Русский корабль - иди нахуй

[Braff Zacklin 13555]

30 minutes ago, TeeDubya said:

Wasn’t ethanol used as propellant in torpedoes early in WWII?  Torpedo juice, IIRC.  I think the Navy had to mix denatured alcohol in to prevent consumption.  

Ze Germans used a form of ethanol (B-Stoff) as liquid propellant for their V2 rockets.

[TwiceHorn 31440]

54 minutes ago, TeeDubya said:

Wasn’t ethanol used as propellant in torpedoes early in WWII?  Torpedo juice, IIRC.  I think the Navy had to mix denatured alcohol in to prevent consumption.  

They always did,from about 1905 forward.  And it wasn't propellant, per se, it was fuel for a tiny reciprocating engine and later a tiny turbine. WWI and WWII torpedos used methylated spirit.  Torpedo juice was always toxic.

But to deter consumption of the poison, Buord added croton oil to the mix to induce cramping and severe diarrhea.

Edited October 28 by TwiceHorn

[Bevo 13569]

12 minutes ago, TwiceHorn said:

They always did,from about 1905 forward.  And it wasn't propellant, per se, it was fuel for a tiny reciprocating engine and later a tiny turbine. WWI and WWII torpedos used methylated spirit.  Torpedo juice was always toxic.

But to deter consumption of the poison, Buord added croton oil to the mix to induce cramping and severe diarrhea.

 

Why was methanol added to the ethanol? Or was it just poor grade? I was in Northern Saskatchewan years ago and a decent number of the indigenous were blind from methanol poisoning.

[MillerEP 30447]

https://www.threads.net/@_nickmelnick/post/DBoSebXo8ct?xmt=AQGzNxFyFLpWxewoxa3ZxOlDwatII90a7_LNRgcUG4WxWg

⚡️Another "black day" for Russian aviation:
💥Yesterday (October 26, 2024), a Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter crashed near the Kerch Strait. The crew did not survive.
💥Additionally, a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft crashed while performing a combat mission; the pilot likely survived.
💥In the Kirov region, a Mi-2 medical helicopter also crashed. The pilot and three medics were killed.
💥This morning, an An-2 transport plane crashed in the Stavropol region.

 

https://www.threads.net/@kyivpost.official/post/DBl_3-rIOpE?xmt=AQGzkdyqwdlnkoBO5gIZaLl50cvuTk0vgSnBeBpvGxD_gA

Ethnic Tensions in Russia Are Boiling Over
The longer the war goes on, the more unsustainable it is and how risk of domestic conflict within Russia may determine what happens within Ukraine.

[B00M 6414]

On 10/26/2024 at 9:43 AM, Chad Fuck said:

Certainly this is just some sort of rah rah patriotic check out our old remember when thing?

No way they’re sending those to the line, right?

 

[TwiceHorn 31440]

10 hours ago, Bevo said:

 

Why was methanol added to the ethanol? Or was it just poor grade? I was in Northern Saskatchewan years ago and a decent number of the indigenous were blind from methanol poisoning.

Well, good question.  My Dad was a torpedo officer and was made aware of the drinking issue and the croton oil.  But, it appears that the methanol was added soley for the purpose of "denaturing" it, making it unfit to drink, according to wiki and various sources.  Of course, no one could tell the methanol had been added, except for maybe the pink tinge, so they had to go further.

[Captainant 27638]

7 minutes ago, TwiceHorn said:

Well, good question.  My Dad was a torpedo officer and was made aware of the drinking issue and the croton oil.  But, it appears that the methanol was added soley for the purpose of "denaturing" it, making it unfit to drink, according to wiki and various sources.  Of course, no one could tell the methanol had been added, except for maybe the pink tinge, so they had to go further.

Russian aviation still drinks their ethanol working fluid

[Parliament 14247]

10 hours ago, TwiceHorn said:

They always did,from about 1905 forward.  And it wasn't propellant, per se, it was fuel for a tiny reciprocating engine and later a tiny turbine. WWI and WWII torpedos used methylated spirit.  Torpedo juice was always toxic.

But to deter consumption of the poison, Buord added croton oil to the mix to induce cramping and severe diarrhea.

Take it to the Vic Mackey food thread.

[General Specific 3253]

Russian aviation still drinks their ethanol working fluid

Texan: “I carry a boot flask to ball games”

Russian: “Ha, in Russia, life is game, and my plane IS my flask”!

[Captainant 27638]

12 minutes ago, General Specific said:

Texan: “I carry a boot flask to ball games”

Russian: “Ha, in Russia, life is game, and my plane IS my flask”!

They literally evaporate vodka for their aircraft A/C

Given the immense heat emitted by engines when a jet is flying, you can imagine how hot the air is when extracted from the compressors. As such, it must be cooled before being pumped into the cockpit.

On the Tu-22, this cooling was provided by a large total-loss evaporator, which ran on a mixture of 40% ethanol and 60% distilled water. If this composition looks familiar to you, it’s because that is what makes up the popular Central, Northern, and Eastern Europe alcoholic beverage, vodka – hence, earning the Tu-22 the moniker ‘Booze Carrier’.

[MillerEP 30447]

https://www.threads.net/@tsua_23/post/DBrIJfjooum?xmt=AQGzLv7wFgX_16OM02bBpJ5xj30OrLuqqQ7hb_LvWOFdFA

Moscow sources report that the sewage system in Moscow broke down.
A "fountain" the height of a residential building is seen in one of Moscow's districts.
A sh*t show, literally! 💩🤭

 

^Seems appropriate

 

https://www.threads.net/@thestarsandstripes/post/DBrKWRwRW9P?xmt=AQGzLv7wFgX_16OM02bBpJ5xj30OrLuqqQ7hb_LvWOFdFA

Russian actors were behind a widely circulated video falsely depicting mail-in ballots for Donald Trump being destroyed in Pennsylvania, U.S. officials confirmed on Friday.

[Chad Fuck 17659]

32 minutes ago, MillerEP said:

https://www.threads.net/@tsua_23/post/DBrIJfjooum?xmt=AQGzLv7wFgX_16OM02bBpJ5xj30OrLuqqQ7hb_LvWOFdFA

Moscow sources report that the sewage system in Moscow broke down.
A "fountain" the height of a residential building is seen in one of Moscow's districts.
A sh*t show, literally! 💩🤭

 

^Seems appropriate

 

https://www.threads.net/@thestarsandstripes/post/DBrKWRwRW9P?xmt=AQGzLv7wFgX_16OM02bBpJ5xj30OrLuqqQ7hb_LvWOFdFA

Russian actors were behind a widely circulated video falsely depicting mail-in ballots for Donald Trump being destroyed in Pennsylvania, U.S. officials confirmed on Friday.

I'm laughing at the shit geyser.

Too bad we can't laugh/rage comment the same post.

[MillerEP 30447]

https://www.threads.net/@24hoursofukraine/post/DBqMqBrN4tU?xmt=AQGzT5HQ-6OOjbmnySTL6MG2QEWvK5bahojvCsvUIgBLUA

Fireeeeeeeeeee 🔥🔥🔥🔥🔥

The Koltsovsky Market on fire in Voronezh, russia

 

https://www.threads.net/@kyivpost.official/post/DBq9PixoGT5?xmt=AQGzT5HQ-6OOjbmnySTL6MG2QEWvK5bahojvCsvUIgBLUA

The Finnish court has granted the motion of “Naftogaz of Ukraine” and imposed a seizure on certain assets belonging to Russia within the country.
These assets include real estate and other holdings valued at tens of millions of dollars.
“This is the first publicly known successful seizure of assets outside of Ukraine in compliance with an arbitration ruling in cases filed by Ukrainian companies against Russia regarding the expropriation of property in Crimea in 2014.”

[Bevo 13569]

1 hour ago, Chad Fuck said:

I'm laughing at the shit geyser.

Too bad we can't laugh/rage comment the same post.

 

It's real funny until we see a shit flood in Austin.

[Chad Fuck 17659]

5 minutes ago, Bevo said:

 

It's real funny until we see a shit flood in Austin.

I'm in Dallas.  You had a whiff of the Trinity lately?  

[Brisketexan 105079]

16 minutes ago, Bevo said:

 

It's real funny until we see a shit flood in Austin.

A few years back, GOLL and I actually litigated a case where we legitimately and properly used the term "shit fountain."  It was every bit as funny and disgusting as you'd think.  No Russians were involved.

[utee94 15808]

Just now, Brisketexan said:

A few years back, GOLL and I actually litigated a case where we legitimately and properly used the term "shit fountain."  It was every bit as funny and disgusting as you'd think.  No Russians were involved.

My first night at our house with my newborn first child, on my first solo diaper duty because my wife was exhausted and sleeping, I discovered the meaning of the words "shit fountain" all on my own.

I never made that mistake again, though.

[Deej 76755]

22 minutes ago, Bevo said:

 

It's real funny until we see a shit flood in Austin.

We had a shit flood that one year at ACL.

[Bevo 13569]

3 minutes ago, Deej said:

We had a shit flood that one year at ACL.

 

Was that when everyone was rolling around in Dillo Dirt and got sick?

[Captainant 27638]

10 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

A few years back, GOLL and I actually litigated a case where we legitimately and properly used the term "shit fountain."  It was every bit as funny and disgusting as you'd think.  No Russians were involved.

I didn't know you've sued pluckers before

[Armybrat 40824]

10 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

A few years back, GOLL and I actually litigated a case where we legitimately and properly used the term "shit fountain."  It was every bit as funny and disgusting as you'd think.  No Russians were involved.

aggy campus?

[MillerEP 30447]

https://www.threads.net/@kyivindependent_official/post/DBrlyuZNd9Z?xmt=AQGz89_oDt13EBHVaIUDfChIlItHOo4BowM9-fTFl5WZ4A

⚡️Croatia to provide Ukraine with 30 tanks, 30 infantry fighting vehicles in exchange for German Leopard tanks.
Croatia has committed to supplying 30 M-84 tanks and 30 M-80 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as spare parts and ammunition, in exchange for financial means to purchase up to 50 Leopard 2A8 tanks, according to the memorandum.

 

https://www.threads.net/@24hoursofukraine/post/DBrqfHJNPzQ?xmt=AQGzyYLQrEiCA8pq7JNK1UmexnI5H6xG3m2a5tyJIoTuEg

🇺🇦🇸🇪Sweden will provide Ukraine with a new aid package worth 63 million dollars.
This money will be used for the purchase of air-to-air missiles for the F-16, the training of Ukrainian marine battalions and the purchase of demining equipment.
❤️THANK YOU SWEDEN

[Deej 76755]

44 minutes ago, Bevo said:

 

Was that when everyone was rolling around in Dillo Dirt and got sick?

Yep

[Gatorubet 30185]

56 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

A few years back, GOLL and I actually litigated a case where we legitimately and properly used the term "shit fountain."  It was every bit as funny and disgusting as you'd think.  No Russians were involved.

“Lex Odem Cacas Fontem”

[Gatorubet 30185]

18 minutes ago, MillerEP said:

⚡️Croatia to provide Ukraine with 30 tanks, 30 infantry fighting vehicles in exchange for German Leopard tanks.
Croatia has committed to supplying 30 M-84 tanks and 30 M-80 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as spare parts and ammunition, in exchange for financial means to purchase up to 50 Leopard 2A8 tanks, according to the memorandum.

T-72s

[Chad Fuck 17659]

3 minutes ago, Deej said:

Yep

All the girls were wearing Ugg boots that year.  They were like giant sponges.  There were pairs of them everywhere as they got too soggy and fucked up to wear.  They were left behind as battle detritus.  A symbol of woman's failed battle against nature.  But they were also selling wine in bike bottles that year.  Many a fashionista's weekend was saved by those bottles.  Several purchased  out of my own very pocketbook.  

[TeeDubya 3362]

6 hours ago, Brisketexan said:

A few years back, GOLL and I actually litigated a case where we legitimately and properly used the term "shit fountain."  It was every bit as funny and disgusting as you'd think.  No Russians were involved.

Which schedule did you bill at?

fee a

fee b

or

fee c?

[MillerEP 30447]

https://www.threads.net/@kyivindependent_official/post/DBs4wY5IrBz?xmt=AQGzO1XmnzpOxPTFe5renkC_R7U2Jy9ulNNJao5fL37vzQ

⚡️ Chechnya hit by drone strike for first time, special forces university damaged, reports suggest.
A drone attack targeted Russia's North Caucasus republic of Chechnya on Oct. 29 for the first time during Moscow's war against Ukraine, according to claims by dictator Ramzan Kadyrov and media reports.

 

https://www.threads.net/@kyivindependent_official/post/DBtaBDGobDH?xmt=AQGzO1XmnzpOxPTFe5renkC_R7U2Jy9ulNNJao5fL37vzQ

⚡️ Drone strike on Chechnya possibly launched from Dagestan, Ingushetia, source claims.
A drone strike that damaged the Russian Special Forces University of Vladimir Putin in the Chechen city of Gudermes on Oct. 29 may have been launched from Russia's neighboring North Caucasus republics, an intelligence source told the Kyiv Independent.

 

^Drones strikes inside Chechneya now

[MillerEP 30447]

https://www.threads.net/@noelreports/post/DBs41wUOftV?xmt=AQGzBSeyoEyrcN7i8Y0FgqgzzS9KYayqOMiMtH-cGndciw

A big explosions was reported in occupied Luhansk; Russian forces claim "air defenses were active." Smoke is now visible across multiple areas of the city following several explosions.

 

https://www.threads.net/@noelreports/post/DBuDumJu_rZ?xmt=AQGznhfjzcgKyXa4NsmxDkyEiw4zpdihkFrJYzSPszCfdg

🇫🇷 France will train and equip another brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in addition to the 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade, named after Anne of Kyiv. The new brigade, like the 155th, will be fully equipped with French military hardware.

[Sawbonz 27542]

8 hours ago, MillerEP said:

Russian Special Forces University

Seems more like a JUCO

[pops 6980]

You're doing God's work, @MillerEP

[BamaATL 16593]

2 hours ago, Sawbonz said:

Seems more like a JUCO

More like Last Chance U, only the stakes really are last chances.  

[Macanudo 12975]

9 hours ago, Sawbonz said:

Seems more like a JUCO

Russia A&M.  

[Parliament 14247]

34 minutes ago, Macanudo said:

Russia A&M.  

We didn’t lose the war, we just ran out of conscripts.

[KYHorn 17015]

 

 

Update around Kurakhivka-Kurakhove. Russian troops have taken Hyrnik -after earlier premature information- and are now geolocated in the industrial area west of Kurakhivka. It is highly unlikely that Ukrainian troops are still in Kurakhivka, Zoryane and the area east of Zoryane. They have probably retreated to the west to take up new defensive positions there.

 

Edited October 30 by KYHorn

[KYHorn 17015]

 

 

"Chervona Kalyna" brigade of Ukraine’s NG repelled a Russian meat assault in the Pokrovsk area. Ukrainian defenders countered effectively, using coordinated firepower from artillery, drones, and firearms despite thorough preparations by the Russian forces, including a rapid approach and heavy grenade attacks. The brigade successfully held the position, repelling the terrorist assault. 

Edited October 30 by KYHorn

[Kel Varnsen 8458]

Edited October 30 by Kel Varnsen

[TeeDubya 3362]

Any reports of Nork casualties from Ukrainian action yet?

[KYHorn 17015]

A brief, sober look at the current status of the war

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-survive-not-to-win 

https://archive.is/kU0HV#selection-1093.465-1093.578 

Spoiler

“AFTER 970 days of war,” said Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, visiting Kyiv on October 21st, “Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.” In public, Mr Austin offered certitude, confidence and clarity: “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.” In private, his colleagues in the Pentagon, Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.

Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defences. In Kupiansk in the north, its troops have cut Ukrainian formations in two at the Oskil river. In Chasiv Yar in the east, they have crossed the main Siverskyi Donets canal, after six months of trying. Farther south, Russian troops have taken high ground in and around Vuhledar (pictured), and are moving in on Kurakhove from two directions. In Kursk, inside Russia, Ukraine has lost around half the territory it seized earlier this year.

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

Map: The Economist

The problem is not so much the loss of territory, which is limited and has come at enormous cost to Russia—600,000 dead and wounded since the start of the war, on American estimates, and 57,000 dead in this year to October alone, according to Ukrainian intelligence—as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. Despite a new mobilisation law that took effect in May, the army, outside a handful of brigades, has struggled to recruit enough replacements, with young men reluctant to sign up to tours of duty that are at best indefinite and, at worst, one-way missions. Western partners are privately urging Ukraine’s leaders to lower the mobilisation age floor from 25 to increase the potential pool of recruits. But political sensitivities and fears over an already alarming demographic crisis stand in the way of any change.

In a recent essay, Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, identifies several reasons for Ukraine’s declining fortunes. One is a shortfall in its air-defence interceptors, allowing Russian reconnaissance drones to establish what he calls “continuous and dense surveillance”. These in turn cue up ballistic-missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian artillery in the rear and glide bombs against troops at the front, allowing Russia to make slow but steady advances in small units, often using motorcycles because tanks are too easy to spot. Ukraine’s limited stock of shells—Russia currently has a two-to-one advantage in shellfire, according to Ivan Havrilyuk, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister—as well as tanks and armoured vehicles compounds that problem. The less firepower and armour are available, the greater the reliance on infantry and the greater the casualties.

Russia is not without its own serious problems. Next year it will spend a third of its national budget on defence, starving the civilian economy in the process. Inflation is perhaps double the official annual rate of more than 8%. In 2025 ordinary Russian families will begin to feel the economic pain for the first time, says a European intelligence official, adding that there are early signs of war fatigue among those closely connected to the conflict, such as mothers and family members.

On the battlefield, Russia remains reliant on crude tactics that result in massive casualties. The decision to borrow thousands of North Korean troops, who are thought to be bound for the Kursk front, shows that Russian units are also stretched. Russia’s general staff and defence ministry have put “heavy pressure” on the Kremlin to mobilise more men, says the European official. “Russia now doesn’t have sufficient forces to mass,” says a senior NATO official. “If they achieved a breakthrough they could not exploit it.” There is little short-term risk of Russian troops streaming west to Dnipro or Odessa.

But the crisis in Russia’s war economy is likely to play out over a longer period. Russia’s defence industry is in part dependent on the refurbishment of Soviet-era stocks, which are getting low in critical areas such as armoured vehicles. It is nonetheless far outperforming Western production lines. The European Union claims to be making more than 1m shells per year; Russia is making three times that, and is also boosted by supplies from North Korea and Iran. “I just don’t know we can produce enough, give enough,” says a person familiar with the flow of American aid, though a recent $800m commitment to boost Ukraine’s indigenous drone production is welcome. “We have no more to give them without taking serious risks in other places.” On manpower, too, Russia remains solvent. Its army is recruiting around 30,000 men per month, says the NATO official. That is not enough to meet internal targets, says another official, but it is adequate to cover even the gargantuan losses of recent months.

Russia cannot fight for ever. But the worry among America, European and Ukrainian officials is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first. “Moscow seems to be wagering that it can achieve its objectives in the Donbas next year,” writes Mr Watling, “and impose a rate of casualties and material degradation on the Ukrainian military high enough that it will no longer be capable of preventing further advances.” That, he warns, would give Russia leverage in any negotiations that follow.

The gloomy mood is evident in a shift in America’s language. Senior officials like Mr Austin still strike a confident note, promising that Ukraine will win. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armoured punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” says a person involved in that planning. Others put it more delicately. “The next several months”, noted Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s top Europe official, at a conference in Riga on October 19th, “are an opportunity for us to reaffirm that Ukraine can stay on the battlefield for the next couple of years.” ■

 

[TeeDubya 3362]

16 minutes ago, KYHorn said:

A brief, sober look at the current status of the war

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-survive-not-to-win 

https://archive.is/kU0HV#selection-1093.465-1093.578 

  Reveal hidden contents

“AFTER 970 days of war,” said Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, visiting Kyiv on October 21st, “Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.” In public, Mr Austin offered certitude, confidence and clarity: “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.” In private, his colleagues in the Pentagon, Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.

Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defences. In Kupiansk in the north, its troops have cut Ukrainian formations in two at the Oskil river. In Chasiv Yar in the east, they have crossed the main Siverskyi Donets canal, after six months of trying. Farther south, Russian troops have taken high ground in and around Vuhledar (pictured), and are moving in on Kurakhove from two directions. In Kursk, inside Russia, Ukraine has lost around half the territory it seized earlier this year.

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

Map: The Economist

The problem is not so much the loss of territory, which is limited and has come at enormous cost to Russia—600,000 dead and wounded since the start of the war, on American estimates, and 57,000 dead in this year to October alone, according to Ukrainian intelligence—as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. Despite a new mobilisation law that took effect in May, the army, outside a handful of brigades, has struggled to recruit enough replacements, with young men reluctant to sign up to tours of duty that are at best indefinite and, at worst, one-way missions. Western partners are privately urging Ukraine’s leaders to lower the mobilisation age floor from 25 to increase the potential pool of recruits. But political sensitivities and fears over an already alarming demographic crisis stand in the way of any change.

In a recent essay, Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, identifies several reasons for Ukraine’s declining fortunes. One is a shortfall in its air-defence interceptors, allowing Russian reconnaissance drones to establish what he calls “continuous and dense surveillance”. These in turn cue up ballistic-missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian artillery in the rear and glide bombs against troops at the front, allowing Russia to make slow but steady advances in small units, often using motorcycles because tanks are too easy to spot. Ukraine’s limited stock of shells—Russia currently has a two-to-one advantage in shellfire, according to Ivan Havrilyuk, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister—as well as tanks and armoured vehicles compounds that problem. The less firepower and armour are available, the greater the reliance on infantry and the greater the casualties.

Russia is not without its own serious problems. Next year it will spend a third of its national budget on defence, starving the civilian economy in the process. Inflation is perhaps double the official annual rate of more than 8%. In 2025 ordinary Russian families will begin to feel the economic pain for the first time, says a European intelligence official, adding that there are early signs of war fatigue among those closely connected to the conflict, such as mothers and family members.

On the battlefield, Russia remains reliant on crude tactics that result in massive casualties. The decision to borrow thousands of North Korean troops, who are thought to be bound for the Kursk front, shows that Russian units are also stretched. Russia’s general staff and defence ministry have put “heavy pressure” on the Kremlin to mobilise more men, says the European official. “Russia now doesn’t have sufficient forces to mass,” says a senior NATO official. “If they achieved a breakthrough they could not exploit it.” There is little short-term risk of Russian troops streaming west to Dnipro or Odessa.

But the crisis in Russia’s war economy is likely to play out over a longer period. Russia’s defence industry is in part dependent on the refurbishment of Soviet-era stocks, which are getting low in critical areas such as armoured vehicles. It is nonetheless far outperforming Western production lines. The European Union claims to be making more than 1m shells per year; Russia is making three times that, and is also boosted by supplies from North Korea and Iran. “I just don’t know we can produce enough, give enough,” says a person familiar with the flow of American aid, though a recent $800m commitment to boost Ukraine’s indigenous drone production is welcome. “We have no more to give them without taking serious risks in other places.” On manpower, too, Russia remains solvent. Its army is recruiting around 30,000 men per month, says the NATO official. That is not enough to meet internal targets, says another official, but it is adequate to cover even the gargantuan losses of recent months.

Russia cannot fight for ever. But the worry among America, European and Ukrainian officials is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first. “Moscow seems to be wagering that it can achieve its objectives in the Donbas next year,” writes Mr Watling, “and impose a rate of casualties and material degradation on the Ukrainian military high enough that it will no longer be capable of preventing further advances.” That, he warns, would give Russia leverage in any negotiations that follow.

The gloomy mood is evident in a shift in America’s language. Senior officials like Mr Austin still strike a confident note, promising that Ukraine will win. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armoured punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” says a person involved in that planning. Others put it more delicately. “The next several months”, noted Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s top Europe official, at a conference in Riga on October 19th, “are an opportunity for us to reaffirm that Ukraine can stay on the battlefield for the next couple of years.” ■

 

they're going to have to move mobilization younger.

[Parliament 14247]

1 hour ago, KYHorn said:

A brief, sober look at the current status of the war

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-survive-not-to-win 

https://archive.is/kU0HV#selection-1093.465-1093.578 

  Hide contents

“AFTER 970 days of war,” said Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, visiting Kyiv on October 21st, “Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.” In public, Mr Austin offered certitude, confidence and clarity: “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.” In private, his colleagues in the Pentagon, Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.

Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defences. In Kupiansk in the north, its troops have cut Ukrainian formations in two at the Oskil river. In Chasiv Yar in the east, they have crossed the main Siverskyi Donets canal, after six months of trying. Farther south, Russian troops have taken high ground in and around Vuhledar (pictured), and are moving in on Kurakhove from two directions. In Kursk, inside Russia, Ukraine has lost around half the territory it seized earlier this year.

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

Map: The Economist

The problem is not so much the loss of territory, which is limited and has come at enormous cost to Russia—600,000 dead and wounded since the start of the war, on American estimates, and 57,000 dead in this year to October alone, according to Ukrainian intelligence—as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. Despite a new mobilisation law that took effect in May, the army, outside a handful of brigades, has struggled to recruit enough replacements, with young men reluctant to sign up to tours of duty that are at best indefinite and, at worst, one-way missions. Western partners are privately urging Ukraine’s leaders to lower the mobilisation age floor from 25 to increase the potential pool of recruits. But political sensitivities and fears over an already alarming demographic crisis stand in the way of any change.

In a recent essay, Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, identifies several reasons for Ukraine’s declining fortunes. One is a shortfall in its air-defence interceptors, allowing Russian reconnaissance drones to establish what he calls “continuous and dense surveillance”. These in turn cue up ballistic-missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian artillery in the rear and glide bombs against troops at the front, allowing Russia to make slow but steady advances in small units, often using motorcycles because tanks are too easy to spot. Ukraine’s limited stock of shells—Russia currently has a two-to-one advantage in shellfire, according to Ivan Havrilyuk, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister—as well as tanks and armoured vehicles compounds that problem. The less firepower and armour are available, the greater the reliance on infantry and the greater the casualties.

Russia is not without its own serious problems. Next year it will spend a third of its national budget on defence, starving the civilian economy in the process. Inflation is perhaps double the official annual rate of more than 8%. In 2025 ordinary Russian families will begin to feel the economic pain for the first time, says a European intelligence official, adding that there are early signs of war fatigue among those closely connected to the conflict, such as mothers and family members.

On the battlefield, Russia remains reliant on crude tactics that result in massive casualties. The decision to borrow thousands of North Korean troops, who are thought to be bound for the Kursk front, shows that Russian units are also stretched. Russia’s general staff and defence ministry have put “heavy pressure” on the Kremlin to mobilise more men, says the European official. “Russia now doesn’t have sufficient forces to mass,” says a senior NATO official. “If they achieved a breakthrough they could not exploit it.” There is little short-term risk of Russian troops streaming west to Dnipro or Odessa.

But the crisis in Russia’s war economy is likely to play out over a longer period. Russia’s defence industry is in part dependent on the refurbishment of Soviet-era stocks, which are getting low in critical areas such as armoured vehicles. It is nonetheless far outperforming Western production lines. The European Union claims to be making more than 1m shells per year; Russia is making three times that, and is also boosted by supplies from North Korea and Iran. “I just don’t know we can produce enough, give enough,” says a person familiar with the flow of American aid, though a recent $800m commitment to boost Ukraine’s indigenous drone production is welcome. “We have no more to give them without taking serious risks in other places.” On manpower, too, Russia remains solvent. Its army is recruiting around 30,000 men per month, says the NATO official. That is not enough to meet internal targets, says another official, but it is adequate to cover even the gargantuan losses of recent months.

Russia cannot fight for ever. But the worry among America, European and Ukrainian officials is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first. “Moscow seems to be wagering that it can achieve its objectives in the Donbas next year,” writes Mr Watling, “and impose a rate of casualties and material degradation on the Ukrainian military high enough that it will no longer be capable of preventing further advances.” That, he warns, would give Russia leverage in any negotiations that follow.

The gloomy mood is evident in a shift in America’s language. Senior officials like Mr Austin still strike a confident note, promising that Ukraine will win. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armoured punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” says a person involved in that planning. Others put it more delicately. “The next several months”, noted Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s top Europe official, at a conference in Riga on October 19th, “are an opportunity for us to reaffirm that Ukraine can stay on the battlefield for the next couple of years.” ■

 

The only thing Russia does well is drag their enemy down into the shit, and eat it faster.  Living in shit is their home, and they excel at it.

[Brisketexan 105079]

1 hour ago, KYHorn said:

A brief, sober look at the current status of the war

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-survive-not-to-win 

https://archive.is/kU0HV#selection-1093.465-1093.578 

  Reveal hidden contents

“AFTER 970 days of war,” said Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, visiting Kyiv on October 21st, “Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.” In public, Mr Austin offered certitude, confidence and clarity: “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.” In private, his colleagues in the Pentagon, Western officials and many Ukrainian commanders are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war and Ukraine’s ability to hold back Russian advances over the next six months.

Ukrainian forces have managed to hold on to Pokrovsk, an embattled town in the eastern Donbas region, an embarrassment for Mr Putin. But elsewhere along the front, Russia is slicing its way through Ukrainian defences. In Kupiansk in the north, its troops have cut Ukrainian formations in two at the Oskil river. In Chasiv Yar in the east, they have crossed the main Siverskyi Donets canal, after six months of trying. Farther south, Russian troops have taken high ground in and around Vuhledar (pictured), and are moving in on Kurakhove from two directions. In Kursk, inside Russia, Ukraine has lost around half the territory it seized earlier this year.

Read more of our recent coverage of the Ukraine war

Map: The Economist

The problem is not so much the loss of territory, which is limited and has come at enormous cost to Russia—600,000 dead and wounded since the start of the war, on American estimates, and 57,000 dead in this year to October alone, according to Ukrainian intelligence—as the steady erosion in the size and quality of Ukraine’s forces. Ukrainian units are understrength and overstretched, worn thin by heavy casualties. Despite a new mobilisation law that took effect in May, the army, outside a handful of brigades, has struggled to recruit enough replacements, with young men reluctant to sign up to tours of duty that are at best indefinite and, at worst, one-way missions. Western partners are privately urging Ukraine’s leaders to lower the mobilisation age floor from 25 to increase the potential pool of recruits. But political sensitivities and fears over an already alarming demographic crisis stand in the way of any change.

In a recent essay, Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank in London, identifies several reasons for Ukraine’s declining fortunes. One is a shortfall in its air-defence interceptors, allowing Russian reconnaissance drones to establish what he calls “continuous and dense surveillance”. These in turn cue up ballistic-missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian artillery in the rear and glide bombs against troops at the front, allowing Russia to make slow but steady advances in small units, often using motorcycles because tanks are too easy to spot. Ukraine’s limited stock of shells—Russia currently has a two-to-one advantage in shellfire, according to Ivan Havrilyuk, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister—as well as tanks and armoured vehicles compounds that problem. The less firepower and armour are available, the greater the reliance on infantry and the greater the casualties.

Russia is not without its own serious problems. Next year it will spend a third of its national budget on defence, starving the civilian economy in the process. Inflation is perhaps double the official annual rate of more than 8%. In 2025 ordinary Russian families will begin to feel the economic pain for the first time, says a European intelligence official, adding that there are early signs of war fatigue among those closely connected to the conflict, such as mothers and family members.

On the battlefield, Russia remains reliant on crude tactics that result in massive casualties. The decision to borrow thousands of North Korean troops, who are thought to be bound for the Kursk front, shows that Russian units are also stretched. Russia’s general staff and defence ministry have put “heavy pressure” on the Kremlin to mobilise more men, says the European official. “Russia now doesn’t have sufficient forces to mass,” says a senior NATO official. “If they achieved a breakthrough they could not exploit it.” There is little short-term risk of Russian troops streaming west to Dnipro or Odessa.

But the crisis in Russia’s war economy is likely to play out over a longer period. Russia’s defence industry is in part dependent on the refurbishment of Soviet-era stocks, which are getting low in critical areas such as armoured vehicles. It is nonetheless far outperforming Western production lines. The European Union claims to be making more than 1m shells per year; Russia is making three times that, and is also boosted by supplies from North Korea and Iran. “I just don’t know we can produce enough, give enough,” says a person familiar with the flow of American aid, though a recent $800m commitment to boost Ukraine’s indigenous drone production is welcome. “We have no more to give them without taking serious risks in other places.” On manpower, too, Russia remains solvent. Its army is recruiting around 30,000 men per month, says the NATO official. That is not enough to meet internal targets, says another official, but it is adequate to cover even the gargantuan losses of recent months.

Russia cannot fight for ever. But the worry among America, European and Ukrainian officials is that, on current trends, Ukraine’s breaking point will come first. “Moscow seems to be wagering that it can achieve its objectives in the Donbas next year,” writes Mr Watling, “and impose a rate of casualties and material degradation on the Ukrainian military high enough that it will no longer be capable of preventing further advances.” That, he warns, would give Russia leverage in any negotiations that follow.

The gloomy mood is evident in a shift in America’s language. Senior officials like Mr Austin still strike a confident note, promising that Ukraine will win. Those involved in the guts of planning in the Pentagon say that, in practice, the ambitions of early 2023—a Ukrainian force that could take back its territory or shock Russia into talks through a well-crafted armoured punch—have given way to a narrow focus on preventing defeat. “At this point we are thinking more and more about how Ukraine can survive,” says a person involved in that planning. Others put it more delicately. “The next several months”, noted Jim O’Brien, the State Department’s top Europe official, at a conference in Riga on October 19th, “are an opportunity for us to reaffirm that Ukraine can stay on the battlefield for the next couple of years.” ■

 

This, unfortunately, matches with what the boy is reporting.  Recall that he has quite a few Ukrainian friends at uni.  His message in texts today was that Ukraine's "ability to take the gloves off is diminishing.  My insider Ukrainians said the mood in the country is souring and they're finding it hard to replenish manpower."  In other words, exactly what the articles above pointed out.

Ukraine very much needs the US to get through this election (and for the election to go the right way, of course).  The hope is that a solid win by the side that supports Ukraine, with no looming counter-electoral pressure in the near-term, can offer Ukraine more unfettered assistance.

Also per the boy, Ukraine's FPV drones are doing so much of the heavy lifting.  He's donated a few hundred bucks to his friends' fundraiser to acquire more....and more young people (including him) are looking into learning to fly them.  The FPV drones really are helping Ukraine to hold the line, where it's able to hold the line.

I think that Ukraine's best hope is for both significantly increased air defense AND long-range strike capabilities, and full clearance to hit Russian air assets far behind the lines.

[Viper 12104]

I wonder if Russia will take an IOU

Russian court fines Google $20,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000

https://gizmodo.com/russian-court-wants-google-to-cough-up-20000000000000000000000000000000000-2000517887

Quote

it will take roughly 219 weeks before Google owes $1 googol (1 followed by 100 zeros).

 

[KYHorn 17015]

18 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

This, unfortunately, matches with what the boy is reporting.  Recall that he has quite a few Ukrainian friends at uni.  His message in texts today was that Ukraine's "ability to take the gloves off is diminishing.  My insider Ukrainians said the mood in the country is souring and they're finding it hard to replenish manpower."  In other words, exactly what the articles above pointed out.

Ukraine very much needs the US to get through this election (and for the election to go the right way, of course).  The hope is that a solid win by the side that supports Ukraine, with no looming counter-electoral pressure in the near-term, can offer Ukraine more unfettered assistance.

Also per the boy, Ukraine's FPV drones are doing so much of the heavy lifting.  He's donated a few hundred bucks to his friends' fundraiser to acquire more....and more young people (including him) are looking into learning to fly them.  The FPV drones really are helping Ukraine to hold the line, where it's able to hold the line.

I think that Ukraine's best hope is for both significantly increased air defense AND long-range strike capabilities, and full clearance to hit Russian air assets far behind the lines.

Talk me out of this because it has been creeping into my head for the past couple of months. Setting aside all other CR considerations:

An election that results in more of the same policies is more likely to mean Ukraine continues to lose slowly while Russia's economy and military continue to be substantially depleted. Put another way, will a Harris admin approach this differently and with much greater resolve and courage than the current admin? I haven't seen much to suggest otherwise. This increases the likelihood of a meaningful Russian breakthrough at some point, but even without that, Russia is able to take more territory and Ukraine loses more bargaining power than it already has for when the time comes to settle this.

An election that results in a new admin where they are determined to end it now could result in significant and terrible concessions for Ukraine, but given the person in charge is unpredictable and highly sensitive to how he is perceived, the risk that it is seen as a "weak deal" would be an effective deterrent to giving up much to Russia and could actually end up strengthening the USA's resolve vis-à-vis the president and, therefore, Ukraine's bargaining power.  Again, this is highly dependent on capriciousness, so it's more likely to result in extremes. But, if it is appearing increasingly likely that the alternative admin would continue down the path of slow decline, then the chance of the more favorable result for Ukraine might actually lie with the counter-intuitive admin. 

[Foosters 17842]

3 minutes ago, KYHorn said:

 

An election that results in a new admin where they are determined to end it now could result in significant and terrible concessions for Ukraine, but given the person in charge is unpredictable and highly sensitive to how he is perceived, the risk that it is seen as a "weak deal" would be an effective deterrent to giving up much to Russia and could actually end up strengthening the USA's resolve vis-à-vis the president and, therefore, Ukraine's bargaining power.  Again, this is highly dependent on capriciousness, so it's more likely to result in extremes. But, if it is appearing increasingly likely that the alternative admin would continue down the path of slow decline, then the chance of the more favorable result for Ukraine might actually lie with the counter-intuitive admin. 

[drt 638]

You’re ignoring the obvious elephant in the room. If Russia is rewarded for their bad behavior in starting this war, what would make you think they would adhere to any treaty that was signed? They’ve told you who they are. Believe them. 

[kevwun 15765]

21 minutes ago, KYHorn said:

Talk me out of this because it has been creeping into my head for the past couple of months. Setting aside all other CR considerations:

An election that results in more of the same policies is more likely to mean Ukraine continues to lose slowly while Russia's economy and military continue to be substantially depleted. Put another way, will a Harris admin approach this differently and with much greater resolve and courage than the current admin? I haven't seen much to suggest otherwise. This increases the likelihood of a meaningful Russian breakthrough at some point, but even without that, Russia is able to take more territory and Ukraine loses more bargaining power than it already has for when the time comes to settle this.

An election that results in a new admin where they are determined to end it now could result in significant and terrible concessions for Ukraine, but given the person in charge is unpredictable and highly sensitive to how he is perceived, the risk that it is seen as a "weak deal" would be an effective deterrent to giving up much to Russia and could actually end up strengthening the USA's resolve vis-à-vis the president and, therefore, Ukraine's bargaining power.  Again, this is highly dependent on capriciousness, so it's more likely to result in extremes. But, if it is appearing increasingly likely that the alternative admin would continue down the path of slow decline, then the chance of the more favorable result for Ukraine might actually lie with the counter-intuitive admin. 

Yes the admin who lets Putin do whatever he wants is definitely the best option for Ukraine.  That's some real solid reasoning.  Your last several posts give off a strong whiff of troll.

Edited October 30 by kevwun

[KYHorn 17015]

 

14 minutes ago, drt said:

You’re ignoring the obvious elephant in the room. If Russia is rewarded for their bad behavior in starting this war, what would make you think they would adhere to any treaty that was signed? They’ve told you who they are. Believe them. 

Fair point. I'm tired of the restrained path we've laid out for Ukraine and have become despondent enough about it that alternative paths (however unlikely they may be to result in something positive) start to become more appealing. 

 

[utee94 15808]

18 minutes ago, drt said:

You’re ignoring the obvious elephant in the room. If Russia is rewarded for their bad behavior in starting this war, what would make you think they would adhere to any treaty that was signed? They’ve told you who they are. Believe them. 

Right.  I mean, Russia signed a treaty in 1994 where they agreed to protect Ukraine.  And here they are destroying it.  No treaty they sign, can be considered valid.

[Parliament 14247]

2 minutes ago, utee94 said:

  No treaty they sign, can be considered valid.

“I agree.”

Joachim von Ribbentrop, 1941