Jump to content

Русский корабль - иди нахуй

Eastwood

By Eastwood
in Daily Texan

 Share

Recommended Posts

  • Replies 86.2k
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

  • atomheartbevo

    8603

  • MillerEP

    7286

  • Schulz2.0

    3638

  • InkaUtexas

    2980

Popular Days

Top Posters In This Topic

Popular Days

Popular Posts

AUS-97HORN
AUS-97HORN

For the love of Christ woman,  stop posting the same fucking thing every 20 mins just to make your neurotic self feel better.     Bring something useful to the thread other than your inane babbli

closetohumping
closetohumping
InkaUtexas
InkaUtexas

I volunteered today. Log/Admin role to replace people for 30-60 days. The operation is in the west, or should the Orcs win will be pulled back behind the NATO wall. Either way the humanitarian effort

Posted Images

Gravy Train

Gravy Train 974

Posted
Posted
5 hours ago, Post Oak said:

FWIW - Zeihan had something on this a few months back. My memory is hazy but what he said was that Sweden knows who did it but if they come out and make it public (it was Russia) then that is considered an act of war and shit gets turned up to 11. Then NATO is all in.

No one wants that. That's why there has been no formal announcement.

Some of my details may be off but that was the gist of it. 

With its reputation of the Hårsfjärden incident, I'm not sure anyone wants to ask the Swedes what's going on in their waters.  

Link to comment
Share on other sites
MissingInAction

MissingInAction 24807

Posted
Posted
3 hours ago, YGIFS said:

A very critical component of the Challenger 2 electronics system is designed/updated here in Austin, Texas.  Nice to know my neighbor will be helping blow up Russian soldiers beyond recognition.  I should buy him a drink, or at least help prune their yard.

I used to assemble power supplies for sidewinder missiles here in the atx many moons ago.

  • Hook 'Em 2
Link to comment
Share on other sites
BehoId, The Underminer!

BehoId, The Underminer! 11668

Posted
Posted

Tim Snyder has some interesting thoughts about the nuclear side of things.  He puts out so much content that some of the quality of some of it isn’t really up to what you would think of someone like him but I appreciated this. It puts into words what I’ve been feeling over the last year, transforming my fear of crossing a red line to you know what, let’s just give them Raytheon’s direct number. 
 

Quote
https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd93e61d9-05df-4a86-91d2-36569861802e_256x256.png

Thinking about...

SubscribeSign in
 
 
Read in the Substack app
Open app

Nuclear war!

Why it isn't happening

https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fec174080-5aa3-45c7-a3c7-7b2767df4ede_2000x3008.jpeg
54 min ago
46
5
 

 

Subscribe
 
 
 

Clickbait! 

That's been a problem in the discussion of the Russian invasion.  Media get your attention by writing of escalation!  Not to mention: nuclear threats! And: nuclear war!  There is a profit motive at work here, one that Russian propagandists exploit by their references to nuclear weapons.  Unfortunately, the atmospherics of what should be a sober conversation are brought more by a counting of dollars than by a reckoning of risks. 

That is one reason why we should be ashamed of our discussion of nuclear war, but not the main one.  Our nuclear talk is a way to claim victimhood, and then to blame the actual victims.  Once we turn our attention to a hypothetical exchange of missiles, we get to imagine that we are the victims.  Suddenly the actual war no longer seems to matter, since our lives (we imagine) are at risk.  And the Ukrainians seem to be at fault.  If only they would stop fighting, then we could all be safe.  This, of course, is exactly how Russian propagandists want us to reason.  And it is wrong.

Not just morally wrong, though of course it is that.  Actual Ukrainians are actually fighting and dying in a war that serves our security in countless ways -- including by reducing the risk of nuclear war, as I'll discuss below.  And we spend our time imagining our own victimhood? 

Yielding to Russian nuclear talk is also wrong, and embarrassingly so, as strategic thinking.  It is an example of a narcissistic fantasy that looms over discussions of American foreign policy: the fantasy of omnipotent submission.  This is the notion, birthed in American exceptionalism and impatience, that since America is the power behind everything, all will be well if America does nothing.  If we do what the Russian propagandists want, and do nothing for Ukraine, then (in this fantasy) there will be no nuclear war.

In the fantasy of omnipotent submission, America has the magical power, by way of complete inaction, to restore a peaceful status quo where we could all sleep soundly.  But America has no such power.  And there is no way to do nothing.  American policymakers have to act within a certain setting, formed by many actors in complex interactions, in which doing nothing will always have consequences, just as doing something will always have consequences.  Doing nothing, in fact, always amounts to doing something, and usually (as in the case of Russian invasion) it is the wrong something!  In this case, doing nothing (to support Ukraine) would increase the risk of nuclear war.  By doing something specific, by supplying arms to Ukraine, the United States has assisted the Ukrainians in decreasing the chances of nuclear war.

I can only make this argument if you will follow me into the realm of strategic thinking.  We have to do this step by step.  The fantasy of omnipotent submission builds and releases anxiety.  Someone in Russia issues a threat; feckless commentators and propagandists amplify it; and then we seek a quick way to release the fear.  Or: the United States send weapons; feckless commentators and propagandists speak of escalation!; and, again, we seek a quick way to release the fear.  When this becomes a habit, it takes the place of thinking about the risks and benefits policy. 

In psychological terms, the fantasy of omnipotent submission is understandable.  So let us understand it as psychology -- and also understand that the Russians deploy it as psychology.  The fantasy is used against us.  We need to be thoughtful about it in order to resist it.  And as we try to work our way out from under it, we must realize that it is there to prevent strategic thinking. 

 

https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.ama

 

Mushrooms, near Kyiv

So, deep breath.  Russia has an interest in anxiety; media has an interest in anxiety; your body can get locked in anxiety.  Getting over that is the hard part.  Once we do, the strategic thinking is the easy part.  It starts in the real world.  Russia invaded Ukraine.  That happened.  We cannot transport ourselves back to the world of 2021.  (Even if we somehow could, we would just be in a world where Russia was about to invade Ukraine...).  Operating within a world where the invasion happened, the soundest nuclear policy is to help Ukraine win a conventional war.  This is for four reasons.

First, it would be a disaster for everyone if Russian nuclear blackmail succeeded.  If any nuclear state can coerce others by references to its nuclear stockpile, then foreign policy of any kind becomes impossible, non-nuclear states will always have to yield, and nuclear states will run the world.  If Russian nuclear blackmail succeeds, we can expect not only more Russian nuclear blackmail, but also nuclear blackmail from other nuclear powers.  We can also expect that other countries will build nuclear weapons to resist future blackmail.  And so support of Ukraine decreases the chances of nuclear war by showing that nuclear blackmail does not work.

Second, global nuclear proliferation should be prevented.  The risk of nuclear war has a mathematical character.  The more countries have nuclear weapons, the more likely it becomes that they will be used.  Russian policy pushes in the direction of nuclear proliferation.  Ukraine actually gave up its nuclear weapons.  Then Russia invaded, in 2014 and again in 2022.  The lesson for non-nuclear states is that they will need nuclear weapons to deter Russian invasion, or invasion by any nuclear power.  The way to prevent that conclusion is for Ukraine to win a conventional war.  And so support of Ukraine reduces the chances of nuclear war by reducing the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.

Third, the European scenario for nuclear confrontation should be made as unlikely as possible.  That scenario is a large war between Russia and NATO, in which there would be nuclear powers on both sides.  In its Soviet and then its later Russian variant, this vision has haunted the minds of Americans and Europeans for decades.  Thanks to Ukrainian resistance, such a war is far less likely than it has been.  The forces Russia might have used in an attack on a NATO member are being destroyed in Ukraine.  Even in the scenario where Russia somehow does mount an offensive against a NATO state, any temptation to use nuclear weapons in response has been reduced by the knowledge that Russia can be defeated in a conventional war.  And so support of Ukraine reduces the chance of nuclear war making the European scenario less likely.

Fourth, the Asian scenario for nuclear confrontation should be made as unlikely as possible.  In the last couple of decades, the possibility of a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan has dominated discussions in Washington.  Americans have been frustrated and frightened by what they take to be the inevitability of the confrontation.  The idea that some other country might deflect it was never part of the debate.  But that is happening.  By resisting Russia, Ukrainians have forced Beijing to recognize that offensive operations are risky and can end badly.  Beijing has by no means lost interest in Taiwan, but it is safe to say that any drastic move has been delayed, at least for a few years. 

And these are an important few years.  A year ago, when Russia invaded, the conventional wisdom was still that China was a rising power.  In the broader American thinking about all this, this was the essence pf the problem: a rising power (China) must confront a declining power (the U.S.).  Now it is much less clear that China is a rising power.  The Ukrainians have delayed the most dangerous scenario; and in doing so, they might have gotten us through the most dangerous moment.  Notably, they have done all this without confronting China.  And so support of Ukraine reduces the chance of nuclear war by making the Asian scenario much less likely.

If we want to reduce the risk of global nuclear war, then we should arm Ukrainians.  Doing so reduces the appeal of nuclear blackmail, the risk of nuclear proliferation, and the likelihood of the scenarios. 

If what we have in mind is a local use by Russia of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, this is a different question.  It is impossible to rule out.  But here the risk is one that the Ukrainians have a right to discuss, since it is their land and their people.  Over and over again, they have made plain that the delivery of western conventional weapons is their priority.  One could say that Ukrainians are wrongly evaluating the risks: this, though, would smack of the kind of colonial arrogance that persuaded so many of us that Ukraine would not resist, or would be quickly defeated if they did.  The Ukrainian leadership knows what it is doing.  And they are doing what their voters want them to do. 

Rather than just listening to Ukrainians about their evaluation of risk of local nuclear use, we sometimes seek Putin's inner thoughts.  When people imagine the use of Russian nuclear weapons in Ukraine, a certain weird empathy comes into play: Putin will feel that his back is against the wall, that he has no choice.  

If we treat that as a hypothesis, we see that it has been disproven.  Russia lost the battles of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson without using nuclear weapons.  Russia has suffered almost a year of surprising defeats of various kinds, not least the collapse of its entire war plan, which involved overthrowing the Ukrainian government and controlling the entire country.  And yet: no nuclear weapon use.  Instead, each defeat generates stories about how Russia was not actually defeated.  That is worth noting.  The escalation one actually sees is narrative.  It takes more and more work for Russians to explain defeat as victory.  But so far they have been up to the task.

Wars end when the political power of rulers is threatened, and we have not yet reached that point.  When we do, Putin will feel the threat in Moscow, not in Ukraine.  In such a situation, using nuclear weapons in Ukraine will not help him.  Withdrawing conventional forces from Ukraine for a power struggle in Russia might.  During that power struggle, no Russian struggling for control of the Kremlin will admit that the war in Ukraine was lost.  Instead, contenders for power will compete with their stories of how grand the victory actually was.  My expectation is that the next Russian leader (or Putin if he remains) will claim that Russia won an extraordinary victory over NATO by eliminating NATO forces in Ukraine before they had a chance to cross into Russian territory.

In both the global and the Ukrainian settings, the Russian calculation is that nuclear talk will induce Europeans and North Americans to deter themselves from sending weapons.  But deploying talk is very different from deploying weapons.  Indeed, it is an alternative to doing so.  We too easily assume that the word must be the antecedent to the deed.  But the word is the deed.  When deploying nuclear talk is the policy, then actually deploying a nuclear weapon undoes the policy.  The implied threat is no longer available, once used.  And the Russian leadership knows that the Americans and everyone else would send more far, far weapons to Ukraine were Russia to use a battlefield nuclear weapon. 

The use of a nuclear weapon on the Ukrainian battlefield would have far greater costs than this for Russia: in the moment, and for years and decades down the line.  Moscow would lose even what tentative support it has around the world.  It would forfeit its ability to present itself as a victim in international relations.  Its leaders would know that they would be remembered as criminals and pariahs.  And that is not even to mention what would usually be mentioned first: direct deterrence.  Should Russia break the taboo of nuclear use, its own status as a military power would be dramatically compromised by the military response of others.

Nuclear weapons are symbolic, for different people in different ways.  I want to close on the question of status, from the Russian point of view.  People sometimes say that a nuclear power cannot lose a war.  This that makes historians cry into their pillows.  The United States is a nuclear power that loses wars on a regular basis.  The Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, Russia lost the first Chechen war.  The French nuclear test in 1960 did not save it from defeat in Algeria, any more than British nuclear weapons preserved the Empire.  The use of a battlefield nuclear weapon will not win the war for Russia in Ukraine, but it would be a tremendous blow to Russian status, which is something that Russian leaders do care about. 

This requires some explanation.  When this war began, the two things that made Russians believe that they were a superpower were the army and the nuclear arsenal.  The first source of status is now in question.  If Russia uses a nuclear weapon, that is an admission that its army has been beaten.  So the first source of status has been conceded -- along with the second.  The moment Russia uses a nuclear weapon, other countries, including those with superior economies and scientific establishments, will build their own nuclear arsenals.  When that happens, Russia ceases to be a superpower, even in the minds of Russians.  That, for Russian elites, is the one intolerable outcome of this war.  It is far worse than withdrawing troops from Ukraine -- for that there will always be a story.  There is no story that can restore the sense of superpower status after it is lost. 

One-year anniversary clickbait! 

It has been almost a year since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.  The magic of anniversaries assures that there will be many articles about Ukraine on February 24th, no doubt some of them reflective and interesting.  I will nevertheless predict that there will be a number of essays along the lines of: "Hey, Let's Keep Talking About Nuclear War."  

It is also safe to say that no one will publish an op-ed along the lines of "We Talked About Putin's Mind For a Year, And We Were Wrong "; or "Despite Our Reflexive Use of the Word 'Escalation,' It Never Happened"; and certainly not "A Year After Russia's Invasion, Ukraine has Reduced the Risk of Nuclear Conflict Around the World." 

But that is the most important thing to say about nuclear war: it's not happening.

Thinking about... is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Subscribe
 
 
 

Share

 
https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff5d2ff29-ade7-4139-8d7b-bef0c9134c8a_1238x1240.jpeghttps%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fd3ce0d04-fa3e-4f47-9e11-494bbe065908_144x144.pnghttps%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F7502dd2d-ae11-4975-a4d0-ae828eb54cf5_100x100.jpeghttps%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fe8eb6a9f-4e4d-4914-bff3-3daeba489ae5_399x399.jpeghttps%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Ff69bb25d-b3ff-49b5-a269-7b7a04d45628_144x144.png
46 likes
 
5 Comments
 

https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack.com%2Fimg%2Favata

 
 
 
 
 

Fantastic! It is a great pleasure to receive each text of yours. Thank you so much for your explanations. Many people seem not to see what is at stake here! Ukraine MUST win this.

All best

With great admiration

Vítor Oliveira Jorge

Institute of Contemporary History - Lisbon

Professor (retired) of the University of Porto, Portugal

 
 
 
 
 
33 min ago·edited 32 min ago

Today I ignore Putin’s ‘end game’ nuclear threats. I recall stories of when Henry Kissinger, during Nikon’s ‘bad moments’ in 1973, would seek assurance from top military that a Nixon nuclear launch order would be ‘slow walked.’

I am confident that the top Russian military would do the same with Putin, if, in deep despair and humiliation, he sought to press the red button. Our military, in 1973, and Russian military today, are opposed to a tizzy fit nuclear Armageddon.

Meanwhile, we must assure that Ukraine retains its sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

(Former Foreign Service Officer and history professor—for 23 years)

 

3 more comments…

 

  • Hook 'Em 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites
Gatorubet

Gatorubet 30083

Posted
Posted
30 minutes ago, The Dog said:

"How'd you follow the war?"

"I watched YouTube videos with a sock puppet."

"WTF"

Very informative.  

I know the Bradleys are used in more of an armored cavalry mode as reconnaissance and attack vehicles, but at the very least, you might prepare some fixed or camouflaged Bradley positions where approaching Russian tanks can join the turret-tossing competition at the invitation of tow missiles.

What is the reason we aren’t giving them stuff with the best thermals and optics? Are we worried about our technology getting in Russian hands? Seeing first is winning and seeing later is dead. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites
956 Worldwide

956 Worldwide 34411

Posted
Posted
2 hours ago, Gatorubet said:

Very informative.  

I know the Bradleys are used in more of an armored cavalry mode as reconnaissance and attack vehicles, but at the very least, you might prepare some fixed or camouflaged Bradley positions where approaching Russian tanks can join the turret-tossing competition at the invitation of tow missiles.

What is the reason we aren’t giving them stuff with the best thermals and optics? Are we worried about our technology getting in Russian hands? Seeing first is winning and seeing later is dead. 

I think the Bradley’s are coming out of drawdown authority, which means existing stocks.  It’s hard to imagine the president directing the military to give up its better equipment and leaving our own forces with second tier and out of date stuff. You don’t know when you might need it. It will be interesting to see what the Ukrainians get now that we’re tapping into funding to go straight to industry. 

  • Hook 'Em 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites
  • Popular Post
956 Worldwide

956 Worldwide 34411

Posted
  • Popular Post
Posted
11 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

One of the things that’s worth looking at with this pipeline/Hersh thing is just how similar the info op is to other info ops— namely MH-17.  I know surly isn’t taken in with this, I’m not trying to convince you- just drawing some dots on how this works. You may remember from MH-17 that various Kremlin adjacent sources cycled through several theories before settling on “Ukraine shot it down,” including “it was a plane full of dead bodies.” 
 

So, back to the NS sabotage. Last fall the Kremlin announced that the UK did it. Not some gray zone disinfo outlet. Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, announced that the UK bombed the pipelines. 
 

https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2022/11/1/russia-accuses-uk-of-directing-nord-stream-blasts

 

This was an extraordinary claim, and of course there was no evidence. Nevertheless— the Russians have already attributed blame to the British. Full stop, as our friends across the pond say. 
 

Now, Seymour Hersh has a scoop! America blew up the pipeline! Joe Biden, personally, directed it. Hersh mentions many different countries in his blog, the UK is notably not one of them. 
 

And of course, Hersh never mentions that the Kremlin has already attributed this attack to someone else. Not even obliquely. At the bare minimum, an honest reporter would point out that “according to my investigation, the actual truth is in conflict with the official version promoted by the Kremlin.” 
 

More notably— not a single amplifier who is excited about this “scoop” has bothered to point out that either Hersh is wrong, or the Kremlin lied to the world last fall when it blamed the UK. There is no second option. But the Kremlin’s official account is down the memory hole, like it never happened. 
 

This is the power of lying not just sometimes, but all the time. When it’s expected and accepted, you are never held accountable. 

 

It is not possible anymore to deny that Tucker Carlson is an amplifier, if not an active participant, in Russian active measures against the United States and Ukraine. 
 

image.thumb.jpeg.d410da06515e880c7d8f50c019290457.jpeg

Hopefully we can keep this on the thread. The single biggest determinate in the outcome of the war is U.S. support for Ukraine. It is not possible to disaggregate the battlefield from the information space in the U.S. It’s explicit Kremlin doctrine that they are one war, different theaters. 

  • Hook 'Em 5
  • Like 1
  • Rage+1 13
  • Drool 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites
KYHorn

KYHorn 16833

Posted
Posted
1 hour ago, 956 Worldwide said:

It is not possible anymore to deny that Tucker Carlson is an amplifier, if not an active participant, in Russian active measures against the United States and Ukraine. 
 

image.thumb.jpeg.d410da06515e880c7d8f50c019290457.jpeg

Hopefully we can keep this on the thread. The single biggest determinate in the outcome of the war is U.S. support for Ukraine. It is not possible to disaggregate the battlefield from the information space in the U.S. It’s explicit Kremlin doctrine that they are one war, different theaters. 

This is all just daring NATO to release the information they have. Release it and use it as justification for ATACMS and F16s

  • Hook 'Em 5
Link to comment
Share on other sites
KYHorn

KYHorn 16833

Posted
Posted

 

 

 Key quote from article below: 

“We have a powerful defense package from the United Kingdom,” Zelenskyy said following the negotiations with Sunak at the Bovington Camp military base in the UK.

 

“We have agreed on a significant number of armored vehicles, the supply of long-range weapons, and also we have agreed to start training Ukrainian pilots,” the President announced.

https://english.nv.ua/nation/uk-meeting-with-ukraine-extremely-productive-says-ukraine-president-zelensky-50303095.html 

  • Hook 'Em 5
  • Drool 1
Link to comment
Share on other sites
SimonBolivar

SimonBolivar 10910

Posted
Posted
5 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

It is not possible anymore to deny that Tucker Carlson is an amplifier, if not an active participant, in Russian active measures against the United States and Ukraine. 
 

image.thumb.jpeg.d410da06515e880c7d8f50c019290457.jpeg

Hopefully we can keep this on the thread. The single biggest determinate in the outcome of the war is U.S. support for Ukraine. It is not possible to disaggregate the battlefield from the information space in the U.S. It’s explicit Kremlin doctrine that they are one war, different theaters. 

He was beating the "Russia and Ukraine wanted peace, but US said no" line a couple days back.

  • Hook 'Em 1
  • Rage+1 3
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

×
 Share
Go to topic listing


Football ... Basketball ... Baseball ... Other Sports ... Futbol ... 🤫995🤫 ... Gambling ... Movies & TV ... Music ... Hobbies ... Lulz ... Food & Travel ... Daily Texan ... Business and Markets ... Cloak Room ... Help ... For Sale ... Board Discussion ... Subscribe!... Donate!... Advertise... COOKIE MONSTER!

×
×
  • Create New...