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Good article about how to increase artillery shell production - lower the requirements.

Makes a lot of sense given the conditions on the ground.

 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2024/01/02/want-200000-155mm-artillery-shells-a-month-for-ukraine-simplify-production/?sh=27bbe6b6c08a

Quote

Want 200,000 155mm Artillery Shells A Month For Ukraine? Simplify Production

It is no secret the artillery fight for Ukraine has devolved into a battle for mass. The West, hoping to pump at least 200,000 155mm rounds a month into the Ukraine fight, is reaching into old stockpiles and even exploring the idea of refurbishing expired shells. These are all viable stopgaps, but, as the West’s ammunition production infrastructure struggles to scale up in 2024, the artisanal, hand-crafted aspects of post-Cold War artillery manufacturing merits some tough scrutiny.

Production is key.

America is set to produce at least 100,000 155mm shells a month by 2025, leaving Europe with the task to boost domestic production of 155mm shells by 150% over the course of 2024.

That is a heavy lift. To beat Russia in the production fight, the West has an obligation to explore every avenue to speed shells to the front. And while raiding old stockpiles and refurbishing expired munitions may offer some relief to Kyiv’s shell-hunger, Ukraine’s allies can do more to speed production by scrubbing their artillery production processes of un-needed and un-necessary requirements.

Excessive requirements are a big problem. To eke the maximum safety, shelf-life, and performance out of each and every shell, Western artillery ammunition is over-engineered—and then, on top of already daunting engineering requirements, the shells are subjected to an array of boutique national requirements.

Having each Western shell lovingly crafted to the exacting tolerances of a Formula 1 race-car engine offers measurable benefit. In ideal circumstances, Allied artillery systems outrange, outfire and hit harder than equivalent Russian systems. But conditions are no longer as ideal.

Any benefit from the West’s exquisite ammunition machining requirements and other time-consuming ammo production steps are likely offset by the degraded field conditions of an actual wartime environment.

Put another way, precision ammunition machining doesn’t make much difference when the shell goes up an overused gun barrel that, in peacetime, would have long been consigned to the scrapheap thousands of shells ago.

This isn’t to say that precision weapons aren’t needed, but a rough-and-ready “deployable” shell—just like the rough and ready M-109 self-propelled gun—is perfectly fine for repulsing Russian human wave attacks. Precision aiming is less of a concern when Ukraine fighters just want to keep hungry and cold Russian conscripts heads-down in their trenches.

Western ammunition is also designed with long-term storage in mind. With a big conventional war long being pretty much an “unthinkable” thing for Europe, frequent artillery employment was secondary to the West’s pursuit of long-term ammunition stability. Long-term ammunition reliability and easy decommissioning after lengthy storage have dominated Western shell requirements.

These peacetime priorities were the correct things for unchallenged armies to pursue. A long-lasting, stable and easy-to-decommission ammunition stockpile is a great thing, but when newly-produced shells are arriving at the front and used within days, some safety and storage features—if they make production more time-consuming or more costly—can be jettisoned.

Speeding ammo production or rapid design changes to advance lethality may not sit well with rear area warrior bureaucrats. In sclerotic procurement systems, change only comes after years of unnecessary study, debate and gamesmanship. Put bluntly, it will take some ruthless leadership to identify and cut requirements that, in the heat of battle, are no longer relevant.

Cherished rice bowls will break. Old, longstanding methods may go away. But, right now, the overarching priority—at least for general purpose artillery ammunition—is lower price and greater speed.

Anything less helps Russia.

 

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Along the same theme as the post above, here is an opinion piece from the WSJ Op-Ed house liberal (sympathetic to administration). The key takeaway- the path to Ukraine defeat starts with not getting them enough artillery. Blame the U.S., blame Europe, blame whomever, but this was completely foreseeable over a year ago. 
 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-may-have-to-accept-a-cease-fire-putin-orban-congress-aid-89f9932a?st=wh5ldjq5iw8a8tx&reflink=mobilewebshare_permalink

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10 hours ago, Superhero said:

Good article about how to increase artillery shell production - lower the requirements.

Makes a lot of sense given the conditions on the ground.

 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2024/01/02/want-200000-155mm-artillery-shells-a-month-for-ukraine-simplify-production/?sh=27bbe6b6c08a

 

I would argue against the lowering the requirements for a lot of reasons, but the biggest actually doesn't have to do with the shells themselves.  I think it would be far more cost effective to invest in the FPV drones, which have shown to be far more effective.  

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1) Russia remains committed to subjugating Ukraine
The study argues that Russian leadership, including Putin and top officials, have thoroughly indoctrinated the Russian people with the notion that Ukraine is a historical part of Russia that must be brought under Moscow’s control. Putin has made reclaiming Ukraine central to his 2024 re-election campaign and revisionist historical narratives are being spread in Russian schools and media.

Therefore, even if the current war ends, a future Russian regime is likely to renew aggression against Ukraine to achieve these ingrained national objectives. Freezing the conflict short of total liberation risks enabling Russia to eventually fulfill its irredentist aims — and sustaining peace is possible only if the Russia-Ukrainian frontier is defensible long-term.

2) The current lines are indefensible
With major Ukrainian population centers like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv near the current frontlines, Ukraine would have to maintain a fully mobilized military just to hold static defensive lines. This would be enormously expensive and socially disruptive over the long run.

image.thumb.png.7fc474ba484c36ae44bf401d6115db43.png
 

In contrast, the pre-February 2022 borders provided strategic depth that allowed for a more efficient defense based on absorbing initial attacks and then counterattacking. The current lines afford no space to absorb and delay assaults before reserves can arrive.

Furthermore, a ceasefire would enable Russia to optimize its force posture for future offensives in a way active fighting now prevents.

Moreover, without the Dnipro River defensive line and with Kherson under threat, defending Ukraine’s southern coast and economy would become exponentially more difficult if Russia retains occupied territory in the south.

The report concludes that retaining any occupied territory irreparably compromises Ukraine’s ability to defend itself:

“The lines as they are now, in either case, would leave it to Putin and his successors to determine the financial and social cost Ukraine and its Western backers must bear for Ukraine’s continued survival, and that cost would likely be very high.”

3) Concessions damage core international principles
The report argues that recognizing Russia’s territorial seizures in Ukraine, even in exchange for peace, would undermine critical international laws banning wars of conquest, ethnic cleansing, and other violations of human rights. While negotiations may be underway, the enormous moral and ethical costs of appeasing Russian aggression by allowing it to retain occupied lands must be considered.

4) Crimea and Donbas are strategically and economically vital
If Crimea remains under Russian control, Ukraine’s ability to defend key southern cities like Kherson and Odesa will be dramatically compromised, and its economy critically weakened by loss of access to maritime trade and Black Sea energy reserves.

Thus, for both military and economic reasons, Ukraine liberating Crimea is strategically vital and cannot be bargained away.

Meanwhile, the Donbas region does not offer Ukraine strategic advantages, as its large cities Luhansk and Donetsk are close to the Russian border and thus require a full-fledged Ukrainian fully-mobilized force ready to defend them at all times. However, allowing Russia to retain occupied territory in the Donbas region would deprive Ukraine of vital mining and industrial assets that are critical to its economic future. Furthermore, with cities like Mariupol directly on the current frontlines, accepting the current lines in the east irreparably damages Ukraine’s defensive and economic viability.

In conclusion, the report argues that for Ukraine to achieve lasting security and prosperity, it must regain all occupied territory lost since February 2022. Anything short of total liberation of its internationally recognized borders critically undermines Ukraine’s military, economic, and moral position. There is no acceptable alternative to the complete restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

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22 minutes ago, bolverk said:

 

1) Russia remains committed to subjugating Ukraine
The study argues that Russian leadership, including Putin and top officials, have thoroughly indoctrinated the Russian people with the notion that Ukraine is a historical part of Russia that must be brought under Moscow’s control. Putin has made reclaiming Ukraine central to his 2024 re-election campaign and revisionist historical narratives are being spread in Russian schools and media.

Therefore, even if the current war ends, a future Russian regime is likely to renew aggression against Ukraine to achieve these ingrained national objectives. Freezing the conflict short of total liberation risks enabling Russia to eventually fulfill its irredentist aims — and sustaining peace is possible only if the Russia-Ukrainian frontier is defensible long-term.

2) The current lines are indefensible
With major Ukrainian population centers like Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv near the current frontlines, Ukraine would have to maintain a fully mobilized military just to hold static defensive lines. This would be enormously expensive and socially disruptive over the long run.

image.thumb.png.7fc474ba484c36ae44bf401d6115db43.png
 

In contrast, the pre-February 2022 borders provided strategic depth that allowed for a more efficient defense based on absorbing initial attacks and then counterattacking. The current lines afford no space to absorb and delay assaults before reserves can arrive.

Furthermore, a ceasefire would enable Russia to optimize its force posture for future offensives in a way active fighting now prevents.

Moreover, without the Dnipro River defensive line and with Kherson under threat, defending Ukraine’s southern coast and economy would become exponentially more difficult if Russia retains occupied territory in the south.

The report concludes that retaining any occupied territory irreparably compromises Ukraine’s ability to defend itself:

“The lines as they are now, in either case, would leave it to Putin and his successors to determine the financial and social cost Ukraine and its Western backers must bear for Ukraine’s continued survival, and that cost would likely be very high.”

3) Concessions damage core international principles
The report argues that recognizing Russia’s territorial seizures in Ukraine, even in exchange for peace, would undermine critical international laws banning wars of conquest, ethnic cleansing, and other violations of human rights. While negotiations may be underway, the enormous moral and ethical costs of appeasing Russian aggression by allowing it to retain occupied lands must be considered.

4) Crimea and Donbas are strategically and economically vital
If Crimea remains under Russian control, Ukraine’s ability to defend key southern cities like Kherson and Odesa will be dramatically compromised, and its economy critically weakened by loss of access to maritime trade and Black Sea energy reserves.

Thus, for both military and economic reasons, Ukraine liberating Crimea is strategically vital and cannot be bargained away.

Meanwhile, the Donbas region does not offer Ukraine strategic advantages, as its large cities Luhansk and Donetsk are close to the Russian border and thus require a full-fledged Ukrainian fully-mobilized force ready to defend them at all times. However, allowing Russia to retain occupied territory in the Donbas region would deprive Ukraine of vital mining and industrial assets that are critical to its economic future. Furthermore, with cities like Mariupol directly on the current frontlines, accepting the current lines in the east irreparably damages Ukraine’s defensive and economic viability.

In conclusion, the report argues that for Ukraine to achieve lasting security and prosperity, it must regain all occupied territory lost since February 2022. Anything short of total liberation of its internationally recognized borders critically undermines Ukraine’s military, economic, and moral position. There is no acceptable alternative to the complete restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

This aligns with my thoughts. However, it is written like it is coming directly from Ukraine politicians.

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4 minutes ago, Bevo said:

This aligns with my thoughts. However, it is written like it is coming directly from Ukraine politicians.

The above is a copy/paste from the Euromaidan news article, which supposedly summarizes an Institute for the Study of War report. Candidly, I didn't read the report, which I probably should've done. Here's a link to the report itself for your and others' edification.

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Russian drone and operators sent to hell

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine used a HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system on the Russian crew of an unmanned aerial vehicle.

Source: SOF press service

Details: Operators from one of the SOF units on the Zaporizhzhia front detected the crew of a Russian ZALA UAV which was attempting to conduct reconnaissance operations.

The operators aimed and adjusted the fire of a HIMARS belonging to a Defence Forces artillery unit at the Russian target.

The successful hit is shown to have killed the UAV crew and destroyed their transport and the drone itself.

 

 

 

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24 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

Because if Poland goes to war, NATO goes to war.  So, NATO is holding Poland's leash very, very tightly.

How the fuck is a jammer that cover majority of your country not an act of war? At the very least I’m immediately transferring long range weapons to Ukraine and giving them permission to fly them through my airspace to take that out. 

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Early in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the two sides sat down to negotiate. But a few days later, the discovery of Russian atrocities in Bucha changed everything, Yaroslav Trofimov writes.
https://www.wsj.com/world/did-ukraine-miss-an-early-chance-to-negotiate-peace-with-russia-d864b7c9?st=7j08gvtdwisanzf&reflink=share_mobilewebshare

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So seems like some countries don't like their citizens fighting over there.

KATHMANDU, Jan 5 (Reuters) - Nepal has stopped issuing permits to its citizens to work in Russia and Ukraine until further notice, an official said on Friday, after at least 10 Nepali soldiers were killed while serving in the Russian army.

Nepal has asked Russia not to recruit its citizens in the Russian army and to immediately send all Nepali soldiers back to the Himalayan nation and compensate the families of those killed.

The government has said that up to 200 Nepali citizens were estimated to be working in the Russian army, and foreign minister N.P. Saud told state-run RSS news agency that about 100 Nepalis are reported to be missing.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nepal-halts-work-permits-russia-ukraine-after-soldiers-killed-2024-01-05/

Edited by InkaUtexas
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