Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max crashes killing 157

[bschoolprof 6353]

Sounds fine. This is fine. 

[elfenix 34819]

On 1/24/2024 at 2:33 PM, Brisketexan said:

Here's a question -- if Boeing ends up genuinely on the ropes (and it damned well may, with the twin hits to its reputation and marketability coming so close together, showing systemic problems)....what does the US government do?  Do we allow our ONLY domestic commercial aircraft manufacturer go belly-up?  Shit, we get a crapload of DOD products (F-18, F-15, Apache, the KC line, etc.) from Boeing.  I suspect it firmly falls in the "too big/important to fail" bucket....but it may end up completely restructured, and I can damned well see shareholders taking a brutal bath.

If I had Boeing stock, I'd sell now, even at a loss....because the losses sure look like they'll get a good bit worse.  Boeing is a shit company right now.

the 737 is the biggest product in the entire US economy, at about 1% of GDP by itself. so there's no way the government lets it fail.  at worst you'd see a very structured bankruptcy like GM went through. 

Edited February 5 by elfenix

[Pato del Muerto 53633]

Do these people understand they they are building commercial airliners?  How does shit like this get missed?  Where is the punch list, who signed it, and when will they be prosecuted?

I know that in my job, the fda can find something I did badly or signed off on that didn’t get done at all and I’m personally responsible criminally. 

[Captainant 28629]

5 hours ago, Pato del Muerto said:

Do these people understand they they are building commercial airliners?  How does shit like this get missed?  Where is the punch list, who signed it, and when will they be prosecuted?

I know that in my job, the fda can find something I did badly or signed off on that didn’t get done at all and I’m personally responsible criminally. 

Well when you're making $25-35/hr and have huge production quotas, shit is gonna get missed. Boeing spun off spirit to keep costs low, and they are reaping the fruits of that decision. But the leadership that made that decision was bonused out long ago and there's no accountability aside from hoping for a "too big to fail" bailout 

[FartingMonk 3630]

7 hours ago, Pato del Muerto said:

Do these people understand they they are building commercial airliners?  How does shit like this get missed?  Where is the punch list, who signed it, and when will they be prosecuted?

I know that in my job, the fda can find something I did badly or signed off on that didn’t get done at all and I’m personally responsible criminally. 

Lack of experience.  Lack of training.  Lack of oversight.  Lack of giving a fuck.  Lack of accountability.  They probably had a pretty robust procedure at one point, then some bean counter eliminated the step to save time.  Dudes who had experience kept doing it.  Experienced dude quit/retired/ laid off.  Fresh dude from the union came in.  Did what procedure said.  Asked if that was how it was done.  Supervisor said if that's what the procedure says then do it.  No one actually knew any better so they kept doing it.

[RPM 26692]

[VirginiaLonghorn 4926]

Boeing … BOING … 💨 

[Wally Fairway 5680]

On 1/28/2024 at 4:10 PM, Pato del Muerto said:

My sainted mother has, after I presume studying the situation in depth, assigned blame. 
 

 

my entire answer is going to be “yes” and I’ll see how far that gets me.  

I think what your Mom meant to ask is - Is it safe to fly any Boeing Max airframe?
I'm asking because my flight to Seattle, in a few months, is on AK and it was  always a Max9.

Looking to Surly for the answer, because my kids don't know shit about this stuff. They would just say yes and see how far that gets them.

 

[ConferenceRoom 6215]

2 minutes ago, Wally Fairway said:

I think what your Mom meant to ask is - Is it safe to fly any Boeing Max airframe?
I'm asking because my flight to Seattle, in a few months, is on AK and it was  always a Max9.

Looking to Surly for the answer, because my kids don't know shit about this stuff. They would just say yes and see how far that gets them.

 

[Gatorubet 30831]

“I'm just a caveman, frightened by the flying machine with bad bolt holes…Listen up, I will sue you and your whole crummy airline if I don’t get another double Dewers!”

[Anastasis 23727]

About to go wheels up in a 737 max 8 out of IAH. Life insurance up to date. 

Edited February 5 by Anastasis

[ClubWhatever 12341]

11 hours ago, Pato del Muerto said:

Do these people understand they they are building commercial airliners?  How does shit like this get missed?  Where is the punch list, who signed it, and when will they be prosecuted?

I know that in my job, the fda can find something I did badly or signed off on that didn’t get done at all and I’m personally responsible criminally. 

We saw in the door blowout fiasco that the door installation was never added to the punch list (work order) because the removal job was never added.   It was as if the door was never removed, as far as their quality control system is concerned.   The real question was why was a part allowed to be removed with no quality control entry (unserviceable tag) being added.   That seems to be a systemic fuckup within Boeing having to do with having two different work tracking systems, two different companies doing work in same factory, improper shift turnover procedures, or untrained personnel, or some combination of the above.   In other words, it's too simple just to say somebody blew off something  they knew was required.

Edited February 5 by ClubWhatever

[Ten Bears 2500]

4 hours ago, FartingMonk said:

Lack of experience.  Lack of training.  Lack of oversight.  Lack of giving a fuck.  Lack of accountability.  They probably had a pretty robust procedure at one point, then some bean counter eliminated the step to save time.  Dudes who had experience kept doing it.  Experienced dude quit/retired/ laid off.  Fresh dude from the union came in.  Did what procedure said.  Asked if that was how it was done.  Supervisor said if that's what the procedure says then do it.  No one actually knew any better so they kept doing it.

It's the Gorilla Experiment.

[wild_turkey 3300]

It's almost like it's not an actual free market, but we are nonetheless allowing the costs to be socialized (too big to fail) while boeing reaps and privatizes whatever gains and profits there are to be had.

Other than a small percentage of Boeing execs, who exactly is profiting here? Their stock is down so the shareholders are not doing well, and I would think the vast majority of Boeing employees are not seeing great raises or bonuses given the overall status of the company.

There should be a housecleaning from the top down, and if future negligence creates more safety incidents, everyone in that chain of command should be held criminally liable.

[Brisketexan 107081]

1 hour ago, wild_turkey said:

Other than a small percentage of Boeing execs, who exactly is profiting here? Their stock is down so the shareholders are not doing well, and I would think the vast majority of Boeing employees are not seeing great raises or bonuses given the overall status of the company.

There should be a housecleaning from the top down, and if future negligence creates more safety incidents, everyone in that chain of command should be held criminally liable.

I suspect the biggest slugs of "profits" were already extracted and run off with by management execs YEARS ago.  They sucked out all the blood they could, turned it into cash, and left a pale husk of a company behind....to die on someone else's watch.  It's not an uncommon story.

[Captainant 28629]

1 hour ago, wild_turkey said:

Other than a small percentage of Boeing execs, who exactly is profiting here? Their stock is down so the shareholders are not doing well, and I would think the vast majority of Boeing employees are not seeing great raises or bonuses given the overall status of the company.

There should be a housecleaning from the top down, and if future negligence creates more safety incidents, everyone in that chain of command should be held criminally liable.

The benefits have already been reaped by shareholders over the decades leading up to this - it's effectively the pre-MAX scandal period when Boeing was able to coast off the success and prior rigorous engineering reputation they had. Now that they've just about strangled and starved their golden goose to death, the public gets to fund its recovery because of their importance to the defense industry. 

[Clintonaldo 2618]

oversight is mad expensive yo

[Captainant 28629]

2 hours ago, Clintonaldo said:

oversight is mad expensive yo

"We don't need oversight! The Free Market will appropriately punish bad actors, its in their best interest to make a good product!!"

[Bateshorn 9993]

On 2/5/2024 at 9:32 AM, Wally Fairway said:

I think what your Mom meant to ask is - Is it safe to fly any Boeing Max airframe?
I'm asking because my flight to Seattle, in a few months, is on AK and it was  always a Max9.

Looking to Surly for the answer, because my kids don't know shit about this stuff. They would just say yes and see how far that gets them.

 

So, putting aside the structural managerial incompetence at Boeing due to a variety of reasons, mostly related to the short term demand of our capitalist system and regulatory capture, flying is, statistically speaking, literally one of the safest things you can do.  
 

It’s much, much, much more dangerous to be outside on a cloudy day. 

[tokamak 6688]

Just now, Bateshorn said:

So, putting aside the structural managerial incompetence at Boeing due to a variety of reasons, mostly related to the short term demand of our capitalist system and regulatory capture, flying is, statistically speaking, literally one of the safest things you can do.  
 

It’s much, much, much more dangerous to be outside on a cloudy day. 

*past performance is no guarantee of future results

[Gatorubet 30831]

Where have you gone, Scoop Jackson?

[Wally Fairway 5680]

38 minutes ago, Bateshorn said:

So, putting aside the structural managerial incompetence at Boeing due to a variety of reasons, mostly related to the short term demand of our capitalist system and regulatory capture, flying is, statistically speaking, literally one of the safest things you can do.  
 

It’s much, much, much more dangerous to be outside on a cloudy day. 

I agree, I am much more at risk driving to the airport. That said, I chose not to drive a 1970's Ford pinto that could explode; and if like not to fly in a Max airframe by Boeing, g there is a responsible alternative

Just now, Wally Fairway said:

I agree, I am much more at risk driving to the airport. That said, I chose not to drive a 1970's Ford pinto that could explode; and I'd like not to fly in a Max airframe by Boeing, g there is a responsible alternative

 

[Brisketexan 107081]

1 hour ago, Bateshorn said:

mostly related to the short term demand of our capitalist system and regulatory capture

1 hour ago, Captainant said:

"We don't need oversight! The Free Market will appropriately punish bad actors, its in their best interest to make a good product!!"

So, so much these.  A massive enterprise like a company that builds large commercial aircraft AND multiple defense products is best run when the focus is on all timeframes - pay attention to the short term (if you run out of operating funds next month, you're in trouble), medium term (what does that 1-3 year cashflow situation look like?) and the long-term (what will our product line and revenues look like over the next 5-10 years).  AND...the products made should be subject to the checks and balances of oversight and the threat of oversight on the front end (i.e., actual baseline regulation).  

Instead, we have a system that incentivizes sucking every drop of blood out of the enterprise in the near-term, at the expense of long-term investment (including the periods of net losses that spending money on R&D, retooling manufacturing lines, etc., require - remember, being able to make long-term strategic moves is why Dell went private again, so it didn't have to answer to short-term demands of the public investment markets).  And the regulators really don't get involved now until AFTER the shit has hit the fan, which is actually bad for long-term business (but great for the execs who reaped their win years ago and are long gone).  

Boeing and its execs played the game according to the rules we decided to set up.  Those rules incentivize really dumb and bad outcomes.  And here we are.

[royiv 9942]

The short term pressure to get airframes out the door is a byproduct of massive delays in development of new aircraft. Shorting engineering and design investments has resulted in repeated missed deadlines. Boeing hasn't delivered a new aircraft on time in more than a decade. The 787 was delivered years behind schedule and has had various quality issues. The MAX was delivered late, went through an 18 month global grounding of the fleet and the MAX 10 still hasn't been certified. The 777X  had its first flight four years ago and still isn't certified. Boeing is a complete mess of a manufacturer.

[Chopper 17460]

Congressional hearing today about Boeing. Pre-hearing WSJ article salient excerpts.
 

Quote

 

Boeing employs more than 12,000 in Renton, Wash., where 737s are assembled. The FAA had eight inspectors assigned to the plant there late last year, up from two in 2018, according to the former government official. “That’s not enough people to monitor the restaurant operations at the site,” said Ed Pierson, a former senior Boeing production manager who raised concerns about quality problems at the 737 factory after the crashes.

On Tuesday, current FAA chief Mike Whitaker is scheduled to testify before a U.S. House panel about the agency’s oversight of Boeing’s manufacturing. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal last month, Whitaker said: “We’re going to be looking at the entire production process, the quality assurance process, try to understand where these breakdowns have occurred, and what are the levers that we have to fix that.”

FAA deputy safety chief Jodi Baker said on Monday that the agency was still figuring out its “reimagined oversight” of Boeing, but that it would include more agency personnel on the factory floor to talk to employees and better assess the safety culture.

...

The FAA said it is sending 20 more inspectors to Boeing’s Renton factory and six more to Spirit’s facility in Wichita, and that it could add more as needed. Whitaker, who became the FAA chief last fall, said in the interview that the manufacturing problems had “gone on for too long, and I think we need to have a more intensive effort to get this resolved, immediately.”

Boeing said it has increased its number of inspectors in its commercial-jet unit by 20% since 2019. Calhoun, the CEO, said the company has begun conducting more inspections at its Renton factory since the Alaska accident and already is learning from its mistake.

Airlines have said they are sending their own inspectors to the 737 factory, a sign they don’t fully trust Boeing’s pledges to improve—or the FAA’s oversight.

The agency also has increased monitoring of problems with 737 MAXs currently flying passengers. Industry and former government officials wonder whether other defects might have slipped through.

 

The article includes a photo from Ethiopia just for the memories.

 

[Wally Fairway 5680]

23 minutes ago, Chopper said:

Congressional hearing today about Boeing. Pre-hearing WSJ article salient excerpts.
 

The article includes a photo from Ethiopia just for the memories.

It is interesting that they posted a photo that was caused by a flight system software glitch/error/failure, and not a hardware issue that could have been caught at inspection. But then again, IMO, the entire things shows how the entire inspection and testing system are not functioning to public liking. 
My question for Airline CEO's would be - if you continue to buy from Boeing, at what point do you share in the blame for the next crash/failure? Seems to me they are taking steps towards sharing more deeply in the shared litigation & settlement costs.

[Bateshorn 9993]

52 minutes ago, royiv said:

The short term pressure to get airframes out the door is a byproduct of massive delays in development of new aircraft. Shorting engineering and design investments has resulted in repeated missed deadlines. Boeing hasn't delivered a new aircraft on time in more than a decade. The 787 was delivered years behind schedule and has had various quality issues. The MAX was delivered late, went through an 18 month global grounding of the fleet and the MAX 10 still hasn't been certified. The 777X  had its first flight four years ago and still isn't certified. Boeing is a complete mess of a manufacturer.

And the 777 is their real money maker and desirable product.  It's the last engineer led Boeing plane and a damn near perfect sub-sonic trans-atlantic carrier. Overbuilt, but not a maintenance hog, economical, flexible in routes options and interior design, and ironically: ideal for a non first class international travel market, since truly rich people fly private now, so most international outside of Emirates has gone to business, premium economy, economy as a 3 tier design.

But it's long lifespan is more a product of General Electric's absolutely genius engines than anything else. 

16 minutes ago, Wally Fairway said:

It is interesting that they posted a photo that was caused by a flight system software glitch/error/failure, and not a hardware issue that could have been caught at inspection. But then again, IMO, the entire things shows how the entire inspection and testing system are not functioning to public liking. 
My question for Airline CEO's would be - if you continue to buy from Boeing, at what point do you share in the blame for the next crash/failure? Seems to me they are taking steps towards sharing more deeply in the shared litigation & settlement costs.

Those genius engines are the downfall of the MAX:  the low slung wings don't really accommodate such big, efficient turbofans, so they had to stick them way out in front of the wings, upsetting the balance of the plane.  Boeing tried to fix it with a software flying assist program.  It, er, didn't work right.....

[FartingMonk 3630]

I blame the lawyers and the MBAs.  The only solution is to shoot them all.  But then surly would be down to 5 members

[Captainant 28629]

https://www.npr.org/2024/02/06/1229528737/ntsb-boeing-737-max-9-alaska-airlines-door-plug-missing-bolts

NTSB preliminary report has found that the door straight up didn't have bolts installed while in service. It seems that some spirit employees in Renton, WA (the Boeing mothership) were tasked with fixing a rivet issue found in the fuselage after hand-off to Boeing. 

So the work was in (and presumably, inspected by) Boeing's shop but done by Spirit people. No findings of fault yet - that will be in a year with the full report, but Boeing and Spirit are up to their eyeballs in inspectors in the meantime. Lots of questions about how Boeing could let a plane leave its building for delivery while missing structurally significant bolts

[Wally Fairway 5680]

So you are saying that I should be okay flying a Max 9, as long as the door plug was not removed after the initial install?
Will they let the service records be reviewed before boarding the plane? - obv, asking for a friend

 

Spoiler

 

Edited February 7 by Wally Fairway

[RPM 26692]

[FartingMonk 3630]

The report about the missing bolts wasn't surprising.  I said and posted the exact same thing by watching a 25 second tiktok video.

Why it happened happens everyday across all industries.  Boeing as the physical owner of the aircraft at the time failed as the dudes who did a closeout inspection.  Spirit as the contractors said what do those Boeing fucks know.  We fixed the repair.  We reinstalled the outer cover and bolted it in.  New Boeing guy comes in and says well they installed the door.  They must have reinstalled the bolts.  Looks good to me.

In oil and gas, the work in confined spaces stuff like that I bet occurs often than not.  A guy enters the space to do a repair.  He leaves.  Says I'm done.  Confined space dude said well he's done.  Let's close the vessel out.  3 hours later QA guy comes and says hey I need to QA this.  Other shift says they bolted up that space someone else must have already done it.  QA guy says well shit, if they closed it up it must be done.  QA guy leaves for a different project.  Documentation is so fucking important but people aren't willing to open stuff up again because of time constraints and rework which leads to shit like this.

[AUS-97HORN 12062]

31 minutes ago, FartingMonk said:

Documentation is so fucking important but people aren't willing to open stuff up again because of time constraints and rework which leads to shit like this.

well, that and the guy (or gal) who keeps insisting (correctly) on visually inspecting the stuff and overriding the rig boss that it has to be approved first, are the first person fired the moment the company needs to do layoffs, or even if they dont "need" to do them but want to get rid of PITA QA sticklers that waste time and money. 

its literally the issue with MBAs in charge of safety inspections instead of Master Engineers.  One is more interested in saving a half of shift of down time to make an extra $30k in earnings that day, while the other is trying to make sure a $1B investment doesnt kill 300 people 

[ClubWhatever 12341]

Yep, it's up to the execs at the top to enforce a culture of safety.   That's why it doesn't happen

[elfenix 34819]

Meanwhile, France is investing a billion dollars into developing the A320 successor

 

https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-development/airbus-ngsa-eaction-rendering-new-airplane/

[Bateshorn 9993]

1 hour ago, elfenix said:

Meanwhile, France is investing a billion dollars into developing the A320 successor

 

https://theaircurrent.com/aircraft-development/airbus-ngsa-eaction-rendering-new-airplane/

This is 100% what Boeing should have done with the 737 twenty years ago.  You can argue about whether the 787 was really the right move, given the 777 emerging dominance in global long haul, but regardless, trying to glue a modern hi bypass turbofan onto a 50 year old design was such a Jack Welch/McDonnell Douglas quick cash grab style move.  

[FartingMonk 3630]

30 minutes ago, Bateshorn said:

This is 100% what Boeing should have done with the 737 twenty years ago.  You can argue about whether the 787 was really the right move, given the 777 emerging dominance in global long haul, but regardless, trying to glue a modern hi bypass turbofan onto a 50 year old design was such a Jack Welch/McDonnell Douglas quick cash grab style move.  

Lipstick on a pig

[Brisketexan 107081]

Just now, FartingMonk said:

Lipstick on a pig

It wasn't.  The 737 is a great airframe.  They just tried to turn it into something it's not.  They tried to make a Frankenplane.  It turns out to be only slightly less absurd than trying to slap modern turbofans onto a B-24.  The B-24 was a great plane.  Turbofans are great engines.  But trying to match them would be folly.

Boeing bet on that modification to the 737, instead of developing a new airframe.  Turns out, it bet wrong.

@Ghost of LL has an explanation of how SWA bears a chunk of the blame for that, BTW.

[elfenix 34819]

44 minutes ago, Bateshorn said:

This is 100% what Boeing should have done with the 737 twenty years ago.  You can argue about whether the 787 was really the right move, given the 777 emerging dominance in global long haul, but regardless, trying to glue a modern hi bypass turbofan onto a 50 year old design was such a Jack Welch/McDonnell Douglas quick cash grab style move.  

the 787 is 767 size.  doesn't quite fit the same market segment, but as you said, you can argue.  i guess the other option would have been a 767neo (and maybe a 757neo, though that plane is too heavy for how many passengers it carries).  but the 787 is a very good product.  at the same time airbus was busy with the boondoggle that is the A380.  boeing's problem isn't that chose a pretty good option from several that it had, it's that it then didn't choose to do another good option (lengthen the gear on the 737 to accommodate bigger engines in the proper place on the 737 - really, what was SWA gonna do, start getting 320s 10 years later?).  compare that airbus, after the A380 flop, tried to sell a warmed over A330, got pushed back, and so designed the A350 (which is a fantastic product), and on top of that also warmed over the A330. 

Edited February 8 by elfenix

[Ghost of LL 15735]

2 hours ago, Brisketexan said:

It wasn't.  The 737 is a great airframe.  They just tried to turn it into something it's not.  They tried to make a Frankenplane.  It turns out to be only slightly less absurd than trying to slap modern turbofans onto a B-24.  The B-24 was a great plane.  Turbofans are great engines.  But trying to match them would be folly.

Boeing bet on that modification to the 737, instead of developing a new airframe.  Turns out, it bet wrong.

@Ghost of LL has an explanation of how SWA bears a chunk of the blame for that, BTW.

 

3 hours ago, Bateshorn said:

This is 100% what Boeing should have done with the 737 twenty years ago.  You can argue about whether the 787 was really the right move, given the 777 emerging dominance in global long haul, but regardless, trying to glue a modern hi bypass turbofan onto a 50 year old design was such a Jack Welch/McDonnell Douglas quick cash grab style move.  

I honestly can't pin that blame on Boeing.  That is what its customers demanded.  And by "customers," I really mean "Southwest Airlines."

Southwest is the largest 737 customer, and it's not even particularly close.  Southwest has ordered nearly 900 of the 737-Max; the next largest airline order is United for 666 (not making that up).  Southwest alone accounts for about 15% of the 737's order book.  So here's the thing:  Boeing does what Southwest wants.

And Southwest wants the 737.

There are some significant cost benefits associated with flying one aircraft type.  We can argue whether those benefits outweigh the costs for an airline of Southwest's current size and system complexity; I would argue that its one-type fixation has outlived its usefulness.  But regardless, flying both the 737 and some other aircraft type (whether it be the A320 or a new 7X7) would come with some significant costs.  There's the obvious cost in spare parts and maintenance, but the real cost is in labor.  Union contracts would have to be completely overhauled.  New mechanics would have to be hired (or mechanics qualified on both airframes would have to be paid more).  And it would impair flight-crew flexibility for dispatch purposes.

Oh, and here's the real fun thing--Southwest's flight-dispatch software isn't set up to allow for that.  That's not to say that it couldn't be changed.  It is to say that such a change would add cost.

So Southwest wants the 737.

And so Boeing is very keen to keep the 737 certified.  But that's a real challenge.  Because engine design has evolved a bit over the past 60 years.

The original 737 was powered by the Pratt & Whitney JT8D engine.  It's a low-bypass, two-spool design on a four-stage turbine, all of which leads to a very long, slim engine design. 

So the great thing about this design is that it allows for a very short landing gear.  And that's nice, because it's super simple.  The main landing gear retracts right up into the fuselage without any extension or rotation.

In 1983, Boeing developed the 737-300 series, which was powered by the CFM-56 engine.  This was a much higher-bypass design than the JT8D, leading to a fatter, but shorter engine.

Boeing was able to deal with this by mounting it slightly forward of the wing.  And that allowed Boeing to retain the main landing gear.  But to come up with the next generation--the MAX--Boeing was going to need to plan for a newer, larger engine.  It is powered by the CFM LEAP, which is significantly more fuel-efficient.  The trouble with it is, though, that it is wider than the CFM-56. 

So Boeing here had a problem.  The CFM LEAP is too big to fit under the 737 wing with the landing gear.  And you can't just slap on a new main landing gear, because that completely fucks up the design of the fuselage and the wing spar.  It could come up with a brand new aircraft, which is what it did with the 787.  There's no way to keep the 737 certification with a complete redesign of the mid-fuselage and wing spar.  And that's going to piss off Southwest.  But more importantly, it's going to create an opening for Airbus.  "Hey, Southwest--since you're going to have to have two different aircraft types anyway, why not buy the A320?".

So Boeing needed to do whatever it could to keep the 737 family going.  To do that. it moved the engine even further forward of the wing to allow part of the engine to actually be above the leading edge of the wing.  Compare the picture of the 737-800 above with the MAX:

Now this is really a cool design.  It wildly shifts the center of gravity forward, which is just fine because of the modern avionics (assuming you get the computer programming right).  I mean, look--there are some things I like a lot more about the A320 family, particularly from the passenger perspective.  But the 737 is still a pretty good design.  And when considering what the engineers have had to do to satisfy the business considerations, it's pretty damned impressive.

But bottom line here--let's not put those business considerations on McDonnell Douglas or the accountants.  It doesn't take an MBA to tell you that you need to do what you can to keep your largest customer tied to you, particularly when that customer is 15% of your order book.

This is entirely about Southwest, the limitations inherent in its model, and its refusal to invest on the front-end to get a better plane on the back end.  This isn't a fuck-up conceived in Chicago or even Seattle; it started on Love Field Drive.

 

Edited February 8 by Ghost of LL

[FartingMonk 3630]

8 minutes ago, Ghost of LL said:

 

I honestly can't pin that blame on Boeing.  That is what it's customers demanded.  And by "customers," I really mean "Southwest Airlines."

Southwest is the largest 737 customer, and it's not even particularly close.  Southwest has ordered nearly 900 of the 737-Max; the next largest airline order is United for 666 (not making that up).  Southwest alone accounts for about 15% of the 737's order book.  So here's the thing:  Boeing does what Southwest wants.

And Southwest wants the 737.

There are some significant cost benefits associated with flying one aircraft type.  We can argue whether those benefits outweigh the costs for an airline of Southwest's current size and system complexity; I would argue that its one-type fixation has outlived its usefulness.  But regardless, flying both the 737 and some other aircraft type (whether it be the A320 or a new 7X7) would come with some significant costs.  There's the obvious cost in spare parts and maintenance, but the real cost is in labor.  Union contracts would have to be completely overhauled.  New mechanics would have to be hired (or mechanics qualified on both airframes would have to be paid more).  And it would impair flight-crew flexibility for dispatch purposes.

Oh, and here's the real fun thing--Southwest's flight-dispatch software isn't set up to allow for that.  That's not to say that it couldn't be changed.  It is to say that such a change would add cost.

So Southwest wants the 737.

And so Boeing is very keen to keep the 737 certified.  But that's a real challenge.  Because the original 737 was powered by the Pratt & Whitney JT8D engine.  It's a low-bypass, two-spool design on a four-=stage turbine, all of which leads to a very long, slim engine design. 

So the great thing about this design is that it allows for a very short landing gear.  And that's nice, because it's super simple.  The main landing gear retracts right up into the fuselage without any extension or rotation.

In 1983, Boeing developed the 737-300 series, which was powered by the CFM-56 engine.  This was a much higher-bypass design than the JT8D, leading to a fatter, but shorter engine.

Boeing was able to deal with this by mounting it slightly forward of the wing.  And that allowed Boeing to retain the main landing gear.  But to come up with the next generation--the MAX--Boeing was going to need to plan for a newer, larger engine.  It is powered by the CFM LEAP, which is significantly more fuel-efficient.  The trouble with it is, though, that it is wider than the CFM-56. 

So Boeing here had a problem.  The CFM LEAP is too big to fit under the 737 wing with the landing gear.  And you can't just slap on a new main landing gear, because that completely fucks up the design of the fuselage and the wing spar.  It could come up with a brand new aircraft, which is what it did with the 787.  There's no way to keep the 737 certification with a complete redesign of the mid-fuselage and wing spar.  And that's going to piss off Southwest.  But more importantly, it's going to create an opening for Airbus.  "Hey, Southwest--since you're going to have to have two different aircraft types anyway, why not buy the A320?".

So Boeing needed to do whatever it could to keep the 737 family going.  To do that. it moved the engine even further forward of the wing to allow part of the engine to actually be above the leading edge of the wing.  Compare the picture of the 737-800 above with the MAX:

Now this is really a cool design.  It wildly shifts the center of gravity forward, which is just fine because of the modern avionics (assuming you get the computer programming right).  I mean, look--there are some things I like a lot more about the A320 family, particularly from the passenger perspective.  But the 737 is still a pretty good design.  And when considering what the engineers have had to do to satisfy the business considerations, it's pretty damned impressive.

But bottom line here--let's not put those business considerations on McDonnell Douglas or the accountants.  It doesn't take an MBA to tell you that you need to do what you can to keep your largest customer tied to you, particularly when that customer is 15% of your order book.

This is entirely about Southwest, the limitations inherent in its model, and its refusal to invest on the front-end to get a better plane on the back end.  This isn't a fuck-up conceived in Chicago or even Seattle; it started on Love Field Drive.

 

Would you also put part of the blame on American?  They were one of the first defectors to Airbus.  I guess when the SWA issue came up, Boeing was already scared of losing bigger market share.  

[Captainant 28629]

20 minutes ago, Ghost of LL said:

 

I honestly can't pin that blame on Boeing.  That is what it's customers demanded.  And by "customers," I really mean "Southwest Airlines."

Southwest is the largest 737 customer, and it's not even particularly close.  Southwest has ordered nearly 900 of the 737-Max; the next largest airline order is United for 666 (not making that up).  Southwest alone accounts for about 15% of the 737's order book.  So here's the thing:  Boeing does what Southwest wants.

And Southwest wants the 737.

There are some significant cost benefits associated with flying one aircraft type.  We can argue whether those benefits outweigh the costs for an airline of Southwest's current size and system complexity; I would argue that its one-type fixation has outlived its usefulness.  But regardless, flying both the 737 and some other aircraft type (whether it be the A320 or a new 7X7) would come with some significant costs.  There's the obvious cost in spare parts and maintenance, but the real cost is in labor.  Union contracts would have to be completely overhauled.  New mechanics would have to be hired (or mechanics qualified on both airframes would have to be paid more).  And it would impair flight-crew flexibility for dispatch purposes.

Oh, and here's the real fun thing--Southwest's flight-dispatch software isn't set up to allow for that.  That's not to say that it couldn't be changed.  It is to say that such a change would add cost.

So Southwest wants the 737.

And so Boeing is very keen to keep the 737 certified.  But that's a real challenge.  Because the original 737 was powered by the Pratt & Whitney JT8D engine.  It's a low-bypass, two-spool design on a four-=stage turbine, all of which leads to a very long, slim engine design. 

So the great thing about this design is that it allows for a very short landing gear.  And that's nice, because it's super simple.  The main landing gear retracts right up into the fuselage without any extension or rotation.

In 1983, Boeing developed the 737-300 series, which was powered by the CFM-56 engine.  This was a much higher-bypass design than the JT8D, leading to a fatter, but shorter engine.

Boeing was able to deal with this by mounting it slightly forward of the wing.  And that allowed Boeing to retain the main landing gear.  But to come up with the next generation--the MAX--Boeing was going to need to plan for a newer, larger engine.  It is powered by the CFM LEAP, which is significantly more fuel-efficient.  The trouble with it is, though, that it is wider than the CFM-56. 

So Boeing here had a problem.  The CFM LEAP is too big to fit under the 737 wing with the landing gear.  And you can't just slap on a new main landing gear, because that completely fucks up the design of the fuselage and the wing spar.  It could come up with a brand new aircraft, which is what it did with the 787.  There's no way to keep the 737 certification with a complete redesign of the mid-fuselage and wing spar.  And that's going to piss off Southwest.  But more importantly, it's going to create an opening for Airbus.  "Hey, Southwest--since you're going to have to have two different aircraft types anyway, why not buy the A320?".

So Boeing needed to do whatever it could to keep the 737 family going.  To do that. it moved the engine even further forward of the wing to allow part of the engine to actually be above the leading edge of the wing.  Compare the picture of the 737-800 above with the MAX:

Now this is really a cool design.  It wildly shifts the center of gravity forward, which is just fine because of the modern avionics (assuming you get the computer programming right).  I mean, look--there are some things I like a lot more about the A320 family, particularly from the passenger perspective.  But the 737 is still a pretty good design.  And when considering what the engineers have had to do to satisfy the business considerations, it's pretty damned impressive.

But bottom line here--let's not put those business considerations on McDonnell Douglas or the accountants.  It doesn't take an MBA to tell you that you need to do what you can to keep your largest customer tied to you, particularly when that customer is 15% of your order book.

This is entirely about Southwest, the limitations inherent in its model, and its refusal to invest on the front-end to get a better plane on the back end.  This isn't a fuck-up conceived in Chicago or even Seattle; it started on Love Field Drive.

 

It's a trickle down of technical debt that culminated in the circus of failure that is the 737MAX. Thank you for laying it all out step by step 

[Ghost of LL 15735]

24 minutes ago, FartingMonk said:

Would you also put part of the blame on American?  They were one of the first defectors to Airbus.  I guess when the SWA issue came up, Boeing was already scared of losing bigger market share.  

No, because AA was never a huge 737 customer.  AA was primarily an MD-80 Family operator.  Only when the MD-80s came to be retired did AA start to buy the 737 in large numbers.  But even then, AA was never exclusive to Boeing in the way Southwest was.  Owing largely to its various mergers, AA has operated the A320 for as long as it has operated the 737.

And that's important for Boeing when it has to go to the banks to get financing for the development of a new aircraft model.  Whether AA is going to buy the new model (rather than switch to Airbus) is pretty speculative.  But Southwest--that's a different story.  Southwest is going to give you the firmest of firm orders pretty damned quickly so long as the new model shares the 737 certification.

But if it's not a 737?  If that new model is a 7X7?  That Southwest business looks a lot more speculative.  Southwest may place orders for a 7X7, but we all know that orders can get canceled.  And that makes the debt Boeing has to take on to develop the 7X7 a lot more expensive.  And that makes the 7X7 less economically viable and a lot less economically attractive than just figuring out how to put the CFM LEAP engine on that low-ass 737 wing.

[FartingMonk 3630]

2 hours ago, Ghost of LL said:

No, because AA was never a huge 737 customer.  AA was primarily an MD-80 Family operator.  Only when the MD-80s came to be retired did AA start to buy the 737 in large numbers.  But even then, AA was never exclusive to Boeing in the way Southwest was.  Owing largely to its various mergers, AA has operated the A320 for as long as it has operated the 737.

And that's important for Boeing when it has to go to the banks to get financing for the development of a new aircraft model.  Whether AA is going to buy the new model (rather than switch to Airbus) is pretty speculative.  But Southwest--that's a different story.  Southwest is going to give you the firmest of firm orders pretty damned quickly so long as the new model shares the 737 certification.

But if it's not a 737?  If that new model is a 7X7?  That Southwest business looks a lot more speculative.  Southwest may place orders for a 7X7, but we all know that orders can get canceled.  And that makes the debt Boeing has to take on to develop the 7X7 a lot more expensive.  And that makes the 7X7 less economically viable and a lot less economically attractive than just figuring out how to put the CFM LEAP engine on that low-ass 737 wing.

Appreciate that insight.  

[Bateshorn 9993]

4 hours ago, Ghost of LL said:

 

I honestly can't pin that blame on Boeing.  That is what its customers demanded.  And by "customers," I really mean "Southwest Airlines."

Southwest is the largest 737 customer, and it's not even particularly close.  Southwest has ordered nearly 900 of the 737-Max; the next largest airline order is United for 666 (not making that up).  Southwest alone accounts for about 15% of the 737's order book.  So here's the thing:  Boeing does what Southwest wants.

And Southwest wants the 737.

There are some significant cost benefits associated with flying one aircraft type.  We can argue whether those benefits outweigh the costs for an airline of Southwest's current size and system complexity; I would argue that its one-type fixation has outlived its usefulness.  But regardless, flying both the 737 and some other aircraft type (whether it be the A320 or a new 7X7) would come with some significant costs.  There's the obvious cost in spare parts and maintenance, but the real cost is in labor.  Union contracts would have to be completely overhauled.  New mechanics would have to be hired (or mechanics qualified on both airframes would have to be paid more).  And it would impair flight-crew flexibility for dispatch purposes.

Oh, and here's the real fun thing--Southwest's flight-dispatch software isn't set up to allow for that.  That's not to say that it couldn't be changed.  It is to say that such a change would add cost.

So Southwest wants the 737.

And so Boeing is very keen to keep the 737 certified.  But that's a real challenge.  Because engine design has evolved a bit over the past 60 years.

The original 737 was powered by the Pratt & Whitney JT8D engine.  It's a low-bypass, two-spool design on a four-stage turbine, all of which leads to a very long, slim engine design. 

So the great thing about this design is that it allows for a very short landing gear.  And that's nice, because it's super simple.  The main landing gear retracts right up into the fuselage without any extension or rotation.

In 1983, Boeing developed the 737-300 series, which was powered by the CFM-56 engine.  This was a much higher-bypass design than the JT8D, leading to a fatter, but shorter engine.

Boeing was able to deal with this by mounting it slightly forward of the wing.  And that allowed Boeing to retain the main landing gear.  But to come up with the next generation--the MAX--Boeing was going to need to plan for a newer, larger engine.  It is powered by the CFM LEAP, which is significantly more fuel-efficient.  The trouble with it is, though, that it is wider than the CFM-56. 

So Boeing here had a problem.  The CFM LEAP is too big to fit under the 737 wing with the landing gear.  And you can't just slap on a new main landing gear, because that completely fucks up the design of the fuselage and the wing spar.  It could come up with a brand new aircraft, which is what it did with the 787.  There's no way to keep the 737 certification with a complete redesign of the mid-fuselage and wing spar.  And that's going to piss off Southwest.  But more importantly, it's going to create an opening for Airbus.  "Hey, Southwest--since you're going to have to have two different aircraft types anyway, why not buy the A320?".

So Boeing needed to do whatever it could to keep the 737 family going.  To do that. it moved the engine even further forward of the wing to allow part of the engine to actually be above the leading edge of the wing.  Compare the picture of the 737-800 above with the MAX:

Now this is really a cool design.  It wildly shifts the center of gravity forward, which is just fine because of the modern avionics (assuming you get the computer programming right).  I mean, look--there are some things I like a lot more about the A320 family, particularly from the passenger perspective.  But the 737 is still a pretty good design.  And when considering what the engineers have had to do to satisfy the business considerations, it's pretty damned impressive.

But bottom line here--let's not put those business considerations on McDonnell Douglas or the accountants.  It doesn't take an MBA to tell you that you need to do what you can to keep your largest customer tied to you, particularly when that customer is 15% of your order book.

This is entirely about Southwest, the limitations inherent in its model, and its refusal to invest on the front-end to get a better plane on the back end.  This isn't a fuck-up conceived in Chicago or even Seattle; it started on Love Field Drive.

 

 

3 hours ago, Ghost of LL said:

No, because AA was never a huge 737 customer.  AA was primarily an MD-80 Family operator.  Only when the MD-80s came to be retired did AA start to buy the 737 in large numbers.  But even then, AA was never exclusive to Boeing in the way Southwest was.  Owing largely to its various mergers, AA has operated the A320 for as long as it has operated the 737.

And that's important for Boeing when it has to go to the banks to get financing for the development of a new aircraft model.  Whether AA is going to buy the new model (rather than switch to Airbus) is pretty speculative.  But Southwest--that's a different story.  Southwest is going to give you the firmest of firm orders pretty damned quickly so long as the new model shares the 737 certification.

But if it's not a 737?  If that new model is a 7X7?  That Southwest business looks a lot more speculative.  Southwest may place orders for a 7X7, but we all know that orders can get canceled.  And that makes the debt Boeing has to take on to develop the 7X7 a lot more expensive.  And that makes the 7X7 less economically viable and a lot less economically attractive than just figuring out how to put the CFM LEAP engine on that low-ass 737 wing.

These are excellent posts.  Very Unsurly-like in both their information, clarity, and general lack of muledick. 

[Ghost of LL 15735]

14 minutes ago, Bateshorn said:

 

These are excellent posts.  Very Unsurly-like in both their information, clarity, and general lack of muledick. 

I promise to do better--i.e., more muledick--in the future.

[ClubWhatever 12341]

Eh, Boeing had the cash to do a 737 Max (right) for low budget folks and a clean sheet airplane for Airbus defectors.   But they gave it all away to shareholders.  Absolving Boeing management of blame is dumb.

[CycleTex87 3047]

Appreciate these posts @Ghost of LL.  I remember talking to an aerospace engineering buddy of mine when we were in school in the 80's:  It's more thermally efficient to accelerate a lot of air a little bit than to accelerate a little bit of air a whole lot.  So high bypass engines were/are the wave of the future.  I remember seeing the 777 for the first time and marveling at the large diameter of the engines relative to the diameter of the fuselage.  Now it's commonplace to see those on all airliners.  Those CFM engines on the 737Max are crazy looking.

[Captainant 28629]

Wendover Productions put out an excellent 20 minute minidoc covering how Boeing got to where they are

 

 

[Deej 77950]