are Russia, do you think the Middle East Dictators buy that spin, anyway? The Gulf arabs that are now buying your S-400s? Or the ones that depend on your influence like Syria? Or the ones like Iran that just inked huge trade deals with as a lifeline for their fully-sanctioned economies? Or the ones in the Stans who just saw you bail KZ out of their jam? I don’t think so. I think they will see this as a win against the west.

So, from my position, I think there is every reason for him to just wind this down. He has gained as much as he can gain, and anything more is just a risk of blowing it all just as he reaches the end-line.

I think it is pretty clear that no one gives a shit about the Ukraine. I don't think it will weaken Putin and I don't think it will have much of an impact on NATO. A bunch of Ukranians will leave their country, though. Finland and Sweden may join NATO, and all countries in Eastern Europe will increase their defenses. It may weaken the US and the UK as leaders of negotiations, but here at home the current administration will not be impacted and people will forget about the Ukraine in a few days. I don't think there will be any residual strain on relations (blowback) between the US and Germany, France, etc. Germany will decrease its reliance on Russian O&G and there will be a continued little Cold War lite between the US and Russia.

Edited February 15, 2022 by Bevo

JerrysJheriCurl · February 15, 2022

I have had a month long bet with a Russian friend of mine regarding the invasion.
If Russia breaches the Ukrainian borders with tanks or launches missiles in Ukrainian space, then that meets the definition of invasion. Yes, we negotiated and came to terms of what defines an invasion.

The spoils: A bottle of Louis Jadot Vosne-Romanee.

Guess we are going to find out this week who buys.

Edited February 15, 2022 by JerrysJheriCurl

Gravy Train · February 15, 2022

21 minutes ago, Shady Ray said:

It will also insulate the Germans from the arrows of “gas as a weapon”, which will take a tool away from the US elements that want NS2 dead. And I know that getting deeper in bed with Putin may seem counterintuitive given what all has just happened. But the impact of this situation will probably serve to focus the Germans on diversifying energy supply, but that will only be possible in the long-term. So I would expect to see a serious debate kick off re nuclear, potentially with the EU now deeming it “green”, but in the short-term, German Industry is going to say, “Fuuuuckk, we dodged this bullet. Let’s get this shit flowing now so that if this comes up again, it is that much harder for Ted Cruz and his band of merry senate allies to intervene in a way that will push us to use US LNG.”

Is Germany walking down from the current-year target of decommissioning nuke power? I had hoped to see some reinvestment in modern reactor designs.

Shady Ray · February 15, 2022

11 minutes ago, Gravy Train said:

Is Germany walking down from the current-year target of decommissioning nuke power? I had hoped to see some reinvestment in modern reactor designs.

There are rumblings that this might require a serious - but quick - re-evaluation, but with the Greens as junior coalition partners in the government, it is going to be nearly impossible to do so without collapsing the coalition.

And of course there is the whole timing element of it.

No one thinks that this will be able to be completely climbed down in the current political environment, but there will be an Industry push for at least a delay from the year-end deadline. Given time constraints, though, that push is going to have to see some quick success behind the scenes. There are schools of thought that the public has seen a glimpse of the abyss that we are facing and might be more receptive than in the past. We will see.

Hook1997 · February 15, 2022

So yesterday tanks were moving closer to Ukraine and invasion was a day away and today all signs point de-escalation? I’ll take no one knows but Putin for $500 Alex.

Edited February 15, 2022 by Hook1997

LonghornJones · February 15, 2022

$500 isn't even an option on Jeopardy anymore.

InkaUtexas · February 15, 2022

Really hope this escalates. We don't need anymore BS for 2022. But, I am still hesitant. Still seeing stuff on twitter of armor moving towards Ukraine.

Eastwood · February 15, 2022

$500 isn't even an option on Jeopardy anymore.

God damned inflation...

956 Worldwide · February 15, 2022

I’ll let @Shady Ray read the Germany tea leaves but in my mind we’re so far away from the end of this crisis or even to begin talking about deescalation. My analysis here is simple, and that is to ignore anything that European leaders announce or suggest, and to assess anything said by Russian sources against Russian actions and conflicting signs. And I don’t see a lot of optimism.

- OSINT nerds continue to be in broad consensus that no drawdown has occurred and if anything, Russian presence has increased on the border and with capability to attack. The one piece of footage of “withdrawal”’ we got turned out to be footage of units that would not have taken part in an assault.

- Russian state media, Zacharova, and others hailed the withdrawal and taunted the West. Putin walked out next to Scholz and said “maybe they will withdraw, maybe they won’t. It’s not up to us.”

- While expressing some hope for talks, Putin also used inflammatory rhetoric like “genocide,” highlighted his belief that long talks are disadvantageous, and demanded a solution “now.”

- The Kremlin engineered an elaborate bit of theatre with the recognition of LPR/DPR and handed Putin another loaded gun to point at Ukraine and the West. He has yet to “decide.”

- Someone carried out a cyber attack against state institutions and financial institutions, perhaps not well and perhaps bigger than we realize. Still unclear.

Where in any of this do we see deescalation? I see conflicting misdirection and head fakes, I see a significant escalation in tools Putin has at his disposal, and I see a military still ready to carry out a massive attack.

Edited February 15, 2022 by 956 Worldwide

atomheartbevo · February 15, 2022

2 hours ago, Jersey Man10 said:

So what’s the current situation?

Is it Tuesday over there?

atomheartbevo · February 15, 2022

1 hour ago, Bevo said:

I don't think it will weaken Putin and I don't think it will have much of an impact on NATO. A bunch of Ukranians will leave their country, though. Finland and Sweden may join NATO, and all countries in Eastern Europe will increase their defenses.

These are all things that would actually bother the shit out of Putin.

Ghost of LL · February 15, 2022

1 hour ago, Shady Ray said:

Ok, so assuming that what we have seen today indicates de-escalation (which, of course, isn’t certain by any means yet) what would be the fall-out from a Public Relations / Political/ “Intra-EU/NATO/Continental” standpoint? And does the insight into the European impact of a possible withdrawal help determine what Putin’s next move is going to be?

Within the US, there would be a lot of “Putin flinched” or “Putin’s bluff was called and he backed down” type of spin, but would that really be the case? And just as importantly, what would the perception/reaction be here in Europe, which is ultimately the geographic area that this entire ordeal was designed to impact?

If you are Putin, what would you reasonably get out of this if you end it right now, at 9:00 PM Moscow time on February 15th, 2022? And what could you still possibly gain?

I will spoiler my take for length:

Reveal hidden contents

1. It has effectively made Ukraine a leper in France and Germany - even more so than before. In Germany specifically, the damage between Ukraine and Berlin that this ordeal has caused is likely irreparable any time soon. The respective governments hate each other, the Germans are so sick of the Ukrainian PR strategy of demands and guilt-trips, and the existing ambassador is actively despised by a majority of those Germans who follow the news, which is a huge percentage here. I don’t know if I have ever seen a situation where the ambassador to a country has even been A) as widely known by the general populace of the country in which he serves, and B) been hated to such a degree by so many people he is tasked with working constructively with…both at the governmental level and by the general populace. And what had long been a quietly whispered sentiment in Germany is now clear to the world: The Germans -at least 86% of the elected Bundestag parliamentary groups - don’t care whatsoever about Ukraine, and even if they are about to be bludgeoned into the ground by the Russian army, there is no chance of Germany helping them beyond tossing them a few million euros now and then and some helmets. It has also allowed for that taboo opinion to be openly shared as “reasonable” amongst Germans, which previously it had not. That is a big deal in a society like Germany where the impression of a certain progressive/inclusive image to others is huge.

  Recall all the way back to three months ago when all this kicked off - at that time, the answer to the question of whether the West would intervene if Ukraine was attacked by Russia was still unknown officially. Well, it isn’t anymore. It has been openly and specifically stated; everyone knows the answer now, and most importantly, Ukraine knows that when push comes to shove, the Germans won’t give you arms, the US and Brits will give you weapons and attaboys, but no other support and they will (understandably) pull their advisors when the Russians get close. Brussels as an institution will basically ignore you, and your true, legitimate allies in Poland, Baltics, Eastern Europe don’t have nearly the juice - even with their own rock solid US backing - to buy you any real support. You are alone and you will have to deal with Russia in that light. And that realization certainly has value to Putin, and it certainly resonates internally within Ukraine. 

2. Secondly, a non-military outcome it would effectively mean that any internal momentum to add Ukraine to NATO (and most likely the EU) is done. If this settles down now with Russian de-escalation, it should be assumed that some type of informal assurances were likely made to Putin; and Paris and Berlin will never allow momentum to get moving again re Ukrainian accession. I mean, hell, Scholz said today it wouldn't happen in his term, and now that this ordeal has occurred, "Will you support Ukraine in NATO?" will become a regular question to potential chancellors. And an affirmative answer will be political suicide. Both Germany and France have long felt that the 2008 Bucharest announcement was done over their heads as a result of intense pressure by GWB administration, at a time when a ton of deference was being given to the US on NATO matters. This is going to be seen as the logical end to that momentum. They’ll never allow a situation where global perception is allowed to pressure the German and French governments again vis a vis Ukraine like it has these past 3 months. Oh, Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO will never be formally removed from the agenda, but if this resolves without war, it is effectively done. They are both essentially seen as poison pills that many European capitals have no desire trying to digest. 

3. It will open the door to Western Europeans portraying the Angloshperic media and intel community as being exactly as many Western European politicians have portrayed it lately…escalatory, full of unreliable intelligence leaks, and a US/UK media that is often seen to be a reckless echo chamber for war. The derision that Macron got in US media for just attempting to generate dialogue with Putin was definitely a bad move here. It was a head scratcher as to why David Frum and the CNN chatterati were so vocally derisive towards that. It undercut a lot of sensibilities here. Conversely, it will allow (laughably) the EU, Scholz, Macron, etc to play up their own wisdom in negotiating, acting slowly and rationally with respect to pulling embassies, consulates, etc. The US won’t be seen as incompetent, but dear God the Brits will…between Boris missing Putin’s phone call because he had to defend himself on the floor of parliament from charges of partying during lockdown, to the complete and total shitshow that was Liz Truss’ Moscow Journey, the UK came across as absolute bumbling idiots here.   Also, this will be spun here as a triumph of European initiative on the diplomatic front. Which is also laughable, but just as the US establishment will spin this as a victory driven by strength and unity, the French and Germans will claim that they stood between an aggressive Russia and a hyperventilating US/UK and guided the way to a drawdown. There will be puff pieces in certain media outlets here echoing the inevitable US line that Putin blinked, but very few people here will believe this occurred as a result of the US/EU/Ukrainian unity, and it also won’t be chalked up to Russia flinching due to fear. No one here really thinks that Russia was scared of these proposed sanctions or Ukrainian guerrillas…this would be seen completely as a decision made out of Putin’s chessmanship and nothing more. 

4. It will give Scholz and Macron well-needed boosts at home, which at least re Scholz, is a benefit for Putin…and on the French side, it gives Putin solid equity with Macron, which is a nice second-place trophy since he’s unlikely to get his dreamgirl Marine Le Pen in. Scholz is foundering in the polls and needs a foreign policy win here, big time. Foreign policy wins here carry much more political weight than they do in the US (as opposed to the domestic focus that the US tends to have) and it will give Olaf some breathing room to get his coalition under control.

As we have seen, the German-Russian co-dependency is strong, but the SPD-Russian bond is even stronger. Putin has an incentive to do what he can to help the SPD stay in power and with the much more headstrong Friedrich Merz quickly gaining in the polls, Putin could coast with respect to a stable German ally like Scholz for another couple of years, making some serious headway in further integrating into the German landscape. I will admit, I alway knew the "lore" surrounding the SPD’s affinity for Russia, but Merkel has been the only Chancellor that I have lived under here so my actual understanding was not nearly as strong as I thought. The SPD realllllly does fucking love them some Russia…it really does seem to be baked into the DNA of that party. Thanks, Willy Brandt. But anyway, with the German economy already soft and Olaf so amenable towards Russia, Putin could make some serious inroads here, particularly in areas not quite so publicly visible/divisive as gas. 

5. NS2. I think if this drops off the pages of the news peacefully, NS2 will be turned on within 3 months, but I think the Germans will push to have an extension of the existing Russia-Ukraine transit contract extended until 2029. It is set to expire in 2024, and the Germans have been completely indifferent as to whether that contract it is extended at all. But I think they can extract some type of extension, which will give the Germans cover to flip the "on" switch, and effectively buy off the existing Ukrainian kleptocrats to go along. It will also insulate the Germans from the arrows of “gas as a weapon”, which will take a tool away from the US elements that want NS2 dead. And I know that getting deeper in bed with Putin may seem counterintuitive given what all has just happened. But the impact of this situation will probably serve to focus the Germans on diversifying energy supply, but that will only be possible in the long-term. So I would expect to see a serious debate kick off re nuclear, potentially with the EU now deeming it “green”, but in the short-term, German Industry is going to say, “Fuuuuckk, we dodged this bullet. Let’s get this shit flowing now so that if this comes up again, it is that much harder for Ted Cruz and his band of merry senate allies to intervene in a way that will push us to use US LNG.” You really can’t discount how powerful the lobby for this pipeline is here. And I think that is why the German press has really come out these last couple of days mainstreaming some positions wrt Ukraine that would previously been reserved only for “fringe-ish” publications. There was an article that was top of the fold in Focus today from a former General of the Bundeswehr/Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Harald Kujat, in which he explicitly claimed that Ukraine wasn’t a democratic country and that the US wanted it as an aircraft carrier. This is stuff that is certainly repeated around here, but never in such a prominent position and never by someone with that level of pedigree.

So, if you are Putin, and your main concerns in Europe are 1) neutering Ukrainian NATO accession dreams, 2) continuing integration into the German economy, 3) further damaging a US reputation in Western Europe that has already been taking a hit due to the Middle East clusterfuckery and the Afghanistan withdrawal, 4) keeping your own domestic economy afloat, 5) portraying yourself as a wise and wily leader for the home audience, then why would you erase all of that by invading now? Do you really need fucking Kharkov in your 11-timezone-long behemoth of a country? Does integrating 15-20 million Ukrainians with a $3,000 per capita GDP really help you out much? You already have Crimea, which is the only thing that matters to you due to strategic reasons…do you really need the mines of the Donbass given how much energy Russia already has? I say he doesn’t.

Or do you simply dust off your hands, wind this down, and walk away ignoring the western media spin that you somehow “blinked”? If you are Russia, do you think the Middle East Dictators buy that spin, anyway? The Gulf arabs that are now buying your S-400s? Or the ones that depend on your influence like Syria? Or the ones like Iran that just inked huge trade deals with as a lifeline for their fully-sanctioned economies? Or the ones in the Stans who just saw you bail KZ out of their jam? I don’t think so. I think they will see this as a win against the west.

So, from my position, I think there is every reason for him to just wind this down. He has gained as much as he can gain, and anything more is just a risk of blowing it all just as he reaches the end-line.

So a few quick counter-/additional points:

Spoiler

1) Having been an exchange student in Germany and having some friends there, I am generally sympathetic to the Germans and understand their point of view (both on this and more generally). So let me say this as diplomatically as one can: NOBODY GIVES A FUCK what Germany thinks about Ukraine or Russia or really very much of anything when it comes to international affairs. In the global international order, Germany is a non-player.

With respect to international finance and business, Germany is very important. It remains the primary driver of European economic policy. So that keeps Germany at the G7 table and makes it one of America's key international partners when crises like a global financial meltdown or pandemic occur.

But when it comes to international security, Germany is not a partner. It's not an adversary, mind you. But it's not a partner. It's more like an obstacle. It's like the wind when you're playing golf. Sometimes, it can actually help you. But more often, it's a hinderance. It doesn't really mean to be a hinderance. It has no ill-will. But it's also not something you're going to negotiate with and do a deal where it won't be a hinderance. Mostly, it's just something you have to work around.

And that's something that really gets the Germans bent out of shape. They get really pissed off that they're not consulted on the great issues of international security. But honestly, why would they be consulted? Does one consult with the wind before taking one's tee shot? No. One might consult with the caddy. But one does not consult with the wind. One accounts for the wind, but that's it.

So I really have to chuckle when you point out that Germany doesn't care about Ukraine. Who the fuck cares? It's not like Germany was ever going to do anything for Ukraine anyway (and anyone who expected otherwise is a fool). Germany is going to do what it does--keep its manufacturing-driven economy going with cheap Russian natural resources (not just gas, but also aluminum, platinum, copper, nickel, etc.) irrespective of any security concerns. It can do that because it has no security concerns, thanks to Nato.

2) France is the European player in the international-security space. And I suspect Emmanuel Macron will take a victory lap, at least domestically. Good. Good for him. If it helps him give le Pen a drubbing, then that's great for everyone.

But everyone in the US and the UK and Russia and China knows that Macron got clowned by Putin. Hell--I think Macron knows that he got clowned by Putin. So I don't think this is going to lead to a huge new shift in the international order whereby French diplomacy is in the ascent.

3) The British are not bumbling idiots. The Johnson Government are a bunch of bumbling idiots. But the UK's permanent foreign-relations apparatus--i.e., the intelligence services, the military, and the diplomatic corps--are still the largest and most capable in Europe.

But let's also recognize something about the UK--the UK lacks freedom of movement in the international-security space. Churchill made very clear during his second term as prime minister that the UK could never deviate far from American foreign policy, and his successors of both parties have strongly adhered to that view. The UK remains a major player in international relations not in spite of its close relationship with the United States, but because of it. And so it really doesn't matter that Liz Truss looks like an idiot--she was never a real player in this anyway.

4) Ukraine joining Nato was never a real prospect. Everyone knew that. We have just been unwilling to say it. And we're not saying it. And not getting that public "security assurance" from the United States and Nato is a defeat for Putin.

5) I guess I just don't see the facts that would lead one to the conclusion that the United States has taken a hit in Western European eyes.

From the German perspective, you're absolutely right that Russlandversteher-ism--if not outright Russophilia--is baked in to the DNA of the SPD. And right alongside that comes a fair amount of anti-Americanism. So anytime the SPD is in government, that's going to be a feature of German public opinion.

So I'm not particularly impressed by the concept that the literati in Germany is going to express more anti-American sentiment tomorrow than they did under Merkel. That was naturally going to be the case under an SPD government. This may be the excuse, sure. But if it wasn't this, then there surely would've been something else.

But again, . . . it really doesn't matter. Because Germany fundamentally does not have freedom of movement. Germany is completely beholden to Russia for a supply of raw materials to fuel its economy, and that's not changing. So Germany has no ability to change that, and hence no ability to influence foreign affairs vis-a-vis Russia (or, by extension, China).

Bottom Line: who the fuck knows what Putin is going to do. I think people give Putin too much credit as being some great strategist. It's like people who thought Trump was some kind of 64-D chess player. Not really; it's just that things frequently work out for people who are well-positioned for the moment.

MNLonghornFUKM · February 15, 2022

I have had a month long bet with a Russian friend of mine regarding the invasion.
If Russia breaches the Ukrainian borders with tanks or launches missiles in Ukrainian space, then that meets the definition of invasion. Yes, we negotiated and came to terms of what defines an invasion.
The spoils: A bottle of Louis Jadot Vosne-Romanee.
Guess we are going to find out this week who buys.

So are you team Putin invades or team nothing happens

Bevo · February 15, 2022

2 minutes ago, atomheartbevo said:

These are all things that would actually bother the shit out of Putin.

Yeah, what I meant was that I don't think it will impact his hold on power. He won't lose support from the Russian military and he won't lose support from Russians. He hurt is relationship with the West but that already sucked and he has probably improved his relationship with China. Russia will eventually gain a portion of the Ukraine but at the expense of more aware neighbors.

JerrysJheriCurl · February 15, 2022

22 minutes ago, MNLonghornFUKM said:

So are you team Putin invades or team nothing happens

I bet on Putin invading.

My friend knows his people and he works in that space. If he’s wrong on this, it will be the first time he has been wrong on Russia geopolitics. But there’s always a first time, and I believe he’s due to be wrong.

As someone said earlier, the only one that knows is Putin… and I’m not too sure he even knows.

I haven’t picked up a bar tab with my friend in over 8 years. He just pays the bill.
So for this bet… If I lose, I win. Even if I win, I still lose.

But at least good wine and conversation will be had.

за здоровье!

Edited February 15, 2022 by JerrysJheriCurl

texasdago · February 15, 2022

https://zeihan.com/russias-ukraine-gambit/?fbclid=IwAR0TZTqQo-q74CuuFOlk8l_AY8PXZ9jiVOkY-hLIlQfAQJav0z07JvR6CVk

texasdago · February 15, 2022

Loop 1604 · February 15, 2022

11 minutes ago, texasdago said:

MoJames · February 15, 2022

clapclapclap · February 15, 2022

4 hours ago, Jersey Man10 said:

So what’s the current situation?

'Speak Softly But Carry a Big Walker' is in effect.

staboner · February 15, 2022

interesting catching up this morning. the more this wobbles on the better for the US imo. the entire world watching, day and night, the ruskies eventually go into a hornets nest and get bogged down with confusing intentions. eastern european buttholes pucker while (hopefully) western europeans grow a spine to care about broader regional security a bit more.

so long as the nukes stay down and asses up, im good

52-80 · February 16, 2022

utee94 · February 16, 2022

JerrysJheriCurl · February 16, 2022

Vlad inspired me to create this. Shit or get off the pot Vlad.
Or something like that.

Edited February 16, 2022 by JerrysJheriCurl

MNLonghornFUKM · February 16, 2022

Probably my favorite scene in all Monty pythons

Harrison Bergeron · February 16, 2022

Pescado_Rojo · February 16, 2022

It's 5 AM in Kyiv. You'd think Ivan would have rolled by now if today was the day. (I assume they can operate in the dark almost as well as we can.)

Brisketexan · February 16, 2022

It's 5 AM in Kyiv. You'd think Ivan would have rolled by now if today was the day. (I assume they can operate in the dark almost as well as we can.)

Yeah, I have to think their first move is a night time air and artillery assault.

Homesickhorn · February 16, 2022

If memory serves me correctly, the paratroopers didn't even touch down (In Colorado, mind you), until the history class taught by the chubby black teacher was well underway. There's still time gents.

Edited February 16, 2022 by Homesickhorn
Because Red Dawn

atomheartbevo · February 16, 2022

25 minutes ago, Homesickhorn said:

If memory serves me correctly, the paratroopers didn't even touch down (In Colorado, mind you), until the history class taught by the chubby black teacher was well underway. There's still time gents.

I always enjoyed the fact that they were able to get a massive number of paratroopers to Colorado.

InkaUtexas · February 16, 2022

1 hour ago, atomheartbevo said:

I always enjoyed the fact that they were able to get a massive number of paratroopers to Colorado.

Duh, illegal Mexican Cartel airstrips.

On a serious note, seeing the OSINT tweet world showing quite a bit of equipment moving away from the border. Could be a feint, but could also mean those pesky ruskies are pulling back. will keep watching.

Shady Ray · February 16, 2022

End of military maneuvers: Russia apparently withdraws troops from Crimea
Russia reports troop withdrawal from Crimea
08:01 a.m.: According to the Ministry of Defense in Moscow, the Russian armed forces have ended a military maneuver in Crimea. The units of the southern military district had finished their "tactical exercises" on the military bases of the peninsula and now returned to their home locations, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced on Wednesday, according to news agencies. Television pictures showed military units crossing a bridge that connects the Ukrainian peninsula annexed by Russia to the mainland.

https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/russland-ukraine-konflikt-ukraine-konflikt-russland-meldet-truppen-rueckzug-von-der-krim_id_52139887.html

Edited February 16, 2022 by Shady Ray

InkaUtexas · February 16, 2022

He can still go full Lee and hammer the flank going straight for Kyiv. I mean once you have that city you have the separatist zones. Not saying he will, but 19-D chess and shit.

InkaUtexas · February 16, 2022

Unity day is here.

South Austin · February 16, 2022

3 hours ago, InkaUtexas said:

He can still go full Lee and hammer the flank going straight for Kyiv. I mean once you have that city you have the separatist zones. Not saying he will, but 19-D chess and shit.

[raised hand] What’s a flank?

FartingMonk · February 16, 2022

29 minutes ago, South Austin said:

[raised hand] What’s a flank?

Part of the front near the rear of the cow. Pretty lean. I much prefer skirt steak if cooking fajitas.

Homercles · February 16, 2022

Why not gain some global focus, air your grievances, earn some good will at home, and spew aggressive propaganda that it was all imagined by your enemies…while simultaneously conducting right-to-the-edge practice for the real deal?

Of course the counter is it got some more countries closer ties to NATO, armed Ukraine with more insurgency-friendly weapons, cost you an arm and a leg, etc.

Aint over obviously, but if that was the play I can see why. Of course it feeds more ammunition to the ‘intelligence agencies rabble rabble Iraq’ folks if it was feint.

South Austin · February 16, 2022

15 minutes ago, FartingMonk said:

Part of the front near the rear of the cow. Pretty lean. I much prefer skirt steak if cooking fajitas.

The correct answer is: I need a drink.*

*That was a Red Dawn softball.

Bevo · February 16, 2022

25 minutes ago, FartingMonk said:

Part of the front near the rear of the cow. Pretty lean. I much prefer skirt steak if cooking fajitas.

The skirt stake comes from the plate section of meat. The chicken fried steak cut comes from a chicken so it isn't shown in this diagram. Russians are chickens also so I don't see how they could flank.

Edited February 16, 2022 by Bevo

FartingMonk · February 16, 2022

27 minutes ago, Homercles said:

Why not gain some global focus, air your grievances, earn some good will at home, and spew aggressive propaganda that it was all imagined by your enemies…while simultaneously conducting right-to-the-edge practice for the real deal?

Of course the counter is it got some more countries closer ties to NATO, armed Ukraine with more insurgency-friendly weapons, cost you an arm and a leg, etc.

Aint over obviously, but if that was the play I can see why. Of course it feeds more ammunition to the ‘intelligence agencies rabble rabble Iraq’ folks if it was feint.

The intelligence part of it by going full invasion may have been his smartest move. He basically probed the west all the way to the point of launch. Now he knows what we do. Who is the spy and which units will carry out the orders.

MonkeyDoughnut · February 16, 2022

Onboard 2.0 · February 16, 2022

44 minutes ago, FartingMonk said:

The intelligence part of it by going full invasion may have been his smartest move. He basically probed the west all the way to the point of launch. Now he knows what we do. Who is the spy and which units will carry out the orders.

Well, not sure I'd agree. We didn't do much more than send some additional troops to the region. We didn't mobilize our forces in an attempt to gear up for a response. I'd also say the military knows they're watching what we do so they didn't do much to tip our hand about what we'd do in a serious situation where we intended to counter their invasion.

I can't speak much to the behind the scene spy thing, but those assets are always hiding what they do regardless of how things are going I bet.

bolverk · February 16, 2022

Thought this was a pretty good explainer of the chess match that's been going on between the White House and the Kremlin:

Spoiler

On Ukraine, U.S. and Russia Wage Signaling War to Avert Actual War
Each side is trying to convince the other that the price of conflict is too high. It is a complex game played with deliberate ambiguity, raising the risk of lethal miscalculation.

As their standoff over Ukraine continues, Moscow and Washington are playing an increasingly high-stakes, increasingly complex game of signaling to try to secure their aims without firing a shot.

Traditional diplomacy is just one component of this dance. Troop movements, sanctions warnings and legislation, embassy closures, leader summits, and intelligence leaks are all aimed, in part, at proving each country’s willingness to carry out certain threats or accept certain risks.

It is a form of high-stakes negotiation, conducted in actions as much as words, meant to settle the future of Europe just as conclusively as if decided by war, by telegraphing how a conflict would play out rather than waging it directly.

Russia, by shifting thousands of troops from its far east to Ukraine’s border, hopes to convince Washington and Kyiv that it is willing to endure a major war to secure its demands by force, so those countries are better off meeting Russian demands peacefully.

The Biden administration, by stating that a Russian invasion may be imminent, even closing its embassy in Kyiv, and vowing economic retaliation, signals that Moscow cannot expect desperate American concessions, making further escalation less worthwhile.

There have been a flurry of such gestures. Russia held Black Sea naval exercises, implying it could close off trade waters. President Biden issued joint statements with European leaders, conveying that they are not balking at American sanctions threats that would harm Europe, too.

But the more both sides try to make their threats credible, for example by relocating troops, the more they heighten the risk of a miscalculation that could careen out of control.

Each side also cultivates ambiguity about what it will or will not accept, and will or will not do, in hopes of forcing its adversary to prepare for all eventualities, spreading its energies thin.

The White House has said that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia could decide this week whether to invade, deflating Moscow’s careful murkiness, while also demonstrating, especially to cautious Europeans, that any invasion would be driven by Russia, rather than in response to some outside provocation.

On Tuesday, Moscow moved to recreate confusion, withdrawing a handful of forces even as it continued nearby war games and as Mr. Putin accused Ukraine of genocide against its native Russophone minority. By feinting simultaneously toward de-escalation and invasion on Tuesday, Moscow builds pressure on the West to prepare for both.

“This dynamic is very volatile,” said Keren Yarhi-Milo, a Columbia University political scientist who studies how countries signal and maneuver amid crises.

A range of factors particular to this crisis, she added — differing political cultures, multiple audiences, rising uncertainty — “makes the signaling in this case very, very difficult.”

The result is a diplomatic cacophony nearly as difficult to navigate as war itself, with stakes just as high.

Persuasion Games
With their positioning, Moscow and Washington are struggling to resolve two outstanding questions about a possible conflict, each to their benefit.

Would a Russian invasion bring Moscow more reward than downside?

And, would the West have less tolerance than Russia for the pain of Mr. Biden’s proposed sanctions, and abandon them?

If Moscow can convince Washington that the answer to both is “yes,” then Mr. Biden and his allies would, in theory, be forced to conclude that they are better off delivering whatever concessions will keep Russia from launching a war.

But if Washington can persuade Moscow that both answers are “no,” then Mr. Putin will have every incentive to cut his losses and step back from the brink.

Mr. Putin has been ambiguous about what he would consider a successful invasion of Ukraine. And moves like his recent visit to China or his ambassadors’ bluster, shrugging off sanctions, signal that he is ready and able to bear the foreseeable costs.

Of course, if war were really so advantageous, it could have already begun, one of many hints that Mr. Putin may be partly bluffing, although by how much is impossible to say.

Mr. Biden, for his part, has sent weapons to Ukraine, a message that he would make any conflict more painful for Russia, and has laid out retaliatory sanctions in detail. He has implied Western unity over sanctions that may be just as much a bluff as Mr. Putin’s war talk.

His administration has also publicized what it says are Russian plans to fake a justification for war, implying that any such ploy would be quickly unmasked, making it less attractive.

But threats and bluffs work best when they are backed up by action, increasing the risk of a war that neither side may truly want.

And these efforts are complicated by each side’s need to persuade multiple audiences of contradictory things.

Mr. Biden must persuade Mr. Putin that Western sanctions would be automatic and severe, while also convincing Europeans, who would bear much of the cost, that sanctions would not hit them too hard or be carried out without their consent.

Similarly, Mr. Putin is seeking to position himself to Western leaders as ready for war, while convincing war-averse Russian citizens that he is being dragged into one, for example with false claims of American and Ukrainian aggression.

But Western leaders often struggle to differentiate which statements Mr. Putin intends them to take seriously and which he expects them to ignore as bluster for domestic consumption, Christopher Bort, a former U.S. intelligence official, warned in an essay for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Kremlin’s “torrent of falsehoods” over Ukraine, Mr. Bort added, risks persuading Western leaders that Moscow’s diplomatic entrees can be ignored as cover for an invasion it has already decided to launch — potentially foreclosing an offramp from war.

Lost in Translation
“Your system is much more open than ours,” said Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “That produces a lot of misunderstanding.”

Because Kremlin decision-making is dominated by a handful of intelligence and military officials, Mr. Gabuev said, there is a tendency to assume that Washington operates the same way.

Offhand comments by American military officers are given special weight in Moscow, while lawmakers who drive much of Washington’s politics are ignored.

Such cultural misunderstandings, Mr. Gabuev added, have become considerably worse in recent years, as Washington and Moscow have expelled one another’s diplomats and ended many unofficial exchanges, hampering their visibility into one another’s politics.

This is not always dangerous. Many in Moscow, assuming that Mr. Biden operates like Mr. Putin, believe that Washington has ginned up the appearance of conflict with the intention of declaring a false American victory when the more reasonable Mr. Putin rolls back the deployments he has insisted are defensive, Mr. Gabuev said.

That misunderstanding significantly eases Mr. Putin’s option to withdraw. And many in Russia view the West as the aggressor, and so would take an averted conflict as Mr. Putin triumphing, not surrendering.

Still, the less Washington and Moscow understand one another, the harder it will be for them to decipher each other’s signals and anticipate each other’s reactions.

“The Russian president’s circle of trust has consolidated over time, insulating him from information that does not fit with his prior beliefs,” the scholars Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky wrote in Foreign Affairs.

As Mr. Putin’s inner circle has shrunk, they wrote, it has grown dominated by yes-men who tell him what they think he wants to hear and by security service leaders who tend to be hawkish and distrustful toward the West.

He would hardly be alone in this: research finds that strongmen leaders like him are, for just this reason, likelier to start wars and likelier to lose them.

So what Washington takes as Russian brinksmanship or bluffing, for example shrugging off sanctions threats or implying that some Ukrainians would welcome Russian liberators, may reflect sincere belief due to political dysfunction.

“Information flows to Putin are choppy at best, and sanctions are a highly technical topic that aren’t even well understood in Washington,” said Eddie Fishman, a top sanctions policy official in the Obama administration.

So far, both sides have avoided any obvious misreadings of each other. This may stem in part from the length of the crisis, which has allowed each capital to repeatedly telegraph its intentions and capabilities.

But that same factor — time — also creates more opportunities for a mistake as each side escalates.

“Every day that we’re not resolving it, we are increasing the percentage chance that something will go wrong,” said Dr. Yarhi-Milo, the international relations scholar.

“We’re testing the nerves of a lot of people at the same time,” she added. “It can take a really bad turn very quickly.”

crash_davis · February 16, 2022

19 hours ago, Shady Ray said:

Ok, so assuming that what we have seen today indicates de-escalation (which, of course, isn’t certain by any means yet) what would be the fall-out from a Public Relations / Political/ “Intra-EU/NATO/Continental” standpoint? And does the insight into the European impact of a possible withdrawal help determine what Putin’s next move is going to be?

Within the US, there would be a lot of “Putin flinched” or “Putin’s bluff was called and he backed down” type of spin, but would that really be the case? And just as importantly, what would the perception/reaction be here in Europe, which is ultimately the geographic area that this entire ordeal was designed to impact?

If you are Putin, what would you reasonably get out of this if you end it right now, at 9:00 PM Moscow time on February 15th, 2022? And what could you still possibly gain?

I will spoiler my take for length:

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1. It has effectively made Ukraine a leper in France and Germany - even more so than before. In Germany specifically, the damage between Ukraine and Berlin that this ordeal has caused is likely irreparable any time soon. The respective governments hate each other, the Germans are so sick of the Ukrainian PR strategy of demands and guilt-trips, and the existing ambassador is actively despised by a majority of those Germans who follow the news, which is a huge percentage here. I don’t know if I have ever seen a situation where the ambassador to a country has even been A) as widely known by the general populace of the country in which he serves, and B) been hated to such a degree by so many people he is tasked with working constructively with…both at the governmental level and by the general populace. And what had long been a quietly whispered sentiment in Germany is now clear to the world: The Germans -at least 86% of the elected Bundestag parliamentary groups - don’t care whatsoever about Ukraine, and even if they are about to be bludgeoned into the ground by the Russian army, there is no chance of Germany helping them beyond tossing them a few million euros now and then and some helmets. It has also allowed for that taboo opinion to be openly shared as “reasonable” amongst Germans, which previously it had not. That is a big deal in a society like Germany where the impression of a certain progressive/inclusive image to others is huge.

  Recall all the way back to three months ago when all this kicked off - at that time, the answer to the question of whether the West would intervene if Ukraine was attacked by Russia was still unknown officially. Well, it isn’t anymore. It has been openly and specifically stated; everyone knows the answer now, and most importantly, Ukraine knows that when push comes to shove, the Germans won’t give you arms, the US and Brits will give you weapons and attaboys, but no other support and they will (understandably) pull their advisors when the Russians get close. Brussels as an institution will basically ignore you, and your true, legitimate allies in Poland, Baltics, Eastern Europe don’t have nearly the juice - even with their own rock solid US backing - to buy you any real support. You are alone and you will have to deal with Russia in that light. And that realization certainly has value to Putin, and it certainly resonates internally within Ukraine. 

2. Secondly, a non-military outcome it would effectively mean that any internal momentum to add Ukraine to NATO (and most likely the EU) is done. If this settles down now with Russian de-escalation, it should be assumed that some type of informal assurances were likely made to Putin; and Paris and Berlin will never allow momentum to get moving again re Ukrainian accession. I mean, hell, Scholz said today it wouldn't happen in his term, and now that this ordeal has occurred, "Will you support Ukraine in NATO?" will become a regular question to potential chancellors. And an affirmative answer will be political suicide. Both Germany and France have long felt that the 2008 Bucharest announcement was done over their heads as a result of intense pressure by GWB administration, at a time when a ton of deference was being given to the US on NATO matters. This is going to be seen as the logical end to that momentum. They’ll never allow a situation where global perception is allowed to pressure the German and French governments again vis a vis Ukraine like it has these past 3 months. Oh, Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO will never be formally removed from the agenda, but if this resolves without war, it is effectively done. They are both essentially seen as poison pills that many European capitals have no desire trying to digest. 

3. It will open the door to Western Europeans portraying the Angloshperic media and intel community as being exactly as many Western European politicians have portrayed it lately…escalatory, full of unreliable intelligence leaks, and a US/UK media that is often seen to be a reckless echo chamber for war. The derision that Macron got in US media for just attempting to generate dialogue with Putin was definitely a bad move here. It was a head scratcher as to why David Frum and the CNN chatterati were so vocally derisive towards that. It undercut a lot of sensibilities here. Conversely, it will allow (laughably) the EU, Scholz, Macron, etc to play up their own wisdom in negotiating, acting slowly and rationally with respect to pulling embassies, consulates, etc. The US won’t be seen as incompetent, but dear God the Brits will…between Boris missing Putin’s phone call because he had to defend himself on the floor of parliament from charges of partying during lockdown, to the complete and total shitshow that was Liz Truss’ Moscow Journey, the UK came across as absolute bumbling idiots here.   Also, this will be spun here as a triumph of European initiative on the diplomatic front. Which is also laughable, but just as the US establishment will spin this as a victory driven by strength and unity, the French and Germans will claim that they stood between an aggressive Russia and a hyperventilating US/UK and guided the way to a drawdown. There will be puff pieces in certain media outlets here echoing the inevitable US line that Putin blinked, but very few people here will believe this occurred as a result of the US/EU/Ukrainian unity, and it also won’t be chalked up to Russia flinching due to fear. No one here really thinks that Russia was scared of these proposed sanctions or Ukrainian guerrillas…this would be seen completely as a decision made out of Putin’s chessmanship and nothing more. 

4. It will give Scholz and Macron well-needed boosts at home, which at least re Scholz, is a benefit for Putin…and on the French side, it gives Putin solid equity with Macron, which is a nice second-place trophy since he’s unlikely to get his dreamgirl Marine Le Pen in. Scholz is foundering in the polls and needs a foreign policy win here, big time. Foreign policy wins here carry much more political weight than they do in the US (as opposed to the domestic focus that the US tends to have) and it will give Olaf some breathing room to get his coalition under control.

As we have seen, the German-Russian co-dependency is strong, but the SPD-Russian bond is even stronger. Putin has an incentive to do what he can to help the SPD stay in power and with the much more headstrong Friedrich Merz quickly gaining in the polls, Putin could coast with respect to a stable German ally like Scholz for another couple of years, making some serious headway in further integrating into the German landscape. I will admit, I alway knew the "lore" surrounding the SPD’s affinity for Russia, but Merkel has been the only Chancellor that I have lived under here so my actual understanding was not nearly as strong as I thought. The SPD realllllly does fucking love them some Russia…it really does seem to be baked into the DNA of that party. Thanks, Willy Brandt. But anyway, with the German economy already soft and Olaf so amenable towards Russia, Putin could make some serious inroads here, particularly in areas not quite so publicly visible/divisive as gas. 

5. NS2. I think if this drops off the pages of the news peacefully, NS2 will be turned on within 3 months, but I think the Germans will push to have an extension of the existing Russia-Ukraine transit contract extended until 2029. It is set to expire in 2024, and the Germans have been completely indifferent as to whether that contract it is extended at all. But I think they can extract some type of extension, which will give the Germans cover to flip the "on" switch, and effectively buy off the existing Ukrainian kleptocrats to go along. It will also insulate the Germans from the arrows of “gas as a weapon”, which will take a tool away from the US elements that want NS2 dead. And I know that getting deeper in bed with Putin may seem counterintuitive given what all has just happened. But the impact of this situation will probably serve to focus the Germans on diversifying energy supply, but that will only be possible in the long-term. So I would expect to see a serious debate kick off re nuclear, potentially with the EU now deeming it “green”, but in the short-term, German Industry is going to say, “Fuuuuckk, we dodged this bullet. Let’s get this shit flowing now so that if this comes up again, it is that much harder for Ted Cruz and his band of merry senate allies to intervene in a way that will push us to use US LNG.” You really can’t discount how powerful the lobby for this pipeline is here. And I think that is why the German press has really come out these last couple of days mainstreaming some positions wrt Ukraine that would previously been reserved only for “fringe-ish” publications. There was an article that was top of the fold in Focus today from a former General of the Bundeswehr/Chairman of NATO Military Committee, Harald Kujat, in which he explicitly claimed that Ukraine wasn’t a democratic country and that the US wanted it as an aircraft carrier. This is stuff that is certainly repeated around here, but never in such a prominent position and never by someone with that level of pedigree.

So, if you are Putin, and your main concerns in Europe are 1) neutering Ukrainian NATO accession dreams, 2) continuing integration into the German economy, 3) further damaging a US reputation in Western Europe that has already been taking a hit due to the Middle East clusterfuckery and the Afghanistan withdrawal, 4) keeping your own domestic economy afloat, 5) portraying yourself as a wise and wily leader for the home audience, then why would you erase all of that by invading now? Do you really need fucking Kharkov in your 11-timezone-long behemoth of a country? Does integrating 15-20 million Ukrainians with a $3,000 per capita GDP really help you out much? You already have Crimea, which is the only thing that matters to you due to strategic reasons…do you really need the mines of the Donbass given how much energy Russia already has? I say he doesn’t.

Or do you simply dust off your hands, wind this down, and walk away ignoring the western media spin that you somehow “blinked”? If you are Russia, do you think the Middle East Dictators buy that spin, anyway? The Gulf arabs that are now buying your S-400s? Or the ones that depend on your influence like Syria? Or the ones like Iran that just inked huge trade deals with as a lifeline for their fully-sanctioned economies? Or the ones in the Stans who just saw you bail KZ out of their jam? I don’t think so. I think they will see this as a win against the west.

So, from my position, I think there is every reason for him to just wind this down. He has gained as much as he can gain, and anything more is just a risk of blowing it all just as he reaches the end-line.

I think China and Russia got their answers on this.

NATO is dead. US will rattle swords but won't get involved with boots on the ground. But why should we if the European members can't even be bothered to give a shit. Putin will turn his attention to another western front country to continue to stress NATOs resolve, which NATO again will buckle. The most genius thing Putin did was to make Germany it's bitch by making it dependent on Russian gas. Take out one of the heads of the table and the coalition is a coalition only in name.

China sees again that the rest of the world again doesn't want to get involved in conflicts outside of their borders. They have been and will continue to assert and take over what they think is theirs or should be theirs in the Pacific. We and the rest of the world will write sternly worded letters but will do nothing. They are committing genocide while the world leaders ignore it. They are claiming land/islands "owned" by Vietnam, Japan, and Philippines. Who's going to stop them from taking those territories? Will we stop them from establishing a naval base on the Atlantic in western Africa?

This is just another nail on the coffin for dictating policy on the world. That's fine by many but our prosperity is tied to our relationships on/to countries which we exert influence. Our economic might is dependent on our position of military strength. The two go hand in hand.

Shady Ray · February 16, 2022

@Ghost of LL I actually don't think you and I disagree on much here. My post wasn't to say that the international order had been reshuffled or that a fatal schism had occurred within the West or anything like that, but rather to point out that given what has happened to date, what more is Putin going to get by invading? He can keep the pressure up and continue to destabilize the entire continent without so much as touching Ukrainian territory. And more specifically, what could he gain by invading that would justify squandering the benefits that he has essentially already secured in the form of intra-block disunity, the de facto death of NATO expansion, etc? All while maintaining the likelihood that NS2 goes live and his influence within Germany expands, which in turn gives him significant influence within the block, as we have seen in this thing.

But, I don't see that he gains much more. That basket of goodies that he can collect upon leaving the game is inherently risked if he decides to move forward with an invasion. You can't keep the goodies AND invade, as one will inevitably result in the other being gone to a large degree. And I just don't see what potential gain would warrant him doing that. And there may be some...I myself just don't see them.

He has realized benefits...and not because he is some great chess player, but because many of the gains have fallen in his lap due to a lack of unity of the West and the public exposure of faults that previously were not glaringly obvious to the general public. Sure, people who follow this closely knew about those weaknesses, but in Western Europe those divisions have been laid bare to the casual news consumer and there is an intrinsic benefit in that. This whole idea that the US and its NATO allies are aligned is political pablum for domestic US/UK consumption. It is clearly not the case, and while news outlets and chat shows in the US talk about how united the West is, ours in Germany say the exact opposite.

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So I really have to chuckle when you point out that Germany doesn't care about Ukraine. Who the fuck cares? It's not like Germany was ever going to do anything for Ukraine anyway (and anyone who expected otherwise is a fool). Germany is going to do what it does--keep its manufacturing-driven economy going with cheap Russian natural resources (not just gas, but also aluminum, platinum, copper, nickel, etc.) irrespective of any security concerns. It can do that because it has no security concerns, thanks to Nato.

Spoiler

Agree in the sense that from an American/Western perspective…who cares. But the Ukrainians realllly do, apparently. At least as evidenced by their nightly appearances on German TV (last night was particularly brutal on the Markuz Lanz roundtable show, where the Ukrainian ambassador was a target of no less than three politicians/advisors saying they found his diplomatic approach to be irritating and "annoying"...with the moderator himself saying, "Speaking of arms, it might be good if you yourself verbally disarmed"). They seem to be in complete shock that the opposition to them is so strong across the board here. And that is what I was referring to in my post…not the collective "western" understanding of German indifference, but the Ukrainians themselves genuinely seemed to think that when push came to shove, Germany would fall in line and at least defer to Washington. And to a large degree their misconception is understandable…Europe jerked them around by allowing NATO and EU accession to be dangled out illusorily for its own internal reasons, all the while knowing it was unlikely to ever happen, and now they can’t understand why no one cares to follow through with it OR at least tell them the truth, even though they have crafted their own internal political movements with exactly that goal in mind. They are increasingly seeing themselves as pawns, and they are absolutely right. And now that it isn't happening, the internal political calculations in Ukraine will necessarily have to be adjusted. And that is another gift to Putin that can be placed directly at Germany’s feet, because the French alone wouldn’t block it if the Germans were committed to it. So in that sense, Germany does matter.

And you are exactly right about Germany’s occupation of the security space. And actually, I think Germany understands that they aren't a player in this space, and I honestly don't think they particularly mind not being treated as an equal partner on international security issues so long as their own interests aren't harmed. They’ll look away while NATO does stupid shit like it did in Libya or was on the verge of doing in Syria, and will trade zero expectations for German involvement in exchange for their own interests being paramount in their own policy doctrine. The problem comes when circumstances require German invovement. And as you rightly said, this is not the sign of a true ally.

But unfortunately for Ukraine, Germany is THE player in the space of blocking any forward movement within the EU/NATO with respect to Ukraine, and I think that many people have been a bit surprised to the degree that they have dug in here. I know I have. I mean, hell, not only not providing defensive weapons, but blocking third-parties from doing so. Refusing to provide ANYTHING but helmets...not even armored medical transport. I mean, Germany hasn't played ball whatsoever, which ultimately is a departure from the Merkel "split the baby" days. The resulting bad blood between the Poles/ the Baltics and Germany is open and hostile, with even Foreign Ministers from those countries openly questioning Germany's status as an ally. That is also a huge gift to Putin, and it is one that will reverberate to some degree within European politics and policy.

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2) France is the European player in the international-security space. And I suspect Emmanuel Macron will take a victory lap, at least domestically. Good. Good for him. If it helps him give le Pen a drubbing, then that's great for everyone.
But everyone in the US and the UK and Russia and China knows that Macron got clowned by Putin. Hell--I think Macron knows that he got clowned by Putin. So I don't think this is going to lead to a huge new shift in the international order whereby French diplomacy is in the ascent.

Spoiler

Agree. That's why I said that self-congratulatory behavior arising out of this would be laughable. But I can definitely say that the media here did not cover this as Macron getting clowned (although I personally think he did) to anything even closely resembling how the US/UK did. Of all the different sub-story lines of this ordeal, this one was the one from my perspective that demonstrated the largest divergence between the US and French/German media coverage. Now, to be clear, he wasn't necessarily portrayed as some great European statesman along the lines of Mitterrand or Kohl or Thatcher, but his discussions with Putin were seen in many quarters as routine and effective diplomacy which so far have shown fruit in the form of continuing dialogue apart from the US. He was seen as being treated with complete and total respect by Putin, and he is going to be able to leverage that in the public eye, both within France and across Europe.

This is from this morning's Welt, which is discussing the roundtable that occurred on one of the big chat shows last night:

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"The author and advisor to EU foreign affairs representative Josep Borrell also gave a positive assessment of Scholz's visit. She said the meeting had been harmonious, not in substance, but in the way everyone had been able to make their points. "There have definitely been other press conferences where the Russians have let their guests ‘have it’ (Shady Note, I used ‘have it’ as ‘auflassen lassen’ in this usage doesn’t translate at all into English),” she said, recalling "mind games" and worse. Most recently, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly humiliated British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss. The conversation was "like between a mute and a deaf person," Lavrov said after a meeting.

Initially, Russia only wanted to negotiate with the USA. First, the French President Emmanuel Macron and now the German Chancellor have been received with respect. A good sign for the FDP foreign policy expert. "The only problem is: Is the whole thing resilient and will it last over time?"

https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article236931597/Markus-Lanz-Als-ob-Waffen-jemals-etwas-besser-gemacht-haetten-ruft-Lanz.html

 One article of course does not a consensus make, but I honestly think that this represents the general thinking here re Macron...no one really spun it as though he was played or kicked around by Putin. Rather, the press generally said he was treated as a welcomed leader and treated with respect.  But yeah, if it keeps Le Pen out, parade it around, Lil' Fella.

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3) The British are not bumbling idiots. The Johnson Government are a bunch of bumbling idiots. But the UK's permanent foreign-relations apparatus--i.e., the intelligence services, the military, and the diplomatic corps--are still the largest and most capable in Europe.
But let's also recognize something about the UK--the UK lacks freedom of movement in the international-security space. Churchill made very clear during his second term as prime minister that the UK could never deviate far from American foreign policy, and his successors of both parties have strongly adhered to that view. The UK remains a major player in international relations not in spite of its close relationship with the United States, but because of it. And so it really doesn't matter that Liz Truss looks like an idiot--she was never a real player in this anyway.

Spoiler

Agree that their permanent apparatus isn't full of idiots. But you are looking at this through the eyes of a very well-informed American, and not a medium-informed Kraut or Frog. And the public perception of the Brits does determine domestic political positions wrt to the future of the British/EU relationship to some degree, which at the EU level is essentially a Franco-German-led strategy. I mean hell, the EU is basically in a position to flex all over the UK's own Northern Ireland as a result of their diminishing power over even their own domestic market. They have chosen...poorly, and the enablement of that choice was completely due to yet another incompetent PM who needed it for his own political gain. And such public service malpractice has become endemic with the Brits. And to your point re power stemming from their alliance with the US, I completely agree with that concept...but only to the extent they ALLOW that influence to exist. But they don't. They are repeatedly passing up the wide-open lay-up and instead choosing to dribble to the three-point line when they are only down 1. It is a bizarre spectacle of active and willing diminishment of one's own power. Fuckin' weird shit.

But from a larger optics perspective, the UK has been a dumpster fire these past few weeks. But more importantly, their chaotic behavior does cause problems in the grand scheme of things. Since Brexit, there has been a legitimate debate in Western Europe as to just how/if they should fit. Sure they are out of the EU, but they were always kinda squirelly to the Europeans, anyway...what with their Sterling and their rebate and all. But they have shown themselves to be increasingly desperate to carve out some type of leverage that they can exploit with Europe, even floating that weird trilateral security alliance with Poland and Ukraine that no one really cared about covering. And it just isn't working and they are coming across as desperate and pathetic. And this fiasco occurring just after the shitshow of Brexit that their electorate chose really caused much of Europe to scratch its head and say, "hmmm…the 'Inselaffen' truly are who we thought they were" /NoDennisGreen. The quality of their diplomatic core or intel community doesn’t resolve the decreasing influence they have around the world, with such talent being squandered by increasingly incapable politicians and deeply divided and misguided electorate.

 And this case with Ukraine is a perfect example...not one single act of the Brits, while certainly the most hyped of all the measures, made one single dent in resolving this conflict. Their economy is weak and isolated, their military is powerful but unable to be deployed without the consent of greater power, and their diplomatic efforts are strictly done in a support role to the larger American initiatives. And domestically, their financial services industry - out of which they indeed draw the most of their power - is corrupted from tip-to-tail by Russian oligarchs and is at risk of seeing the remaining legitimate elements slowly but steadily relocating to the Continent. And, of course, they don't manufacture shit anymore so that professional services industry is the whole kit and caboodle for them. That is not to say that the British military/intel/diplomatic rank and file are idiots: they certainly aren't. But I don't see how the case can be made that they can independently influence anything in their current condition. And with the likely replacement to Boris being Rishi Sunak, a man who is essentially already THE stalking horse for the City of London within a party of stalking horses for the City of London, or Liz Truss, there is very little hope for a proper calibration on the horizon.

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But again, . . . it really doesn't matter. Because Germany fundamentally does not have freedom of movement. Germany is completely beholden to Russia for a supply of raw materials to fuel its economy, and that's not changing. So Germany has no ability to change that, and hence no ability to influence foreign affairs vis-a-vis Russia (or, by extension, China).

This last point is a great fucking point that will be the next big discussion if/when this Russia thing blows over. “Big German Industry”…read auto manufacturing… has only survived Covid due to China. If the Germans are dependent on Russia for gas, Gott Damn are they dependent on China to keep Big Auto and it’s associated economic ecosystems afloat. BMW sold over 40% of its cars to the Chinese market last year. Almost a million cars, and the half that they sold were to a very large degree the higher end models…the ChiComs loooooove themselves some 850i and Alpina B8 models. And they really like the stretch versions for extra leg room, which is a bit odd to me /NoRacist. By comparison, 20% went to the US market, and a higher portion of those were Minis and the mid-range X3 and X5 SUVs. That number is expected to increase this year. Daimler China sold almost a million units into China in 2021, also of higher end models, and China constituted almost 40% of their revenue, as well. VW sold just over 3 million, which was quite a bit down due to their chip shortage, and Audi sold 700k units, as well. That is a ton of business that puts a ton of food in German mouths.

Now, there isn’t the institutionalized support structure within existing political parties for China…and God knows it doesn’t have the general “understanding” that the Russians do amongst the German populace, but it will be really, really interesting to see how Germany plays that one. So far, from my perspective, Berlin has been much more willing to play ball here, offering Washington more support for initiatives with China than with Russia. But if that starts to hit Auto sales, then we will see what Germany is ready to stomach.

Anyway, I have probably derailed this issue too far into a German discussion, so back to the Russian topic at hand I will shuffle. Appreciate your solid points, as usual.

Edited February 16, 2022 by Shady Ray

JerrysJheriCurl · February 16, 2022

María Zakharova stated she wanted the American and British media outlets to publish the schedule of the upcoming Russian invasions this year so she could plan her vacation.

She called NYT and Bloomberg (as well as The Sun) disinformation.

A Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson calling anyone else disinformation… that’s VERY rich.

Still wood.

Ghost of LL · February 16, 2022

38 minutes ago, Shady Ray said:

@Ghost of LL I actually don't think you and I disagree on much here. My post wasn't to say that the international order had been reshuffled or that a fatal schism had occurred within the West or anything like that, but rather to point out that given what has happened to date, what more is Putin going to get by invading? He can keep the pressure up and continue to destabilize the entire continent without so much as touching Ukrainian territory. And more specifically, what could he gain by invading that would justify squandering the benefits that he has essentially already secured in the form of intra-block disunity, the de facto death of NATO expansion, etc? All while maintaining the likelihood that NS2 goes live and his influence within Germany expands, which in turn gives him significant influence within the block, as we have seen in this thing.

But, I don't see that he gains much more. That basket of goodies that he can collect upon leaving the game is inherently risked if he decides to move forward with an invasion. You can't keep the goodies AND invade, as one will inevitably result in the other being gone to a large degree. And I just don't see what potential gain would warrant him doing that. And there may be some...I myself just don't see them.

He has realized benefits...and not because he is some great chess player, but because many of the gains have fallen in his lap due to a lack of unity of the West and the public exposure of faults that previously were not glaringly obvious to the general public. Sure, people who follow this closely knew about those weaknesses, but in Western Europe those divisions have been laid bare to the casual news consumer and there is an intrinsic benefit in that. This whole idea that the US and its NATO allies are aligned is political pablum for domestic US/UK consumption. It is clearly not the case, and while news outlets and chat shows in the US talk about how united the West is, ours in Germany say the exact opposite.

I don't think we're in much disagreement, at all, and I should have led with "additional" rather than "counter-" on the points I was making. And to the extent I express frustration, it is with the German position, which I think you (unfortunately) accurately synopsize.

I definitely hear you on your prediction on Putin. I think that's a very possible scenario, and I think Putin would be well-served to follow your assessment of the current cost/benefit of invasion.

But here's the thing--I think Putin is a poor strategist. He's a fine tactician, but a poor strategist. And the points you're making are points of high strategy.

But then again, it's awfully arrogant of me--a lawyer in Austin--to criticize as a "poor strategist" a guy who has survived for two decades at the top of a mob-ocracy that is only mildly less murderous than the Soviet regime of the 1930s. And the reality is that I am no Kremlinologist. Putin is undoubtedly facing pressures internally of which I have no awareness. I don't know how a draw-down would play with the military. Or, for that matter, with the kleptocracy or the intelligence services. Putin has some internal pressures here, and I just don't know what they are.

So I really don't know what the fuck Putin is going to do.

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