Русский корабль - иди нахуй

[Nice Guy Eddie 13412]

I don't disagree that Germany and Russia have an economic relationship that is more important than Ukraine but Russia needs Germany more than the other way around. Sure Germany has a o&g problem if they cut off Russia but that can be managed long term. Russia has the opposite problem. If Germany cuts them off, they're screwed long term.

[Immaculate Vibes 114]

8 minutes ago, Nice Guy Eddie said:

I don't disagree that Germany and Russia have an economic relationship that is more important than Ukraine but Russia needs Germany more than the other way around. Sure Germany has a o&g problem if they cut off Russia but that can be managed long term. Russia has the opposite problem. If Germany cuts them off, they're screwed long term.

Politicians thinking tends to be short term though. 

[phdhorn 6224]

Sometime geopolitics is complex, sometimes it's not.

This one isn't.

Russia could invade the Ukraine and there's nothing anyone in the world can do about it, really.  And there won't be any significant ramifications for Russia if they do.

While we're at it, 

China could invade Taiwan and there's nothing anyone in the world can do about it, really.  And there won't be any significant ramifications for China if they do.

[Eastwood 4394]

Germany bends the knee to Russia, so they can keep their houses warm. What is it with them, cold winters and Russia?

Typical western democracy. Human rights and the sovereignty of countries are important until actual sacrifice is needed to preserve them.

The gas problem is a big one, though. There were no easy solutions for Germany and Russia played dead just long enough to maintain Berlin's dependency on Russian supply. The only solution I can think of is an expansion of LNG in Germany, but that is time consuming, expensive, and still vulnerable to disruption during times of war, as the ships would require heavy naval escort across the Atlantic. But the US has the supply to keep all of Europe powered if the infrastructure is put in place.

[Shady Ray 1633]

What a clusterfuck:

 

EU uncertain over trigger for sanctions if Russia acts against Ukraine

Some member states remain wary of responding to ‘hybrid’ attacks such as cyber warfare

...

The EU, alongside the US and UK, has warned that Russia will face sanctions entailing “massive consequences and severe costs” in the event of an attack on Ukraine. They want to deter a feared assault sparked by the deployment of more than 100,000 troops close to the country’s border.

But EU countries do not agree on what scale of attack would trigger a response. Some argue that so-called hybrid attacks — such as deploying cyber weapons or a “false flag” operation sparking a response — may not meet the threshold, according to four officials involved in the discussions.

Official said informal talks last week hosted by France made clear the divergence.

“There was no agreement at all on what aggression means, and very big differences between states,” said a person involved in the talks. “Some want all kinds of hybrid actions to be included, others aren’t far away from only full invasion [being enough to trigger sanctions].”

 

...

 

Officials from some member states, particularly eastern and northern countries geographically closer to Russia, worry that without a defined trigger for sanctions bigger countries such as France or Germany would in effect take a political decision on whether the bloc should respond to any steps taken by Moscow.

That has raised concerns that moves short of a full invasion, such as the use of proxy fighters or intentional sabotage inside Ukraine used as a pretext for Russian intervention — as the US warned last week was being planned by Moscow — could be overlooked by some EU states reluctant to impose sanctions.

“Defining what ‘when something happens’ means is right now the biggest question,” a second person told the Financial Times. “We don’t have a system for automatic application of sanctions . . . As it stands right now, it will depend on the political mood.” 

https://www.ft.com/content/dedf5460-f4ff-4580-abfd-eedc0cb43372

[Nice Guy Eddie 13412]

Take the pipelines out the equation and does anyone really think that Germany or even the UK is going to war over Ukraine? The most that I could see from any Western power is to declare Ukraine a no-fly zone to prevent Russian air forces from supporting their ground forces. And even that is a stretch but it could be a strategy to prevent an invasion of the entire country. 

[Brisketexan 104604]

8 minutes ago, Bravo said:

The US back in the day should've pushed so much harder to stop this pipeline with incentives and strong arming. Probably should've really worked out a US NG deal which wouldn't of been dramatically more expensive than the pipeline. Doesn't matter now. Germany is now quasi under control by Russia. 

Except a US NG deal 1) would have been significantly more expensive, 2) would have taken a long time to develop in terms of infrastructure and shit to make it happen, and 3) would never have been seen by Germany as reliable as a physical pipeline.

Nothing has changed -- Germany was and is under Russia's thumb in this respect.  When party A has something party B desperately needs, party A has an inordinate amount of leverage.

AND, as PhD pointed out, when party C wants to stop party A from doing some shenanigans, and the only real leverage available is actual combat.....options become quite limited.

Russia has exactly one piece of major leverage in this world: it is the primary supply of natural gas to Europe, which gets cold and needs heat and shit.  Their secondary piece is being a big enough military threat that tangling with them is a major engagement.  This is their game.  The Russians may have only one major piece on the chess board, but they sure as shit know how to play it to their advantage.

 

Oh, and Germany's strident "no nukes, ever, at all, in any way" attitude means that there is no long-term play to get out of their current situation.  They are beholden to Russian gas, and will be for decades to come.

Edited January 19, 2022 by Brisketexan

[NeverMarryAStripper 21781]

Ukraine should take out major stretches of those pipelines before they go down

[956 Worldwide 34440]

6 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

Except a US NG deal 1) would have been significantly more expensive, 2) would have taken a long time to develop in terms of infrastructure and shit to make it happen, and 3) would never have been seen by Germany as reliable as a physical pipeline.

Nothing has changed -- Germany was and is under Russia's thumb in this respect.  When party A has something party B desperately needs, party A has an inordinate amount of leverage.

AND, as PhD pointed out, when party C wants to stop party A from doing some shenanigans, and the only real leverage available is actual combat.....options become quite limited.

Russia has exactly one piece of major leverage in this world: it is the primary supply of natural gas to Europe, which gets cold and needs heat and shit.  Their secondary piece is being a big enough military threat that tangling with them is a major engagement.  This is their game.  The Russians may have only one major piece on the chess board, but they sure as shit know how to play it to their advantage.

There was no need to work out a U.S. LNG deal.  The nasty truth about NS2 is that it doesn't bring on board any new sources of gas or additional capacity to Germany.  What it does do is bypass Ukraine and Central Europe, which increases Russia's ability to strong-arm and divide Europe.  Russia has long had plenty of capacity available to book on those pipelines, but it won't do so-- because artificially creating a gas shortage in Germany helps prod them to press ahead on NS2.

Merkel also prematurely announced the elimination of nuclear without even a pretense of having alternate sources online, aside from NS2.  

NS2 is a geopolitical project, not an energy or commercial project.  It's not an exaggeration to say that Russia is holding a gun to Europe's head that Germany loaded and handed to them. As to why the Germans would choose to screw over their neighbors for the sake of something that will not really save them any money and that will cause greater energy insecurity through Europe?  Well, you might start by combing through the board of directors of the various companies involved in putting this deal together, all the way from Gazprom down . . . .

[phdhorn 6224]

48 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

Except a US NG deal 1) would have been significantly more expensive, 2) would have taken a long time to develop in terms of infrastructure and shit to make it happen, and 3) would never have been seen by Germany as reliable as a physical pipeline.

Nothing has changed -- Germany was and is under Russia's thumb in this respect.  When party A has something party B desperately needs, party A has an inordinate amount of leverage.

AND, as PhD pointed out, when party C wants to stop party A from doing some shenanigans, and the only real leverage available is actual combat.....options become quite limited.

Russia has exactly one piece of major leverage in this world: it is the primary supply of natural gas to Europe, which gets cold and needs heat and shit.  Their secondary piece is being a big enough military threat that tangling with them is a major engagement.  This is their game.  The Russians may have only one major piece on the chess board, but they sure as shit know how to play it to their advantage.

 

Oh, and Germany's strident "no nukes, ever, at all, in any way" attitude means that there is no long-term play to get out of their current situation.  They are beholden to Russian gas, and will be for decades to come.

Not to mention that the entire eastern half of Ukraine is overwhelmingly Russian in culture, identity, and favoritism.  I would think that a good portion of those people would welcome being "back" in Russia.  I can see a lot of the land east/south of the Dneiper essentially turning Russian within days.

The ironic thing in all this is that Ukraine is light years away from being qualified to enter NATO anyway... they wouldn't be able w/o special exception to "make the grade" for a decade at least.  Obama's administration gets blamed for the Crimea in 2014, but there's nothing whatsoever they really could have done (sanctions, yawn).  That is exactly the same scenario now.  Nothing you can so short of dropping a nuke, and well, we know how that would go.  So...

It won't take long for the Russians to render the Ukrainian Air Force moot, and the Chia Pet-era Ukrainian tanks will be nothing but supper for the Russian current-tech models.

Ukraine's best bet is to give up the east, huddle near Kiev and defend it, and hope like hell someone comes to their aid militarily.  I don't see that.  But I don't think Putin would want the entire country, just the eastern half.  Of course, that's just a guess.

Belarus as well as Moldavia might also be at risk - Putin wants his buffers again.  But I think he would stop there.  He can no longer go into Romania, or the Baltic states, which are in no way culturally/racially tied to Russia.  If he did that, Russia would lose big time... unless China came in.

The recent Chinese-Russo alliances (space race, Siberian 2 pipeline, 2015 grain accords) have really warmed relations between the two. 

There's no way right now China would enter militarily.  But they could easily supply Russia with current tech weapons for years.

Unfortunately, this could be a case where one of the former satellites is just (re)-given up.  Because there's not much anyone can do about it, and the future of Europe and Asia is as concerning as at any time since 1945.  I don't see any way the Western allies could defeat a Russo-Chinese military campaign - without huge, significant destruction to people and property - and yes, in our own country.  I think the best hope is if Putin wants the country, he'll get it - and hope that's about it.

 

[Brisketexan 104604]

12 minutes ago, phdhorn said:

Not to mention that the entire eastern half of Ukraine is overwhelmingly Russian in culture, identity, and favoritism.  I would think that a good portion of those people would welcome being "back" in Russia.  I can see a lot of the land east/south of the Dneiper essentially turning Russian within days.

The ironic thing in all this is that Ukraine is light years away from being qualified to enter NATO anyway... they wouldn't be able w/o special exception to "make the grade" for a decade at least.  Obama's administration gets blamed for the Crimea in 2014, but there's nothing whatsoever they really could have done (sanctions, yawn).  That is exactly the same scenario now.  Nothing you can so short of dropping a nuke, and well, we know how that would go.  So...

It won't take long for the Russians to render the Ukrainian Air Force moot, and the Chia Pet-era Ukrainian tanks will be nothing but supper for the Russian current-tech models.

Ukraine's best bet is to give up the east, huddle near Kiev and defend it, and hope like hell someone comes to their aid militarily.  I don't see that.  But I don't think Putin would want the entire country, just the eastern half.  Of course, that's just a guess.

Belarus as well as Moldavia might also be at risk - Putin wants his buffers again.  But I think he would stop there.  He can no longer go into Romania, or the Baltic states, which are in no way culturally/racially tied to Russia.  If he did that, Russia would lose big time... unless China came in.

The recent Chinese-Russo alliances (space race, Siberian 2 pipeline, 2015 grain accords) have really warmed relations between the two. 

There's no way right now China would enter militarily.  But they could easily supply Russia with current tech weapons for years.

Unfortunately, this could be a case where one of the former satellites is just (re)-given up.  Because there's not much anyone can do about it, and the future of Europe and Asia is as concerning as at any time since 1945.  I don't see any way the Western allies could defeat a Russo-Chinese military campaign - without huge, significant destruction to people and property - and yes, in our own country.  I think the best hope is if Putin wants the country, he'll get it - and hope that's about it.

 

The play is to fund an insurgency.  Afghanistan didn't go well for Russia (or us, ultimately) because a steady stream of body bags for not much in return doesn't sell well at home.

Providing enough advanced munitions to kill multiple Russians a day for a year or two isn't a bad play.  10,000 dead Russian troops dead after a coupla years, steady stream of body bags coming home, for what?  It's a good way to burn through support at home.  Attrition is a powerful tool.

[phdhorn 6224]

20 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

The play is to fund an insurgency.  Afghanistan didn't go well for Russia (or us, ultimately) because a steady stream of body bags for not much in return doesn't sell well at home.

Providing enough advanced munitions to kill multiple Russians a day for a year or two isn't a bad play.  10,000 dead Russian troops dead after a coupla years, steady stream of body bags coming home, for what?  It's a good way to burn through support at home.  Attrition is a powerful tool.

Possibly, but there would likely be a ton of more dead other armies (Ukraine, UK, NATO, etc.)... and as we know so well, an overwhelming desire to get out/give up and concede defeat.  Attrition works both ways.

[Brisketexan 104604]

Possibly, but there would likely be a ton of more dead other armies (Ukraine, UK, NATO, etc.)... and as we know so well, an overwhelming desire to get out/give up and concede defeat.  Attrition works both ways.

I think it would be mostly Ukrainian on the other side….and fighting on your home soil tends to mitigate the concern about dead bodies coming home. Foreign expeditions resulting in attrition and death are always a risky gamble in their own right.

[Ghost of LL 15489]

1 hour ago, 956 Worldwide said:

There was no need to work out a U.S. LNG deal.  The nasty truth about NS2 is that it doesn't bring on board any new sources of gas or additional capacity to Germany.  What it does do is bypass Ukraine and Central Europe, which increases Russia's ability to strong-arm and divide Europe.  Russia has long had plenty of capacity available to book on those pipelines, but it won't do so-- because artificially creating a gas shortage in Germany helps prod them to press ahead on NS2.

Merkel also prematurely announced the elimination of nuclear without even a pretense of having alternate sources online, aside from NS2.  

NS2 is a geopolitical project, not an energy or commercial project.  It's not an exaggeration to say that Russia is holding a gun to Europe's head that Germany loaded and handed to them. As to why the Germans would choose to screw over their neighbors for the sake of something that will not really save them any money and that will cause greater energy insecurity through Europe?  Well, you might start by combing through the board of directors of the various companies involved in putting this deal together, all the way from Gazprom down . . . .

This is all right, and it does raise some questions about Germany's role in NATO going forward.

It's one thing for Germany to be a free-loader.  Germany has been a free-loader to the alliance for decades.  Its military isn't in shape to provide any material support in the event common defense is needed.  And it has never swung enough diplomatic weight to be helpful.

But now Germany is actively undermining common security.  Successful Russian aggression against Ukraine would make NATO members right across Eastern Europe materially less secure.  

Germany needs to figure out whether it wants to continue to reap the benefits of collective security.  If so, it needs to occasionally bear some of the burdens of collective security.

[phdhorn 6224]

Another really interesting thing I've learned - you wouldn't think it's this way - but we import much, much more from Russia than we export to them, almost to the tune of 5:1 in value (2021 almost $27 billion Russia vs. almost $6 billion U.S (link below).  And the top 3 imports from Russia include oil, gas, and semifinished metals (iron, steel, etc.).  Our exports to them (top 3) are wood pulp, aluminum scrap, and motor vehicle parts.

I look at that and think that, yeah, we don't have much leverage in this game.  They throw far more stuff our way than vice-versa.  And that stuff is more basic to our energy stability.  About the only thing we could do is to relieve militarily - which would be far worse than anything we've had in the Middle East in the last 60 years.

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html

Edited January 19, 2022 by phdhorn

[Onboard 2.0 9083]

2 minutes ago, Ghost of LL said:

This is all right, and it does raise some questions about Germany's role in NATO going forward.

It's one thing for Germany to be a free-loader.  Germany has been a free-loader to the alliance for decades.  Its military isn't in shape to provide any material support in the event common defense is needed.  And it has never swung enough diplomatic weight to be helpful.

But now Germany is actively undermining common security.  Successful Russian aggression against Ukraine would make NATO members right across Eastern Europe materially less secure.  

Germany needs to figure out whether it wants to continue to reap the benefits of collective security.  If so, it needs to occasionally bear some of the burdens of collective security.

Time to cross the Rhine again ??  (sarcasm of course) but they've definitely benefitted, and have reaped those rewards thru the economic strength they wield in Euroland.  

Now they're crossing swords with France, and the EU over nuclear energy as a source of greenhouse gas reduction the next 20 years.

[Brisketexan 104604]

Just now, Onboard 2.0 said:

Now they're crossing swords with France, and the EU over nuclear energy as a source of greenhouse gas reduction the next 20 years.

And I foresee that becoming a critical, even crisis issue for Germany in the coming years.  Climate change and green energy is only going to become a bigger focal point in the coming decade.  And Germany's steadfast and irrational opposition to any nuclear energy is going to put them in an untenable, non-credible, minority position.

Quite simply, Europe (and maybe everywhere else) cannot wean themselves off of fossil fuels without nuclear energy being part of the mix.  Germany as the petulant outsider on one issue will infect their status on other issues.  

[Onboard 2.0 9083]

24 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

And I foresee that becoming a critical, even crisis issue for Germany in the coming years.  Climate change and green energy is only going to become a bigger focal point in the coming decade.  And Germany's steadfast and irrational opposition to any nuclear energy is going to put them in an untenable, non-credible, minority position.

Quite simply, Europe (and maybe everywhere else) cannot wean themselves off of fossil fuels without nuclear energy being part of the mix.  Germany as the petulant outsider on one issue will infect their status on other issues.  

Yep, They have a severe hard on for nuc-u-ler energy.  It's going to have to be part of a worldwide plan to wean off fossil fuels.

[956 Worldwide 34440]

1 hour ago, phdhorn said:

Not to mention that the entire eastern half of Ukraine is overwhelmingly Russian in culture, identity, and favoritism.  I would think that a good portion of those people would welcome being "back" in Russia.  I can see a lot of the land east/south of the Dneiper essentially turning Russian within days.

The ironic thing in all this is that Ukraine is light years away from being qualified to enter NATO anyway... they wouldn't be able w/o special exception to "make the grade" for a decade at least.  Obama's administration gets blamed for the Crimea in 2014, but there's nothing whatsoever they really could have done (sanctions, yawn).  That is exactly the same scenario now.  Nothing you can so short of dropping a nuke, and well, we know how that would go.  So...

It won't take long for the Russians to render the Ukrainian Air Force moot, and the Chia Pet-era Ukrainian tanks will be nothing but supper for the Russian current-tech models.

Ukraine's best bet is to give up the east, huddle near Kiev and defend it, and hope like hell someone comes to their aid militarily.  I don't see that.  But I don't think Putin would want the entire country, just the eastern half.  Of course, that's just a guess.

Belarus as well as Moldavia might also be at risk - Putin wants his buffers again.  But I think he would stop there.  He can no longer go into Romania, or the Baltic states, which are in no way culturally/racially tied to Russia.  If he did that, Russia would lose big time... unless China came in.

The recent Chinese-Russo alliances (space race, Siberian 2 pipeline, 2015 grain accords) have really warmed relations between the two. 

There's no way right now China would enter militarily.  But they could easily supply Russia with current tech weapons for years.

Unfortunately, this could be a case where one of the former satellites is just (re)-given up.  Because there's not much anyone can do about it, and the future of Europe and Asia is as concerning as at any time since 1945.  I don't see any way the Western allies could defeat a Russo-Chinese military campaign - without huge, significant destruction to people and property - and yes, in our own country.  I think the best hope is if Putin wants the country, he'll get it - and hope that's about it.

 

It’s overstating a bit to call the eastern half of Ukraine “Russian” in culture and sympathy.  A lot of that perception is based on linguistic maps and voting patterns from pre-Maidan Ukraine and it’s a pretty big oversimplification. Put it this way, I’ve been to dinners in Kyiv with Russian speaking Ukrainians from Poltava and Kharkiv who spent the evening cursing the Russians.  There’s a lot of blending and overlapping. 
 

One thing that came out of Crimea and Donbas was the hardening of attitudes to Russia in most of the rest of Ukraine.  A true “pro-Russia” candidate ala Yanukovych is dead in the water even in areas that before would have gone for the “Party of the Regions.”  Ironically, Putin’s intervention probably did more for the creation of a real Ukrainian national identity than any Azov Battalion enthusiast or western Ukrainian chauvinist.  Putin kind of forced Ukrainians to choose and looking at things logically— no one chooses Putin’s Russia.  It’s not attractive. 
 

Ukraine has been investing a lot into becoming a porcupine— of no threat to Russia as an aggressive force or even on the counteroffensive, but a dangerous prey to attack. It’s weakness remains air defense, and that’s what it desperately is asking for help with. In a land war, on the defensive, Russia is going to find a force completely unlike what the insurgents met in 2014. It’s probably better equipped to handle a mass Russian invasion than any force outside of a superpower, as that’s what it’s been monomaniacally focused on. 

 

[The Royal We 3065]

@Shady Ray do the people in your circle consider the decision to bail on nuclear a colossal fuck up as well? 

I've never been well read on this subject, but I just can't fathom a conscious decision to become MORE reliant on Russia for energy by moving away from nuclear before replacing it with something else.

[956 Worldwide 34440]

47 minutes ago, phdhorn said:

Another really interesting thing I've learned - you wouldn't think it's this way - but we import much, much more from Russia than we export to them, almost to the tune of 5:1 in value (2021 almost $27 billion Russia vs. almost $6 billion U.S (link below).  And the top 3 imports from Russia include oil, gas, and semifinished metals (iron, steel, etc.).  Our exports to them (top 3) are wood pulp, aluminum scrap, and motor vehicle parts.

I look at that and think that, yeah, we don't have much leverage in this game.  They throw far more stuff our way than vice-versa.  And that stuff is more basic to our energy stability.  About the only thing we could do is to relieve militarily - which would be far worse than anything we've had in the Middle East in the last 60 years.

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html

To the contrary, Russia as an exporter of mostly globally traded raw commodities is a target rich environment for U.S. sanctions, which is why they are our favorite tool.  27 billion is a fraction of a fraction to the U.S. economy and most raw materials can be sourced elsewhere and our supply chain is far more flexible to do that.  On the flip side, 27 billion in hard currency is very important to Russia— and the pain of losing it is concentrated among their political elite to a great extent. 
 

This is why Russia is so desperate to artificially make Germany dependent via NS2.  True, they can redirect some raw materials to the Chinese— who will be happy to drive a hard bargain for it. Sitting on a pile of raw commodities that you have difficulty selling on the open market is not a nice place to be. They want to put Germany in a place where they have no other options than to buy. 

[956 Worldwide 34440]

49 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

And I foresee that becoming a critical, even crisis issue for Germany in the coming years.  Climate change and green energy is only going to become a bigger focal point in the coming decade.  And Germany's steadfast and irrational opposition to any nuclear energy is going to put them in an untenable, non-credible, minority position.

Quite simply, Europe (and maybe everywhere else) cannot wean themselves off of fossil fuels without nuclear energy being part of the mix.  Germany as the petulant outsider on one issue will infect their status on other issues.  

Germany has a lot to gain.  First, they think (with good reason) that they will be a world leader in green and renewable tech that they can sell inside the Eurozone.  By keeping energy expensive, they help to keep German factories competitive. And by become a Russian gas hub for the continent, they stand to collect some fees and to become a bigger player in continent wide energy policy.  All that falls apart if the bloc just builds nukes like the French want— and behind the scenes THAT dealing and quarreling is nasty in Brussels. 

[Brisketexan 104604]

3 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

Germany has a lot to gain.  First, they think (with good reason) that they will be a world leader in green and renewable tech that they can sell inside the Eurozone.  By keeping energy expensive, they help to keep German factories competitive. And by become a Russian gas hub for the continent, they stand to collect some fees and to become a bigger player in continent wide energy policy.  All that falls apart if the bloc just builds nukes like the French want— and behind the scenes THAT dealing and quarreling is nasty in Brussels. 

Seems like Germany is placing a really heavy bet on a play that requires them to functionally control all the other EU member states.  Seems a risky bet.

[SimonBolivar 10921]

3 hours ago, phdhorn said:

Russia could invade the Ukraine and there's nothing anyone in the world can do about it, really.  

Sure we could. Let's give the Ukrainians some warheads under local control. Sorry, by about 1pm everyday of dealing with the general public I'm always open to giving caged animals nukes.

 

 

I've been playing lots of Hearts of Iron IV lately and another easy solution is to install Trotsky as a leader of a breakaway Vladivostok. 2 front war and all that.

Edited January 19, 2022 by SimonBolivar

[956 Worldwide 34440]

5 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

Seems like Germany is placing a really heavy bet on a play that requires them to functionally control all the other EU member states.  Seems a risky bet.

Germany has a really big carrot. Germany is Papa Sugar, they fund the whole shebang. They dig their heels in and all the lovely cohesion funds and ag subsidies and R&D funding goes “poof.” Its even more pronounced after Brexit.

Which speaking of, from a strategic standpoint encouraging the Brits to leave was stepping on our own dicks.  Having London in Brussels was the next best thing to having a vote in Brussels. A lot of member states are privately missing the Brits as well. 

[SimonBolivar 10921]

3 minutes ago, Bravo said:

6 Russian landing ships from the Baltic Fleet are apparently transiting south through the English Channel. If this is a bluff they're spending a whole lot of $ to do it.

 

 

 

It's about time those Dutch bastards were taught a lesson.

 

 

 

[Onboard 2.0 9083]

16 minutes ago, SimonBolivar said:

It's about time those Dutch bastards were taught a lesson.

 

 

 

Wooden shoe wearing, mother fuckers,,,,,,,,,,

[Trey3216 15325]

2 hours ago, Brisketexan said:

The play is to fund an insurgency.  Afghanistan didn't go well for Russia (or us, ultimately) because a steady stream of body bags for not much in return doesn't sell well at home.

Providing enough advanced munitions to kill multiple Russians a day for a year or two isn't a bad play.  10,000 dead Russian troops dead after a coupla years, steady stream of body bags coming home, for what?  It's a good way to burn through support at home.  Attrition is a powerful tool.

Russia doesn't care about dead bodies like we do, unfortunately.  

[Trey3216 15325]

53 minutes ago, Brisketexan said:

Seems like Germany is placing a really heavy bet on a play that requires them to functionally control all the other EU member states.  Seems a risky bet.

Yep.  Control by brute force or control by $$ has long been a play for Germany.  They don't have the stomach for force control any longer, so they try to wage economic superiority controls.   Losing control of your ability to keep the lights on seems a bit of a quandary, however.  

[SimonBolivar 10921]

16 minutes ago, Trey3216 said:

Russia doesn't care about dead bodies like we do, unfortunately.  

Yeah when Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili was in charge and everyone was scared to death of their neighbors on top of the Huns. None of the subsequent leaders could coerce the country in such a manner especially without a German boogeyman or a cult of personality. Deaths in Afghanistan absolutely had an impact on the party due to internal pressures. (1) Putin may be a strong leader, but he isn't going to lead a 21st century Russia (softies compared to the post famine Soviet Union) into a war of attrition against a country of 44 million people where everyone can understand you (pretty much), is armed, and looks just like you. If the Ukrainians have the stomach for it then they'll eventually stay Russian free, but I'm not sure they're willing to fight that hard for independence. 

 

(1) Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War : a New History. New York :Penguin Press, 2005.

[Trey3216 15325]

1 minute ago, SimonBolivar said:

Yeah when Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili was in charge and everyone was scared to death of their neighbors on top of the Huns. None of the subsequent leaders could coerce the country in such a manner especially without a German boogeyman or a cult of personality. Deaths in Afghanistan absolutely had an impact on the party due to internal pressures. (1) Putin may be a strong leader, but he isn't going to lead a 21st century Russia (softies compared to the post famine Soviet Union) into a war of attrition against a country of 44 million people where everyone can understand you (pretty much), is armed, and looks just like you. If the Ukrainians have the stomach for it then they'll eventually stay Russian free, but I'm not sure they're willing to fight that hard for independence. 

 

(1) Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War : a New History. New York :Penguin Press, 2005.

I hear you on that front.  The Russian people as a whole and the Russian government are orders of difference.  I imagine the Russian government has some tricks up it's sleeve to paint a pretty rosy picture of how things are going on the warfront even if they aren't going well, for a little while at least.  The outright fear that many of the citizens there live in (fear of being disappeared) is probably several orders higher for their military conscripts.  They probably have days of footage of each guy they could fab as a call home to mama to show little Boris is doing ok on the front lines even though little Boris got blowed up 3 weeks ago.  

That may be a bit much, but I wouldn't put shit passed those assholes.  

[bolverk 29399]

Nice Google-based map that shows and identifies all Russian forces:

https://www.gfsis.org/maps/russian-military-forces

[Trey3216 15325]

Whew!!!!   This should be a fun few months.   

[SimonBolivar 10921]

1 hour ago, Trey3216 said:

Whew!!!!   This should be a fun few months.   

Strategic maps every morning!

[SimonBolivar 10921]

Is Belarus gonna get in this too?

[Anastasis 23395]

13 minutes ago, SimonBolivar said:

Is Belarus gonna get in this too?

Am I close?

 

 

[workswithseed 2036]

1 hour ago, Anastasis said:

Am I close?

 

 

Ukraine needs bigger tits.

[Shady Ray 1633]

10 hours ago, 956 Worldwide said:

Which speaking of, from a strategic standpoint encouraging the Brits to leave was stepping on our own dicks.  Having London in Brussels was the next best thing to having a vote in Brussels. A lot of member states are privately missing the Brits as well. 

This is exactly right. The Brits served as a capable counterweight to the respective tendencies/"European Union worldview" of the Germans, French and Italians in Brussels. But even outside of the Ukraine issue, the past year has shown so many signs of the EU recalibrating to a much, much more "Western Continental European" Envisioned-style organization than it was when the Brits had their weighty heft within the organization. The EU is basically shifting to the truest, highest, purest form of its inevitable impotent clusterfuckery.

 

I was in Brussels last month and I was talking with a longtime contact who is involved in the regulatory aspect of my industry in the EU Commission. We were talking about this exact thing wrt the impact of Brexit within the EU and he made the statement that what we are seeing on so many levels throughout EU regulatory practice and policy is the "attempted vomitous expulsion of Anglospheric legacies from common European policy". The Brits truly were the US proxy in Brussels to some degree and their removal has opened to door to a complete overhaul. This extends from highly visible areas like international relations and defense policy, all the way down the line through the technocratic elements that don't make headlines like ag, medicine and - as you so rightly mentioned on another post - the usage of cohesion funds to force unpopular measures on the net-recipients of EU largesse, which is going to be much, much more common now that the Central/East Europeans don't have a powerful ally like the UK in Brussels. You don't take migrants? Funds slashed. You overhaul your internal affairs in a way we don't like? Funds slashed. You set up social policy in a way that is seen as discriminatory? Funds slashed. The French and Germans have been waiting for the day they can wield this pressure freely, and they are much freer to do that with the Brits and Merkel gone.

 

 

And on a related note, this entire Ukraine deal is playing out at precisely the same time as the Germans are preparing to take on a joint effort by the French and Italians to wrest control of EU fiscal policy from the vise-like grip of the Germans. In an under-appreciated development late last year, Macron and Draghi (Italian PM and ex-head of the European Central Bank) met and signed the Quirinal Treaty in Rome. This represents a coordinated attempt by France and Italy to overhaul financial rules within the EU with an eye towards the French wet dream of Germany underwriting other member state debt. This is the third rail of German politics. The Germans absolutely will not budge on this. The idea of Eurobonds where debt to a member state is issued "jointly"/underwritten by "other members" of the EU (cough, Germany and the northern, fiscally sound members, cough) is a recipe for pure chaos, but the French and Italians would love nothing more than this. But even this left-leaning German government put Free Democrat Christian Lindner in as German Finance Minister, who is known for his absolutist position on No Eurobonds now...no Eurobonds tomorrow...no Eurobonds forever!

 

And there is a time constraint here...the current German government is weak and doesn't have its sea legs yet after 16 years of "Mama Merkel". But the CDU, which is truly the dominant party in German politics outside of this recent post-merkel anomaly, just voted in Friedrich Merz as its leader, and if the current Govt falls, Merz will be the next chancellor. Merz is Germany's Darth Vader. He will go after the French and Italian plans on fiscal reform with a flamethrower and will throw all kinds of German financial pressure around. This is the only chance the French and Italians have to make this move, so if this situation in Ukraine causes the coalition to fall apart, then their opportunity is over. Merz will kill fiscal policy reform on day one if he is elected.

 

So without detracting too far from the original topic, there are major territorial pissings going on within the big players in the EU at the moment due to Brexit and this Ukraine deal cannot be separated/seen independently from those. They are all part of the machinations of Brussels and they are all being played off of one another at the moment. The likely outcome (albeit probably years down the road knowing the EU) of all of this is that the Germans will cede leadership to the French on a common EU foreign/defense policy, while retaining primacy in fiscal policy for the EU block.

Edited January 20, 2022 by Shady Ray

[956 Worldwide 34440]

The Russian Embassy in Sweden feels the need to promise Swedish pensioners and schoolchildren that Russia isn’t going to attack them.  This is all normal and it’s a good thing Europe has clear eyed thinkers in Berlin to pursue a path of accommodating Russia……

[956 Worldwide 34440]

In addition to the movement of naval assets, Russia has also enhanced its presence along the Belarus border with Ukraine.  This is not to say that any assault on Ukraine would include those units.  If Lukashenko allowed that, Belarus would become a belligerent and party to conflict by almost any version of international law. But their mere presence there forces Ukraine to plan as though they might attack from the north.  More evidence that if Putin is bluffing he badly wants it to be believable.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-troops-belarus-pose-direct-threat-lithuania-defence-minister-2022-01-19/

 

 

[956 Worldwide 34440]

A very balanced article on the gulf between the U.S. and Germany that includes the ways the U.S. has been a major asshole while not letting the Germans off the hook, either.

Especially good is the explanation of how Germans (and all Europeans) usually have a better surface level understanding of the U.S., even their “experts” often lack real context and how that shapes attitudes.

https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-pivot-from-america/?fbclid=IwAR1X6XDgJQCtgKtR2KeFxArkaHGI5CANYzkEhSd47ELtIPlU7jlgKkOs1eI

[Shady Ray 1633]

17 hours ago, The Royal We said:

@Shady Ray do the people in your circle consider the decision to bail on nuclear a colossal fuck up as well? 

 

Yeah, definitely. Merkel's intention to get off nuclear was a kneejerk to Fukushima and it is seen by traditional center lefties/center right/free marketeers as a foolish political stunt driven by shortsighted political winds of the day. 

 

German society is weird on that front though...they don't see it as a colossal fuck up in the sense that Germany is now more reliant on Russia with the removal of nuclear, but rather that it is forcing us to now go to France for nuclear energy or Poland's coal plants because there will be shortfall in energy since the renewables aren't keeping up with demand. The Germans do not like poorly made plans that result in shortfalls. So, the shortfall is the problem...but the fact that the failure of the plan resulted in greater dependence on Russia is not particularly objectionable to them.

 

You also have to remember, while in the US it is the MAGA, nationalist elements that value what they see in Russia, in Germany, that same perspective is held by the elites, as well. There is an element of highbrowedness tinged with their common history there. There is a very strong historical familiarity with Russia/Russians here and there is a deep, deep mistrust of the US, particularly after Iraq (no CR, but just saying that it has proven to be an irreparable mistake here re American actions given the benefit of the doubt as being altruistic or "good").

 

At the risk of being a shot messenger, to the Germans, the aggression that the Russians have shown has a tangible, understandable nexus to the Russian position...namely, geographic borders. They might not be "in the right", but their actions are "understandable" and predictable. The Americans, on the other hand, are widely seen as completely wild and unpredictable, stirring up mischief in lands that have no perceived connection to our logical interests outside of pure economic empire. 

 

So, what an American would dismiss as Russian propaganda...namely things like America being an empire bent on global hegemony with Europe as its pawns falls on very, very fertile ground here. It is completely acceptable to openly question whether American interest in this thing extends to anything beyond economic benefit in the form of a new gas market. It certainly isn't seen SOLELY Putin wanting to annex Ukraine. It will be seen as a mixture of fault by each side, which makes it much easier on the national psyche when it comes to deciding not to punish them. That and the fact that many Germans genuinely despise Ukraine itself.

 

And that should be a huge concern at present. In the event Russia does stage a false flag as has been reported, there will be no shortage of the population here that will completely believe that the Ukrainians were seeking to draw the West into a conflict or that they were pushed to start something by the US...or more likely to the German eye, the weakening Brits who are seen as desperately needing a resurgent NATO to solidify any leverage they still have on the Continent. 

 

Here is a Pew poll from a couple of years ago...note that this is long after the whole Georgia, Crimea, Donbass stuff. The Americans completely misunderstand the German view of the US. Sure the US is seen as a priority, but not nearly as strongly as one might expect:

 

Edited January 20, 2022 by Shady Ray

[The Royal We 3065]

Fascinating, thank you for the perspective. 

I can understand their mistrust of US foreign policy, but if I was in their position, I'd be much more resentful of Russia using my energy security as a pawn in their geopolitical games.  At least I think I would, impossible to say I guess.

[Armybrat 40736]

It is easy to understand why the Germans prioritize Russia over the US.... because geography.

But they apparently don’t have much of a problem with dictatorships (like we don’t) because of economic ties.

[956 Worldwide 34440]

8 minutes ago, Armybrat said:

It is easy to understand why the Germans prioritize Russia over the US.... because geography.

But they apparently don’t have much of a problem with dictatorships (like we don’t) because of economic ties.

It’s important not to go too far with this. There’s some good evidence that Russian and Chinese assertiveness and aggression is not helping them.  The chart below is in German (I can’t find English) but the question is— which countries are trustworthy partners for Germany. The data is from late last year and is compared with 2019. 
 

Of course, the big jump for the U.S. involves the replacement of Donald Trump and we can expect some degree of disillusionment to set in. But the slumps for China and Russia are not linked to Joe Biden.

 

[Shady Ray 1633]

17 minutes ago, The Royal We said:

Fascinating, thank you for the perspective. 

I can understand their mistrust of US foreign policy, but if I was in their position, I'd be much more resentful of Russia using my energy security as a pawn in their geopolitical games.  At least I think I would, impossible to say I guess.

Yeah, it is definitely not the most rational approach, but with respect to German experiences/approaches to Russia, it isnt based on any form of pure logic...there is also a huge, huge element of collective, national, mind-fucking trauma that occurred at the hands of the Russians, and that has stuck in the national attitude.

 

Your average German’s right eye will start twitching at even the mention of another war with Russia. The Red Army truly fucked up this country’s psyche something fierce and that has been passed down intensely, particularly in the German version of the Boomers and Gen X. The Germans fucked around and found out on the battlefield, and their old men who didn’t fight were beaten or killed and many of their mothers were raped by Russians, and that shit stuck. Big time. So, just as the trauma of the Eastern Front and subsequent Soviet occupation of those Central and Eastern European countries forms their justifiable geopolitical stances towards Russia, respectively, the ass-whipping annihilation that the Russians put on the Germans at every level of society forms much of the German position now with respect to fighting/engaging in “the East” now. 

 

I see it all the time within my wife's family. Just two days ago we were at the local cemetery with my in-laws for the monthly tending to family graves, as is customary here. Walking through the cemetery, I can count at least two dozen “Missing in Stalingrad/Missing in Ostfront” gravestones, including one in my wife’s family (Stalingrad). Shit is everywhere, particularly in certain cemeteries in Munich proper. The death dates between 1943-1947 are insanely disproportionate.

 

Another example from my own experience… there are family photos taken in what looks to be about 1957-59, given my mother-in-law’s age in the photo. They are candid shots around a beer bench at my wife’s family land in Southern Bavaria, with a few from the house where my in-laws live now, and there is a man there dressed nicely but oddly positioned just far enough from the group to indicate he was somewhat involved in the goings on, but weirdly separate with a blank expression on his face. It is this way in every photo of this guy, on multiple different occasions over the years. Just this dude…nice-looking, well-dressed, physically removed from the group and blank-faced…1000 yard stare type shit. So after years of coming across this picture at various times, I finally asked my mother-in-law what the story was with this guy, and she just said, “Oh, he was my uncle that fled with my mother and aunts from the Sudetenland during the expulsion. He was the only of the brothers who survived and he never snapped out of it. He died in the early 70s, he lived with us until I was 22, but he was always somewhere between shellshocked and scared. I never really knew him because he was never really “there” upstairs." She "never really knew him", yet she saw him every day...ate dinner with him all the time...celebrated holidays, birthdays, and life events...but he was "never really there." So the impact of a Russian ass-whipping isn't abstract like it is to us.

 

So, the point is, reminders are everywhere…and not reminders in the form of memorials or public statements or vigils or lapel pins, but in the form of family members with 1000 yard stares at the dinner table, gravestones for missing uncles in family cemeteries, warnings from mothers to daughters to avoid Russian males on the street corners, stories from Opa about his cold feet wrapped in newspaper shoes, buried in the snows of the Great Steppe for what felt like an eternity. Yeah, that shit leaves an impact. In short, this was highly personal trauma that wasn’t able to be “dealt with” in a natural, collective way, IMO, and due to the collective guilt, was expected to be pushed down and managed privately. So they became experts at burying their heads in the sand. Drives me crazy, but God they have perfected it. I could write a book on how fucked up the situation with the post-war children was. They took the process of national atonement very, very seriously and they scrambled the fuck out of a generation of young minds in the process.

 

And by “dealt with” I mean in the way that the victims of German and Soviet aggression were able to. The Czechs or the Poles or the Balts, for example, were able to rely on each through their collective victimizations and re-build together, forging a new chapter of resilience in their long existing national identity, which, of course, contains an element of a collective national outlook on security matters/positioning. The post-war Germans didn’t do that. They worked through the post-war trauma in a highly individualized and repressed manner, primarily through shame in their parents, fear of it happening again and internal guilt (albeit self inflicted by the actions of their parents and grandparents, of course). They didn’t have a moment during their national reckoning where they collectively (through their leaders) defined a constructive, newfound role for Germany on the international stage independent of avoiding a repeat of their past sins and trauma…and, as such, their foreign policy ethos is comprised of guilt, trauma, and the fear of experiencing it again…but certainly not any element of leadership or assertiveness abroad. So it is basically a wealthy, wealthy country with little idea of how to finally act comfortably in a role of leadership when hard power is required.
 

And to be clear, in no way do I mean this as a justification for their feeble foreign policy positions, but I do think it comes down to much more than just a desire for cheap energy. But, to be sure, that plays a huge part as well.

[Shady Ray 1633]

10 minutes ago, 956 Worldwide said:

It’s important not to go too far with this. There’s some good evidence that Russian and Chinese assertiveness and aggression is not helping them.  The chart below is in German (I can’t find English) but the question is— which countries are trustworthy partners for Germany. The data is from late last year and is compared with 2019. 
 

Of course, the big jump for the U.S. involves the replacement of Donald Trump and we can expect some degree of disillusionment to set in. But the slumps for China and Russia are not linked to Joe Biden.

 

That is a good point. The post-Trump bounce definitely changed things.

[The Royal We 3065]

17 minutes ago, Shady Ray said:

Another example from my own experience… there are family photos taken in what looks to be about 1957-59, given my mother-in-law’s age in the photo. They are candid shots around a beer bench at my wife’s family land in Southern Bavaria, with a few from the house where my in-laws live now, and there is a man there dressed nicely but oddly positioned just far enough from the group to indicate he was somewhat involved in the goings on, but weirdly separate with a blank expression on his face. It is this way in every photo of this guy, on multiple different occasions over the years. Just this dude…nice-looking, well-dressed, physically removed from the group and blank-faced…1000 yard stare type shit. So after years of coming across this picture at various times, I finally asked my mother-in-law what the story was with this guy, and she just said, “Oh, he was my uncle that fled with my mother and aunts from the Sudetenland during the expulsion. He was the only of the brothers who survived and he never snapped out of it. He died in the early 70s, he lived with us until I was 22, but he was always somewhere between shellshocked and scared. I never really knew him because he was never really “there” upstairs." She "never really knew him", yet she saw him every day...ate dinner with him all the time...celebrated holidays, birthdays, and life events...but he was "never really there." So the impact of a Russian ass-whipping isn't abstract like it is to us.

Damn.  You are right, the vast majority of Americans cannot even fathom this level of emotional/mental scarring.  Even those American families who have lost loved ones fighting overseas were not all consumed by it like the Germans were.  It was overseas, not here surrounding all facets of their being for years and years. 

My dad worked for a German pipe mill for quite a while when I was growing up and would travel with clients over to visit the mills a couple times a year.  The clients would inevitably want to visit Holocaust sites and I can remember my dad telling me about how his German counterparts would try to discourage this and how full of shame they were about it. 

[Onboard 2.0 9083]

25 minutes ago, Shady Ray said:

That is a good point. The post-Trump bounce definitely changed things.

Leaving aside all the other Trump baggage, how much of the bounce could also be related to Trump early on telling the EU, and Germany it/they needed to shoulder a fair shape of NATO monetary support ?

[Shady Ray 1633]

11 minutes ago, The Royal We said:

Damn.  You are right, the vast majority of Americans cannot even fathom this level of emotional/mental scarring.  Even those American families who have lost loved ones fighting overseas were not all consumed by it like the Germans were.  It was overseas, not here surrounding all facets of their being for years and years. 

My dad worked for a German pipe mill for quite a while when I was growing up and would travel with clients over to visit the mills a couple times a year.  The clients would inevitably want to visit Holocaust sites and I can remember my dad telling me about how his German counterparts would try to discourage this and how full of shame they were about it. 

Yeah, it is really weird. And it is unavoidable but they still try. It takes a looong time to get them to talk about it, and unless you have essentially "gone native", they won't talk about it to non-Germans. But it is always in the air.

 

Somewhat related...of all the spots in this town to get Chinese food, my wife's favorite place is way out in Dachau not far from where her Oma lived. Dachau is not just the camp, but also a very pleasant little town outside of Munich. So about twice a year she says, come on...let's go out to Dachau and get crispy duck. So off we go, 25 minutes out there, take a left at the gates to the Camp, one block down...pick up the takeout order, and back home for dinner.

 

Fucking bizarre.

Edited January 20, 2022 by Shady Ray