Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max crashes killing 157

[RPM 26702]

But I was told by professional pilots that it was no big deal @Bobby_Batronic

[Your Mom 4986]

I'm not digging through all his old posts but I don't think any pilot on the board said Boeing's actions were anything short of a giant fuck-up they should be held accountable for.   A giant fuck-up that should have never happened but was also shown to be easily overcome by the basic airmanship and adherence to procedures expected of someone at that level in their flying career.   Not sure why everyone has such a problem with those accidents having more than one causal factor.  Being critical of the crews actions doesn't let Boeing off the hook and nobody has claimed it should.

 

[JimmyJames 12271]

3 hours ago, Your Mom said:

I'm not digging through all his old posts but I don't think any pilot on the board said Boeing's actions were anything short of a giant fuck-up they should be held accountable for.   A giant fuck-up that should have never happened but was also shown to be easily overcome by the basic airmanship and adherence to procedures expected of someone at that level in their flying career.   Not sure why everyone has such a problem with those accidents having more than one causal factor.  Being critical of the crews actions doesn't let Boeing off the hook and nobody has claimed it should.

 

You have obviously not read thus entire thread which is chock full of posters calling to be pilots making apologies for Boeing and blaming the brown untrained and dumb pilots.

[Homercles 10206]

It’s a good thing most of you don’t read AVHerald. Plenty of pilots of all races finding holes in the Swiss cheese due to lack of airmanship and design gaps...AF447, Asiana 214, leaving gust locks on, shutting down the wrong engine, incorrectly setting takeoff parameters, trying to land on a loaded taxiway, etc.

I don’t recall any of the legit pilots here saying Boeing is fully in the clear.

[Bobby_Batronic 1994]

5 hours ago, Captainant said:

idk, sounds like a lack of basic airmanship to me /s

That’s because you don’t have the first clue what airmanship is. 

[Bobby_Batronic 1994]

1 hour ago, JimmyJames said:

You have obviously not read thus entire thread which is chock full of posters calling to be pilots making apologies for Boeing and blaming the brown untrained and dumb pilots.

Quote any such remark. 

Life’s short. Being a bitch is optional. 

[JimmyJames 12271]

On 3/15/2019 at 3:26 PM, Bobby_Batronic said:

Incorrect. MCAS didn’t kill two planes worth of people. Pilots failing to react to an inadvertent nose down pitch input correctly as per their MEMORY ITEMS, killed two planes worth of people. Someone so panicked that they didn’t even attempt to do something that they are supposed to do by rote with no hesitation isn’t  going to look at their instrumentation, interpolate an AOA indication and then save the plane.

We’ll find out about the Ethiopian crash, but supposedly the Lion Air crew spent 17 seoconds screaming and pulling against the control column instead of doing the one thing that they are supposed to do to stop erroneous pitch inputs in a 737. Pilot error, followed by faulty AOA sensor, followed by shitty training and maintenance would come before MCAS as proximate cause. But the general public is shitting themselves over something they don’t understand stoked by media outlets that couldn’t differentiate between a greyhound bus and a Boeing. 

Tell me, how many of you are gnashing your teeth every day over the rash of fume events happening in airliners today that are hospitalizing and killing crew and pax?  What’s that?  You don’t know anything about it?  Hmmm.

How many of you are losing their minds over the fact that the average Pratt and Whitney 1100B geared turbofan engine had a life expectancy of 600 hours under the wing of an airliner until very recently, and that P/W was paying through the nose to make airlines whole for their grounded airplanes?  I can name an airline that’s had to replace 50+ of these motors at P/W’s expense because the motors kept eating thenselves until recently. Oh, you didn’t?

How many of you still don’t understand that an Airbus will react in the same way given faulty AOA information, and will require the pilots to disable systems to correct a pitch down as well?  Air France killed a boatload of people in one shot due to similar pilot error and yet their is no worldwide panic over low speed/AOA protections in Normal Law or ADR failur procedures. There certainly isn’t a grounding of airplanes.   

Or how about this. How many people have died worldwide due to driver error, poor maintenance or failure to understand the very basic systems in the exact make and model of car that you drive daily since the Lion Air crash?  And you didn’t give two thoughts about crawling into it today. 

Fly the f’’ing airplane. Trim the f’ing airplane. Know your memory items and limitations cold.  Hand fly the airplane often. And maybe don’t be overly surprised when Arfrica’s premier airline staffed by a young Captain and 200 hour FO digs a hole because they didn’t do the above. 

Is this still your take on the situation?

Edited October 19, 2019 by JimmyJames

[JimmyJames 12271]

16 hours ago, Bobby_Batronic said:

Quote any such remark. 

Life’s short. Being a bitch is optional. 

Then choose to stop being a bitch. 

[UT_OB1 2270]

1 hour ago, JimmyJames said:

Is this still your take on the situation?

If the pilots fucked up, there’s nothing wring with saying they fucked up. And maybe they fucked up because they were put in to that situation without having enough experience and training. You took half the point made by your mom and tried to select a quote that “proves” proves your right if you ignore the other half. 
 

I don’t see any attempt to apologize for Boeing. You are the only one making it about brown skin  quit being a bitch  

 

22 hours ago, Your Mom said:

IA giant fuck-up that should have never happened but was also shown to be easily overcome by the basic airmanship and adherence to procedures expected of someone at that level in their flying career.   Not sure why everyone has such a problem with those accidents having more than one causal factor.  Being critical of the crews actions doesn't let Boeing off the hook and nobody has claimed it should.

 

 

Edited October 19, 2019 by UT_OB1

[JimmyJames 12271]

6 hours ago, UT_OB1 said:

If the pilots fucked up, there’s nothing wring with saying they fucked up. And maybe they fucked up because they were put in to that situation without having enough experience and training. You took half the point made by your mom and tried to select a quote that “proves” proves your right if you ignore the other half. 
 

I don’t see any attempt to apologize for Boeing. You are the only one making it about brown skin  quit being a bitch  

 

 

Why are there so many Boeing apologists on this thread? The company criminally killed people yet you assholes want to talk about whatever else you can come up with to talk about besides that fact.

Fuck all Y’all. 

[Bobby_Batronic 1994]

No. Fuck you for thing to make it about race, and fuck you for shitty reading comprehension. 

[XYZ 2154]

What do you call an idiot who keeps making an ass out of himself and everybody is pointing their finger at him and saying “what a moron”, but he is completely clueless about the fact that he’s stupid and that everybody is aware that he’s stupid, but he keeps spewing his idiocy?

[Brisketexan 107134]

What do you call an idiot who keeps making an ass out of himself and everybody is pointing their finger at him and saying “what a moron”, but he is completely clueless about the fact that he’s stupid and that everybody is aware that he’s stupid, but he keeps spewing his idiocy?

The next in a long line of shitty Longhorn defensive coordinators?

[Eskimohorn 5685]

My PR expertise tells me:

MCAs were a serious problem and Boeing rolled the dice that they could manage this issue.

Training was haphazard and delayed as a result because it might tip the media and regulators that something was amiss.

After first accident occurred, certain Boeing people knew it was a cluster, went in CYA mode with need-to-know fixes, pressure on regulators, nada to media.

After 2nd accident, Boeing double-downed, downplayed its own culpability, used surrogates to blame foreign pilots, put pressure on American policy makers and regulators, and ignominiously was able to delay the grounding of these planes longer than any other country in the world.

This is my expert professional opinion and is incontrovertible.

[elfenix 34840]

On 10/21/2019 at 8:49 PM, XYZ said:

What do you call an idiot who keeps making an ass out of himself and everybody is pointing their finger at him and saying “what a moron”, but he is completely clueless about the fact that he’s stupid and that everybody is aware that he’s stupid, but he keeps spewing his idiocy?

congress(wo)man?

[NeverMarryAStripper 22459]

On 10/21/2019 at 8:49 PM, XYZ said:

What do you call an idiot who keeps making an ass out of himself and everybody is pointing their finger at him and saying “what a moron”, but he is completely clueless about the fact that he’s stupid and that everybody is aware that he’s stupid, but he keeps spewing his idiocy?

Most surly posters

[Brisketexan 107134]

33 minutes ago, NeverMarryAStripper said:

Most surly posters

Ahh....but we get REP for our idiocy, so, who's the moron now, big guy????

[Wally Fairway 5682]

I'll let someone else read and summarize the 353 page report on the Lion Air crash.
The summary I read included contributing factors
MCAS
Pilot training
Aircraft maintenance
Faulty sensor
 

Quote

Investigators said faults by Boeing, Lion Air and pilots caused the crash...

This report describes a catalogue of failures - from poor communication to bad design to inadequate flying skills...

 But at the heart of that chain was MCAS - a control system that the pilots didn't know about, and which was vulnerable to a single sensor failure.

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50177788

 

Let the Surly debate continue

 

 

[XYZ 2154]

10 minutes ago, Wally Fairway said:

Investigators said faults by Boeing, Lion Air and pilots caused the crash...

That’s exactly what the surly pilots have been saying all along.

[Wally Fairway 5682]

On 8/19/2019 at 3:17 PM, NeverMarryAStripper said:

How does Ralph Nader weigh in on this issue?

I saw an interview thismorning with a panel discussing Boeing issues, and they had Nader on the phone. And now I can tell you why he weighs in on this issue.

He had a relative on the plane (i think the 2nd crash), it was a niece or great-niece (i really wasn't paying that close attention)  but he is out for people to lose their jobs, people at Boeing, people in the FAA, and he points out the problem starts with Boeing being a big campaign donor to members of the House Transportation Committee and the Senate Science and Transportation Committee. Not to go all Cloak Room, but he is right that donors have undo influence in our political system, and therefore in the regulatory system within the Congress.

Edited November 6, 2019 by Wally Fairway

[Deej 78041]

6 hours ago, Wally Fairway said:

...donors have undo influence in our political system, and therefore in the regulatory system within the Congress.

[elfenix 34840]

Quote

Boeing Co. engineers were nearly done redesigning software on the grounded 737 Max in June when some pilots hopped into a simulator to test a few things.

 

It didn’t go well.

 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-08/delays-in-boeing-max-return-began-with-near-crash-in-simulator

 

 

Edited November 8, 2019 by elfenix
let me fix my quote you stupid piece of shit editor

[Captainant 28647]

22 hours ago, elfenix said:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-08/delays-in-boeing-max-return-began-with-near-crash-in-simulator

have the pilots just tried being better at their job? /bobby

[JimmyJames 12271]

On 10/25/2019 at 8:19 AM, XYZ said:

That’s exactly what the surly pilots have been saying all along.

Nope. The initially blamed the pilots. Then when it become obvious that wasn’t the case and was an untenable position, they started blaming everybody. Now its still not flying and I suppose they still want to blame the pilots for, I guess, not figuring out how to fly it after months of training. Must be some really dumb pilots on those testing and training sessions. 

[Armybrat 41576]

But why were there no other Such incidents with the thousands of previous Max flights?

[XYZ 2154]

6 minutes ago, Armybrat said:

But why were there no other Such incidents with the thousands of previous Max flights?

The AoA sensor has to malfunction.

[Your Mom 4986]

47 minutes ago, JimmyJames said:

Nope. The initially blamed the pilots. Then when it become obvious that wasn’t the case and was an untenable position, they started blaming everybody. Now its still not flying and I suppose they still want to blame the pilots for, I guess, not figuring out how to fly it after months of training. Must be some really dumb pilots on those testing and training sessions. 

https://www.npr.org/2019/10/25/773291951/pilots-ground-crew-share-blame-for-lion-air-737-max-crash-indonesian-report-says

These are the findings of the official investigation Indonesia concluded recently for the Lion Air crash.  Indonesia has no alligiance to Boeing or the FAA.  The report criticizes the FAA, Boeing, Lion Air's maintenance practices, AND the actions of the two... well you know.  They list each of those entities as contributing factors, any one of which could have broken the chain of events that led to the crash.

As for the MAX, the propsed fixes for the MCAS are complete.  I think I read last week that the flight testing is also complete.  The task force they created is made up of a who's who of Air Force test pilots and engineers, NASA pilots and engineers, and a host of other experts.  Those guys have all flown it and signed off on the changes.  They are in the certification stage with the FAA and the other regulatory agencies around the world.  With the eyes of the entire world on them it isn't going to move quick.   Last I read the FAA and the EU equivalent are asking Boeing for more documentation about how the new software was developed.  

MAXs are also currently flying over the US, without passengers.  They are being moved from desert storage to other locations where the required changes can more easily be made.  United flew 9 of them from Houston Hobby not long ago.  SWA has been moving a few too. around the country too.

[El Diablo 4232]

1 hour ago, JimmyJames said:

Nope. The initially blamed the pilots. Then when it become obvious that wasn’t the case and was an untenable position, they started blaming everybody. Now its still not flying and I suppose they still want to blame the pilots for, I guess, not figuring out how to fly it after months of training. Must be some really dumb pilots on those testing and training sessions. 

I was under the impression that as more information came out that everyone's understanding of the factors involved changed. I didn't realize that you knew from the start.

[Pasken 1312]

1 hour ago, Your Mom said:

https://www.npr.org/2019/10/25/773291951/pilots-ground-crew-share-blame-for-lion-air-737-max-crash-indonesian-report-says

These are the findings of the official investigation Indonesia concluded recently for the Lion Air crash.  Indonesia has no alligiance to Boeing or the FAA.  The report criticizes the FAA, Boeing, Lion Air's maintenance practices, AND the actions of the two... well you know.  They list each of those entities as contributing factors, any one of which could have broken the chain of events that led to the crash.

As for the MAX, the propsed fixes for the MCAS are complete.  I think I read last week that the flight testing is also complete.  The task force they created is made up of a who's who of Air Force test pilots and engineers, NASA pilots and engineers, and a host of other experts.  Those guys have all flown it and signed off on the changes.  They are in the certification stage with the FAA and the other regulatory agencies around the world.  With the eyes of the entire world on them it isn't going to move quick.   Last I read the FAA and the EU equivalent are asking Boeing for more documentation about how the new software was developed.  

MAXs are also currently flying over the US, without passengers.  They are being moved from desert storage to other locations where the required changes can more easily be made.  United flew 9 of them from Houston Hobby not long ago.  SWA has been moving a few too. around the country too.

Here is the npr summary of the pilots:

 

When the problems surfaced on Flight 610, the pilot asked the first officer to perform an Airspeed Unreliability checklist that should have indicated which of the plane's two AOA sensors was reading incorrectly. The first officer should then have directed the pilot to engage the autopilot, which disables MCAS.

It took the co-pilot four minutes to locate the checklist because he was "not familiar with the memory item," the report concludes. During training at Lion Air, the first officer had shown unfamiliarity with standard procedures and weak aircraft handling skills, according to the report.

The pilot reportedly countered the nose dives more than 20 times before, apparently needing a break, turning the controls over to the co-pilot, who quickly lost control of the aircraft, which plunged into the sea.

[ChickenSandwich 10003]

4 minutes seems like a long time

[DaysOff 8263]

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/11/boeing-expects-to-resume-737-max-deliveries-in-december.html

[DaysOff 8263]

Getting closer to return to service


https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeings-fix-tames-the-tiger-in-the-737-max-flight-controls/

After months of intense scrutiny, even some of the harshest critics of the 737 MAX’s flight-control system believe Boeing’s software fix will prevent a recurrence of the scenarios that killed 346 people in the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.

Boeing has redesigned the MAX’s new automated Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that relentlessly pushed down the noses of the two aircraft on both crash flights. Though serious questions linger about the overall safety culture at Boeing that waved through MCAS’s original development and certification, U.S. airline pilots are almost ready to fly the updated jet.

“The hazard is designed out of it,” Capt. John DeLeeuw, chairman of the safety committee of the Allied Pilots Association (APA), the union for American Airlines pilots, declared to colleagues a week after trying the flight-control fix in a Boeing simulator in Miami in late September.

Bjorn Fehrm, an aerospace engineer and former fighter pilot in the Swedish Air Force, now a France-based aviation analyst with Leeham.net, has said Boeing’s original MCAS design was “criminally badly done … unforgivable,” and compared the system’s aggressiveness to a tiger. He too believes the redesign now makes the airplane as safe as the previous 737 model.

“There’s no part of any airplane out there that’s been as thoroughly vetted,” said Fehrm. “MCAS is no longer a tiger, but a house cat.”

The final pieces of that vetting are now imminent.

Boeing expects the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to formally unground the jet next month and to pin down all the pilot training requirements in January.

That’s pending a formal certification flight and a final evaluation of the software fix for the jet’s flight controls. And the FAA insisted Friday that it will take its time and won’t be swayed by pressure from Boeing.

After the FAA clears the plane to fly and issues the pilot training regimen, Boeing and the U.S. airlines will need 30 to 40 days to complete the enormous logistical challenge of getting their airplanes ready to fly after the better part of a year in storage.

Boeing will install the final software fix, refresh all the fluids and lubricants, do ground tests on the engines and flight controls, then conduct a checkout flight. The FAA will inspect every plane.

After months of intense scrutiny, even some of the harshest critics of the 737 MAX’s flight-control system believe Boeing’s software fix will prevent a recurrence of the scenarios that killed 346 people in the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.

Boeing has redesigned the MAX’s new automated Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that relentlessly pushed down the noses of the two aircraft on both crash flights. Though serious questions linger about the overall safety culture at Boeing that waved through MCAS’s original development and certification, U.S. airline pilots are almost ready to fly the updated jet.

“The hazard is designed out of it,” Capt. John DeLeeuw, chairman of the safety committee of the Allied Pilots Association (APA), the union for American Airlines pilots, declared to colleagues a week after trying the flight-control fix in a Boeing simulator in Miami in late September.

Bjorn Fehrm, an aerospace engineer and former fighter pilot in the Swedish Air Force, now a France-based aviation analyst with Leeham.net, has said Boeing’s original MCAS design was “criminally badly done … unforgivable,” and compared the system’s aggressiveness to a tiger. He too believes the redesign now makes the airplane as safe as the previous 737 model.

“There’s no part of any airplane out there that’s been as thoroughly vetted,” said Fehrm. “MCAS is no longer a tiger, but a house cat.”

The final pieces of that vetting are now imminent.

Boeing expects the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to formally unground the jet next month and to pin down all the pilot training requirements in January.

That’s pending a formal certification flight and a final evaluation of the software fix for the jet’s flight controls. And the FAA insisted Friday that it will take its time and won’t be swayed by pressure from Boeing.

After the FAA clears the plane to fly and issues the pilot training regimen, Boeing and the U.S. airlines will need 30 to 40 days to complete the enormous logistical challenge of getting their airplanes ready to fly after the better part of a year in storage.

Boeing will install the final software fix, refresh all the fluids and lubricants, do ground tests on the engines and flight controls, then conduct a checkout flight. The FAA will inspect every plane.

737 MAX CRISIS

The worldwide fleet of MAXs previously delivered to airlines was 385, including 72 jets at U.S. airlines. With all the airplanes Boeing has built since, the total of parked MAXs is now just over 700.

American, Southwest and United have all already pushed out the MAX’s return to early March and have said it will rejoin their schedules in a phased approach over several months.

Boeing will also begin delivery of MAXs to carriers like Alaska, whose finished jets the manufacturer has parked and stored pending the ungrounding of the fleet.

Boeing’s fix

On the two crash flights, the pilots struggled to counter MCAS after it was triggered by a single sensor that fed the system an erroneously high value for the jet’s angle of attack — the angle between the wing and the oncoming air flow.

MCAS activated for up to 10 seconds, swiveling the horizontal tail, known as the stabilizer, so as to aggressively pitch the nose of each aircraft down. When countered by the pilots, the system stopped, then kicked in again with a new activation five seconds later. After a vain struggle against these repeated nose-down movements, each short flight — the first 12 minutes, the second just six minutes — ended in a high-speed nose-dive to earth.

Boeing’s fix for MCAS entails three changes to the system design:

- It will take input from the jet’s two angle of attack sensors instead of just one.
- If they disagree by more than a nominal amount, the system assumes a false signal and will not activate.
- yIf both angle of attack sensors somehow get stuck at the same wrong high value — perhaps if they got frozen in the wrong position — again MCAS won’t activate because the upgrade is designed to do so only when the angle moves suddenly from below the threshold to a new high value.

If both sensors together register a sudden movement to a high angle of attack, the system will activate once only — not repeatedly, as in the accident flights.

The capability of the system to move the horizontal stabilizer so as to pitch the jet nose-down will be limited. The pilot will always be able to counter it by pulling back on the control column.

In addition, Boeing has revised the overall architecture of the MAX’s flight-control computer system, so that on every flight the MAX takes separate inputs from the jet’s two flight-control computers, rather than just one as previously.

These two computers, each processing air data readings from the various sensors on both sides of the airplane, will cross-check and compare values. Again, if they disagree, automated systems including MCAS will be shut down.

This change should catch any computer error as opposed to a sensor fault.

A person briefed on the details said such a shutdown would come in less than one-third of a second, so even if the pilots are distracted and fail to notice the airplane moving as it shouldn’t, the automation won’t be allowed to continue.

This addresses a problem identified in both accident investigations: that pilots took much longer to recognize and react to an MCAS fault than Boeing had assumed. By stopping any erroneous uncommanded movements automatically, the redesign takes the response out of the pilots’ hands altogether.

“We’re not letting the system run while the pilots are inattentive,” said the person, who required anonymity because parties to the ongoing accident investigations are not allowed to speak publicly.

Peter Lemme, a former Boeing flight-controls engineer and avionics expert who has been very critical of the original MCAS design, said Boeing has addressed all his concerns.

Once the FAA approves the fixes, said Lemme, he’ll fly on a MAX with “no misgivings.”

To get the flying public equally comfortable with the MAX, Boeing needs also to counter a recurring theme on social media: the idea that software shouldn’t have been needed in the first place and that the plane’s large engines throw its aerodynamic balance out of whack and make it “inherently unstable.”

Boeing says MCAS is needed not for stability but only to make the MAX feel the same to a pilot as the previous 737 model. The airplane will fly safely with or without MCAS, Boeing insists.

To prove that, Boeing has flown near-stall maneuvers in flight tests this summer with MCAS turned off. Safety regulators plan to do the same during upcoming recertification flights.

Pilot checklists and manuals

Pilots from American and Southwest, as well as Air Canada and some overseas carriers, in late September got hands-on experience with the new MAX flight controls in Boeing’s full-motion, full-flight simulator in Miami.

At a pilot-union conference a week later, Greg Bowen, training and standards committee chairman at the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association union, echoed APA’s DeLeeuw in declaring MCAS no longer a problem.

“In terms of handling characteristics … those anomalies have been designed out of the airplane,” said Bowen.

He said all that remains to be resolved is the training required for pilots, with new attention to how flight crews handle the confusion of a cockpit inundated with multiple alarms. The training and instructions need to be calibrated for pilots with lesser training and experience, he said.

The FAA will issue a report recommending the pilot training regimen, with a period for public comment likely in January. It’s expected that pilots already qualified to fly the older 737 model will be required to take only a two-hour computer course to highlight the differences on the MAX and the changes with the new software.

Bowen said the FAA is also considering significant changes to clarify the procedures in six pilot checklists that cover abnormal flight conditions, including the Runaway Stabilizer checklist that Boeing says the crews on both crash flights could have used to recover the airplanes.

Moving the tail manually

The Runaway Stabilizer checklist is a focus because the Ethiopian flight crew partially followed it: They cut off electric power to the horizontal tail, stopping MCAS from activating.

However, at that point the nose was still pitched downward and when they tried to move it back up manually by turning a wheel connected by cable to the stabilizer, they couldn’t budge it.

The problem was that as they coped with the emergency, the pilots allowed the plane to accelerate to 45 mph beyond the jet’s maximum design speed, causing high opposing forces on the tail that rendered the control surfaces immovable.

Even if the revised MCAS cannot act up again as it did on the crash flights, MAX pilots will still want to be comfortable with manual control of the stabilizer.

A 737 captain on a U.S. airline, who asked for anonymity to speak without permission from his employer, described his own extensive experience as a former test pilot of moving the tail manually.

He said that with the 737 tail at full nose-down position and at maximum design speed, it is “nigh impossible for a normal human to move the manual trim wheel in the nose up direction. The forces are too strong.”

Dennis Tajer, an American Airlines captain and APA spokesman, recently replicated that flight situation in a simulator, deliberately inducing an MCAS-style nose-down pitch at high speed, though still within the normal flight range.

He was able to move the wheel only “a couple of inches, but not enough.”

Tajer said that if the MAX is pitched down toward the ground, it gathers speed all too easily.

“The 737 is a slippery airplane,” said Tajer. “When you put the nose down, it wants to accelerate very quickly.”

He and his co-pilot in the simulator were able to recover control by using an old piloting skill called the roller-coaster technique that’s no longer in the manuals: letting go of the control column to ease the forces, then cranking the wheel, and repeatedly easing and cranking.

“Before we can be fully confident in the MCAS fixes we have to know more about the accompanying pilot training, emergency checklist changes, the extraordinary effort required to recover the aircraft with the manual trim wheel,” Tajer said.

While the FAA is likely to mandate hands-on Runaway Stabilizer training built into every airline pilot’s yearly recurrent training sessions in a simulator, some foreign regulators may make that a requirement for their pilots before they permit the MAX to return to service.

In a recent interview with trade magazine Aviation Week, Patrick Ky, executive director of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), indicated that his agency will likely go along with the FAA in not making that a requirement.

Ky said that while some nations may demand simulator training for “purely political or public relations-driven” reasons, it would be “a complete disaster” if the FAA and EASA diverged. “We need to be fully harmonized,” he said.

That suggests the world’s two major aviation regulators are now aligned, though EASA’s schedule lags slightly the FAA’s. Ky said he expects an EASA decision on returning the MAX to the air “sometime in January.”

In the 737’s largest global market, China, the return of the MAX could be delayed by political factors around trade talks and U.S./China tensions.

For U.S. air travelers, though, the MAX could soon be airborne again.

[Your Mom 4986]

That's well-written article not just with respect to bringing it back on-line but for the description of the system, the misunderstood reason for MCAS in the first place, and for the basic runaway trim procedure.  

[LABEVO 928]

 

[DaysOff 8263]

Huh?

[XYZ 2154]

Oh noes! Boeing shares are down 2%! Whatever shall we do?

[Onboard 2.0 9083]

Is this something new ?  I thought they just said the planes will be back on line in a couple months (by the end of the year or shortly thereafter), and had gone thru just about all the new safety reviews.

[Your Mom 4986]

That CNBC piece tweet said “... to redesign the 737..” when the actual NTSB recommendation was to redesign the engine cowlings of the 737.  Not really the same thing at all.  Not to mention the fact that Boeing does not make the engines. 
And yeah, the engines in question are on the NGs, not the MAX. 
 

 

[Your Mom 4986]

Correction:  Boeing does make the cover.  Still, not Max related.  

[Captainant 28647]

https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/11/politics/fatally-flawed-737-max-had-significantly-higher-crash-risk-faa-concluded/index.html

Quote

A Federal Aviation Administration analysis of the Boeing 737 MAX following the Lion Air crash last fall found the plane is significantly more likely to crash than other aircraft, according to a document released Wednesday at a House Transportation Committee hearing.

The agency predicted there would be more than 15 additional fatal crashes of the MAX over its lifetime, the document shows.

...

The crashes and information revealed since have raised questions about whether the FAA and Boeing have an inappropriately close relationship. Several investigative panels and the House committee are reviewing whether the aircraft certification process requires changes.

"The system is not broken," Dickson said, although he allowed that the agency's procedures "need to be improved each and every day."

Dickson, the FAA administrator, said in an interview on CNBC prior to his testimony that he expects the grounding of the plane to "extend into 2020." Regulators have at least 10 additional steps to complete before the 737 Max can fly again, he said.

Man, the MAX is really being let down by all those pilots lacking airmanship. I hear all you need to overcome fundamental flaws in design is airmanship.

[El Diablo 4232]

20 minutes ago, Captainant said:

https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/11/politics/fatally-flawed-737-max-had-significantly-higher-crash-risk-faa-concluded/index.html

Man, the MAX is really being let down by all those pilots lacking airmanship. I hear all you need to overcome fundamental flaws in design is airmanship.

If only they'd developed a procedure.

[Bobby_Batronic 1994]

55 minutes ago, Captainant said:

https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/11/politics/fatally-flawed-737-max-had-significantly-higher-crash-risk-faa-concluded/index.html

Man, the MAX is really being let down by all those pilots lacking airmanship. I hear all you need to overcome fundamental flaws in design is airmanship.

Unfortunately, there’s no cure for bitchmanship, and you have it in spades. 

[Telegraph_it 3400]

My flight to Vegas in March says it is a 737 Max 9. Looks like I'll be gambling before I even arrive.

[Onboard 2.0 9083]

1 hour ago, Telegraph_it said:

My flight to Vegas in March says it is a 737 Max 9. Looks like I'll be gambling before I even arrive.

Jesus h Christ when I was a boy every squirt wanted to be a pilot.

You go inside the plane 

Plane goes in the air 

You go in the air

Our air ?

Way up high air ?

Farewell and adieu to you fine Spanish lay-dees.  Farewell and adieu to you lay-dees of Spain........

[Telegraph_it 3400]

3 minutes ago, Onboard 2.0 said:

Jesus h Christ when I was a boy every squirt wanted to be a pilot.

You go inside the plane 

Plane goes in the air 

You go in the air

Our air ?

Way up high air ?

Farewell and adieu to you fine Spanish lay-dees.  Farewell and adieu to you lay-dees of Spain........

Cheers.

[ShaggyBevo RIP 3874]

6 hours ago, Bobby_Batronic said:

Unfortunately, there’s no cure for bitchmanship, and you have it in spades. 

Says the flyboy telling us from the beginning it was the pilot(s) and not the plane.

[Bobby_Batronic 1994]

11 minutes ago, ShaggyBevo RIP said:

Says the flyboy telling us from the beginning it was the pilot(s) and not the plane.

The statement that appropriate action by the pilots likely saves the day still stands. And when every pilot on the thread repeats that while acknowledging the multitude of other failures involved then perhaps you only prove that you’re out of your depth when you run your mouth. 

Edited December 12, 2019 by Bobby_Batronic

[El Diablo 4232]

Did this same failure happen to pilots who didn't end up crashing the plane? Or were these crashes the only times this failure ever happened? 

[XYZ 2154]

10 minutes ago, El Diablo said:

Did this same failure happen to pilots who didn't end up crashing the plane? Or were these crashes the only times this failure ever happened? 

I think the failure happened on another flight and the pilots saved it. I think the pilot in the jump seat told them what to do, or something like that.

[C-Man 27912]

On 12/11/2019 at 9:37 PM, XYZ said:

I think the failure happened on another flight and the pilots saved it. I think the pilot in the jump seat told them what to do, or something like that.

I think it happened on one of these exact planes on the trip before it crashed.