Русский корабль - иди нахуй

[SL Xpress 7505]

Any time Iran gets brought into the picture, there's a good chance for zealot talk.

Heck, I'd argue the whole prosecution of war in Ukraine is the work of a zealot who believes Ukraine has no historical significance outside of an association with Russia, and also sees himself as the leader of a set of historical patriarchal values that the seedy demonic west has turned away from. 

The whole war is centered on zealotry as far as I'm concerned. Which also helps rationalize the whole "the end justifies the means" approach to this war. For many Russians, they're convinced this is their equivalent of a jihad. Which is a big reason I'm all in favor of supplying the Ukrainians more powerful weapons, including long range missiles and fighter jets, sooner rather than later, and am hopeful the new armor commitments are able to be fielded ASAP. 

[SL Xpress 7505]

3 minutes ago, Schulz2.0 said:

 

 

That's not as helpful to me as he seems to think it is. 

So we're talking about 10k soldiers on both sides? How much artillery on both sides? I mean, I never know that. I just know that Ukrainian artillery always seems to be completely outnumbered, and that Russia has a much higher ammo expenditure rate, although there appears to be a trend toward conservation that didn't exist earlier in the war. 

Based on Ukraine fielding two brigades in the area, they don't seem to be as outnumbered as they appear to be in Bakhmut and the Soledar region. 

[Mach 1 1676]

You should tweet him back. Tell him the information he’s providing is not detailed enough for your liking.

[Schulz2.0 28768]

 

[KYHorn 16863]

 

 

Edited January 30, 2023 by KYHorn

[KYHorn 16863]

I think I see another flying Russian.

 

Sound on for the command post video: 

 

 

[KYHorn 16863]

 

 

Edited January 30, 2023 by KYHorn

[Gatorubet 30099]

Every young T-72 dreams of one day becoming a Ukrainian tractor…

[RDCanecutter 26267]

In for Battle of Hastings.

[flatdawgs 1258]

24 minutes ago, Gatorubet said:

Every young T-72 dreams of one day becoming a Ukrainian tractor…

Swords into plowshares something something 

(but not yet)

[atomheartbevo 89428]

13 hours ago, MillerEP said:

^A man after Surly's own heart

12 hours ago, Homesickhorn said:

That guy is so fucking metal.

 

[RPM 26227]

[956 Worldwide 34440]

Make Minsk Poland again. 
 

 

[956 Worldwide 34440]

3 hours ago, atomheartbevo said:

 

/csb, Czech and Slovakia have a well developed hiking and outdoors infrastructure. Camping is not allowed in national parks, instead you stay at “chalets” in the backcountry. The chalets are basic but offer a limited menu (gulash) and always beer. All that has to be packed in. Don’t care how good the frame is, seeing someone haul a keg up a goat trail in the High Tatras is impressive as hell. 

[BehoId, The Underminer! 11668]

50 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

/csb, Czech and Slovakia have a well developed hiking and outdoors infrastructure. Camping is not allowed in national parks, instead you stay at “chalets” in the backcountry. The chalets are basic but offer a limited menu (gulash) and always beer. All that has to be packed in. Don’t care how good the frame is, seeing someone haul a keg up a goat trail in the High Tatras is impressive as hell. 

Those seem like two cool countries.  They should join up. 

[Bevo 13527]

57 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

/csb, Czech and Slovakia have a well developed hiking and outdoors infrastructure. Camping is not allowed in national parks, instead you stay at “chalets” in the backcountry. The chalets are basic but offer a limited menu (gulash) and always beer. All that has to be packed in. Don’t care how good the frame is, seeing someone haul a keg up a goat trail in the High Tatras is impressive as hell. 

I've done a lot of hikes in the Tatras but never with a keg. Are we sure that it was full, though?

[956 Worldwide 34440]

8 minutes ago, Bevo said:

I've done a lot of hikes in the Tatras but never with a keg. Are we sure that it was full, though?

Don’t know about his, but the sherpas that keep the mountain chalets stocked absolutely pack everything in. This one is at over 2000 meters /endofofftopic

Chata pod Rysmi
+421 903 181 051
https://maps.app.goo.gl/PPVzdey2DzNRTXi9A?g_st=ic

[KYHorn 16863]

 

Two articles out today that make the case for more, now, rather than slow, incremental provisions:

Full ISW report referenced above:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2023 

Spoiler

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 29, 2023

Jan 29, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

 

Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

January 29, 8:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 29. This report focuses on the impact of delays in sending high-end weapons systems to Ukraine on Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of windows of opportunity throughout this war.

Delays in the provision to Ukraine of Western long-range fires systems, advanced air defense systems, and tanks have limited Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of opportunities for larger counter-offensive operations presented by flaws and failures in Russian military operations. Western discussions of supposed “stalemate” conditions and the difficulty or impossibility of Ukraine regaining significant portions of the territory Russia seized in 2022 insufficiently account for how Western delays in providing necessary military equipment have exacerbated those problems. Slow authorization and arrival of aid have not been the only factors limiting Ukraine’s ability to launch continued large-scale counter-offensive operations. Factors endogenous to the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian political decision-making have also contributed to delaying counteroffensives. ISW is not prepared to assess that all Ukrainian military decisions have been optimal. (ISW does not, in fact, assess Ukrainian military decision-making in these updates at all. Yet, as historians, we have not observed flawless military decision-making in any war.) But Ukraine does not have a significant domestic military industry to turn to in the absence of Western support. Western hesitancy to supply weapons during wartime took insufficient account of the predictable requirement to shift Ukraine from Soviet to Western systems as soon as the West committed to helping Ukraine fight off Russia's 2022 invasion.

The military aid provided by the US-led Western coalition has been essential to Ukraine’s survival, and this report’s critiques illustrate the importance of that aid as well as its limitations. Western military advising before the February 24 invasion helped the Ukrainian military resist the initial Russian invasion. Western weapons systems such as the Javelin anti-tank missile helped Ukraine defeat that onslaught and throw the Russian drive on Kyiv back to its starting points. The provision of essential Soviet-era weapons systems and munitions by members of the Western coalition has kept the Ukrainian military operating throughout the war. The delivery of more advanced Western systems such as the US-produced 155mm artillery (in April) and then HIMARS (in June) facilitated the Ukrainian counter-offensives that liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast and then western Kherson Oblast.[1] The arrival of Western NASAMS air-defense systems in November helped blunt the Russian drone and missile campaign attacking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.[2]

The war has unfolded so far in three major periods. The Russians had the initiative and were on the offensive from February 24 through July 3, 2022, whereupon their attacks culminated. The Ukrainians seized the initiative and began large-scale counteroffensives in August, continuing through the liberation of western Kherson Oblast on November 11. Ukraine has been unable to initiate a new major counter-offensive since then, allowing the conflict to settle into positional warfare and allowing the Russians the opportunity to regain the initiative if they choose and to raise the bar for future Ukrainian counteroffensives even if they do not. The pattern of delivery of Western aid has powerfully shaped the pattern of this conflict.

Western reluctance to begin supplying Ukraine with higher-end Western weapons systems, particularly tanks, long-range strike systems, and air-defense systems, has limited Ukraine’s ability to initiate and continue large-scale counter-offensive operations.

Sound counter-offensive campaign design calls for stopping the enemy’s offensive as rapidly as possible, initiating decisive counter-offensives rapidly after the enemy’s offensive culminates to take advantage of the enemy’s disorganization and unpreparedness for subsequent major operations, and then continuing counter-offensive operations with the briefest possible pauses between them to prevent the enemy from reconstituting its forces and possibly regaining the initiative.

Many factors contribute to the failure of most militaries to meet this ideal standard, and the Ukrainian military faced many internal challenges to do so. Weapons and supplies are always central to the planning and execution of sound campaigns, however. Ukraine had no meaningful defense industry going into the war and was therefore almost entirely reliant on its Western backers to provide the materiel it needed to stop the initial Russian offensive and then, even more so, to initiate and sustain counter-offensives. The patterns of Western aid thus heavily shaped Ukraine’s ability to develop and execute sound campaign plans.

The Russian invasion began on February 24, 2022. The only major phase of Russian offensive operations continued through the capture of Lysychansk on July 3.[3] Russian offensive operations then culminated, and Russia lost the initiative in July.

Indicators that the Russian offensives would culminate and that Western weapons would be needed at scale emerged clearly in late May and June. ISW observed on May 28 that “Ukraine may have a chance to launch significant counteroffensives with good prospects for success.”[4] The West had been sending Ukraine Soviet-era equipment and ammunition to resupply and replace Ukraine’s Soviet systems, but Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Vadym Skibitsky warned on June 10 that Ukrainian forces were running low on Soviet supplies.[5] Western officials began publicly warning that stocks of Soviet-era materiel were running low on June 24.[6] The United States authorized the delivery of 155mm howitzers on April 21, and those systems began arriving in Ukraine on April 29.[7]The United States authorized HIMARS in late May, which began arriving on June 23.[8] The Western coalition did not prepare to provide Ukraine with armored vehicles during this period.[9]

If the West’s aim had been to shorten the war by speeding Ukraine’s liberation of occupied territory, the assessment that stocks of Soviet-era weapons held by friendly states were running low should have triggered a fundamental change in the provision of Western aid starting in June 2022. The Western coalition has no capacity to produce Russian weapons or ammunition at scale, so the exhaustion of the Cold War holdovers of those systems clearly indicated that the West would have to shift Ukraine to full reliance on Western systems in order for Ukraine to have any military at all in the future, to say nothing of supporting Ukraine’s continued ability to fight a protracted war against Russia. The West should therefore have begun setting conditions to shift Ukraine onto the use of Western weapons platforms, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft, by early summer 2022 and in advance of the forecasted culmination of Russian offensive operations.

Ukraine used what systems the West made available to it to take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by the Russian culmination following the seizure of Lysychansk on July 3, 2022, to initiate counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces began using US-provided HIMARS systems to set conditions for counter-offensives in both Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in July. Ukraine launched its first major counter-offensive, in Kharkiv Oblast, on September 6.[10] That counter-offensive was a stunning success, recouping over 12,000 square kilometers of territory in a six-day lightning advance that overran and destroyed some of the most elite mechanized units in the Russian military.[11]

The Ukrainians followed the Kharkiv counter-offensive with a counter-offensive in Kherson Oblast. They began setting conditions for operations in Kherson as early as July 23, escalating in September and October, and culminating in the Russian withdrawal from western Kherson Oblast on November 11, 2022.[12] That counter-offensive proceeded much more slowly and cautiously than the Kharkiv counteroffensive had, partly because the Ukrainians wanted to avoid fighting in (and thereby destroying) the city of Kherson, but largely because by that point they feared running out of counter-offensive capabilities. The West was still refusing to supply armored vehicles and was increasingly warning about Western shortages of supply even of the artillery systems and munitions it was providing.[13]

Had the West begun providing Ukraine the equipment it needed for sustained counter-offensive operations as the Russian offensives were culminating, it might have been possible for Ukraine to begin those counter-offensive operations earlier.[14] If the West had begun working to shift Ukraine fully to Western systems when the need to do so had become apparent in the summer of 2022, conditions could have been set to allow Ukraine to continue counter-offensive operations after Kherson and thereby deprive the Russians of the ability to reconstitute their forces and attempt to regain the initiative.

Western delays in providing Ukraine the materiel needed for counter-offensive operations have instead had a snowballing effect on Ukrainian abilities to conduct and sustain counter-offensives. Having failed to begin setting conditions to send Ukraine armored vehicles in May and June, when the need was becoming apparent, the West still did not prepare to do so when the Ukrainian counter-offensives began. The Ukrainians thus lacked any assurance that they would receive replacements for weapons systems lost or damaged in a new counter-offensive and therefore likely became more cautious in deciding to initiate and continue counter-offensives after liberating western Kherson Oblast.

Failure to commit to providing counter-offensive materiel at scale after the conclusion of the Kherson counter-offensive has contributed to delays in the initiation of any further counter-offensives. The effects of that failure and of the cautiousness it likely induced in Ukrainian leaders may help explain the fact that Ukrainian officials routinely indicated that they intended to continue counteroffensives in the winter of 2022 and 2023 while some Western officials said instead that they anticipated a lull in fighting during the winter and therefore did not see any urgency in providing additional materials.[15] Ukrainian forces, in any event, have not initiated a new large-scale counter-offensive following the Russian withdrawal from west bank Kherson Oblast in mid-November.[16]

The Russians have taken advantage of these delays and failures to benefit from the windows of vulnerability their own defeats and incompetence produced by mobilizing manpower and equipment and starting to rationalize their own forces. They renewed their offensive against Bakhmut in late July, although it picked up steam only when Wagner Forces began leaning into it (although without making significant territorial gains) in October-November.[17] The Bakhmut offensive coincided with the dramatic air campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure that started on October 10 and made use of Russia’s remaining stocks of precision missiles as well as drones that Moscow procured from Iran.[18] Both the Bakhmut offensive and the missile-drone campaign put pressure on Ukraine that distracted from efforts to prepare for further counter-offensives—the Bakhmut offensive by drawing Ukrainian reinforcements to the defense of the city and the infrastructure attacks by diverting Ukrainian command attention from the battlefield. The muddy season in October and November also slowed operations but did not stop them.[19]

The initial deployments of mobilized Russian reservists were largely disastrous for Russia and did not pose a major obstacle to Ukraine’s continuation of counter-offensive operations.[20] As the months went on and stretched into 2023, however, the Russians redeployed conventional units, likely filled out with mobilized reservist replacements, to stiffen the sector of the front (Luhansk) toward which the next Ukrainian counter-offensive appeared to be headed and filled out those units with mobilized personnel in a more effective way.[21] Russian forces also spent considerable resources in the fall of 2022 establishing a long line of supporting field fortifications in Luhansk Oblast to defend against Ukrainian advances.[22] The mass mobilization of Russian convicts by the Wagner Group rapidly generated tens of thousands of “soldiers” who were used in human wave attacks that generated dreadful casualties on the Russian side but placed great pressure on Ukrainian defenders in November, December, and January.[23]

Ukraine’s inability to mount a subsequent counter-offensive in November following the Russian withdrawal from western Kherson Oblast gave Russia time and space to stabilize its lines and put pressure on Ukraine to which Kyiv had to respond.[24] Many factors no doubt contributed to Ukraine’s failure to continue counter-offensive operations after Kherson, but the West’s failure to provide the necessary materiel was certainly key. That failure thus allowed the Russians partially to regain the initiative in the war starting in November and to establish defensive positions posing a much greater challenge for the next counter-offensive than the Russians could have posed in November-December.[25]

The incorporation of Western weapons systems such as tanks and aircraft takes a long time. Many Ukrainian soldiers must be trained to use them. Logistics systems must be established to supply them. Spare parts must be assembled and depots equipped to repair them. The inevitable delay between the pledge to send such systems and the Ukrainians’ ability to use them means that Western leaders must commit them when the earliest indicators that they will be required appear, not when the situation becomes dire. Had Western leaders started setting conditions for Ukraine to use Western tanks in June 2022, when the first clear indicators appeared that Western tanks would be needed, Ukrainian forces would have been able to start using them in November or December.

The continual delays in providing Western materiel when it became apparent that it is or will soon be needed have thus contributed to the protraction of the conflict. They are not the only reason for that protraction, to be sure, but the West must recognize the contributions these delays have made to hindering Ukraine’s ability to liberate more of its territory faster.

Recent Western commitments to provide Ukraine with the tanks and armored vehicles it requires for further counter-offensive operations are important, but the delays in making those commitments may have cost Ukraine a window of opportunity for a counter-offensive this winter. Russian forces are likely preparing to launch an offensive of their own in Luhansk Oblast and are adding weight to their offensives around Bakhmut, as ISW has reported.[26]

Ukraine may still launch a long-planned counteroffensive this winter, which would somewhat mitigate the consequences of Western delays in providing necessary aid. The delay in launching that counter-offensive thus far, however, has allowed the Russians to set conditions to make it harder and more costly. The delay has also allowed Russia to set conditions for an offensive of its own, greatly complicating Ukrainian campaign design.

If Ukraine does not already have the materiel it needs to launch its counteroffensive, then it may have to wait many weeks for Western tanks to arrive in enough quantity to support renewed efforts. The delay will likely be lengthened by the weather. Both the Russians and the Ukrainians will have to account for the spring muddy season, most likely to occur in March and April, that will make high-speed mechanized counter-offensives difficult if not impossible. Ukraine may need to wait until late spring or early summer before renewing its large-scale efforts to liberate strategically vital terrain. Ongoing Russian offensives may well make more gains before then.

The West will need to avoid drawing the erroneous conclusion that future Ukrainian counter-offensives are impossible based on a timeline imposed by the West’s own delays in providing necessary material and meteorological conditions. Current and planned Russian offensives will very likely culminate without achieving operationally decisive gains and in ways that could very well create propitious conditions for Ukrainian counter-offensives, especially once Ukraine has ingested the incoming Western tanks. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can liberate critical terrain with the current and promised levels of Western support and that it is a matter of vital national interest for the United States and its Western partners that Ukraine do so.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 29:

 

• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensives in the vicinity of Kuzemivka (about 16km northwest of Svatove).[27]
• Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel limited Russian counterattacks west and south of Kreminna.[28]
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that Wagner forces seized Blahodatne (about 12km northeast of Bakhmut) on January 29.[29]
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Donetsk City-Avdiivka areas.[30]
• Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces repelled assaults near Pobieda (4km southeast of Donetsk City) and Vuhledar.[31] Russian sources claimed that fighting is ongoing to the west and east of Vuhledar.[32]
• Russian sources did not report on any Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast for the third consecutive day on January 29.[33] Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a bridge in Svitlodolynske (20km northeast of Melitopol).[34]
• Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire against Kherson City and other settlements in the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[35] Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to fire on Beryslav.[36]
• Russian authorities are continuing to set conditions for a second wave of mobilization. Head of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrey Kartapolov stated on January 28 that the committee is reviewing over 20 laws regarding mobilization deferrals.[37]
• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 29.[38]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Perhaps a reasonable summary of the above article:

The war has unfolded so far in three major periods. The Russians had the initiative and were on the offensive from February 24 through July 3, 2022, whereupon their attacks culminated. The Ukrainians seized the initiative and began large-scale counteroffensives in August, continuing through the liberation of western Kherson Oblast on November 11. Ukraine has been unable to initiate a new major counter-offensive since then, allowing the conflict to settle into positional warfare and allowing the Russians the opportunity to regain the initiative if they choose and to raise the bar for future Ukrainian counteroffensives even if they do not. The pattern of delivery of Western aid has powerfully shaped the pattern of this conflict.

Western reluctance to begin supplying Ukraine with higher-end Western weapons systems, particularly tanks, long-range strike systems, and air-defense systems, has limited Ukraine’s ability to initiate and continue large-scale counter-offensive operations.

 

The 2nd is from McFaul at Foreign Affairs and focuses on how to move forward and avoid the 2 undesirable paths that David French described a few weeks ago:

How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-get-breakthrough-ukraine :

Spoiler

How to Get a Breakthrough in Ukraine

The Case Against Incrementalism

By Michael McFaul

January 30, 2023

A NATO military exercise in Bemowo Piskie, Poland, May 2022

Kacper Pempel / Reuters

Nearly a year after he invaded Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has failed to achieve any of his major objectives. He has not unified the alleged single Slavic nation, he has not “denazified” or “demilitarized” Ukraine, and he has not stopped NATO expansion. Instead, the Ukrainian military kept Russian troops out of Kyiv, defended Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, and launched successful counteroffensives in the fall so that by the end of 2022, it had liberated over 50 percent of the territory previously captured by Russian soldiers that year. In January, Putin removed the general in charge of the war in Ukraine, Sergei Surovikin, whom he had appointed just a few months earlier. Wartime leaders change their top generals only when they know they are losing.

Ukraine is doing so well in part thanks to the unified Western response. Unlike reactions to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014, the Western pushback against Putin’s latest war has been strong along multiple fronts. NATO enhanced its eastern defenses and invited Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. Europe has provided shelter to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees. Led by the Biden administration, the West has provided massive amounts of military and economic support at amazing speed, levied punishing sanctions, and begun a difficult shift away from Russian energy. Even Chinese leader Xi Jinping has offered Putin only faint rhetorical support for his war. He has not provided Russia with weapons and has cautiously avoided violating the global sanctions regime.

These are the reasons for optimism. The bad news, however, is that the war continues, and Putin has shown no signs of wanting to end it. Instead, he is planning a major counteroffensive this year. “The Russians are preparing some 200,000 fresh troops,” General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the commander in chief of Ukraine’s armed forces, warned in December. “I have no doubt they will have another go at Kyiv.” Even though Putin must understand by now that Ukrainians are willing to fight for as long as it takes to liberate their country, he still believes that time is on his side. That is because Putin expects Western governments and societies to lose their will and interest to keep helping Ukraine. If Putin or his aides watch the television personality Tucker Carlson on Fox News or saw the protests last fall in Prague, their hunch about waning Western support would be confirmed.

Stay informed.

In-depth analysis delivered weekly.

Sign Up

If Russia starts winning on the battlefield, or even fights to a stalemate, few will remember U.S. President Joe Biden’s remarkable leadership in galvanizing the world to assist Ukraine in 2022. This is why Western leaders need to shift how they approach the conflict. At this stage, incrementally expanding military and economic assistance is likely to only prolong the war indefinitely. Instead, in 2023, the United States, NATO, and the democratic world more broadly should aim to support a breakthrough. This means more advanced weapons, more sanctions against Russia, and more economic aid to Ukraine. None of this should be doled out incrementally. It needs to be provided swiftly, so that Ukraine can win decisively on the battlefield this year. Without greater and immediate support, the war will settle into a stalemate, which is only to Putin’s advantage. In the end, the West will be judged by what happened during the last year of the war, not by what happened in the first.

THE BIG BANG THEORY

The most important step the United States and NATO allies can take this year is to provide Ukraine with weapons that will allow its armed forces to go on the offensive sooner and more successfully in eastern Ukraine. This year started with much encouraging news. The United States, France, and Germany announced plans to provide Ukraine with infantry fighting vehicles, including M2 Bradleys and Strykers, AMX-10 RCs, and Marders, respectively. The United Kingdom decided to provide a dozen Challenger II tanks and 30 AS-90 155mm self-propelled howitzers. The United States and Germany announced plans to give Ukraine one battery each of the Patriot air defense system, and the Netherlands pledged to contribute Patriot missiles and launchers. And finally, the United States made the decision last week to provide Ukraine a few dozen M1 Abrams tanks, which paved the way for Germany and other European countries to send the coveted German-made Leopard 2 tanks.

 

This is a strong way to start the year, but our support should not stop there. Ukraine needs more of everything that has already been supplied. It especially needs more High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and more Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLR) munitions, which have proved so effective on the battlefield. If more HIMARS are not available, then the United States should send M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. The more loitering munitions that can be supplied to Ukraine, the better. The number of tanks announced so far is substantial, but still falls multiples short of what the Ukrainian military needs to push Russian occupiers out of their country, especially because the Abrams tanks will take many months to be built, trained on, and deployed. Ukraine could also use several hundred infantry fighting vehicles, which far surpasses those pledged by the United States and other NATO allies in January. Ukraine could also use more Patriot batteries, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, and other air defense systems.

In addition to greater quantities of weapons, the United States and its allies should upgrade the quality of weapons being supplied. At the top of this list should be the long-range missile system called ATACMS. It fires missiles that can travel nearly 200 miles and would thus allow Ukrainian forces to attack Russian airfields and ammunition sites in Crimea and elsewhere that are now out of range and offer sanctuary for Russian soldiers using long-range weapons to attack Ukrainian towns. The provision of long-range strike weapons, including the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb, could be a game-changer in a Ukrainian offensive this spring. The Ukrainian military also needs much stronger offensive air capabilities, including Soviet-made MiG-29 fighter jets and advanced drones such as the U.S. Gray Eagle and Reaper models.

 

Putin still believes that time is on his side.

Ukrainian pilots also should begin training to fly F-16 fighter jets. Eventually, either in later stages of this war or for enhanced deterrence after the war, Ukraine’s air force will need to switch from Soviet- or Russian-made planes to U.S. fighter aircraft. In return for receiving these weapons, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy could sign a legally binding agreement to not use these weapons to strike targets inside Russia.

The way this new military assistance is announced also matters. Rather than providing ATACMs in March, Reapers in June, and jets in September, NATO should go for a Big Bang. Plans to provide all these systems should be announced on February 24, 2023, the first anniversary of Putin’s invasion. An announcement of this size will produce an important psychological effect inside the Kremlin and Russian society, signaling that the West is committed to Ukraine’s ambition to liberate all occupied territories. Already Kremlin propagandists on television lament that they are fighting a well-armed and rich NATO, which has greater resources than Russia. On February 24, Biden and NATO allies could fuel this perception that it would be futile for Russia to continue its fight.

RISK CALCULUS

Soon after the war began, many observers, including me, worried that Putin would view the provision of these kinds of offensive weapons as escalatory. And yet, after deployment of these major weapons systems, Putin so far still has not escalated. The reason is simple: Putin has no good way of doing so. He is already using very expensive cruise missiles to attack apartment buildings. He cannot attack NATO, lest he risk a broader war that Russia would lose quickly. That leaves him with only the nuclear option, but even that would not serve him well. Everyone agrees that a nuclear attack against the United States or other NATO countries is off the table because mutual assured destruction is still in place. The probabilities of Putin using a tactical nuclear weapon inside Ukraine is also very unlikely as it would serve no obvious battlefield objective. It would not stop Ukrainians from fighting. Just the opposite: they would recommit to defeating Russia, and even unleash more attacks, including covert operations against targets inside Russia. Using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine also would rally greater opposition to the war around the world, including in Beijing, within Russian society, and maybe even among Russia’s generals. Obviously, Ukrainians would suffer most from such an attack, and yet they are the ones urging the West not to be deterred by Putin’s nuclear blackmail.

There are risks to providing more and better weapons to Ukraine, but there are also risks to not doing so. If the war in Ukraine drags on for years, so many more people—Ukrainians first and foremost, but also Russians—will die. “Stalemate” on the battlefield is a euphemism for continued death and destruction. This is the cost of incrementalism.

 

Protracted war also risks losing public support in the United States and Europe. At the end of 2022, Biden signed into law a new $45 billion aid package for Ukraine. This should fund U.S. military assistance until the end of this year, including new weapons systems such as ATACMs and fighter jets, should they be given the green light. But now that the House of Representatives is under Republican control, future appropriations could be less forthcoming. If the war drags through the end of the year without major Ukrainian victories, the Biden administration will struggle to obtain congressional renewal for a new military and economic assistance package, especially as the presidential election heats up with at least one major candidate, Donald Trump, who is not a fan of aid to Ukraine. Debate over aid will become fiercer in European capitals, too, if 2023 results in only minor changes on the battlefield. The dangers of incrementalism grow over time.

TIGHTENING THE VISE

Governments supporting Ukraine also need to ratchet up dramatically sanctions. The United States should lead the way by designating the Russian Federation a state sponsor of terrorism. Doing so would first amplify American condemnation of Russian terrorist acts in Ukraine and other countries. But there are also practical effects: U.S. citizens and companies would no longer be able to engage in financial transactions with the Russian government. Higher scrutiny would be given to transactions with Russian state-owned banks, state-owned enterprises, and government-related individuals. Controls over exports, re-export, and transfer of dual-use items would be strengthened.

But a terrorist designation would not close all loopholes. The United States, together with other countries in the sanctions coalition, should enact full-blocking sanctions on all major Russian banks, such as Gazprombank, as well as all state-owned enterprises—all of them—including Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company. Of course, exemptions for the financing of Russian exports of food and fertilizer should remain, but the West must make it more difficult, and therefore more expensive, for Russian companies to transact with the outside world.

New sanctions must be imposed to cut off all critical technologies helping Putin’s war machine, from microprocessors needed to build smart weapons to all forms of imported information technology on which the Russian government and economy relies. The G-7 should reduce the price cap on Russian oil exports further, from today’s $60 limit to $30 a barrel, and introduce greater penalties for shipping companies, insurance agencies, and banks that violate the price cap. And they must apply more pressure on U.S. and European companies still doing business in or with Russia. These companies cannot continue to pay taxes to a terrorist state. They must leave.

 

The dangers of incrementalism grow over time.

Individual sanctions must be expanded dramatically to include all Russian oligarchs still not sanctioned but supporting Putin, all government officials, all top managers and board members of the state-owned enterprises, all propagandists advocating for the war, all Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine, and the family members of everyone in these categories. Sanctioning categories of people, —United Russia party members, government officials, soldiers, and so on— and not specific individuals has the added advantage of giving Russians the option of resigning as a way to get off the sanctions list. At a minimum, countries involved in the sanctions regime could start expanding their lists to include everyone already identified by Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention as deserving of sanctions. Countries imposing sanctions also must coordinate their activities so that if a Russian is sanctioned in one country, that person immediately appears on the sanction list of all countries participating in the sanctions regime.

New travel restrictions should also be imposed on all Russian citizens. A complete travel ban to all democratic countries is one option, although it risks alienating Russians opposed to the war. Another is to make all Russians wanting to travel to democratic countries pay an additional “Ukrainian reconstruction fee” on top of the cost of their visas. If they do not want to pay such a fee for fear that it signals support for Ukraine, then they can vacation in Minsk instead of Barcelona. The way these new sanctions are announced also matters. It is best done all at once by participating countries on February 24.

At the same time, democracies should make it easier for Russians opposed to the war to defect. The tens of thousands of Russia’s best and brightest who have already fled should be given work visas to stay in Europe and the United States. Men who fled Russia to avoid the draft should be given incentives to not return until the war is over. Russian opposition leaders and independent journalists living in exile should be able to obtain visas and work permits, open bank accounts, use credit cards, and monetize their YouTube channels with much greater ease than can be done today.

MONEY AND MESSAGES

Ukraine needs more money, and the West needs to find new ways to provide it. The obvious place to start is to transfer the over $300 billion in Russian Central Bank reserves currently held by the West to the government of Ukraine. Treasury and finance officials in the United States and Europe are nervous about such moves. But state assets have been seized legally in the past, in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and it should be done now. (Moreover, doing so now has the added advantage of sending a deterrent message to China about invading Taiwan, as Beijing has many more financial reserves invested in the West.) In addition, following the lead of the Canadian government, frozen assets of Russian oligarchs should also be considered for confiscation and transfer to Ukraine. Western countries should impose an import tax on all Russian goods and an export tax on all goods and services provided to Russia, the proceeds of which would be transferred to a Ukrainian reconstruction fund. And comprehensive planning for the hundreds of billion dollars postwar reconstruction of Ukraine should begin today—an effort that should include an international pledging conference.

 

Harsher sanctions work to cut off Russia from the world, but the West should simultaneously do more to reach the hearts and minds within Russia. The U.S.-government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty nearly tripled its audience, most of it in Russia and Ukraine, after the war began. Russian independent media now operating outside of Russia also expanded their audiences. Viewership of YouTube channels operated by colleagues of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny also jumped dramatically in 2022. The two channels Navalny originally created have at least 9.5 million subscribers. But every one of these outlets would benefit from more resources, new methods of financing, easier access to work visas, and technologies to help them penetrate Putin’s informational Iron Curtain. New modalities for reaching Russians—be it through text messaging, greater use of TikTok, and Telegram channels, or more subtle cultural messaging rather than direct news—should be attempted.

As long as Russian soldiers occupy their country, Ukrainians will fight. They will fight with or without new advanced weapons, with or without harsher sanctions, with or without money to help them run their country. Understanding this key insight about the Ukrainian mentality today leads to an obvious policy recommendation for the West: help Ukraine win as fast as possible.

The best way to commemorate February 24, the anniversary of Putin’s invasion, is to make clear that this is the West’s strategy. This requires a rollout—coordinated by dozens of countries on the same day—of more and better weapons, tougher sanctions, new economic assistance, greater public diplomacy efforts, and a credible commitment to postwar reconstruction. This is also the best way to avoid being in the same place when February 24, 2024, rolls around.

 

Edited January 30, 2023 by KYHorn

[KYHorn 16863]

 

 

[KYHorn 16863]

 

 

 

Edited January 30, 2023 by KYHorn

[Parliament 14134]

Good luck with that.  

[Pato del Muerto 52342]

Does the west want a swift military defeat of Russia?  Or are they leveraging Ukraine’s commitment to fighting to bleed russia out as much as possible before being defeated, to more thoroughly weaken them?

[Chad Fuck 17565]

Does the west want a swift military defeat of Russia?  Or are they leveraging Ukraine’s commitment to fighting to bleed russia out as much as possible before being defeated, to more thoroughly weaken them?

I wouldn’t attribute to western malice/cynicism what may be more likely typical discussion/dithering at which western democracies excel. We are great at a lot of things, but quick decisive action as a group is not one of them.

[Viper 12028]

5 hours ago, BehoId, The Underminer! said:

Those seem like two cool countries.  They should join up. 

didn't someone post a few days ago about how separating led to Czechia and Slovakia becoming even closer? Classic case of the divorced couple that become best friends. 

[Bevo 13527]

10 minutes ago, Viper said:

didn't someone post a few days ago about how separating led to Czechia and Slovakia becoming even closer? Classic case of the divorced couple that become best friends. 

They were pretty close when they broke up. I was working in Ostrava the year before and was told that it would never happen, that it was just politicians who wanted more power. I pretty much agreed with that assessment back then. It is/was somewhat comparable to the Texas Secede stuff.

Edited January 30, 2023 by Bevo

[SL Xpress 7505]

1 hour ago, Chad Fuck said:

I wouldn’t attribute to western malice/cynicism what may be more likely typical discussion/dithering at which western democracies excel. We are great at a lot of things, but quick decisive action as a group is not one of them.

Representative governments by their nature are not going to be proactive.

It's difficult to get credit for solving a problem that doesn't exist yet. It's more likely you'll get blamed for spending money that shouldn't have been spent.

On the other hand, if you wait until there's a full blown crisis and then folks step in with the full might of the government to solve things, you have a different story. That's how you get people reelected!

It should also be noted that no one in the US is going to win an election based on what they did in Ukraine. Not a single person. I've seen references on twitter by Ukrainian or European centered social media people friendly to Ukraine about how the US electorate will reward politicians if there's a victory prior to 2024 elections, which we know - or at least should know - is completely farcical. 

I'll admit I'm a single issue voter right now the same way some folks are about gun rights, abortion, LGBTQ+, climate change, lower taxes, prayer in school, what have you. Are you or are you not in favor of maximum support for Ukraine, and where are you on that continuum? But I try to engage as many people as possible in conversations regarding Ukraine, simply trying to gauge their interest, and the truth is there isn't any to speak of. This is not a new dynamic. Toqueville described it well in the mid 19th century, and we've never changed. Because of geography, resources, culture, etc. the US is isolationist by nature. It's only because the Democrats controlled both houses for about 50 years and so there was a broad amount of cross party collaboration to get things done, and the elites in this country decided it was important in all kinds of ways for the US to be the leader of the free world, that we're reluctantly in the position we're in, even if foreign policy were determined by direct popular vote it's doubtful we'd have a single military base outside our borders. My goodness, 99% of the people I talk to have no idea who the current president of Mexico is (Obrador), and we're in Texas. A good 90% can't even make a guess at Trudeau as the leader of Canada. They certainly have no concept of a parliamentary system, or what party he represents, or even what other choices there might be. 

(I should make it clear I'm grateful for this forum and others like it I participate on, with people who have a rabid interest in these issues - but we do not represent a powerful voting bloc, I'm afraid)

To me it's a clear choice between good and evil. Ukraine can win this fight with the full support of the west without sending a single NATO troop in. I realize many of us feel frustrated with the shortcomings of the support, but I also look back at how I felt in 2014 when the West REALLY fubared things, and I'm grateful we've at least done as much as we have, because it's been significant, even if not enough. I'm scared the folks who tried to sabotage McCarthy's speaker position are going to be successful in hampering support for Ukraine, but I guess we'll see. 

At this point they need fighter jets and long range missiles. They need a robust resupply of the equipment being given. You can't just send 300 main battle tanks and then Pontius Pilate your way out the door. You have to keep sending them to replace the ones destroyed, and help repair the ones that can be repaired (thank you Poland for the new massive repair installation at the border!). Same thing with the infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. They'll need more ground based air defenses and the missiles that go with them. Ukraine had an unusual number of S-300 platforms to start the war because of their position in the Soviet Union on the far western border, but they have no way to resupply those systems with more missiles. They need even more western platforms so the west can supply even more missiles to arm them.

There is a clock ticking on this conflict. On the one hand, can Ukraine and the West sustain the fight until Russia has a transition fight because of Putin's death. On the other, can Russia sustain this fight until the West loses the appetite to support them. You look at the poll numbers, and outside of the Baltic States, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and a few others, it's not as high a level of support as I'd like to see. Especially in Germany. I feel fortunate the prime minister of Italy, Meroni, seems as supportive of Ukraine as she is, since the Italians in general or in her party don't seem to feel the same. 

I'd love to see the land bridge to Crimea cut off. I don't know how realistic that is militarily, but that would be a huge boon to Ukraine achieving their objectives, IMO. 

[BehoId, The Underminer! 11668]

Nothing credible says Putin is dying, right?  That’s just our wishcasting for how this thing can resolve itself in a timely way, si?

[SL Xpress 7505]

I've posted this guy's stuff (Perun) on this thread before. He's basically a civilian in Australia who started his youtube video making guides for a couple of video games: Dominion 5, which is an extremely complicated low poly fantasy based 4x game, and Phoenix Point, which is an X-Com type tactical strategy game. I've never watched a single video from him on either subject.

He transitioned to analysis of the Russian-Ukraine conflict, starting on March 5, 2022. He's now made 50 videos - basically one per week - covering the conflict.

They're powerpoints of his research on various topics surrounding the conflict, the majority of which I'd describe as detailing the contributions to why Russian has been so inept. 

This one is designed to take more of a devil's advocate position, based on some kind of poll he put up when asking about future videos, where he details what strengths Russia brings to the table, both now and into the future. It's about an hour long, although you can run it at 1.25 speed and still take in everything pretty easily. He is good about citing his sources, and it's clear he does a ton of research, so don't let his background in video games prejudice you towards him as much as it did me at first. 

The clearest conclusion one can come to - and it's absolutely a part of his aim at producing this particular video - is the importance of Western nations to provide long range missiles and fighter jets. The sooner the better. 

Here's the video:

 

[SL Xpress 7505]

3 minutes ago, BehoId, The Underminer! said:

Nothing credible says Putin is dying, right?  That’s just our wishcasting for how this thing can resolve itself in a timely way, si?

I mean, we're all dying. That's the sense in which I mean it for the most part. He's 70 years of age. Stalin was 74 when he was poisoned. I don't foresee some kind of transition of power until that happens. Do you? I certainly don't see Russia suddenly giving up this fight until that happens. This is not the kind of guy you send to the equivalent of St. Helena. So my expectation is this war continues on the Russian side until he's dead. 

[MillerEP 30339]

 

[MillerEP 30339]

 

[Pato del Muerto 52342]

19 minutes ago, BehoId, The Underminer! said:

Nothing credible says Putin is dying, right?  That’s just our wishcasting for how this thing can resolve itself in a timely way, si?

We’re all dying. 

[MillerEP 30339]

 

[BehoId, The Underminer! 11668]

12 minutes ago, SL Xpress said:

I mean, we're all dying. That's the sense in which I mean it for the most part. He's 70 years of age. Stalin was 74 when he was poisoned. I don't foresee some kind of transition of power until that happens. Do you? I certainly don't see Russia suddenly giving up this fight until that happens. This is not the kind of guy you send to the equivalent of St. Helena. So my expectation is this war continues on the Russian side until he's dead. 

Speak for yourself, mortal. 

[SL Xpress 7505]

Another update from Bakhmut.

He indicates in here they received around 5k in reinforcements (a brigade plus a regiment). Could be additional forces. Could be some kind of rotation. 

The fighting sounds ridiculously intense. Watching the maps on various services it seems like Russia continues to make progress in the far north and far south of the city. It's amazing Ukraine continues to hold there despite Russia throwing everything they've got at them.

 

[The Dog 43803]

 

[MillerEP 30339]

 

[texasdago 7553]

Whether Putin lives or dies is irrelevant.  It may stop the current conflict but their culture, the people who support this, their layers or propaganda, the olds and not-so-olds who long for the Russian/Soviet empire will still be there... their system is rotten.  

Exhibit A:

Edited January 30, 2023 by texasdago

[SL Xpress 7505]

3 minutes ago, The Dog said:

 

I mean, it's not funny. It's not. It's really not. Seriously, nothing funny about a Russian propaganda channel sending a woman reporter to cover the war and her being gang raped by the Russian troops there. Maybe if they added pillage it would sound like it was a bit of knockabout fun.

It just seems so par for the course. Send the fucking jets and ATACMS already.

[MillerEP 30339]

 

[DigglerontheHoof 21061]

16 minutes ago, The Dog said:

 

A country and culture that is completely barbaric.  The earth would be a much better place without Russia. 

[SL Xpress 7505]

Just now, texasdago said:

Whether Putin lives or dies is irrelevant.  It may stop the current conflict but their culture, the people who support this, their layers or propaganda, the olds and not-so-olds who long for the Russian/Soviet empire will still be there... their system is rotten.  

I wouldn't say it's irrelevant. When the current leader dying is the only way to get a transition of power, it's extremely relevant.

No one is saying that Russia will somehow change. But there won't be any change in current policy until there's regime change. Even if the system doesn't change.

I remember in the 90s I went to an investment meeting at a house in River Oaks hosted by a family friend. The whole conversation was about the opportunities in Russia. I told them then that we were in a type of Weimar Republic era for Russia and that soon they would fall back to a strong central leader who was likely repressive and autocratic because that's what the Russian people are comfortable with. I was decidedly unwelcome and was told I was a doomsday sort. 

At the time I thought we would have been better off with a sort of Marshall Plan for Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, but in hindsight it's clear it would have simply ended up in the hands of criminal bosses. I remember hosting some judges as part of my Rotary group who had come over to see how the US justice system worked, and how it implemented a rule by law. I really enjoyed meeting with all of them. About a half dozen of them. They were here for about 3 weeks. We met with judges at the municipal, JOP, district, and federal level. Now I look back and think about what a big waste of time it was. 

In any case, the death of Putin is not irrelevant. Thinking that it's a magic wand and suddenly Russia becomes a liberal state based on rule of law is a fantasy. That part is absolutely true. To change the Japanese and German systems - and make no mistake, both of those cultures still think they're better than anyone else, and their predatory nature is still exhibited in their economic export oriented policies - required long occupation periods. Japan had literally never been conquered before. Being conquered (or not being conquered, for that matter) changes a nation's collective consciousness in ways that few things can. Look at how much the UK changed from the Vikings, William of Orange, the Normans. I can't imagine how different the United States would be after emerging from some kind of foreign occupation. In any case, no one is going to be occupying Russia, so that's flat out. 

[Bevo 13527]

22 minutes ago, texasdago said:

Whether Putin lives or dies is irrelevant.  It may stop the current conflict but their culture, the people who support this, their layers or propaganda, the olds and not-so-olds who long for the Russian/Soviet empire will still be there... their system is rotten.  

Exhibit A:

I assume Oleysa & Alexei threatened the waiter with a poor Yelp review.

[The Dog 43803]

 

[MillerEP 30339]

 

[Chad Fuck 17565]

[/url]  

Wtf is that?

[BehoId, The Underminer! 11668]

 

[NorthLoop 14091]

10 minutes ago, Chad Fuck said:

Wtf is that?

death ray duh

[Chad Fuck 17565]

1 minute ago, NorthLoop said:

death ray duh

[BehoId, The Underminer! 11668]

Someone in the comments was theorizing it’s an anti tank missile used anti personnel.