Русский корабль - иди нахуй

[atomheartbevo 90053]

 

[atomheartbevo 90053]

 

[texasdago 7589]

6 hours ago, MillerEP said:

 

Who would've thought that the country who brought us Slobodan Milosevic would still be full of dicks.

[atomheartbevo 90053]

2 hours ago, texasdago said:

Who would've thought that the country who brought us Slobodan Milosevic would still be full of dicks.

How long until he tries to invite Russian peacekeepers to take up residence there.

[InkaUtexas 26352]

22 minutes ago, atomheartbevo said:

How long until he tries to invite Russian peacekeepers to take up residence there.

Kosovars might fuck them up. And how would they get their? Close off air space and say enjoy your flight back to your shithole Vlad. 

And the Serbs can kiss my ass. I saw what they did to Bosnia. Russia light. 

[956 Worldwide 34916]

10 hours ago, SL Xpress said:

 

That doesn't read like they're sending Leopard tanks to Ukraine. That reads like they're committed to sending Leopard tanks to Ukraine but they still don't have Germany's permission, yet. Still good to see, in that its a public affirmation of what we've been told about Poland's willingness to send them in any case, but I don't know that's it's a massive move of the needle. 

Having said that, I do think it feels inevitable that Germany is going to relent. 

It feels a little odd that the US equivalent is such a complicated piece of machinery, with such a complex supply line needed to operate and maintain them, that it's not realistic to export them to Ukraine, so we have to depend on Germany with their diesel tank engine Leopard, to supply Ukraine with what they need in this case. The Challenger 2 tank is in the same boat to an extent. UK doesn't have many of them, so the production and spare part facilities aren't going to be exactly robust, and from what I've read they have a proprietary ammunition for their main gun:

"Uniquely among NATO main battle tank guns, the L30A1 is rifled, because the British Army continues to place a premium on the use of high-explosive squash head (HESH) rounds in addition to armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding-sabot rounds. The Challenger 2 is also armed with a L94A1 EX-34 7.62 mm chain gun and a 7.62 mm L37A2 (GPMG) machine gun. Fifty main armament rounds^[11] and 4,200 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition are carried."

But here we are. 

Poland is sending the Leopards. Germany has signed off, and the UK is going to sweeten the pot with a few Challenger IIs. 
 

You are really surprised that the U.S. went with what was at the time a far superior engine in terms of combat capabilities, damn the cost and supply chain?  Welcome to the American way of war. These tanks were designed to fuck up the Russians real fast in the Fulda gap, operating with all the logistical support of USAREUR at the peak of Cold War. No one ever contemplated the idea of sending them to a former Soviet republic trying to stand up to Russia on its own. 
 

I can’t speak much to the Brits, but keep in mind that they have a long history of giving the Army second shrift in peacetime (the Navy is not just the “Senior Service” in age). It’s a super British thing to have some piece of tech that’s really good while at the same time just…odd. 

[956 Worldwide 34916]

4 hours ago, texasdago said:

Who would've thought that the country who brought us Slobodan Milosevic would still be full of dicks.

For clarity, this is the “President” of the Republika Srpska that is an enclave/constituency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has some autonomy that was negotiated as part of Dayton. It is NOT an independent country and it isn’t Serbia. The Serbian president is a piece of dick too, though. 
 

I have passed through there, Alice in Wonderland type shitty place although Banja Luka has some kind of grungy, funky vibes. 

[SL Xpress 7518]

11 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

Poland is sending the Leopards. Germany has signed off, and the UK is going to sweeten the pot with a few Challenger IIs. 
 

You are really surprised that the U.S. went with what was at the time a far superior engine in terms of combat capabilities, damn the cost and supply chain?  Welcome to the American way of war. These tanks were designed to fuck up the Russians real fast in the Fulda gap, operating with all the logistical support of USAREUR at the peak of Cold War. No one ever contemplated the idea of sending them to a former Soviet republic trying to stand up to Russia on its own. 
 

I can’t speak much to the Brits, but keep in mind that they have a long history of giving the Army second shrift in peacetime (the Navy is not just the “Senior Service” in age). It’s a super British thing to have some piece of tech that’s really good while at the same time just…odd. 

 

I understand the history of the Abrams and the Challenger I and II. 

You and I both know how much politics/lobbying is involved in both the various military branches as well as in Congress and even the executive branch that ends up being part of the procurement and maintenance process. 

Regardless of understanding all of that, here we are in a situation where we're dependent on the Germans to provide diesel engine tanks so that Ukraine can have the heavy armor they need. I guess maybe the K2 would be another option, but it's certainly much worse than the Leopard for a variety of reasons. Starting with they'd actually have to be manufactured, whereas the Leopards already exist. What I'm mostly expressing is that because of the series of decisions made by US and UK governments (not really much of a point in adding in UK really - what the fuck are they going to build a huge tank force for, really?) over decades, there's no real viable export option for a main battle tank between the two. 

It's not like I have a solution. The procurement process for the Abrams alone has been byzantine for decades. I cannot imagine a universe where there would be an appetite to manufacture a main battle tank with a different chassis designed for export with a simpler supply chain to support and maintain it. It still makes for an odd situation. 

[956 Worldwide 34916]

We’ve exported plenty of Abrams— to Egypt, to Australia, to Saudi. Poland is purchasing a shit-ton of Abrams right now.  It’s an Ukraine specific deal. They’re already at war and need to throw stuff into the field with minimal prep and logistics set-up time.  That’s why the Leopard is so in-demand. 
 

If we had decided to arm them in 2018 or 2019, then the Abrams would have been great. 

[KYHorn 17272]

 

[KYHorn 17272]

 

 

 

[statsman 5498]

Germany knows exactly what they’re doing. This is, perhaps, their worst trait. They believe they are smarter than everyone else and can navigate a strategy that achieves their goals without damage. What a bunch of shitheads. (FTR- I am of German descent and was actually born in Germany). 
 
Meanwhile, in Bhakmut, Ukraine has got to figure a way out of trading lives of skilled citizen-soldiers for the lives of Russian conscripts and convicts, cannon fodder that Russia sacrifices happily. 

[texasdago 7589]

5 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

For clarity, this is the “President” of the Republika Srpska that is an enclave/constituency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has some autonomy that was negotiated as part of Dayton. It is NOT an independent country and it isn’t Serbia. The Serbian president is a piece of dick too, though. 
 

I have passed through there, Alice in Wonderland type shitty place although Banja Luka has some kind of grungy, funky vibes. 

I swear how have I not heard of this place? I'm up to speed on world events and geography but this one totally flew under my radar.

"Piece of dick" designation confirmed...

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bosnian-serb-leader-awards-russian-president-putin-medal-absentia-2023-01-08/

 

[atomheartbevo 90053]

Another fundraiser, and just thought it amusing that they are using Private Raccoon on a patch.  Because the idea the Russians would steal an actual fucking raccoon is completely fucking insane.  Except that they filmed themselves stealing the raccoon, and even filmed themselves getting bit by the thing.

 

[atomheartbevo 90053]

Maybe not a demotion, maybe a bigger game (dragging Belarus into it).  I still don't see Belarus going in voluntarily, but Putin has to be eyeing their tens of thousands of troops who are theoretically trained and rested.

 

[mbtex 683]

 

 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[Chad Fuck 17840]

5 hours ago, KYHorn said:

 

[MillerEP 30570]

^Medium sized thread, but essentially they're almost depleted, but the hope for Wagner is that this gives Prigozhin the negotiating power to get weapons, shells, and ammo from the RU army now instead of fronting the bill himself, and can refill their ranks by building penal battalions of "refusniks."

[SL Xpress 7518]

9 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

We’ve exported plenty of Abrams— to Egypt, to Australia, to Saudi. Poland is purchasing a shit-ton of Abrams right now.  It’s an Ukraine specific deal. They’re already at war and need to throw stuff into the field with minimal prep and logistics set-up time.  That’s why the Leopard is so in-demand. 
 

If we had decided to arm them in 2018 or 2019, then the Abrams would have been great. 

I'm not arguing with you. I understand all of that as well. It's an odd situation, which requires us to depend on Germany to export their Leopards. 

That was literally my whole point, and you've now spent a couple of posts "educating" me as to why it's a unique situation. I understand why it's a unique situation. I wish we weren't dependent on Germany for the Leopards. It's unfortunate. 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[SL Xpress 7518]

5 hours ago, KYHorn said:

 

 

 

 

So Germany hasn't signed off on Poland sending the Leopard 2s. 

Not sure if time and more pressure on Germany is the solution. I did find it interesting one of the solutions Ukraine is advocating for:

"Ukrainian officials have suggested that the U.S. send just a handful of Abrams tanks – as few as five – in order to spur Europe to act, a second person familiar with the discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine said. Despite promising full transparency over where the tanks are deployed and how they’re used, the Pentagon has not signed off on the idea."

[Schulz2.0 29040]

3 minutes ago, SL Xpress said:

 

So Germany hasn't signed off on Poland sending the Leopard 2s. 

Not sure if time and more pressure on Germany is the solution. I did find it interesting one of the solutions Ukraine is advocating for:

"Ukrainian officials have suggested that the U.S. send just a handful of Abrams tanks – as few as five – in order to spur Europe to act, a second person familiar with the discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine said. Despite promising full transparency over where the tanks are deployed and how they’re used, the Pentagon has not signed off on the idea."

So we're going to continue to pussy foot around.

[Bevo 13635]

5 minutes ago, Schulz2.0 said:

So we're going to continue to pussy foot around.

Yes

 

"Ukrainian officials have suggested that the U.S. send just a handful of Abrams tanks – as few as five – in order to spur Europe to act, a second person familiar with the discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine said. Despite promising full transparency over where the tanks are deployed and how they’re used, the Pentagon has not signed off on the idea."

 

BTW, this seems like a stupid idea. What is Ukraine going to do with 5 Abrams? Training and bringing in supplies, fuel, parts, etc. for 5 tanks.

[Schulz2.0 29040]

20 minutes ago, Bevo said:

Yes

 

"Ukrainian officials have suggested that the U.S. send just a handful of Abrams tanks – as few as five – in order to spur Europe to act, a second person familiar with the discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine said. Despite promising full transparency over where the tanks are deployed and how they’re used, the Pentagon has not signed off on the idea."

 

BTW, this seems like a stupid idea. What is Ukraine going to do with 5 Abrams? Training and bringing in supplies, fuel, parts, etc. for 5 tanks.

[Orange&White 5554]

25 minutes ago, Bevo said:

Yes

 

"Ukrainian officials have suggested that the U.S. send just a handful of Abrams tanks – as few as five – in order to spur Europe to act, a second person familiar with the discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine said. Despite promising full transparency over where the tanks are deployed and how they’re used, the Pentagon has not signed off on the idea."

 

BTW, this seems like a stupid idea. What is Ukraine going to do with 5 Abrams? Training and bringing in supplies, fuel, parts, etc. for 5 tanks.

I get it and I agree, but if that is what will make the fucking germans give up some tanks, then just fucking do it.

[SquishMitten 10459]

30 minutes ago, Bevo said:

Yes

 

"Ukrainian officials have suggested that the U.S. send just a handful of Abrams tanks – as few as five – in order to spur Europe to act, a second person familiar with the discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine said. Despite promising full transparency over where the tanks are deployed and how they’re used, the Pentagon has not signed off on the idea."

 

BTW, this seems like a stupid idea. What is Ukraine going to do with 5 Abrams? Training and bringing in supplies, fuel, parts, etc. for 5 tanks.

It's not stupid. It's to get the German's to stop being pussies. They said they won't send Leopards until we sends Abrams. So, fuck them. Send 5 Abrams and tell them to stop being petulant assholes. 

[Brisketexan 105572]

55 minutes ago, MillerEP said:

^Medium sized thread, but essentially they're almost depleted, but the hope for Wagner is that this gives Prigozhin the negotiating power to get weapons, shells, and ammo from the RU army now instead of fronting the bill himself, and can refill their ranks by building penal battalions of "refusniks."

I gotta say, I am a bit concerned about the Soledar/Bakhmut fight.

At this point, this war is less about territory than it is how much meat and equipment of the other side you can grind up.  Yes, it seems like Ukraine is grinding up a lot of Wagner bastards and gear.  But it ALSO seems like they're spending a lot of bodies to do so.  Ratio matters.  If Ukraine can perhaps kill fewer Wagnerites, but improve their kill ratio, they should do that.  If that means leaving certain areas to the Wagnerites, they should do that.  Ukraine has finite resources (primarily -- human beings), and it has to husband that resource.  I'm concerned that they are getting the ratio wrong in this engagement.

[SquishMitten 10459]

By "not stupid," I mean there's a legitimate reason for it. I seriously doubt there would be any effort to maintain a supply chain or repair network for them. Just consider them to be a write off

[MissingInAction 25299]

I say we drop the 101st into Soledar and pull a Bastogne on those Wagner cock suckers.

[SL Xpress 7518]

50 minutes ago, Schulz2.0 said:

So we're going to continue to pussy foot around.

Ha! Yeah, that's my attitude as well.

I vacillate between being grateful we're giving Ukraine the support we're giving them, and being frustrated it's not more. It would be criminal to give them enough arms so that they destroy everything about their way of life in a brutal war of attrition. There's an article from David French that someone posted just a couple of days ago outlining the west has 3 options. Let Russia win. Give Ukraine enough arms to fight a long war of attrition. Or give them the quality and quantity of arms required to drive Russia out. I know choice 1 is the worst, but choice 2 doesn't feel great to me, either. Especially because while the strength of democracies is the peaceful transition of power, transitions of power inherently means different priorities. I'd prefer to go as aggressively as possible as quickly as possible, while it's possible. 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[SL Xpress 7518]

20 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

I gotta say, I am a bit concerned about the Soledar/Bakhmut fight.

At this point, this war is less about territory than it is how much meat and equipment of the other side you can grind up.  Yes, it seems like Ukraine is grinding up a lot of Wagner bastards and gear.  But it ALSO seems like they're spending a lot of bodies to do so.  Ratio matters.  If Ukraine can perhaps kill fewer Wagnerites, but improve their kill ratio, they should do that.  If that means leaving certain areas to the Wagnerites, they should do that.  Ukraine has finite resources (primarily -- human beings), and it has to husband that resource.  I'm concerned that they are getting the ratio wrong in this engagement.

 

I have the same concern. Of course, getting any kind of accurate casualty count is a fool's errand. Both Soledad and Bakhmut have some pretty valuable troops, too, in terms of experience and skill level. 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[KYHorn 17272]

25 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

I gotta say, I am a bit concerned about the Soledar/Bakhmut fight.

At this point, this war is less about territory than it is how much meat and equipment of the other side you can grind up.  Yes, it seems like Ukraine is grinding up a lot of Wagner bastards and gear.  But it ALSO seems like they're spending a lot of bodies to do so.  Ratio matters.  If Ukraine can perhaps kill fewer Wagnerites, but improve their kill ratio, they should do that.  If that means leaving certain areas to the Wagnerites, they should do that.  Ukraine has finite resources (primarily -- human beings), and it has to husband that resource.  I'm concerned that they are getting the ratio wrong in this engagement.

From the thread linked above, it seems Wagner spent everything for Soledar and don't have enough for Bakhmut, but are using Soledar to make the case for more recruits and arms. Their prison recruiting base is drying up because word has gotten to them that they're just being slaughtered in the grinder. So, they need help to get more bodies to throw at Bakhmut. It does make me wonder if their stretched lines after Soledar might present a vulnerability somewhere to regain the initiative in the area. Nonetheless, your point stands and is likely part of the Russian strategy: throw multiples of untrained bodies at fewer trained Ukrainian soldiers to preserve Russia's remaining trained and equipped soldiers while depleting Ukraine's numbers.

 

7 minutes ago, SL Xpress said:

Ha! Yeah, that's my attitude as well.

I vacillate between being grateful we're giving Ukraine the support we're giving them, and being frustrated it's not more. It would be criminal to give them enough arms so that they destroy everything about their way of life in a brutal war of attrition. There's an article from David French that someone posted just a couple of days ago outlining the west has 3 options. Let Russia win. Give Ukraine enough arms to fight a long war of attrition. Or give them the quality and quantity of arms required to drive Russia out. I know choice 1 is the worst, but choice 2 doesn't feel great to me, either. Especially because while the strength of democracies is the peaceful transition of power, transitions of power inherently means different priorities. I'd prefer to go as aggressively as possible as quickly as possible, while it's possible. 

See below. As you said, French argues that the clearest path to victory is #3, though there are still degrees to all of this. ATACMS aren't inherent to scenario 3, for example. 

On 1/10/2023 at 10:00 PM, KYHorn said:

I found this article by David French to be a helpful big-picture analysis of the future of this war in the context of the last century of war. Would be interested in others' thoughts. One particularly insightful point he made was that a stalemate strategy by the West that results in an ongoing WWI-like slugfest (scenario 2), makes the eventual total loss of Western support and overall Russian victory more likely (scenario 1). 

Thinking Through the Remainder of the Ukraine War

Of pyrrhic victories, material advantage, and the steeliness of Western resolve.

  Reveal hidden contents

Thinking Through the Remainder of the Ukraine War

Of pyrrhic victories, material advantage, and the steeliness of Western resolve.

David French

 Jan 10, 2023

As we’re approaching the one-year mark in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it’s clear that we’re witnessing something the world hasn’t seen in generations—a protracted all-out battlefield struggle between two large nations. The Vietnam War was certainly a major conflict and a protracted struggle, but it didn’t quite match what we’re watching play out in Eastern Ukraine. 

The first Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 lasted a few weeks. The Six-Day War in 1967 lasted, well, six days. The second Indo-Pakistan War in 1971 lasted roughly two weeks. The Yom Kippur War was 19 days long. The major combat phase of Operation Desert Storm was less than two months, and the ground war lasted a mere 100 hours. 

The long fights we’ve experienced are the insurgencies or the guerilla wars, where big armies don’t clash in the field, where advanced weapons aren’t deployed by both sides. Our long wars are low-intensity compared to the warfare we see in Eastern Ukraine.

The closest post–World War II comparison might be to Korea, where the U.S., South Korea, and their U.N. allies fielded huge armies in a brutal contest with North Korea and China that raged up and down the Korean peninsula for three long years. The Iran/Iraq war was also a brutal war of attrition, but it was fought by nations that lacked the military capacity of Russia or Ukraine. We’ve forgotten what that’s like. In fights between powerful nation-states we’ve become accustomed to quick victories or quick defeats, and we lack the frame for thinking through long slogs. 

There’s a reason why I’m writing this piece today. Russia is threatening to seize a Ukrainian city, but without much more information we can’t truly understand the implications of Russian victory or defeat. Both sides can potentially lose by winning, if the cost of victory is too great. The real contest in Ukraine isn’t over real estate but over resources, and expending too many resources to take (or hold) too little ground is a net loss for either side. 

Ukraine and Russia are locked in an all-out slugfest over the city of Bakhmut. For the Ukrainians, the city has become, as The New York Times described it, “a national symbol of defiance.” Russia—and the Wagner Group mercenary force that’s led much of the fight for the city—are as committed to taking the city as the Ukrainians are to defending it. 

Both sides have taken horrific losses, but there are signs the Russians are making progress. Here’s NBC News: 

Russian forces appear close to capturing a small but strategically important town on the front lines of the war in eastern Ukraine.

Russian soldiers and the Wagner group's mercenary fighters were engaged in bitter fighting for the mining town of Soledar, officials in Kyiv and its Western allies said Tuesday, control of which could finally hand them a breakthrough in their bid to seize the key nearby city of Bakhmut.

I’m not predicting that Bakhmut will fall. I hope it will hold. But the plight of the city helps frame our thinking about what’s happened so far and what may happen in the months (or, God forbid, years) ahead.

One way to think about modern warfare between nation-states is through the prism of gathering and spending. When two advanced powers enter into protracted conflict, warfare can start to seem somewhat cyclical. One side gathers its strength, builds up its forces, and then—at the time and place of its choosing—pours out that strength and delivers its blow.

The other side gathers up its strength to receive the blow while preserving and/or obtaining the resources to deliver a counter-attack. Over time, the growing (or waning) ability to absorb and deliver blows can dictate the outcome of the war. 

A paradigmatic example of this cycle took place on World War I’s Western Front. France and Germany traded offensives for year after year until the German capacity to strike bled away in its offensives of Spring 1918.

Operation Michael was the first and most potent of Germany’s spring attacks. At first, it looked like a German victory. It produced some of the largest gains since the onset of trench warfare in 1914, and it inflicted immense losses on allied forces. But the cost for Germany was too high. Tens of thousands of Germany’s best remaining troops were dead on the field of battle. It lacked the time and resources to fully reconstitute its forces. Meanwhile, American troops were pouring into France. Over the summer, the Allied material advantage became overwhelming, and they delivered a string of decisive blows in the fall.

A similar dynamic took place in World War II and, on a smaller scale, in Korea. Giant armies gathered their resources, delivered immense blows, took terrifying casualties, and then braced themselves for the coming counterattack. If they’d expended too much or moved too far, the offensive was a mere prelude to a defeat, as the opposing force took advantage of over-extended lines and/or thinned-out ranks. 

Now let’s think through the cycles of the war in Ukraine. In the opening phase, Russia gathered its forces, then spent the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers and hundreds of advanced vehicles in the initial reckless attack on Kyiv.

Ukraine, in its turn, absorbed the blow and gathered (or maintained) sufficient force to expend a portion in its own counterattacks that ultimately drove Russian forces from the outskirts of Kyiv.

Russia then tried again. It gathered forces in the Donbas and again expended thousands of lives and hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition to make incremental gains in the Donbas. At the time, it seemed as if the battlefield momentum had shifted back to Russia. But as the Times notes, it appears that the Russians had once again gathered too little and expended too much, leaving their lines vulnerable to the Ukrainian attacks that cleared Russians from Kharkiv and retook much of Kherson. 

The upshot is that, while the territorial map obviously matters, it mainly matters when considered over a period of time rather than at any given moment (unless there’s a decisive breakthrough). What really matters is that awful calculus of resource and expense. That’s how Russia could take Bakhmut and still suffer a defeat if the cost is too high. That’s how Ukraine could hold Bakhmut and endure a net loss for the same reason. If the cost is too high, it alters the balance of power.

This is why Ukrainians, for example, are rightly alarmed by Russian mobilization. Even if Russian troops are untested and poorly trained, to quote Joseph Stalin, “Quantity has a quality all its own.” And now Vladimir Putin is poised to call up as many as 500,000 additional conscripts to add to the 300,000 called up this fall. Russia can’t rapidly replace its advanced weapons, but it can pour new men into the fight. 

That’s why Volodymyr Zelensky would fly to the United States for his first trip outside Ukraine since the war started. In the gather/spend cycle, Russia can resource itself for a years-long struggle. Ukraine cannot. It simply doesn’t possess the manpower or industrial capacity to compete with Russia over the long term. Absent massive amounts of outside help, eventually Ukraine will run out of resources to gather, and it may well spend down its army to the point of collapse. 

That’s the bad news. Here’s the good news. So long as American (and, to a lesser extent, British) support remains solid, Russia doesn’t possess the industrial or technological capacity to overcome Ukraine. And if America and its NATO allies start to supply Ukraine with Western armor, then Ukraine may be able to gather forces that Russia cannot withstand. 

We can therefore consider three scenarios for a potential endgame in Ukraine. 

1. Russian resolve hardens and Western support fades. If American aid doesn’t keep pace with battlefield demand, then Ukraine will find itself constantly withdrawing from a diminishing bank account. Each cycle of attack and counterattack will leave Ukraine weaker, and there will be peace on Russian terms.

2. Western support remains, but it merely matches Russian resolve. Under this scenario, the United States and its allies supply Ukraine with enough military aid to maintain the fight but not enough to win. Under this scenario, the West provides Ukraine with its defensive needs but not the offensive capacity that could allow it to punch through Russian lines and drive the invaders from Ukrainian territory. 

3. Western support and Ukrainian valor overcome Russian resolve. This is the decision to go for broke, to provide the kinds of weapons (main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, ATACMS missiles) that would permit Ukraine to gain a decisive battlefield advantage. This is the scenario that enables Ukraine to strike deep into Russia to degrade Russian striking power and to achieve a material edge that can overcome Russia’s manpower advantage.

I’m concerned that Western caution might take the third scenario off the table. Fear of Russian escalation in the face of total battlefield defeat would mean that Western powers won’t give Ukraine the tools to win. Yet making a strategic choice to settle for a stalemate could not only yield even greater bloodshed, over time it could diminish support for the substantial aid that’s still necessary to merely stop Russia, much less throw it back to its borders. 

In other words, choosing to settle for scenario 2 might both extend the war and make scenario 1 more likely. Asking populations to sacrifice for a stalemate hardly inspires as much as victory. The instant you make stalemate your goal is the instant that the Western will to support starts leaking away. 

You’ll note that I didn’t list a fourth factor for an endgame in Ukraine—Russia losing resolve. That certainly a possibility, and if it continues to expend too much blood and treasure, the possibilities increase. But breaking Russian will is a hope. Breaking the Russian line is a plan.

I know all of this is simplistic. I know that there is room for battlefield brilliance to alter the grim arithmetic of total war. I know there is at least a theoretical risk of Russian escalation if it faces complete defeat. But we’ve seen this scenario before, and in a catastrophic contest between two great nations, the nation that can gather the most resources is quite often the nation that wins. 

We have the capacity to help Ukraine gather superior resources, to force Russia to spend too much, and to help Ukraine force an end to this war. The question is whether we have the intention or the will. That’s exactly the question that the Biden administration and Congress have to answer this year and (perhaps) for years to come.

 

 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[MillerEP 30570]

^I think this is close to that article from yesterday, where they need to make sure they're not fighting a war of attrition on Russia's terms on grounds of their choosing, because that's a losing strategy for Ukraine who doesn't have a bunch of prisoners they can willy-nilly keep throwing into the grinder. 

[MillerEP 30570]

 

[statsman 5498]

Russia really doesn’t give a shit about its convicts and conscripts. They’re using them in a rope-a-dope. Ukraine can’t be a dope. It has to remember- it’s the fox, not the hedgehog. Fighting with small arms on a ruined street gives the Russians too much of an equalizer. Sam Houston nailed it-“Discretion is the better part of valor”
 
We grow up watching movies about heroic soldiers- airborne rangers, marines, Seals. We are proud of their courage and resourcefulness. Yet, that’s not the real strength of the US infantry. 
 
The real, honest (and completely un-glamorous) strength of our infantry is our artillery. When the Germans mocked our troops in WWII, they would point out that we did Forest reconnaissance by blowing the hell out of a wooded area until enemy stopped running out. (It is the standard for our citizen soldiers that we are more willing to waste shells than lives, well…our lives) As an operational standard, we ratio more artillery per soldier in our battalions than any other army. We are just really good at it. Maybe that’s what we should focus on, and encourage Ukraine to do the same, dropping all that war movie nonsense. 

Edited January 12, 2023 by statsman

[MillerEP 30570]

^Wow 4 and we haven't even sent them yet! That's some efficiency!

 

[MillerEP 30570]

^More symbolic than anything as they don't really have any power, but man would it be great if the Russian Colonial Empire starts to fracture.

[27-25 2056]

1 hour ago, MillerEP said:

 

 

I realize the lettering may be an accidental coincidence.  But, does that guy's jacket read, "RONIN"?  Is he a Cyrillic samurai?

[KYHorn 17272]

 

 

Interesting development caused by their own propaganda

Edited January 12, 2023 by KYHorn

[The Dog 44180]

 

[Brisketexan 105572]

12 minutes ago, The Dog said:

 

Again, the dirt held or lost there really doesn't matter (to Ukraine, at least).  In every situation, maximize the opportunity to kill Russians and destroy Russian gear, while minimizing your own losses.  If you retreat a KM per day, but are killing Russians at a 5:1 clip, that's a big win.

[KYHorn 17272]

This is an incredible report from Bakhmut from mid December. It's about 15 minutes long. Among a number of insights, one hospital reports 100 wounded/day.

 

[The Dog 44180]

 

[AUS-97HORN 11875]

21 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

Again, the dirt held or lost there really doesn't matter (to Ukraine, at least).  In every situation, maximize the opportunity to kill Russians and destroy Russian gear, while minimizing your own losses.  If you retreat a KM per day, but are killing Russians at a 5:1 clip, that's a big win.

you ratio is way waay too low.  to inflict the kill ratio you want with the impact you want it needs to be more than 25:1

 

The US lost about 58,000 KIA in Vietnam.   best estimates are 1.1 million N Viet/ cong minh, NVA deaths. 

 

thats roughly a 19:1 ratio  and we didnt win.